Notes on: Bernstein, B.  (2000) Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity.  Theory, research, critique.  Revised edition.  Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

Dave Harris

[ Find a way through this complex and dense material for yourselves. The real thing is even larger and denser. The first 5 chapters spell out key aspects of the work, sometimes in a repetitive way. Chapter 6 overviews the whole project, and I found this the most informative. It certainly shows the value of reading Bernstein for himself, since the summaries are indeed, as he says, rather selective]

Chapter one Pedagogic Codes and Their Modalities of Practice (3-24)

This model is intended to be universal and to include pedagogic practices outside schools, including say relations between architects and planners.  This produces a general model that focuses on 'underlying rules shaping the social construction of pedagogic discourse and its various practices', rather than say aspects of contemporary educational systems.  This is to stand between more general series [presumably reproductive ones] to explain the relationship between knowledge and consciousness.  Reproduction theories are too limited and cannot provide sufficient description of pedagogic agencies and the discourse and practices, because they focus on education as a carrier of external power, while the actual structure which carries the power is less relevant.  However the logic and the structure of pedagogic discourse needs to be examined. There is no need to see education as a pathology or for social class to become dominant in this examination.  We're after 'the inner logic of pedagogic discourse',the rules of construction, circulation, contextualization and change, specifically:

How does the dominant distribution of power and control generate and legitimize 'dominating and dominated principles of communication'?  How does this distribution of principles 'regulate relations within and between social groups'?  How do these principles distribute 'forms of pedagogic consciousness'?  (4).

Power can be distinguished from control although they are 'embedded in each other' (5) empirically.  Power relations produce boundaries between different categories which might be groups discourse or agents.  Power produces 'dislocations … punctuations in social space', the relations between categories, the legitimate order between them.  Control however 'establishes legitimate forms of communication appropriate to the different categories', within the categories, or socializing individuals and offering a potential for both reproduction and change.  Pedagogic discourse features different categories, pedagogic practices different forms of control, and together they offer 'forms of pedagogic communications'.  However, a special terminology is required to show how macro relations and micro interactions are related, and this terminology should also operate with general principles, generate specific descriptions, and produce a range of modalities of discourse and practice, including some which do not currently exist.

Classification is the concept used to describe the relationship between categories, but it does not refer to some underlying defining attribute [I think it must in practice], but rather refers to relations between categories.  These relations need not be discursive ones, but describe, for example 'the division of labour'(6) [hints at some organic unity or solidarity?].  School subjects have their own boundaries and identity, but this is not justified by some external discourse.  Categories only exist in relation to others and they can define themselves against others [politically?].  However, we can see these as 'other categories in the set' [so what defines the set?].  We can see the exercise of power in the gap between categories [so more confusion here because it's categories of discourse which apparently maintain 'the principles of their social division of labour'].  Barriers can be broken down and categories can lose their identities, so the 'insulation' has to be maintained, or at least its principle does.  What preserves insulation is power and power relations [we seem to have come full circle here].

There are strong and weak classifications different degrees of insulation between categories.  With strong classification 'each category has its unique identity, its unique voice, its own specialized roles of internal relations'(7) [so it is some kind of ideal or formal possibility?], but classifications 'always carry power relations'[power is something external again].  These power relations are arbitrary, but are 'hidden by the principle of the classification' which comes to take on a reality of its own connected to the integrity and coherence of the individual.  All the contradictions and dilemmas have to be suppressed, and this also functions as 'a system of psychic defences', although these are 'rarely wholly effective'.

As examples of classifications, we can compare the medieval university with the modern one, as examples of stronger and weakening classifications.  [Description of the medieval university follows, with strong internal divisions between mental and manual practice, further reflected in the relationship between the rhetorical and logical trivium and a more applied quadrivium.  These feature different languages, roughly linguistic and mathematical.  God integrates the two, permitting an excepted order of precedence or 'regulated discourse' to be constructed in the trivium and then later applied.  We can also see this as constructing inner consciousness before going on to consider the structure of the outer.  This reflected a division inside Christianity itself - so it reflects this division in pedagogy?  It also forms the characteristic European notion of consciousness as a relation between inner and outer - the pedagogy does or Christianity does?  The church provides the underlying power to maintain strong classifications.  In the modern university, European knowledge is restructured, however and singular discourses are grouped together in regions.  Apparently, modern subjects can be seen as singular discourses because they have unique names [!] and have 'very few external references other than in terms of themselves'.  However, they became regionalised following recontextualization, and this regionalization was based on 'a recontextualizing principle', although we don't seem to be told what it is --doubtless a reworking of one of the descriptions above.  However, these movements to different forms of classification provide 'spaces for ideology to play'(9), which is not defined either.  New forms of competition for resources and indifference broke out within and between regions.  Overall, what an entirely unhelpful example!]

Looking at institutions, we can see strong and weak classifications in schools or universities.  For example, school departments 'represent discourses', and they can be strongly classified.  It is common [later I think this becomes 'essential'] to accompany this with strong classification between the institution and the outside as well.  Strong classifications therefore produce a hierarchy of knowledge between common sense and school knowledge [must do, in the interests of formal coherence?] .  Staff are also closely identified with departments and this is a symbolic allegiance, 'the sacred reason' (10), although 'the main reason' is that promotion follows from departmental activity.  The reproduction of pedagogic discourse itself is not collective, since the staff are weakly related and specialized.  'Thus, the contents are not open to public discussion and challenge' [by teachers, that is]. The diagram (on page 10) also resembles a temple, a symbolic representation 'of the origin of the discourse' in Greek philosophy and the church [all this is based on the way he has drawn the diagram of course].  Discourses are collected in, er, a collection code.

In weakly classified schools, boundaries are permeable, but this also makes the institution vulnerable to 'communications from the outside'.  Staff must be members of a strong social network to integrate the differences, and their relations 'cohere around knowledge itself' [the whole thing is riddled with idealism].  This also provides an alternative power base against the hierarchy.

Strong classifications of discourse also produced temporal dislocations, 'although it is not logically necessary' (11), since strongly classified knowledge empirically produces a progression from local knowledge through the usual steps of simple operations to general principles.  If children drop out 'they are likely to be positioned in a factual world tied to simple operations, when knowledge is impermeable.  The successful have access to the general principle'.  [We only ever learn general principles through acquiring school knowledge -- now enter Rancière]. Some particularly successful people go on to create the discourse itself and realise its fundamental incoherence.

The whole discussion shows two rules.  First, where there are strong classifications, things must be kept apart [a definitional rule again, a rule stemming from his model], and vice versa.  We should go on to ask about whose interest is behind these options [although I don't think he ever does -he leaves us to imply that some dreadful hierarchy is at work]

Classifications construct social spaces, as translations of power relations, with the affects of creating social divisions of labour, identities and voices.  The arbitrary nature of power relations are disguised by the classifications and various psychic systems of defence when they appear necessary.  Pedagogic practice itself and how it forms consciousness requires a notion of control to regulate and legitimise communication.  Framing affects such control, in any pedagogic relationship. Framing helps people acquire 'the legitimate message' (12) and also establishes voice, although the two 'can vary independently', since different modalities can establish the same voice, while more than one message can carry the voice [so what else affects voice?].  Framing helps the discourse to be realised, meanings are to be put together and in what forms, people related in a given context.  Control was exercised over the selection of the communication, its sequencing and pacing, the criteria and 'the control over the social base' (13).  Framing can be strong and weak, although the loss of control to the acquirer in weak framing can be only 'apparent'.  Difference strengths of framing can affect the different aspects of control above.

There are two systems of rules, those of social order and those of discursive order [rules here are not specific ones as in the above example, but abstract necessities, functional prerequisites]. The first one relates to expectations of acquirers and can be a source of labeling - 'which labels are selected is a function of the framing'[?] [A strange bit here, apparently strong framing seems to be associated with positive labels, but weak framing means more problems for the acquirer].  With discursive order, we are talking about selection, sequence, placing and criteria.  Framing can be represented in a little equation, page 13, where instructional discourse appear as above the line and regulated discourse below it, this apparently shows that 'instructional discourse is always embedded in the regulative discourse, and the regulative discourse is the dominant discourse [empirically or logically?]

Elements of the discourse can be framed with varying strengths, and so can regulative and instructional discourses.  They do not 'always move in a complementary relation to each other.  But where there is a weak framing over the instructional discourse, there must be weak framing over the regulative discourse'.  In general, if framing is strong,  we have a visible pedagogic practice with explicit rules, and where it is weak we have an invisible pedagogic practice [the invisible practice is a bit like the hidden curriculum and pedagogy, where it all goes on implicitly, and the example cited elsewhere is the progressive primary school where the whole set of social relations teaches something].  Now to 'write pedagogic codes'(14) [a pompous way of saying supply more detail].

Classification and framing can be strong or weak and combined producing a range of modalities [well, four, surely?].  Now we find that classification relates both externally and internally, to external relations and also to internal classifications like those 'of dress, of posture, of position', and spaces and objects can also be strongly specialised or classified.  The same goes for framing.  The external value relates to communications outside that pedagogic practice which affect it [the example is whether or not you pay the doctor, which will affect the sorts of legitimate communication you can have with them.  Your identity externally can be strong or weak].  Here, 'social class may play a crucial role', and external dimensions of school framing can 'make it difficult for children of marginalised classes to recognise themselves in the school'.  So we have more complications on the four basic possibilities, since classification and framing are not only strong or weak, but internal or external [I still think this only gives 16 possibles].  There is one of Bernstein's nice little equations to show the elaborated orientation on page 15 - it has strong classification and framing [I think.  Actually the diagram seems to show all the possibilities again, but in that case the elaborated orientation would be no different from the restricted one in the abstract, but only when we actually entered values].

Classification and framing produce rules of the pedagogic code, 'that is, of its practice, but not of the discourse'.  The changing values of classifications and framing produce different organisational practices, discursive practices, transmission practices, psychic defences, concepts of the teacher, concepts of the pupils, concepts of knowledge itself and expected pedagogic consciousness.  There is always pressure to weaken framing, because pedagogic practices are always an arena for struggle over symbolic control.  Framing is the most likely source of change in the classification.  The connection between classification and power never completely removes 'contradictions, cleavages and dilemmas', at social and individual levels.  One problem with the notion of cultural reproduction is that these possibilities ['rules' again] are usually never specified. [well --not formally identified in these terms nor seen as 'rules' ? But internal and external change factors are clearly listed in say Homo Academicus]

We can suggest some possibilities.  If there are changes from strong to weak, either with framing or classification, we can always ask 'which group was responsible for initiating the change?', dominated or dominating.  If values are weakening, which one still remains strong?  [And how do we answer these questions?]

Pedagogic practice therefore has its own internal logic [based on the abstract possible combinations] , and classification and framing produces different modalities, especially of 'official elaborated codes'(16) [so are there unofficial ones?].  These can shape the consciousness of the acquirer, but we need to explore this and go beyond transmission.  Such consciousness of acquirer and transmitter can show 'biasing', although we are not going to refer to ideology, because the system constructs ideology.  It is 'a way of making relations.  It is not a content but a way in which relationships are made and realized'[weird and confusing -- could be that ideology is or is embedded in practices as in Althusser?]

