Dr Will
Large

So far we have only talked
about

the metaphysics of Aristotle and Plato,

and although they were close contemporaries (in fact, as we know,
Aristotle

was a student of Plato) they had radically different philosophies. 

For Plato to know reality was to know that which transcended individual

particular things.  Thus, to know what a beautiful painting was one

would have to know the general form of beauty itself that could not be

found in any individual thing, but existed only as a form.  For
Aristotle,

on the contrary, what was primary was the individual thing, what he
called

a primary substance, and our knowledge of universal came from our
recognition

of what was common between individual things.  This commonality,
however,

unlike the forms of Plato, did not have an independent reality. 
Rather,

the only thing that was real were the individual substances
themselves. 

Thus, when we say that Socrates is a man it is only Socrates himself
that

exists and not man in general.

It should not surprise us,
therefore,

that they also had different conception of ethics.  We can see this

difference by comparing their different conceptions of the idea of the

Good.  We might typify Plato’s view that there is a Good in itself

that is independent of own interests.  We can distinguish between

two kinds of actions.  Those action that we do because they serve

some purpose for ourselves (eating healthily so that we do not becomes

ill) and those action that we do, because it has intrinsic value.

What differentiates Plato’s
position

on ethics from, for example the relativism of the Sophists
is the believe that this intrinsic Good is not just a Good for us, but
is an ideal that transcends human nature.  This is why for Plato
the
idea of Justice, which is a form like any other abstract idea, is the
source
of a critique of ethos and politics of the Athenian city.  The
first
important break with the common sense attitude about ethics in Plato is
the idea that morality is not neither due to the natural world nor to
divine
intervention.  Justice does not come about by chance or necessity,
but from the very willingness to break radically from nature, and from
a culture that believe that the source of justice to be found in nature
(one of the forms of natural morality that Plato criticises is the idea
that Thrasymachus puts forward in the Republic that ‘might is
right’).  

If it is up to us to create
a just

world, rather than expect nature to do so or wait for divine
intervention,

then the first thing that we must do is look at the models that we
already

have in our culture and society and seen if they measure up to the ideal

conception of justice, that is to say, the idea of an intrinsic
Good. 

For Plato the just city rest upon just souls, and a just soul is one in

which the rational part order the irrational part.  In most of the

laws which men live by it usually the irrational part that has the
ruling

hand.  It is for this reason that Plato also believes that it only

the truly rational being that can be just.  For he or she chooses

the good because it is right in itself, rather than for their own
benefit. 

They can choose the good because they are ruled by the idea of
justice. 

If I know what justice is then no-one will be able to persuade me that

justice is anything else.  Plato is convinced that the idea of
justice,

no matter how people’s opinions might change, does not change in
itself. 

I would thus be ruled by reason rather than desire or emotion to what is

right.

It is the intrinsic notion
of the

Good in Plato, plus the idea of a purely rational will, that Aristotle

finds indefensible in Plato’s ethics.  Like Plato, he believes that

ethics belongs to the human will, and not to nature or divine
intervention,

but unlike Plato, he believes that our ethics should not deny the fact

of our humanity.  That we are, for example, vulnerable and
suffering

creatures, in which the tragedy of our lives far outstrips ethical
principles

and laws.  We can therefore see a similar difference in their
ethical

theories as in their metaphysical.  Just as Plato is a rationalist

in terms of the world of knowledge, so too is he in the world of
ethics. 

In fact, the world of ethics and knowledge are inseparable for
him. 

We need the same certainty in our ethical lives as we find in
mathematics. 

In the same way, we might say that just as much as Aristotle is a
pragmatist

in the area knowledge so too is he in ethics.  The great difference

between them, however, and one that breaks this simple doubling up of
their

comparative ethical and metaphysical theories, is that for Aristotle we

cannot in any way think about our ethical lives in the same way that we

think about our sciences.  It is not therefore a matter for
Aristotle

of applying metaphysical concepts, even his metaphysical concepts, to
ethics

in the manner in which for Plato the idea of justice is inseparable from

his own metaphysics.  We must not forget that the subtitle of the
Republic, which many believe to be the place in which we can find,

always being careful also to remember that there is a controversy about

whether Plato has a theory at all, Plato’s theory of forms, has as well

the subtitle ‘On Justice.’  As Aristotle writes at the
beginning

of his most important work on ethics, the Nicomachean Ethics, we

should not expect the same level of certainty that we find in
mathematics

or the other sciences, in our deliberation about the good.  

