Townshend, J.  (2004)  'Laclau and Mouffe's Hegemonic Project: The Story So Far', in Political Studies, 52: 269 - 88.

Laclau had a number of  'friendly dialogues' with Rorty, Derrida and Zizek, for example [detailed 275 - 9]. For example Zizek thought there was still mileage in the old Marxist-Hegelian concepts to understand modern capitalism, and pointed to the problem of moving from philosophical analyses of discourses to actual political choices of systems, just as did Geras. In particular, the capitalist system as described by Marx should be seen not as some foundational essence but more as a  'positive condition' for concrete forms of political struggle  (276): class struggle creates the spaces in which other political activity takes place. Hegel's dialectic could also be used to understand a relation between the universal and the particular (an 'inconsistent composite', for Laclau, 276).  [This debate reminds me of the  'aversion against the universal' identified in Lyotard's work by Honneth -- a willful refusal to entertain the possibility that all the apparently diverse and multifarious celebrations of difference in current politics do really have much more in common than appears on the surface]. Townshend suggests that Laclau's argument for the complexity of social class relations  [in which he uses rather curious empirical data, seemingly forgetting that this is also produced by a discourse, according to him] should not be taken as a reason for abandoning social class relations altogether

Townshend argues that Laclau's response repeats the same  'preference for contingency' (278), and asks a classic sociological question -- how could or should democracy limit contingency? Another sociological inquiry follows -- how is it that particular contingent patterns and symbolic discourses get  'sedimented' into actual social structures? Laclau prefers  'to dissolve structures into discourses' (279) [philosophy = idealism], which leaves out the role of institutions in promoting or limiting discourses. This leads him into 'some form of utopianism' in the case of his own radicalism.

Mouffe wanted to engage with more conventional contemporary political philosophy, centred on the notion of  'radical democracy'. She wanted to avoid ethical and moral philosophies in an attempt to understand the political in its own right. Curiously,  'She derived her notion of  "the political"  from the Conservative/Nazi Carl Schmitt' (279), who had apparently some underlying anthropology based on  'passion - driven human conflict' (279). These conflicts had to be transformed into peaceful politics, based around the  '"paradox of democracy"  -- the impossible promise to eliminate conflicts, especially between the "logics" of equality and liberty' (279). The democratic appeal of these logics led to a constant challenge of all forms of subordination -- as witnessed by the new social movements.

[This position is then compared with an number of others, such as Rawls, MacIntyre and Habermas, 280-2]. Rawls begins with some liberal utopia rather than with actual politics, with dissent confined to some mythical private sphere [where binding values are being established]. Habermas's hope of rational consensus makes the same error, and ignores the structured basis of social conflict  [based on this underlying Nazi anthropology?]. Similar problems apply to MacIntyre's notion of some consensual common good  [echoes in these critiques of Lyotard's suggestion that any hope of making social arrangements rational and transparent will lead only to terrorism]. Instead, different interpretations and points of view must be defended, but relativism and nihilism must also be avoided: [this leads to a  'relationist' position, it seems, whereby] we judge notions like justice and equality against 'the standards provided by a particular tradition' (280). Mouffe also flirts with Wittgenstein and his notion of language communities as ways of life [ again, all contemporary idealist philosophers. seem to do this]

Townshend thinks that these arguments were only partially successful. For example why  should we, and how can we replace the moral with the political? Why support this underlying anthropology of passions? Rawls and Habermas can both be used to critique existing arrangements  [Habermas recommends we do this,  rather than see the ideal speech act as a template to be put into immediate practice]. Can relativism be avoided? As usual,  'the question is whether she offers efficient theoretical resources to support her plea for an  "agonistic pluralism"' (281). Mouffe also is forced to recommend liberal democracy on the basis that it exists now, instead of even a weak foundationalism. She cannot provide a foundation of another kind,  'for example, a recognition of a  "common humanity"' (282). She is left expressing a mere preference for liberal democracy. Her insistence on pluralism also means she cannot simply support political movements that claim to be true, as do the new social movements, despite their potential to develop radical democracy.