A nice new diagram appears on page 16 to put together all the concepts developed and show their [formal] dynamics.  These will demonstrate 'the model of acquisition within any pedagogic context'.  First there is a connection between classification and 'recognition rules...  at the level of the acquirer' (17).  As classification strength changes, so individuals are able to 'recognise the speciality of the context that they are in'[strong classifications mean you're in a special educational situation].  Classification shows that one context differs from another, and some contexts are distinct and require a particular orientation for communication.  In university seminars, the members 'share a common recognition rule' whatever their disciplinary background, and this helps them read the context and contribute appropriately.  It's not always easy for him to infer a discursive context for the particular questions, however, and in this case the weakly classified context can create ambiguity [so is this saying that students do recognise what's going on better than lecturers do?  Or that seminars can be both recognized and not very well recognized?  Or that recognition affects behaviour, but lack of recognition affects content?].

Apparently, strong classification produces strong recognition rules and power relations and this helps to produce legitimate communication.  Some children from the marginal classes might not realise this and remain silent in school.  This shows the key effects of power in distributing recognition rules.  However, even if we recognise that the context is specific, we still might find it difficult to produce legitimate communication, and again children of the marginal classes find themselves in this position: 'they may not possess the realization rule'.  As a result, 'they will not have acquired the legitimate pedagogic code, but they will have acquired their place in the classificatory system'.  This is the main experience of school for them.

Recognition rules enable appropriate realizations, but realization rules are required to actually put meanings together and make them public, producing legitimate text.  This can be affected by the different values of framing.  We therefore have an explanation of classification as a result of power, and framing values as the result of control [rather as translations of them, selecting and distributing recognition and realization rules].  However, pedagogic practice 'is essentially' interactive, defined by classification and framing procedures.  The acquirer is expected to construct legitimate text, which may cover only 'how one sits or how one moves', since 'the text is anything which attracts evaluation' (18).  Evaluation itself is a condensed version of the pedagogic code, its classification and framing procedures, and the relationships of power and control that have produce them.  However, texts can change interactional practices, that is change classification and framing values [no examples?].[So texts must have or be a power of their own?]

Some research can illustrate the relevance of all this, including some done by Holland [already discussed here].  Here the interest is in how context and tasks produce different readings, including tacit ones.  Here the exercise turned on classifying food items as a kind of general issue.  Pictures were sorted differently by samples of working class and middle class children.  Formally, the task can be described as weakly classified and framed, since children were told to choose any picture and classify them in any way they liked.  They gave two types of reason, one referring to the life context [something they had for breakfast for example], and one relying on more abstract classifications [they are vegetables].  This is not just a difference between abstract and concrete thinking because we would then 'lose sight of the social basis of that difference' (19) [what a classic way to put it - we can't accept one term because we want to see social class differences].  We can trace these classifications in terms of direct relations or indirect relations 'to a specific material base', the local context and local experience.  Initially middle class children offered indirect reasons, but when all the children were asked to sort the cards again, they were able to switch back to a direct relation to local experience, although working class kids were not.  So it looks like middle class kids have two principles of classification, 'which stood in a hierarchical relation to each other'- why did middle class kids choose the indirect form first?

Apparently it depends on how you read the coding instructions.  Middle class kids realized that in that particular context, classifications were still expected to be strong between school knowledge and common sense knowledge.  They had a better understanding of the recognition rule that said there was a strong classification between home and school, 'itself based on the dominance of the official pedagogic practice' (20).  This gave middle class kids more relative power and privilege.

In another example, secondary schools responded differently to the 1988 Educational Reform Act and the introduction of cross curricular themes.  These have arisen as a result of criticism of the narrow subject based curriculum.  Students talked about these themes differently, however, some in terms of subject conventions and others in terms of topic orientations and concrete examples.  Again there were social class differences [but were they significant?  The totals actually look quite close].  Bernstein says it's not clear how this happened, but he says there is a school effect, and one school in particular taught themes in subject-based ways.  There can also be an interaction with social class.  In any event, strong classification and framing defeats the ostensible purpose of cross curricular themes.  Weakening a classification between school knowledge and every day knowledge 'could lead to a perception on the part of the student that themes were not really official pedagogic discourse, as the researchers found' (21).  [Actually the extract isn't terribly clear in my view, but Bernstein says it shows that some students are aware of subject based recognition and realization rules - Rancière would have a field day with this!].

These examples show the 'empirical relevance' of the models, which show how power and control 'translate into pedagogic codes and their modalities'.  (22).  Bernstein also thinks he has 'shown how these codes are acquired and so shape consciousness'[ridiculously ambitious].  He has linked macro structures of power and micro processes of the formation of pedagogic consciousness.  The models reveal order and change, but above all they  'make possible specific descriptions of the pedagogising process and their outcomes'[well he has generated number of possibilities by combining structure and options].  Now we need to look at the construction of pedagogic discourse.


The model has been criticised because it doesn't adequately describe organisational or administrative dimensions.  The organisation can be seen as the container for something that is transmitted, and thus offers 'the primary condition without which no transmission can be stable and reproduced' (23).  There is a necessary level of administration of staff and resources and the management of external responsibilities.  The relation between these and the transmitting agents affect the shape of the container.  Changes in classification and framing can affect the government of educational institutions and therefore affect the shape of the container, and pedagogic codes can be relatively stable or unstable, producing different levels of conflict and consensus.  This in turn will require different levels of management.

However the management of resources itself, the 'economy of the container', is not always related to the code modality, and can deal with different code modalities.  There are other effects independent of code modality, extrinsic to them.  These can be seen as 'external biases imposed by some power (e.g. State)'(24).  This complicates the picture and the metaphor of the container and the contained, since 'bias operates at a different level as it mediates between some external power and the internal regulation of the agency'.  We therefore need to identify the parameters involved - 'bias, shape, stability, economy' and develop a new concept to include them.  To some extent, we can use the old notions of distributive rules to cover resources as well as discourses.  We can extend the notion of regulative discourse to include management functions and even external biases.  However, we need a concept that shows how it can regulate pedagogic code while also being dependent on it [!], to show how the fundamental 'mode of being of the agency' is regulated.  The notion of 'pedagogic culture' will do this, reflecting the way in which agencies cope with bias, shape, stability and economy.  [So nothing falsifies or tests the model - we just generate endless ad hoc hypotheses to incorporate criticism]

Chapter 2.  The Pedagogic Device

We want the general principles that govern the transformation of knowledge into pedagogic communication, whatever the knowledge might be [in other words very general abstract principles again, and not actual effective rules in empirical circumstances].  This could be unnecessary because we have some empirical understandings, but these are often see pedagogic communication as a mere carrier for external power relations or ideology, or for skills and legitimate identities.  If we are to study what is actually carried or relayed we have to examine 'social grammar, without which no message is possible' (25). 

The language device has several formulations, but basically it examines how roles are acquired and how interaction is regulated.  For Chomsky, this device is independent of culture, existing 'at the level of the social but not at the level of the cultural' (26).  It has just evolved and 'we could not leave a device as critical as this to the vagueness and vicissitudes of culture'.  [The diagrams are very limited, with meaning potential at one end and communication at the other, with black boxes called language device and pedagogic device respectively in the middle.  There is also a feedback loop which acts 'either in a restricted or in an enhancing fashion'.  Since rules vary with the context, there are contextual rules to understand local communications [!].  They are relatively stable over time but contextually regulated. 

One question which arises is whether this affects the apparent neutrality of the language device, [whether there are some emergent effects].  Halliday has argued that these roles are not 'ideologically free, but that the rules reflect emphases on the meaning potential created by dominant groups' (27).  Perhaps it is these dominant interests that produce the relative stability of the rules.  [As well] language and speech are dialectically interrelated.  This is a complex argument and there are contradictory views about it.

At one level the language device clearly has some built in classifications, especially gender classifications, and gender equality suffers from having to work with these in built classifications [the example is the term 'mastery'] [gender is never mentioned again from what I can see].  So both the carrier and the carried have contextual rules and neither 'is ideologically free'.

Turning to the pedagogic device, we can also identify the internal rules that regulate pedagogic communication which 'acts selectively on the meaning potential', the latter referring to all discourse that can be pedagogised.  The pedagogic device continuously restricts or enhances realizations of potential pedagogic meaning.  The formal structure is similar to the linguistic device [because he has drawn it this way].  There are rules to regulate realization and these rules are intrinsic and relatively stable, although they 'are not ideologically free' (28).  They are 'implicated in the distribution of', and constrain forms of consciousness.  Both language device and pedagogic device are sites for conflict and control, but only the pedagogic device can produce an outcome 'which can subvert the fundamental rules of the device'[surely not so, we can produce challenging avant-garde linguistic utterances as well.  This is Bernstein's implicit functionalism again?].

The pedagogic device provides the 'intrinsic grammar of pedagogic discourse' where grammar is used 'in a metaphoric sense' [clear as forking mud].  This grammar is realized through distributive rules, recontextualizing rules, and evaluative rules.  [I am still trying to figure out what I find difficult about this notion of a rule rather than a convention or a constraint - is it that rule implies some structural, consensual, functional operation?].  These rules are related and they also feature power relationships between them [a continuing ambiguity about power as well].  Distributive rules particularly regulate relations 'between power, social groups, forms of consciousness and practice'; recontextualizing rules 'regulate the formation of specific pedagogic discourse'; evaluative rules 'constitute any pedagogic practice', since the purpose of pedagogic practice is to 'transmit criteria', and this provides 'a ruler for consciousness'[compare this with dispositions in Bourdieu, which are socially sedimented, unconscious, and embodied]. [This argument means instructional and regulative discourse are also organized in a hierachy as we shall see -- separate arguments are really the same argument. This is an axiomatic system]

There are two different classes of knowledge that 'are necessarily available in all societies' and are 'intrinsic to language itself' - the thinkable and the unthinkable.  This provides two classes of knowledge, the esoteric and the mundane, or the 'knowledge of the other' and 'the otherness of knowledge' [all of them variants of the sacred and profane?].  There is also the knowledge of the possible and the possibility of the impossible.  The line dividing these two classes varies historically and culturally.  If we compare small scale non literate societies with more complex ones, religion regulates the division between the thinkable and the unthinkable, but in 'a very brutal simplification' (29), it is the 'upper reaches of the educational system' these do not always originate divisions, but they control and manage them.  The mere thinkable is still within schools.

However simple and complex societies have a similar order of meaning [a key functionalist assumption again].  It would be wrong to see it as an abstract vs. concrete division, since 'all meanings are abstract'.  However, the abstraction takes different forms.  In all cases it 'postulates and relates two worlds', the material and the immaterial, the mundane and the transcendental.  What this means is that meanings have different relations to the 'specific material base', a direct one where meanings are 'wholly consumed by the context' (30), and an indirect one, which both create new meanings and unite the two worlds.  This division is reflected in a division of labour and a set of social relationships [and not the other way about]. 

Indirect meanings produce a 'potential discursive gap', but this is not a dislocation.  Instead, it offers alternative possibilities and realizations, offering a space for the unthinkable and impossible, something yet to be thought, and this is both 'beneficial and dangerous at the same time'.  Any distribution of power tries to regulate the realization of this potential, since it must be regulated [for social order, but particular groups are also able to follow their own interests in preventing alternatives].  The religious systems of simple societies are a good example.  The 'paradox' of the gap [between beneficial than harmful outcomes, I assume] is covered by distributive rules which govern those who can access the site.  [Another?] paradox arises because the device itself cannot do this effectively, and contradictions are 'rarely totally suppressed', and the pedagogic process itself reveals the possibility of the gap and makes power relations visible.  There is a connection with the notion of field, which is constituted by distributive rules, which are 'controlled more and more today by the state itself'(31).