Aristotle wants to show
that ethics

has a specific meaning and a specific rationality that cannot be thought

in terms of other kinds of knowledge.  In does so by returning to

the everyday experience of ethical life, which to some extent Plato’s
philosophy

is a refusal of.  Aristotle uses a particular Greek expression to

describe our ethical rationality as opposed to our scientific
rationality

and that is phronesis.  This Greek expression is usually
translated

as ‘practical wisdom’, but because it has such a specific meaning in
Aristotle’s

lexicon it is better to leave it untranslated.  It is about this
word

that I mostly want to speak about today, because I think it gives us the

deepest insight into Aristotle’s ethics and we can see why it differs
from

Plato’s so much.

Before we can enter any
discussion

of phronesis, we must first of all grasp Aristotle’s conception

of activity itself.  The only actions, Aristotle says, that can
have

an ethical meaning are that that are voluntary -  ekousios. 

Involuntary acts, on the contrary, are those whose origin are external

to the agent of that action.  They are acts that are performed
because

of external compulsion, either because of the power of another, or
because

of external circumstances that are beyond the agents control. 
Voluntary

acts, therefore, are those acts whose origin in within the agent himself

or herself.  In other words, they have been chosen 

The reality of human
action, however,

is that no action is either purely involuntary or voluntary. 
Aristotle

uses the example of the captain of a ship in a storm who has to throw
his

cargo overboard in order to save the lives of his men.  In this
action

voluntary or involuntary?  The captain is not to blame for the
storm

that in a sense forces him to act.  Nonetheless, even in these
circumstances,

it is up to him to make a decision.  This means that the origin of

the act, throwing the cargo overboard, is also within him.  We can

see then that for most, except in the most extreme circumstances, the
origin

of the act is both internal, in the agent, and external, in outside
forces,

whether this forces are one’s of nature or other persons (might we, in

our modern age, also speak of inner compulsions that are not under the

control of the agent?).

For Aristotle the question
is not

so much whether I am wholly free or wholly determined, but the practical

question of how much I am in control of what I do, and thus how much I

am to blame for the consequence of my actions.  Aristotle's
response

to this practical question is that I am far less in control of these
consequences,

and also the origin of my actions as I might like to think.  This

again is one of the major differences between Plato’s and Aristotle’s
vision

of our ethical lives.  The Platonic ideal is autarkia, that

is to say, self-control and self-sufficiency, which would only be
possible

if my life were under the sway of the idea of the Good that would be
universal

and therefore unchanged by any external circumstance.  

Aristotle, on the other
hand, stresses

that my ethical deliberations and choices are always determined by the

particular situation that I am in, where the right course of action can

never be determined in advance.  Thus, the ship’s captain can never

be certain that, the next time that he is in a storm, the right course

of action would again be to throw the cargo overboard.  If human
action

were governed by rules, then we would never have to deliberation about

our actions, for it would always be clear and transparent what the
correct

action would mean.  We would simply have to learn these rules in
advance

to be sure that we would not make the incorrect and unethical
decision.  

For Aristotle the tragedy
of human

life, an essential tragedy that can never be avoided, is that I can
never

know before hand, or even in moment of my decision, what the outcome of

my actions might be.  I might have the best intentions, but still

have my action lead to dreadful consequences.  Ethics is always a

perhaps and maybe, and never a yes or a no.  Aristotle’s ethics is

therefore a finite ethics that stresses the limits of human practical
knowledge,

whereas for Plato ethics is governed by the same rule as the
universality

of the sciences.  What is involuntary therefore is not something
that

can avoided.  It is rather that which necessarily accompanies every

one of my actions.  It is that which is unforeseeable in every
act. 

What Aristotle calls chance or fortune – tuche.

If circumstance and the
unforseeable

are the context of human choice, how does Aristotle understand
choice? 

He does not understand it in terms of the conflict of the will.  I

wake up in the morning and I cannot decide whether I should get up or
stay

in bed.  It is as if there were almost two voices arguing in my
head. 

What Aristotle means by choice, proairesis, is not to be
confused

with these voices.  For Aristotle to make a choice is to act. 