Recontextualizing rules govern what counts as adequate pedagogic discourse, specialized communications.  Pedagogic discourse itself is 'the rule which embeds two discourses', relating to skills of various kinds and to social order, instructional and regulative discourse.  Bernstein thinks that instructional discourses are always embedded in regulative discourse which is the dominant one [repetition of what he said above].  Pedagogic discourse combines the two, so it is wrong to separate the transmission of skills and the transmissions of values - 'the secret voice of this device is to disguise the fact that there is only one' discourse (32).  [Is this ideology as well? Or maybe a latent function?]

Pedagogic discourse appears as neutral compared to the familiar subject based discourses.  So we need to redefine it as a principle not a discourse [why not say that originally, dick], regulating the connection between the other discourses.  However, it does give rise to a specialised discourse of its own [!].  It also creates a gap between discourses and the pedagogised sites or forms, and again we have 'a space in  which ideology can play.  No discourse ever moves without ideology at play'[ideology here means the disguised interests of powerful groups? Or just 'worldview'?] This move also turns it into 'an imaginary discourse', a mediated or virtual one.  It also produces 'imaginary subjects' (33) [a note on this distinction between the real and the imaginary says it is supposed to draw attention to an activity unmediated by anything other than itself, compared to one when mediation is intrinsic in practice.  The example is between carpentry and its pedagogic equivalent, 'woodwork'.  Real discourses are related to the social base again.  Presumably, then they are also restricted in what can be thought - practice itself can never produce new possibilities for thinking?  All manual occupations seem to produce some kind of mechanical solidarity]. 

We can put this in formal terms - 'pedagogic discourse is a recontextualizing principle', selecting, and organising other discourses, but never identified with them.  This is 'a recontextualizing discourse', and it creates 'recontextualizing fields' with suitable agents 'with practicing ideologies'[ideology here appears to be world view?].  Recontextualization creates 'the fundamental autonomy of education'.  There is even an 'official recontextualizing field' operated by the state, and a 'pedagogic recontextualizing field' inhabited by specialist educators, and this provides the relative autonomy and struggle [none within the state?  No regulation of the specialist educators by the state - he admits that today the state is attempting to weaken the PRF].

Since moral discourse creates the criteria for subsequent instructional discourse, we can see that in general regulative discourses affect the order in instructional discourses. [repetition again really, going from a specific case to some underlying principle or rule].  We can see this with physics. We distinguish between physics as the production of the discourse, and physics as a pedagogic discourse: the former displays variety, but the latter is controlled by devices such as textbooks, written by pedagogues and only 'rarely physicists'.  As a result, there is no formal logical link between the discourses, since pedagogues select.  The selection also depends on how physics is to be related to the other subjects, how is to be sequenced and paced, and these 'cannot be derived from the logic of the discourse of physics or its various activities'[so this is almost the opposite of the 'powerful knowledge' merchants' argument that school curriculum, at least, should reflect the vertical hierarchical structures of proper sciences?  Or perhaps they are just saying we should design the curriculum and let pedagogues figure out how to teach it?].  The rules for the transmission of physics have a reality of their own - they are 'social facts' (34), inevitably incorporating selection [weird].  [Somehow] the overall regulative functions of the discourse provide the rules of the internal order of instructional discourse - it is dominant [I think this is just saying that pedagogues have to work with objects that are already selected as being important, as social facts.  Whether Bernstein means this in the full Durkheim sense is not clear - it still seems to imply some consensus or some powerful imposition of a consensus.  Hasn't the discourse of physics itself done much to undermine this?  And is almost a way of saying that the objects in pedagogy are indeed arbitrary?].

Recontextualizing principles also produce a theory of instruction.  This is never 'entirely instrumental' since it also imports from the regulative discourse models of learners and teachers and their relation.

Pedagogic discourse has to be transformed into pedagogic practice.  This involves a specialist notion of time, a text and a space and their interrelationship.  This takes the form of 'very fundamental category relations' and again these have 'implications for the deepest cultural level' (35) [all this follows as another implication from the connection between pedagogic discourse and regulative discourse, between pedagogic order and social order in general].  Pedagogic discourses can operate at a very fine level, producing, for example the notion of age stages to punctuate time, although these are 'wholly imaginary and arbitrary' (35).  Both text and spaces are also organized into a specific context, but again behind the specifics stand more abstract levels.  Beneath lies another level, that of actual pedagogic practice and pedagogic communication, which features acquisition, evaluation, and transmission, where the 'key to pedagogic practice is continuous evaluation'(36).

The pedagogic device condenses these levels, providing an overall 'symbolic ruler for consciousness' [consciousness is assumed to follow from pedagogic practice].  It is a form of religious practice with its descending levels to control the unthinkable. [Gives the Durkheimian game away. The wonderful diagram on page 36 indicates the full story, where ID is instructional discourse, RD is regulative discourse, and dividing them by a horizontal line does not indicate division, but embeddedness.


Why practice should be an indicator of a pedagogic code with its modalities is still a puzzle - why use the term code at all unless you wish to imply some structural determination? Note that codes relating to the (un)thinkable do not appear where they should in the diagram below -- on the left even before social groups. There seem to be no feedback loops now either].  We can see homologies between religion and education.  We can follow Max Weber here as well, with his division between prophets priests and laity being homologous to producers, reproducers and acquirers.  There is a 'rule' that people can only occupy one category at a time, and that while prophets and priests are in opposition, priests and the laity are in relations of 'natural affinity' [Bernstein is only implying that these social relations affects the pedagogic field too - I would have said there is opposition between all three categories].

We now have an even better a model of the pedagogic device on page 37 showing the connections between social groups and various rules and fields and processes. 

diagram 2

This is how consciousness is regulated [this is actually only assumed to follow from processes, although it is already smuggled in with evaluation rules], and cultural transmitted.  However there is no determinism and there are sources of indeterminacy:

Internally the device controls the unthinkable, but in the very process of doing so 'makes the possibility of the unthinkable available' [deviance is the same as the principle of conformity in Durkheim's terms] (38).  Externally the distribution of power outside itself has potential challenges and oppositions, and the device shows this background struggle: it  'creates an arena or of struggle for those who are to appropriate it'.

Overall, the claim is that Bernstein has exposed 'the intrinsic grammar of the device' and its 'hidden voice'.  As it processes, it regulates. Its ' [very] grammar...  codes order and position' while at the same time containing a potential for transformation.

Another note discusses the French System where university staff circulates to the lycée as a rare exception to the strong classification between those who produce discourse and those who recontextualize it.  However, recontextualizers rarely go the other way, and this might be preserved by increasing distinctions between research only and teaching only institutions in the UK.  Another note points out that the texts produced by pedagogy are also imaginary.  Unlike the texts of producers, they are not expected to be original and unique.  Pedagogic texts instead offer 'intra-textuality [in the] process of constructing unique authorship'.

[Overall, I'm not surprise that this article has been so controversial, and so tidied up in commentaries.  Apart from the massive assumptions, principally about consciousness and about the effects of social context in limiting what can be thought, there is a clear functional argument throughout.  By and large, power is necessary for order, even though it occasionally has to be adjusted through functional conflicts.  This is also an interesting text for people like Maton who want to accuse Bourdieu of operating only with the arbitrary - it is hard to tell because Bernstein uses ideology in different terms, but it looks as if there is an arbitrary social order behind all these developments as well, at least once the basic paramters have been established. The non-arbitrary in Bernstein only amounts to social facts like the split between the sacred and the profane. Certainly, pedagogy is arbitrary compared to the operation of real discourses.  I suppose that by calling them real discourses, you might think that Bernstein is some kind of social realist, but he insists that that only means that they are closely connected to their material bases: this is a theory of verisimilitude at best].

Chapter 3 Pedagogising Knowledge: studies in recontextualizing

[At last! Some concrete detail. This is a very good discussion of the neolibleral turn, but with only an implicit marxism. All the terms introduced in the above are just used descriptively]

Titles [that is academic classifications] relate more to positions in intellectual fields than to the content of actual arguments, so this one could have been called anything with functionalist, Althusserian, Foucaldian or postmodern resonances [strikes me as both defensive and arrogant].

In the 1960s, there was a notable shift towards the notion of agent or member competence in a number of different intellectual  fields, and this had consequences for pedagogy.  We're not going to discuss the origin of the convergence [shame, because it doesn't seem to have been predicted in the earlier work].  Competences 'are intrinsically creative and tacitly acquired in informal interactions.  They are practical accomplishments' (42), somehow they escape power relations, and agents can now negotiate social order and interact with various kinds of cognitive and linguistic structures.  They are assumed to be culture free.  They 'embrace populism'.

There is an implicit logic that says that all people are inherently competent and that there are common procedures with no deficits; the subject is active and creative; the subject is self regulating and this is benign; this brings skepticism towards hierarchy and emancipation; there is a focus on the present tense as the most relevant time.  These characteristics can apply unevenly but most of them are present.  It is an 'idealism of competence, a celebration of what we are' (43), but it involves an abstract individual somehow outside power and control.  The idea clearly resonates with the liberal progressive and radical ideologies of the 1960s and was taken up by those in education, even though most of those formulating their theory were not really concerned with education.  The position also entered conflicts in the intellectual field, and were crucial in taking on various opposing positions, including 'Piaget on behaviourism, Garfinkel and structural functionalism'.  Structuralism even in Levi Strauss was one strand, but there was also ethnomethodology and other strands in sociolinguistics.  There was a common anti positivism.  Somehow, these arguments became important to the theory and practice of education, including members of the official recontextualizing field, as in the Plowden Report, as well as among the expert pedagogues 'an unusual convergence'.  At the same time, different inflections applied more to different educational disciplines - Piaget to educational psychology, for example.

This led to a specific pedagogic practice especially in primary and preschools areas, constituting 'a competence model' and struggling with its opposite 'the performance model', based on specific outputs particular texts and specialized skills.  [A diagram on page 45 tries to refer back to classification as well, especially with the main issues of space time and discourse].  In more detail:

At the level of discourse, competence models favour 'projects, themes, ranges of experience, a group base',  acquirer control, celebration of difference rather than stratification,  weak classification.  Performance models offer specialised subjects, 'skills, procedures which are clearly marked with respect of form and function'.  Acquirers have less control and their texts are graded and ranked.  There is strong classification.

In terms of space, competence models do not distinguish specially defined pedagogic spaces and allow acquirers to construct different spaces and to circulate between them.  Classification is weak.  In performance models there are clear boundaries and markings and regulations, with strong classification. In terms of time, competence model see the present tense as the major mode.  Time is not particularly punctuated or marked, nor is the future particularly emphasized.  Weak pacing also features.  Only the teacher can know what each acquirer is revealing a particular moment, and uses this as the basis for provision.

When it comes to evaluation, competence models again emphasise what is present in the product, using diffuse and implicit criteria of evaluation.  However, there is more emphasis on regulated discourse criteria of conduct and manner.  In performance models the emphasis is upon what is missing in the product, referring to explicit and specific criteria for legitimate text.

For control, children do not have their experience structured by space, time or discourses and positional control is a low priority.  Control is likely to 'inhere in personalised forms', hence forms of communication 'which focus upon the intentions, dispositions, relations and reflexivity of the acquirer' (47).  This is the most favoured mode.  In performance models, space time and discourse do structure and classifying and therefore 'constitute and relay order'.  Instructional discourse disciplines.  A more economical form of control appears, not personalised.  Neither of these techniques work smoothly necessarily, and acquirer subversions are 'mode specific'.

Pedagogic text in competence models is not seen as a product of the acquirer, but rather something that reveals their development and can be diagnosed by the professional teacher, drawing on suitable 'social and psychological sciences which legitimise this pedagogic mode' (46-7).  It follows that these meanings are available only to professionals.  In performance modes, the focus is on the text itself as the performance of the acquirer, and professional teachers offer explicit pedagogy ease and professional grading.  The emphasis is on both past and future.  But the pedagogic practice itself constructs the past for the acquirer.

Notions of autonomy vary, competence models assume a wide range of autonomy, although teacher autonomy is often compromised because they all have to practice the same pedagogy.  There are also context dependent elements which require local autonomy.  There is no reliance on outside pedagogic resources like textbooks.  There is less availability for public scrutiny and accountability, especially as outputs are difficult to evaluate.  There is no strong tie to predetermined futures either [so no coaching for grammar school or university].  There are different performance modalities, some relate to the future, 'introverted modalities' and some relate more to external regulation, 'extroverted modalities'.  The first looks like the exploration of the specialised discourse itself is autonomous, whereas the second one relates to something external like the economy or the job market.  At the same time, even introverted modalities are subordinate to external curriculum.  There can be individual variation at the level of teaching practice aimed at increasing performance, although external criteria limit this autonomy.  The need to market institutions can also produce a certain kind of autonomy [well, market variation at least].

There is an economic factor.  The costs of competence models are higher, and so are the cost of training teachers in the 'theoretical basis of competency models' (49) [selecting people for teacher training is also 'likely to be stricter' because the qualities required are 'restricted and tacit'].  There is a substantial cost in terms of time and the construction of pedagogic resources, and in evaluating each acquirer.  Parents have to be socialised, extensive feedback is required on development, teachers have to interact a lot in order to plan and monitor.  Usually, it is the individual, committed teacher who bears these costs, and this can lead to 'ineffective pedagogic practice' due to teacher fatigue.  Transmission costs of performance models are relatively lower for all those reasons.  Accountability can also be managed more objectively.  Performance can sometimes be routinized [these days, put online].  It is easier to regulate the costs and to impose other controls.  A different kind of commitment and motivation is required.

We can spell out the differences in more detail.  Competence models stress the similarities between people which are seen as complementary.  However, this splits into three different options.  The first one, 'liberal/progressive' is located within the individual and to things that all individual share.  It intended to emancipate the new notion of the child away from the old repressive forms of authority, based on a 'new science of child development'(50).  The caring ethos opened professional careers for women and attacked patriarchy.  Individual potential was to be released.  Advocates and sponsors included the new middle class 'in the field of symbolic control'[referring to empirical examples of these correspondences?  - in class codes  and control vol. 3].

The second model looks at similarities within a local culture and it is that local culture which is usually dominated, but which has hidden communicative competences.  This is the populist mode.  The third mode agrees that competence is found in local dominated groups or classes, but focuses on various material and symbolic opportunities to overcome domination and achieve emancipation.  This is the radical mode, associated with Freire, and 'often found in adult informal education' (51)

Although these competence models share a focus on similarities, they are often found opposed within the pedagogic recontextualizing field.  They all feature an invisible pedagogy.  The radical mode is not found at all in the official recontextualizing field, and only appears in the PRF  if there is sufficient autonomy.  Performance models also differ according to how their texts are specialized.  They emphasize '"different from" relations'.  They are 'empirically normal across all levels of official education', so that competence models can be seen as resistance or interruptions.

The variables for performance models include whether they are singular or regional, with the former offering much stronger boundaries and hierarchies in the intellectual field its practices, its examination and its licences.  Regions follow where singulars are recontextualized into larger units [some examples are given, but not the principle, apparently much depends on the social base].  They threaten the culture of singulars and include 'journalism, dance, sport, tourism' (52).  Modular forms also help.  Regionalization opens the structure to greater central control, but they must also remain autonomous in terms of content so they can be more responsive to markets.  The classification of discourses is weakened, and so is subject identity, which becomes 'projected' rather than 'introjected'.  These trends are less obvious in schools, and cross curricular themes have been resisted.

There is also a generic performance mode, operating outside pedagogic recontextualizing fields, as in the innovations introduced by the Manpower Services Commission or the Training Agency.  These became 'the distinctive "competences" methodology', as in NVQs.  They focus on work and life outside school.  They are located primarily in further education, and this transformed the professional culture of FE and weakened 'both the liberal education and technical craft tradition'.  They also feature misrecognition, seeming to be based on a functional analysis yielding specific competencies, thus borrowing from the competence model.  In the process, they have rejected any notion of a cultural basis for stills tasks practices and areas of work and have produced 'a jejune concept of trainability'[so who misrecognises here?  Does he thinks that teachers and students are taken in by this sort of hijack?  Why is this a misrecognised version and not just a hybrid version?  Another option is offered below in terms of a shift back from competence to performance mode].

All this tells us something about the potential of the recontextualizing field in the contemporary context [rendered as 'I am now in a position to construct the discursive potential of the recontextualizing field which characterises the contemporary context', 53].  These examples show the increased importance of 'the dominant ideology in the ORF', and the elements of relative autonomy in the PRF.  They reveal oppositions within recontextualizing fields.  There are however shared preoccupations - competency models stress development of consciousness, are therapeutic, and 'are directly linked to symbolic control' [that is emphasize the symbolic and cultural] (54), while performance modes are more directly linked to the economy.

The emergence of a range of singulars arises from the division of discursive labour, and that in turn is tied to English nationalism and imperialism, including the development of economics and social sciences, 'linked to the new technologies of the market and the management of subjectivities' [not much evidence here].  Classics was linked to entry to the administrative levels of the civil service, science is linked to material technologies.  This is the 'profane face' of the development of subjects, compared to its 'sacred face' which claims otherness and dedicated identities, the notion of a calling.  Singulars create strong boundaries and introjected 'narcissistic' identities (55).  Regions also face both ways, linking with the professions outside as well as addressing the need to group singulars.  They are likely to become the modal form.  [Compare this with the desperate struggles for status inside and outside the official university hierarchy in Bourdieu, where addressing the cultural industries became a strategy for marginalised academics].  New regions particularly face outwards and therefore have to relate to the requirements of external practices, providing a projected identity.  Those practices will affect this identity: it is a volatile context. Generic performance is complex.  It features 'similar to' relations like competence modes, but finds this in terms of general skills, linked to the market and flexible performance, providing projected identities again.

We can classify them [diagram page 56] in terms of the sorts of control and discourse they feature.  Control refers to therapeutic or economic functions, and discourse to pedagogic modes [liberal, radical, populist]; specialist performance produces different possibilities for identity and control, and the context outside can act in different ways even on apparently autonomous modes, from external determination, to pragmatic embrace.  These tensions can sometimes be managed by classifying strongly introjected and projected elements [especially with modular schemes, theoretical and practical modules] [Bernstein again uses terms like dependency being 'masked', or the need to interpret exigencies].  The modes can be mixed as well, including a case where 'the therapeutic mode may be inserted in an economic mode, retaining its original name and resonances, while giving rise to an opposing practice'[which seems to cover all the possibilities].  The state can embrace particular modes, as with Plowden.

Competency modes became dominant in the late 1960s.  The obvious resonance with emancipatory ideologies is not the sole explanation.  The main factor turns on relative autonomy for the PRF at the time, especially in terms of training teachers.  The government changed the particular form of schools, moving towards comprehensives, for example but 'pedagogic discourse was not the subject of legislation' (57).  However, 'an autonomous local space for the construction of curriculum' was created.  The abolition of selection removed one crucial external regulator, since selective grammar schools had upheld performance modes, usually in terms of collections of singulars.  The focus was on something that the acquirer did not already possess, with an emphasis upon the text to be acquired.  Learning was considered in terms of behaviourism and atomism.  As school organisation turned to a weaker form of classification, a space was opened up and it was not subject to state regulation.  At both primary and secondary levels the competence mode emerged and was legitimised by trends in the pedagogic field.

Performance modes were attacked as being based on the concept of deficit.  Therapeutic emphases focused on empowerment in different ways, individual, cultural and political, and these were in opposition.  These discourses are filled the gap and some were embraced by the ORF. As the population bulge appeared, colleges of education expanded and were subject to fewer controls, including over selection.  At the same time, theoretical discourses were becoming more specialized.  At school level teacher shortages reduced the selective power of management.  Full employment put the emphasis on social relations like multiculturalism and leisure, together, these produced new agendas.  At one stage, there was even 'ideological rapport'between the pedagogic field and the ORF [plowden]

In the 1970s, the state moved to intervene, largely through centralised monitoring and funding, and this 'changed the culture of educational institutions', from the increasing management to more explicit criteria for staff appointments.  The role of the market increased and schools were seen to be adding value.  Local authorities were stripped of responsibilities.  Overall, the PRF lost autonomy, and new discourses were introduced to teacher training, including 'management, assessment' (58).  There is also more school based training.  Overall, there was a shift to performance models by the ORF, imposed more rigorously, although this varied in different levels of education. 

Generic modes came to the fore based on a particularly short term conception of work and life, reflecting the need to be flexible and trainable over a lifetime.  Everyone now needs to acquire the ability to be taught and to respond effectively,  with 'concurrent, subsequent, intermittent pedagogics' (59), producing 'a pedagogized future'.  Actors have to find their own meanings from their past and future, and therefore require a specialised identity as 'the dynamic interface between individual career is and the social or collective basis'.  This is not just a matter of individual psychology or ambition, but the product of a particular social order offering other identities 'of reciprocal recognition, supports, mutual legitimization, and finally through a negotiated collective purpose'.  Trainability is 'empty'.

The identity is supported in consumption, and we can see the products of the market as 'signifiers whereby temporary stabilities, orientations, relations and evaluations are constructed'.  This generic mode is extended from its base in manual practices to other areas of work.  The main pedagogic objective is to produce trainability.  This involves the production and reproduction of 'imaginary concepts of work and life which abstract such experiences from the power relations of their lived conditions and negates the possibilities of understanding and criticism'[could be Bourdieu again].

The practice seems to be driven by an increased official control, even in higher education, where it works indirectly, through funding and through research, and in some cases 'industrial niche' (60).  This stratified institutions.  Intellectual development can involve acquiring academic stars, and this has been a brake on regionalism.  Those lower down have been forced to market their pedagogic discourse, and develop projected identities.  Regionalization is increased here.  Thus practices have affected staff student and institutional identity, and increased diversity and stratification.  The move to modularization has assisted this.  This offers a difference with performance modes in primary and secondary levels.

The national curriculum has clearly introduced stronger classification based on a collection of singulars, and there is increased stake monitoring.  However, framing has weakened with the importance of coursework assessment.  Somehow 'schools may well exploit such weaker framing over evaluation as a means of increasing their performance' (61) [teach to the test?].  Curriculum monitoring is more central, but schools now have greater autonomy over the budget and administration.  Management focuses on performance, whatever the pedagogic discourse, and managerialism has affected all educational institutions, including a greater regulation of selection and promotion.  The big dislocation these days is between the culture of pedagogy and management culture, producing a certain 'retrospective' element of pedagogic culture and a prospective one for management.  The state seems to have embedded both, and the result might well be 'a state promoted instrumentality', despite the implicit claims for the intrinsic value of knowledge in the school curriculum.  However, there are other influences.

One note says that the research selectivity exercise is altering the type of research and publication, away from long-term basic research to short term applied research 'with low risks and rapid publication' (63), and this will have effects on both the orientation of teaching and the knowledge base of the students.  It has produced a new culture, 'reproduced by new actors with new motivations' .

Chapter 4 Official Knowledge and pedagogic Identities: the politics of recontextualization

[More detail about identities, using the same sort of framework as above.  Bernstein introduces this one as but a mere sketch, but tells us he is a hero who likes to live dangerously].