It is not first to think and then act.  Choice is not prior to
action,

rather it is the very action itself that is performed, and it is the
outcome

of something else that he calls deliberation. 

Deliberation is not to be
thought

as something merely subjective, rather it is the laying bare of certain

possibilities that are perceived in a particular situation.  It is

what the situation lets be seen in relation to practical activity. 

This is why Aristotle distinguishes it from wishing, for one can wish
the

impossible, but one cannot deliberate it.  The captain of the ship

can wish for Poseidon to stop the storm, but he himself must deliberate

about the practical action to achieve what he thinks might be the best

outcome in these terrible circumstances.  This deliberation
concerns

not only the mind of the agent, but also, if one might speak this way,

the contour of the situation itself.  Choice and deliberation are

not outside activity for Aristotle, rather they are internal to
it. 

Choice means performing a certain act, and deliberation is linked to the

possibilities that the situation offers to me, rather than what I might

think would be the best.  Again this is the recognition of the
limits

of human action.  Sometimes the situation is so difficult that I
might

need to perform an act that in other circumstances I would never think

of doing because it is the situation itself that demands it.

It is for this reason,
Aristotle

argues, that we need to distinguish between practical and scientific

reason.  Scientific reason is suitable only to what is

governed by laws that are universal.  2+2 will always equal
four. 

Objects will always fall to the ground because of the force of gravity

(though of course Aristotle himself did not know of the force of
gravity),

but no situation is ever absolutely identical with another situation,
and

therefore practical knowledge needs to be subtle and
flexible. 

Again this is the great difference between Plato and Aristotle. 
Plato

only saw one kind of knowledge, universal science, which was applicable

in the same way both to the mathematical objects, as it was to human
conduct.

Aristotle, on the contrary, would say that to concern oneself with
generalities

would be to think one could have moral laws in the same way that one
could

have mathematical and scientific laws, would be to do violence to the
demands

of a particular situation, and such inflexibility could lead to even
worse

consequences.  

But then if a universal
approach

is not possible how can I know what the right course of action might
be? 

To be able to make the right decision, Aristotle argues, requires phronesis. 

He compare it to a perception, though here we are talking about an
ethical

perception, rather than a sensible one.  Like sensible perception,

ethical perception is concerned with particulars rather than universals.

Phronesis is a kind of ‘seeing’.  Thus perhaps the
best translation

of this word is not the usual 'practical wisdom', but 'insight'. 

I am in a situation and I see the right thing to do, and it is this
‘right

seeing’ that guides my deliberation and choice.  Without it I am
blind. 

To see right is to see what the situation offers to me as the right
course. 

This is why we can compare phronesis to perception.  

And yet how can I gain this
phronesis? 

To gain scientific and mathematical knowledge is relatively simple in
comparison. 

I simply have to learn it, and this is why education is so important for

Plato.  But I cannot the correct deliberation and choices for a
particular

situation in advance, because as we have already said, no situation is

identical to another situation.  It is for this reason that
Aristotle

says that phronesis can only be gained through experience. 

This is why the young cannot have phronesis even though they
might

have mathematical or scientific knowledge.  It is through activity

itself that you gain ethical insight.

This seems to place us in
an unavoidable

paradox.  I can only choose and deliberate wisely if I have phronesis,

and yet can obtain phronesis if I have already chosen and
deliberated. 

This, however, would only be a paradox if I look at human action
abstractly,

rather than in its proper context, which is always within a given
community. 

This is the final difference between Plato and Aristotle.  For
Plato

ethical values that are governed by the idea of the Good are immutable

and eternal, whereas for Aristotle are values arise from our concrete
community. 

I do not act in a vacuum, rather my actions are already guided by the
values

of my society and past models of ethical action.  We must, however,

stress again that these values and models can never be a 
substitute

for our choices and deliberations, but can only act as a guide.  It

is the situation itself that must be our true master.  These
guidelines

that are given to us by our society in its moral values are therefore
not

to be thought of in the same way as universal laws.  I would not be

ethical for Aristotle if I simply chose what my fellow citizens did, no

matter how venerable and cherished this tradition might.  The true

source of my ethical activity is always myself no matter how much I
buffeted

by the storms of chance and misfortune.

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