Official knowledge reveals different biases and focuses with the intention of constructing in teachers and students a particular disposition embedded in particular performances and practices.  Abstract analysis produces four possible positions.  Pedagogic identity follows from 'embedding a career in a collective base'(66) and a career can have knowledge, moral and locational dimensions.  The collective basis refers to the social order in schools as institutionalised by the state.  Major changes in bases and careers have occurred, and these are 'international, national, domestic, economic, educational or leisure' contexts, and curriculum reform follows as a response to these changes.  Four different approaches to manage change are possible, and these take the form of pedagogic identities.  There is a struggle to institutionalise them.

Two identities are generated by state resources, and two from local resources, where institutions have relative autonomy (centred and decentred).  The diagram on 67 shows the four possibilities.  Identities may be restricted/retrospective, or selected/prospective at the state level, and differentiated/decentred (market) or integrated/decentred (therapeutic) at the local level.  These different positions may both oppose and collaborate with each other, and there is a struggle to legitimate some and exclude others.

The restricted/retrospective identity is a conservative one, insulated from economic change, with the control exercised over 'discursive inputs', or contents, and not outputs.  They are 'formed by' hierarchical strongly bounded and sequenced discourses and practices, and they refer to a collective social based in the past, as recovered by some grand narrative.  This past has to be stabilised and preserved in the future.  This becomes urgent in times of particular secular change, for example in the Middle East or the Russian federation.

Selected/prospective identities also refer to the past, but not the same one.  It has a more positive stance towards a dealing with change, and it does this by selecting elements of the past and linking it to economic performance.  Thatcherism is a good example, with its emphasis on Victorian values and individual enterprise.  This time, individual careers are foregrounded.  Exchange value dominates the judgement of performance, and this requires control over both inputs' to education and outputs.  New Labour also launched a new prospective identity in comparison to the old retrospective one of old labour, stressing preserving communities with participating in the economic sphere.

The local decentred identities depend on institutional autonomy.  This autonomy are either leads to some therapeutic outcome, or a new flexibility in terms of the market.  In both cases, the emphasis is on the present, although these are different presents.  In the therapeutic identity, the main stress is on 'personal, cognitive and social development, often labelled progressive'(68).  It features 'a control invisible to the student', and stresses autonomous flexible thinking and social relations in teamwork.  It is costly.  It is currently weak on the national scene, and its sponsoring social group has little power.  The identity it offers participants opposes specialisation and stratification, offers weak boundaries, soft management, power 'disguised by communication networks and interpersonal relations'(70), and ideally, 'stable, integrated identities with adaptable cooperative practices'. The decentred market identity is not yet fully realized [it is now].  It occur in educational institutions with a lot of autonomy over the use of the budget and organisation.  These aim at attracting students in a competitive environment, meeting external performance criteria, attempting to optimise its market position [exactly like Marjon, suitably scaled down] the same goes for a department or groups inside the institutions.  Everything depends on the market.  There is an unaccountable hierarchical management system operating allegedly technically, and monitoring the distribution of resources according to the effectiveness of local groups.  The institutional identity focuses on exchange value of the product in a market, and there is an attempt to maximize inputs' .  The focus is short term and extrinsic, vocational rather than based on exploring knowledge.  Flexibility is crucial, so that 'personal commitment and particular dedication of staff and students are regarded as resistances' (69), seen as a restrictive practice.  Relations are characterised by contract.

Universities themselves might be stratified according to these different identities, with the elite ones able to acquire academic stars to develop the old claims to power and position, with [personal?] identities which can be defined as related to 'introjection [of] knowledge'.  In non elite institutions, the organisation becomes 'discursive' as the main way to maintain market positions [that is with flexible discourses to create different packages and permutations].  Identities here work through projection, driven by external forces.

We can use the terms in the diagram to recognise the effects of contemporary educational reforms.  These have combined centralised control, such as the 'standardisation of knowledge inputs', and local autonomy.  Originally, there was a 'complementary relation' (71) between retrospective conservatives and neoliberal marketisers, but also some tension, for example over whether a centralised national curriculum was required - the retrospective seem to have won out here, although there is also an inclusion of basic skills and other 'vocational insertions'.  It was the professional pedagogues driving the market [so this is one example of a feedback loop?] identity, with some support from civil servants, although this was not strong enough to completely prevail - for example the original intention for 'complex profiling forms of assessment' ended up with simple tests.  Thematic links between traditional subjects were also ineffective [with the same study by Whitty cited again].

The market identity transformed managerial structures and 'has created an enterprise, competitive culture'.  It did not affect the curriculum so much, but did introduce 'new discourses of management and economy', say in the training of school head teachers.  In other words, it has 'radically transformed the regulative discourse of the institution'.  External competitive demands are stronger.  This position has been supported by the state.  However, contradictions with the more traditional curriculum and the identities it produces have produced 'a new pathological position at work in education: the pedagogic schizoid position'[nice, but it could just be a hybrid, showing the weakness of the original divisions?]. [Why didn't Maton use this term in his piece on cultural studies? Bernstein hints at instrumentalism reconciling or replacing the two in the generic mode in the chapter above]

Social change has been described in various ways, including postmodernism and disembedding, but we can use the old terms and compare ascribed with achieved identities.  The former have been now considerably weakened, since the classic 'cultural punctuations and specialisation' (72) of 'age, gender, and age relation'[not ethnicity?] have been weakened as bases for identity, in favour of individual achievements.  The dimensions of the life space have also contracted, reducing age differences.  Those identities achieved through class and occupation have also become weaker resources, even though equal distributions remain.  Geographic movements of population also create new sets of cultural pressures.  Overall, there has been a 'disturbance and disembedding of identities'.

The new ones have not just replaced the old ones, but there are emerging identities - again these will be considered as decentred, retrospective, and prospective.  The first one relates to local resources oriented to the present, the middle one to the effects of 'grand past narratives', the third one to provide a new recentred identity for the new conditions, sometimes based on selections from the past.

Decentred identities produce two types.  The first one is instrumental, where identities 'are constructed out of market signifiers'(73) as in consumerism.  These can be coherent, but are not stable over time.  The politics associated with them is anti centralist.  The second one is therapeutic, relying on internal local resources, introjection, based on the self as a personal project, relatively independent of consumerism.  'It is a truly symbolic construction', with an open narrative, partly oppositional.  Internal sense making is stressed.  Both of these identities are segmented, but the first one is segmented by the market, the second by some notion of personal development [and the shift to competence as in Ch3?] .  Both are fragile.  In the face of breakdown, the instrumental can shift to the retrospective nationalist, and the therapeutic to prospective, but age and context will be important.

Retrospective identities draw on narratives of the past for exemplars.  Again there are two types.  The fundamentalist, which has subsets of its own (religious or nationalist) assumes a stable impervious collective identity, sometimes with 'a strong insulation between the sacred and profane', with suspicions of the corrupt influences of the profane, as in Islamic fundamentalism, or earlier Jewish orthodoxy.  These identities find it difficult to be reproduced in the next generation.  Age might have an influence, with the young being drawn to the emotional, intense 'interactive participation'(75).  The revival of student fraternities in Europe might also provides an example.  However, social change may weaken the social basis and produce differences among the young.  The elitist retrospective identity is based on access to high culture, offering 'an amalgam of knowledge, sensitivities, manners, of education and upbringing'[similar to Bourdieu].  Education and social networks can overcome upbringing.  There are strong classifications and internal hierarchies, but an avoidance of the market 'unlike fundamentalists'[really?].  There is little emphasis on conversion, unlike fundamentalism, since what is required is 'the very long and arduous apprenticeship'.  There is less evidence of 'intense solidarities'- and signs of narcissism rather than the superego formations of fundamentalism.

When it comes to prospective identities, narrative resources are important as well, but these are 'narratives of becoming' (76), becoming a social category such as 'race, gender or region'[all involve imaginary communities?]. These are individualised, but offer a new basis for social relations, 'a recentring'.  They are often 'launched' by social movements [including pedagogical ones?] are initially evangelist and confrontational, but also have 'strong schismatic tendencies'.  They are also focused on the self.  They attempt to desocialise themselves from earlier identities, and depend on new group supports for a new forms of economic and political activity.  Apparently, 'in the USA, Islamic movements have created a new basis for black identity' leading to new politics and to entrepreneurialism.  The becoming can involve a recovery of something which is still potential, but this is productive of heresy and schism, so 'gatekeepers and licencers' become crucial, and there is a constant struggle over 'the construction of authentic becoming'.

This identity in particular shows the potential for 'change in the moral imagination' (77).  Enlightenment announced universal rights, but the subject became anonymous in the subsequent universalism.  Modern moral imagination may be offering the reverse, and thus shrinking, with 'empathy and sympathy…  only…  offered and received by those who are so licensed'.  However, the subject is no longer anonymous.  To take a homely example, people who are moderately short may experience themselves as having a spoiled identity and attempt to rediscover an authentic voice based on 'valid scholarship and research', but requiring a licensed member of the group as a spokesman.  The new social category can be established, but it is subject to being undermined by 'a more radical agenda', formulated by those who are excessively short.  This is 'the first schism and a new shrinking of the moral imagination'.  [The endless procession of the oppressed as Maton puts it]

Overall, we are experiencing 'the weakening of, and a change of place, of the sacred'.  It is no longer central to the collective social base of society supported by overlapping institutions like state, or religion and education.  Today, the basis been weakened and 'the sacred now reveals itself in dispersed sites, movement and discourses' in segmented and specialized forms.  Instead of talking of cultural fragmentation, however, we can see the diverse local identities as an attempt to pursue these new forms of solidarity through the 'rituals of inwardness' [an exact parallel to the secularisation debate].  Instrumentalism is the exception.  This will deepen pedagogic schizophrenia, since there has now emerged 'for the first time a virtually secular, market driven official pedagogic discourse, practice and context, but at the same time, there is a revival of forms of the sacred external to it' (78).  This reverses Durkheim's notion of the sites of the sacred and profane, and also challenges Weber on increasing rationalisation, and produces new tensions between pedagogic identity with their associated transmission and acquisition, and local identities.  Of course, not all of these new local identities 'are to be welcomed, sponsored or legitimated'.

Notes include a definition of pedagogy as 'the sustained process whereby somebody(s) acquires new forms or develops existing forms of conduct, knowledge, practice and criteria from somebody(s) or something deemed to be an appropriate provider and evaluator...  We can distinguish between: institutional pedagogy and segmented (informal) pedagogy'.  Informal pedagogy is carried out in every day experience by informal providers, it may be tacit or explicit, and the producer may or may not be aware that the transmission is taken place.  Informal pedagogy ease tend to be limited to the context or segment, producing 'unrelated competencies'.  There is an interaction between informal and explicit forms, governed by framing regulations which produce varieties of voice and message '(what is made manifest, what can be realized)' (79).  Sometimes, the acquirer can initiate change in these.  Overall identity 'is the outcome of the "voice message" relations'.

Chapter 5.  Thoughts on the Trivium and Quadrivium: the divorce of knowledge from the knower

 [Rehearses the example already given in an earlier chapter, apparently based on an original essay by Durkheim.  I think the point is that the Trivium and Quadrivium were different but linked together, both by sequence, and by Christian thought - understanding the word preceded understanding the world.  His particular emphasis, however is on consciousness and how Christianity brought about a particular division between the outer world and the inner word.  The Christian inner is given first, while the sacredness of the world is guaranteed.]

 Similarly, the Christian notion of conversion involves a change of the inward.  This in turn implies that the inner is separated from outer practice, 'which becomes the site for a new awareness'(83), a gap with outward culture.  This is a new gap not found in Greek thoughts or in Judaism.  The Jewish god is invisible, producing a maximum distance between god and people.  Holiness has to be demonstrated through rituals and through the law.  The social bond joins god and people: there is no dislocation but a perfect community.  However, this text is incomplete, and has to be constantly adjusted and elaborated.  The emphasis on the self in Christianity, however least a doubt questioning and interrogation, a new 'interrogative mode' (85). 

 Thus the Trivium is really about the inner, and the Quadrivium the outer.  This also provided the foundation for the professions.  A 'humanising secular principle' then emerged and lead to a new specialisation of the study of the outside in the Quadrivium, and 'the disciplines of symbolic control - the social sciences'in the Trivium.  There is less of a gap between the two, esp. with a new principle, relating to the market and its managers.  'Market relevance is becoming the  key orientating criterion for the selection of discourses, their relation to each other, their forms and their research' (86), and it is affecting all levels of the education system.  This is 'a truly secular concept', where knowledge becomes money, divorced from people and their commitments, divorced from inwardness and 'literally dehumanised' turning people into resources.

 The inner relationship no longer guarantees legitimacy integrity or the value of knowledge and thus status of the knower.  Now there are two markets, one for knowledge and one for potential creators and users.  The disconnection between inner and outer has produced a crisis, 'and what is at stake is the very concept of education itself'. [NB despite Maton, the divorce of knowledge and knower is a bad thing here?]

Chapter 6 Codes and Research

The first three volumes of Class, Codes and Control was the first stage of a theory of pedagogic discourse and modes of symbolic control, but this does not become clear until vol. 3.  The whole projects was rooted in the issue of classroom-regulated class differences in school successes.  Earlier notions of socialization seem to depend on the internalisation of values and roles, but this seemed 'mystical'.  Symbolic interactionism and the focus on communication seems more promising.  Durkheim addressed the social basis of symbolic forms, Marx pointed to class specialisation.  'I linked the unlinkable -Durkheim's analysis of mechanical and organic solidarity to our own specialized, homogenous occupational functions on the one hand, and specialized interdependent functions on the other in relations of differential power' (89).  Modalities of communication were identified, and these were differentially valued by schools and differentially effective in it.

The first empirical studies reported elaborated and restricted codes and their modalities in families and children, using closed questionnaires and interviews.  The findings were confirmed by more naturalistic studies carried out later.  It was wrong to think of this is a deficit theory.  Codes were ‘trivialised and confused with dialect’ (90) making it look biased against the working classes.  Micro and macro levels were often separated out, as were the linguistic and the sociological bits, misunderstanding the theory.  This argument was developed over a series of papers, they were often taken out of context.  An early collection of empirical papers, Christie 1999, shows the applications best. As more research was undertaken, by colleagues and doctoral students, the focus shifted to look at the modalities of elaborated codes institutionalised in education, leading to a more general account of pedagogic discourse and its various practices – emphasizing symbolic control.

It is now possible to list some criteria for a good theory.  This is not to say that others hold the same criteria.  The criteria include links between the different levels of the theory through concepts which described aspects at each level, especially interactional and structural.  Macro constraints should be visible, and interaction should be allowed a potential to change those constraints.  The problem will be to distinguish between variation in and change of the agencies and fields.  A good theory should provide an explicit description of the objects, not just a specification at the theoretical level, but agreed rules to recognise and describe them at the empirical level.  A good theory should provide the rules for the description of empirical cases, to avoid circularity: there must be an interaction with the empirical, and this depends on adequate descriptions.  The good theory should ‘have the potential of exhausting [describing all] the possibilities of contextual displays’ (91).  At the substantive level, the goal is to explain a process where principles of control and power become principles of communication distributed differently to social groups and classes, and how these shape the formation of consciousness of members.  The link between power and control and communication becomes essential.  Finally, the principles of communication and their social construction, the modalities of transmission and acquisition in pedagogy, and the various relations of the members and groups and classes should all be described explicitly [‘explicit rules are required for writing’ them].

However, these criteria themselves developed in the course of an 'uneven journey.'  External commentary often engaged in ‘epistemological botany’ (92), locating the approach in various theoretical categories, and then evaluating them.  None of these general categories really fit – for example structuralism through Durkheim does not describe internal construction and development.  It is not just a matter of spelling out the implications of [axiomatic] concepts, more a matter of seeing the concept ‘as a necessary limitation on the stories which can be told’.  The descriptions arising from the theory are crucial, and they should not simply prescribe a classification.  The very ambiguity inherent in social order should find a place, and it does in the concept of code, ‘which at the same time as it relays ordering principles and their related practices necessarily opens a space for the potential of their change.  Inherent in the concept code is a choice about itself’.  Similarly, the pedagogic device includes an inherent arena of conflict.

A number of specific studies have been important.  Early work focused on modes of family control, the social origins of codes in the family, and the subsequent interaction with the primary school.  The theory, ‘however primitive’ came before the research as ever.  Conceptual clarification emerges from engagement with the empirical, and there are some other conceptual developments.  The papers that resulted represented different stages of this development.  An early interest was analysing family types in terms of how roles were allocated and the relations between them, and this leads to a ‘shorthand’ account of positional and personal modes, each with different ‘sociolinguistic realizations’ (93).  Subsequent empirical research ensued improving the language of description of modes of control, by asking more questions, including some hypothetical ones of mothers and then children.  An overall ‘index of communication and control’ was constructed, and scores on the index correlated with measures of the child’s IQ and with the parents' social class [a stronger correlation with the IQ].  There were also correlations with teacher estimates of the children at school.  Although the closed questionnaire was a problem, we cannot just dismiss this research, and some other research tended to confirm it.  Nevertheless, a more sensitive measure was required, and a model was developed including modes of control, areas of discretion for the child, general attributes of the child and particular ones unique to the child.

From this complex model, more complex principles of descriptions of the speech of parents and children were developed in the study with Cook-Gumperz.  This saw control as operating in a number of subsystems, each with a network of choices, and an accompanying ‘rationale system’ which justified controls in each case.  There was a system of strategies, a system of concessions, ‘concerned with diverse bargaining choices’ (95),  a punishment system, an appeals system, a reparation system, and a motivational system, each offering a network of choices.  The analysis turned on which subsystem was taken up, in what order, and with what choices.  The subsystems are seen as ‘the realizations of the formal model’, and this shows how principles of description are related to theory.

The effort then turned to describing school structures.  Again the simple model involved the social division of labour producing modes of control which had communicative outcomes.  At the same time, a more detailed analysis of the school was going on in terms the instrumental and expressive orders of the school and the expressive order of the school [the possible forms of involvement appear as a table on page 96, which looks rather like Merton’s classification of possible responses to social strain]. The model itself did not describe contents of the two orders, but it did provide the basis for an empirical study, by Ron King [!  I encountered him very early in my own career].  The earlier work on positional and personal modes of control was also incorporated in subsequent papers, through a discussion of school organisation as a variable. Stratified schools produced social divisions based on fixed attributes like age and gender or ability [= positional], or school subjects, and this in turn leads to horizontal and vertical structures of control.  The possibilities to produce consensus, were left ambiguous, however.  If the basic units and categories were not fixed and specialized, they produced a differentiated school structure and here, extensive ritualization was required to maintain the expressive order to compensate for the weak organisation of the school itself.  This offered a form of ‘therapeutic control’ based on personalised communications.

Reading Mary Douglas on purity and danger lead to new thoughts about boundaries and ritualization, and the ways in which categories of discourse might be separated or combined.  This was linked to Durkheim on types of solidarity.  Stratified schools were now seen as integrated through mechanical solidarity, with differentiated ones integrated through organic solidarity, at first.

Here, someone else, King, did the empirical work, and happened to conclude that there was very little evidence for the expected relations, even though his own work was subsequently criticised.{Contrary evidence did not stop the bandwagon, evidently]

The theory was still unable to link macro constraints to micro processes, however, and schools structures [‘elaborated codes institutionalised in schools’, 97] were still to be analysed in more detail, especially the distinction between power and control.  Nor was social class anything more than a ‘shadow concept, more hidden than revealed’. 

By then, extensive empirical research was being taken on by a team of researchers, and Bernstein was focusing more on the sociology of education than the sociolinguistics, the institutionalising of codes rather than primary socialization.  However, one study on the ‘coding orientation of children’ was completed with Holland.

[A marvellous diagram on page 98 shows the complexity and detail of the descriptions of the various instrumental and expressive orders, and the pure vs. mixed forms that they take.  These descriptions are supposed to lead to detailed empirical work, by providing a kind of checklist]

The transmission systems of the school needed more work, and to be focused on ‘the micro level of pedagogic practice’ (99).  Before, the discourse contents were not separated from the form of its transmission and evaluation.  The term classification was borrowed from Durkheim, and framing from symbolic interactionism, although both were modified.  Classification is defined as relations between categories and the degree of insulation, maintained by power.  Classification can also go on within categories.  Communication can claim to be legitimate if it is constructed to follow these boundary rules and principles, and this will help us describe specific pedagogic practices as forms of translation and acquisition of the principles.  [Contents are assumed to be arbitrary, provided by subject discourses, or somehow determined by classifications?  In any event, they also carry messages about classifications].  Framing refers to control over ‘selection, sequencing, pacing and criteria of the knowledge to be acquired’ [can’t really see a link with symbolic interactionism here].  Teacher control is associated with strong framing, whereas with a weak framing ‘control lies apparently with the student’.  Framing might differ within schools and outside them, for example when they communicate with local communities.  This produces the famous diagram for the pedagogic code – school code is elaborated, and it is embedded in classification and framing values, which can be strong or weak, internal or external.

We still have a connection with the social division of labour and the forms of communication, through the concept of classification, since each category ‘refers to a given social division of labour’ (100) [determined by them?] , although these are also connected to power relations [capable of change] – hence both horizontal and vertical or hierarchical relations are involved.  The concept also relates macro to micro.  Framing refers to the social relations of a given division of such labour, since it relays its practices, or rather its principles.  This is also why a wide range of practices can be analysed.  Everything turns on boundaries and whether they are made explicit, and this is a reformulation of family types, the boundaries between positions, and various kinds of control including the personal.

So everything is now integrated through the notions of classification and framing, and we can use the terms to refer to families, and schools.  The two can be compared, and an intensive study was undertaken of families to construct their pedagogic code and compare them to the school class [this was Neve].  Again the task was to produce detailed descriptions, and then to describe modalities of elaborated code in schools.  It was even possible to suggest different kinds of pedagogic practices, and this was done by Morais [Spanish reference unfortunately] who designed three different practices in terms of variations of classification and framing values, and then produced a detailed teaching protocol for each one and trained a teacher to use the different modalities over two years.  Observations were gathered to make sure that the protocols were used consistently.  A mixed group of pupils were then given tests of scientific reasoning, like those in Piaget, and Neve’s work on families was added.  This ‘remarkable study’ shows exactly the right relationship between theory description and research.

The team then realized that the same language could be used to describe ‘any transmission relation of control’, including those between doctor and patient, social worker and client, prison staff and prisoners and even industrial relations.[They 'realized ' this how -- from empirical observations or as a structuralist commitment?] However, there had been up to then an undue emphasis on the transmission or acquisition of a particular competence, like a curriculum subject [ Morais studied science teaching], not the discourse itself, the subject- specifics of sequencing etc not the general issues. Framing also had to be modified to include the differences between expressive and instrumental orders, so they could be clarified and interrelated.  Ideology was a feature particularly of the moral order so that needed to be made more explicit and descriptions improved.

Another research project, Pedro, attempted to pursue the new developments, following systematic classroom observations of pupils studying maths and language in primary schools in Lisbon.  Tape recordings were then described using the framing at work in the newly specified instructional discourse and regulative discourse [used to be instrumental and expressive orders].  The two could now be different and related.  These two types of discourse also lead to new investigations of classification for both.  A marvellous model on page 103 shows the details and the scope.

Attention now returned to acquisition not just transmission and recognition.  Early work suggested there might be ground rules to guide pupils in the way in which they read what was legitimate in a particular context.  Again social class would act selectively on these.  Ground rules were supplemented by performance rules to produce a text.  Acquisition needed further investigation, and without that, we could not see how codes would ‘bias consciousness’ (104).  The same problem affects Bourdieu in explaining the acquisition and functioning of the habitus.  Ideology here was originally seen as ‘the mode of making relations’ [managing boundaries?]. There was a connection between classification and framing, since these would act selectively on the rules of the acquirer to produce the required text.

Classification for example orientates the speaker to what is expected and what is legitimate, although some children fail to realise this.  Those who are already aware of the difference between the family context and the school context will do much better, and these are more likely to be middle class children.  All depends on a strong classification between family and school, produced by the ‘symbolic power of the middle class family’.  [The implication so far is that all this is arbitrary – at least, it could have been otherwise, with schools valuing lower working class families].  Performance rules to construct specific texts are still required, ‘realization rules’ (105), and these referred to requirements once within the context, so they relate to framing, which now comes to include regulating realization rules.  However, individuals are not simply passive.

The relation between classification and framing and recognition and realization rules was further explored, in a study of the texts offered by children from different social classes.  This included the attempts to classify foodstuffs [described above and here].  The importance of the relation to context became clear, although the data were still not specifically constructed to indicate this [I’m not sure if this is a good or a bad thing – I think the argument is that it might help guarantee that the results were not tautologous?]. 

In another study, Daniels, four schools were selected according to how they varied in their values of classification and framing, following some initial observation and study, with some respondent validation.  Classes were then observed and pedagogic codes described.  Children were asked to talk about topics in art and in science while they were actually taking the lessons, and the responses were offered to teachers to classify in terms of whether they were legitimate text in terms of being either art or science.  Children with different competences were then further interviewed, and teacher judgments were correlated with their competences.  The artwork produced by children was also examined in terms of [teacher?] classification and framing.  The study found that all children had adequate recognition rules to discriminate between science and arts, which was ‘taken to mean that these recognition rules were probably acquired outside the schools’ (107), but realization rules depended on the pedagogic practice and its classification and framing [weak classification and framing lead to ambiguous texts]. Schools apparently failed to teach children to recognise the difference between art and science or how to produce them.  This raises important issues about where these rules originate.  Evidently outside the school, they might relate to more fundamental ways of organizing experience.  In this case, the theory had generated ‘new empirical problems of some importance’.

Another study by Morais examined how pedagogic practices might affect the acquisition of recognition and realization rules in science, focusing on how scientific problems might be solved.  In the Portuguese curriculum, science is divided into knowledge of definitions and formulae, and knowledge of application, and children were invited to identify examples of each.  Then there were given a set of five problems and asked questions about them, resulting in oral responses,  choice of alternative answers, or choice between different statements.  Some children had both recognition and realization rules, others possessed only one or neither.  Both social class background and pedagogic practice were correlated with these characteristics, again with strong framing seeming to produce more acquisition.

It might be useful to clarify what a code is at this stage – ‘a regulative principle, tacitly acquired, which selects and integrates relevant meanings, the form of their realization and evoking contexts’ (109).  This definition is unpacked to produce the conceptual language required to study the distribution of power and control and its connections with pedagogic communication.

Another theme connected pedagogic practices to social class location and ideology.  Initially, this generated the notion of visible [explicit] and invisible pedagogic practice in a range of modalities.  The invisible pedagogies ‘were derived from complex theories of child development, linguistics, gestalten theories and sometimes derivations from psychoanalytic theories’ (109-10).  With invisible pedagogy ‘it is as if’ the pupil is the author of the practice and the authority, implying weak classification.  Visible forms came to be regarded as conservative and invisible ones as progressive, but both had social class assumptions, and both show that acquisition depended on economic and symbolic practices in the family.  Different class fractions sponsored different kinds, within the middle classes.  That fraction located in the field of production, especially economic production supported visible.  The other fraction, located in the ‘field of symbolic control’, working in communication, social services, education or the civil service, supported invisible forms.  That is because those working in symbolic control, ‘control discursive codes’, while producers ‘dominate production codes’.  Either type could actually  work in different sectors, but location produces distinct forms of consciousness and ideology within the middle class, based on divisions of labour in symbolic control and in the economic field, produced largely by the new technologies.  The analysis was pursued in more detail [with a nice diagram on page 111]. [NB this division within classes is used by Bernstein to defend himself against marxist accusations -- actually by the Althusserian Demaine -- that he does not explain class]

Again some empirical research was undertaken, by Jenkins, on the ‘social class basis of progressive education in Britain’.  Progressive educators were identified as members of the New Education Fellowship, active between the wars, and once quite powerful.  Jenkins analysed their journal, the authors and their occupations.  She identified it as advocating invisible pedagogy, deliberately opposing visible forms, and designed to produce emancipation from authoritarian modes of socialization and encourage internationalism.  Most of the authors were found occupied in the field of symbolic control.

In another piece of work, Holland looked at adolescent perceptions of the domestic and industrial division of labour, featuring both sexes and members of both main classes.  Parental occupations were located into different fields.  Adolescent responses classified, with different amounts of strength, gender positions, and hierarchies and movements between classes.  Additional data was reanalysed on socialization practices, divided into positional and personal modes of control.  Mothers located in the symbolic field were more personal and offered weaker classifications of gender boundaries.  However, an unexpected finding was that boys and girls with parents located in the economic field also differed, with boys holding stronger classificatory principles.

Finally, there was a sociolinguistic study by Faria, on how different social groups used languages to refer to themselves.  Again differences between those working in the field of symbolic control and in the economic field were apparent, although they also occupied different social classes.  Differences were found with respect to both field location and class position, although the numbers were small. 

Again we can see how the theory developed through greater articulation to empirical study.  In particular, concepts of social class were refined, so were differences in ideology and pedagogic sponsoring.

[It went the other way too].The specific focus on pedagogic codes was placed in a wider context of symbolic control.  First pedagogic discourse itself was seen as divided according to the actions of groups of specialised agents with their own interests, sometimes competing ones [eg ORF and PRF as above].  They were operating in fields of production, reproduction, and recontextualization.  The latter activity involved selective delocation and relocation, a form of ‘ideological transformation according to the play of specialised interests among the various positions’ (114) [presumably occupational ideology].  At the same time, state regulation was increasing.

This led to work on the pedagogic device and the various ways in which it was realized, the distinction between the relay and what is relayed.  In particular this highlighted the grammar of pedagogic discourse – distributive rules, recontextualizing rules and evaluative rules [explained in other chapters].  The pedagogic device is ‘a symbolic ruler, ruling consciousness, in the sense of having power over it, and ruling, in the sense of measuring the legitimacy of the realizations of consciousness’ [the power and notions of legitimacy of the professional agents at work in the pedagogic field, which might include the state?].  There is always a struggle between social groups [agents as above?] over the device, and this is about ‘perpetuating power through discursive means’.

Empirical research on these models lead to work by Bernstein and Diaz, and by Cox, with the latter also relating back to the notions of symbolic control occupations.  The work was focused on educational change in Chile, and the support for different options by the different political parties.  Policies were described and compared, and the implementation of these policies in the education system were described.  The struggle for control over the education system was then seen as the struggle between different class fractions [in alliance] , whose interests arose from their class habitus.  Again considerable specification had to take place to do empirical research, and the activities of the official recontextualizing field compared to those of the pedagogic recontextualizing field.  These were established by examining educational documents and interviewing key personnel.  The occupational composition of the different parties was examined, comparing their roots in either production or in discourse.  Those rooted in discourse ‘were concerned to declassify the educational system and weaken all classification and framing, in particular between education and production (similar to the Chinese model)’ (117).  Those rooted in production upheld strong classifications and frames, but in the interest of empowering the working classes.  The crisis led to a broader political crisis. Cox’s empirical explorations clearly influenced the development of the theory, and the requirements of his research led to clarification at different levels and relationships.

Swope investigated informal pedagogy with adults, sponsored by the catholic church in Chile.  There was a struggle over groups known as the Base Christian Communities, and the theological discourse in this case was compared with the actual practice of these Communities.  Here, there was no recontextualizing field, however, between strongly classified and framed theological discourse, and actual pedagogy, few guides to practice: the church relied on its own institutional forms of control.  Again considerable observation of meetings and interviews took place.  Actual pedagogy consisted of the discussion of every day problems brought forward by members, which were dealt with by the theological codes of different kinds, all varying according to their secular elements.  This was a successful application to nonofficial pedagogic discourse in informal contexts, and showed the flexibility of the theory.

Singh studied the introduction of computing as a specialised discourse in primary schools, using ethnographic techniques to examine interactions with a computer in four Australian primary schools.  There were also interviews in ‘an exceptionally systematic study’ of how computing became a pedagogic discourse and how it was institutionalised (119).  There was a special interest on gender differences among the students.  Singh was able to apply pedagogic rules of production recontextualization and evaluation to actual discursive interactions.  She argued that the results showed the emergence of a form of technocratic masculinity to privilege the boys, against a more domestic form provided for the girls.  This introduced a new element for the theory to incorporate – ‘the process of production, fixing and canalising of desire’ (120).  It was also the first study of the emergence of computing as a pedagogic discourse, relating to both macro and micro levels.

Overall, theory and research have been closely related, and earlier concepts have been refined into later ones.  The concepts of classification and framing were decisive.  Looking back on the criteria for a good theory, the issues of clarification have been successfully adapted, and there has been a useful focus on actual modalities of transmission and acquisition.  However, there is less support for the project to identify ‘the various realizations of members, groups/classes/agencies as cultural displays of a specialised consciousness’, despite the efforts to clarify the effects of different locations in occupational systems or families.

The project was carried forward by a number of Ph.D. students, with Morais (Domingo) producing the most exhaustive study.  All the concrete researchers made demands upon the theory and helped develop strong principles of description.  They also created further theoretical issues, as suggested.  [An addition is the discovery by Faria that forms of self referents could either be metaphoric or metonymic, and again this varied according to occupation in symbolic or production fields].  Other researchers picked up gender differences of various kinds.  There was a process of subsequent rationalisation of the theory, but in practice much ‘depended upon who knocked on the door and with what problem’ (121).  Others not connected with Bernstein also did some research, but many outsiders did not appreciate the context or the detailed processes involved in applying the models.  [One example turns on the rebuke by Bourdieu that Bernstein’s elaborated code is fetishized: ironically, he then goes on to argue that language and its categories, including decoding should depend on the complexity of the language spoken in the family environment!]. Textbooks and commentaries have also produced a misleading impression of the theory and its range of research, partly because the research crossed subject disciplines.  More research is still required, however.

On methodology, the issue is forms of symbolic control as regulators of cultural reproduction and change, especially those forms appearing as pedagogic practices, both formal and informal.  The modelling agencies and agents and practices themselves reveal varieties or modalities; the organising principles themselves reproduce class relations, so the two issues are connected, even though the theory might be more successful in one case than the other, and we might think that the first issue is logically prior.

It looks as if the theory offers opposed dichotomies with each side as an ideal type [elaborated/restricted and so on] yet these are not ideal types, which assemble a number of features abstracted from a phenomenon [those are empirical types -- ideal; types have a notion of the 'ideal', that is the essential] .  These categories are generated by a principle, however, which can produce a number of different forms.  Some early categories [positional/personal, stratified/differentiated, open/closed] were generated on the basis of boundary rules keeping some things apart and others together. We could ask about the interests involved, seeing boundaries as a matter of power.  However, the ‘generating grammar’ of these early dichotomies was weak, and this had to be strengthened – hence the development of classification and framing.

In terms of theoretical traditions, the whole approach has always had ‘Durkheimian roots’ (124), Durkheim is often seen as a conservative functionalist positivist, a view which originated in the USA and the reception of Suicide, and which connected Durkheim to Parsons.  In response, Bernstein perhaps ‘unashamedly waved the Durkheim banner’.  However, the structural emphasis, especially connecting with linguistics was the main influence, although it would still be ‘a little too excluding of other influences’ to describe the whole approach as structuralist.  There is an interest in discovering the systems of rules involved, and to make explicit conventions which govern the production of meaning, but this does not always involve the notion of a linguistic system external to the actors involved.  In particular, social change is given more emphasis, relating to the acquisition of codes, but also to extrinsic influences.  In particular, codes also provide us with ‘the potential of disordering’ [I must say I think this is only acknowledged as a formal possibility, as a kind of deviance arising from necessary complexity or cultural lag.  The conflicts described are not really traced to ambiguities or contradictions in codes].  External contexts are also important, especially the power relations attach to different social groups and how they lead to struggle.

Overall, systems do not determine practices.  At the micro level, message can change voice, framing in interaction can change classifications [still not the explicitly addressed].  Thus ‘the theory of ideology I have found the most congenial, in the sense of resonating with the problems addressed, is that of Althusser: the imaginary subject’ (125) [very baffling –Bernstein agrees on economic determinism in the last instance? On social class?  Does Althusser provide a sufficient description of disorder and the potential for change?].

The work on pedagogic discourse shows the limits of calling this structuralism.  It shows both the openness of discourse and the attempts to close it, and here there is a link with Foucault [just seems like hat doffing to me rather than a serious attempt to locate his work in other traditions].  Any attempt to label the project tends to overemphasise particular sections of it: ‘one’s allegiance is less to an approach and more to exploring a problematic’.

The process is best described in terms of the theory producing models to produce modalities of control on the basis of the set of rules, with hypothetical consequences.  Models should be capable of identifying particular specifications, recognition rules to identify something external.  Usually, this will identify more information than the model itself calls for.  Realization rules of the model should regulate the description and produce relevant data, but not simply by limiting data to what appears consonant, to avoid circularity.  There must be a discursive gap between the rules and their realization, which will protect ‘the integrity of something to exist in its own right’ (126). Principles of description will never exhaust the information provided, but some descriptions are more open than others.  Theory saturates the process up to the stage of description, but it need not constrain the steps excessively.  Models, descriptions and criteria are essential in all research, but the criteria should be explicit, and so should the voice of the person speaking – at least this will lead to subsequent deconstruction.

Subsequent notes take up the cruelties of some of the commentaries, and their selective focuses.

An appendix refers to subsequent work by Hasan and her colleagues on the occupational background of groups of mothers as they are undertake book reading to their children, describing the activities in terms of functional grammar and semantic variations.  The latter has been developed, partly through an enormous empirical study with 20,000 examples of spontaneous conversations between mothers and children.  Differences between high autonomy professionals and low autonomy professionals emerged strongly, ranging from constructing the individual as the unique subject to using various kinds of invisible pedagogies, with clear links to positional and personal modes in families.  Great care is taken not to support deficit theories, and she does identify the differences in terms of maintaining or challenging hierarchy respectively rather than as a matter of the superiority of middle class practices.

Chapter 7 Research and Languages of Description

This follows on from the previous chapter and shows  further developments.  It shows more clearly how the discursive gap appears between the descriptions generated by the model and the 'potential enactments of the described' (131), which explains how the described reacts back reflexively.

Things have changed and the contemporary context for university research, with the new funding and regulation bodies like the ESRC, and HEFCE, which have insisted on effective research training, and generally have increased pressures of time and resources on applicants for funding.  Sometimes there are also recommendations for a particular type of sample or research design.  The Ph.D. has now become 'a driving licence rather than a licence to explore' (132), with pressures to complete.

Theoretical and methodological innovations are no longer encouraged, and there is a tendency for languages of description to become merely 'routinized procedures and quick fixes' [quick and unproblematic codes I would have thought].  The move to qualitative methodology generates complex and extensive texts, where these quick fixes are hard to apply.  Description in general is not prioritised, for example in textbooks, and procedures for managing it normally just  suggest 'introspection, on the one hand, or telling quotations on the other'.  Research students encounter a ' botanical garden (nicely domesticated and epistemologically labelled)', but this is abstracted from more creative and constructive procedures, which now have become invisible.  This context of regulation determines the choice of methods and procedures, rather than the research itself.

Languages of description involve translating one language into another, and this may be both internal and external.  Internally, the conceptual language needs to be created, and externally, it is then used to describe something other than itself.  Sociological languages of description are often stronger internally than externally.  For example the concept habitus links to epistemological problems of agency and structure, but is not really described 'with reference to the particular ordering principles for strategies which give rise to the formation of a particular habitus' (133).  The specific formation of one is not described.  We recognise them from their outputs not inputs.  As a results, 'there is no necessity between the concept or ['and', surely] what counts as a realization'. We can retain the concept as something good to think with, and it might alert us to new possibilities, acting as a metaphor, with manifestations as metonyms.

If internal languages create new invisibles, external languages of description make them visible, but 'in a non circular way'.  We are not just doing content analysis, which implies that something exists already to be inspected.  Instead, description constructs what is to count as something empirical, and translates it to the conceptual.  It enables the internal language to be 'activated as a reading device or vice versa'.  Description involves rules for the 'unambiguous recognition of what is to count', and then reading empirical data as enactments of empirical relations - recognition and realization rules.  With real research, the internal language often consists of 'orientations, condensed intimations, metaphors which point to relevancies' (134).

In the classic empirical context, what results is itself not described except statistically, and all the imaginative effort lies in the design of the experimental context.  Here it is the realization rule which is the important one, and it becomes an issue of designing a context which creates an unambiguous response, which does not need to be described in detail, although it does have to be recognized.  In the opposite case, ethnography, performers produce recognition and realization rules and an implicit model from which they are derived, and the researcher has to find the rules and the model.  Ethnographers have to learn the language and know the rules relating it to contextual use, to grasp how members construct their various texts, by modeling their recognition and realization rules and their strategies for practice which result.  The underlying model is the important one if we are to avoid mere description. At the same time, it is not just a matter of grasping the potential semantic of the culture as the members see it, and some additional language of description is required operating at the external level: it must be capable of doing more than just recording the descriptions of members.  These two processes go on at the same time, so that the expert language of description is rarely free of the members' language, although it should be.  Without a gap, mere description is the only possibility, and there is also an ethical issue if we believe that those researched should be able to redescribe their native descriptions.  At the same time, expert languages of description cannot just refer to theoretical categories unknown to participants, because this will silence them.  Instead, it should interpret, offer a dialogue between the actors and the internal language of the model.

As an example, the work on family controls of children [above, ch. 6] showing variations in communication might be developed.  The early simpler distinction was between positional and personal, and this can be described in a theoretical language in terms of variations of classification and framing, at least eventually, but not at the time.  From the original theory relating to the boundaries inside families a model was developed, referring to two principal axes - one relating to general attributes of the controlled as opposed to particular ones [positional and personal]; the second relating to the discretion allowed to the child in terms of the discursive space permitted [high or low]. This model produced modes of control and different sorts of communication at the theoretical level, the problem was then to generate 'theoretically relevant data', with the test that the researched could also describe their practices in terms provided by the model.  The empirical data were reports of mothers about how they would control their child in various hypothetical contexts, but overall, the nature of the data is not relevant, and it could equally well have been observations.

Moving away from the theory for a moment, control relations were considered as offering potential semantics, with the abstract possibilities realized in different specific forms of interaction, as 'repertoires' for the actors (137).  It is not possible to know in advance whether this is a successful model or not, but at least it is making potentials 'better known'.  The semantic potentials could then be seen as producing 'a set of independent subsystems'[rationale, avoidance, appeal and so on as above], with binary choices available to controllers in each [eg make justification available or not].  Empirical patterns of control would offer a series of subsystems as well as choices within them, and they might even be ordered in different contexts.  At least we have proceeded to construct a descriptive language that is actually independent of the theory and its model.  [I wonder how independent it really was in practice.  This descriptive language seems to have been conjured out of thin air].

The specific control contexts are relevant to the theory.  We can revise the formal model as offering modes of regulation by focusing on choice points within particular systems - expected variations within a subsystem.  However, we still have no guidance about the choice of subsystems.  This produced further development, requiring a need to specify the potential semantic within any discursive space; explain choices within particular subsystems, relating back to the theoretical model; describe any interactions with the information itself to see if further extensions to networks [branching sets of categories and subcategories]  or systems are involved [using what seems to be a standard coding procedure - whether information can be fitted in or not to a subsystem by making it more general]

There are available tests of reliability of the translator performing these links between the two languages.  The binary nature of the choices available should lead to decisions that are unambiguous and explicit, and this is the case for the descriptive language.  However, there is still a problem of acquiring this descriptive language.  The test here is whether the translator can 'recognise and formulate acceptable sentences' in that language (139), and a competent speaker of the descriptive language might be used to train new translators and produce the necessary 'intuitive grasp' which accompanies a knowledge of the rules.  The sentences produced by the translator can be tested further, to see if they are well formed, for example, or to ask the translator to produce acceptable sentences which go beyond the actual examples.  Apparently, Hasan has done this in the most elaborate way, and so has Dowling.  Network analysis in Halliday is also the source, apparently, although his followers have done less work on description.

Properly formulated, a language of description goes beyond the theory and its model and can therefore be used to test the theory.  However, current conditions probably mean that the time needed to develop such a language may well be inadequate.

As an example of a further subsystem their work, the rationale subsystem can be developed [with a diagram on 140], first into child/mother/context components, with each of these divided into universal/specific [unconditional/conditional for context], and then each of those divided into positional/personal options [more options for context].  Some examples taken from the conversations are then used to illustrate particular kinds of statement.  Apparently, 'the network coded nearly all the rationales offered', and any that did not fit could be covered by even more subdivisions.  Overall, what results is 'a very differentiated picture', and this also shows how 'the description respects the responses'.

Chapter 8 Sociolinguistics: a personal view

The interest in language grew out of dissatisfaction with functionalist notions of socialization.  That was before the notion that discourse was something separate from social structure.  The influences included Luria and Vygotsky and Cassirer (Philosophy of Symbolic Forms).  Experience was provided by teaching post office messenger boys in London.  There has never been much connection with sociolinguistics, the initial problem was to find how to analyse speech that had been collected.

The meeting with Halliday was crucial, providing a systematic theory of description 'A semantic network of choices' (146) have already been worked out, but it needed a linguistic theory based on meaning and its patterns, something that offer the unit 'above the level of the sentence'.  This appeared in what was then called 'Scale and Category grammar'.  Hasan provided further contributions on semantic variation.  She also help to argue that Labov restricted himself to social diagnostics, rather than seeing language is a matter of power and consciousness, or maintenance and change of social institutions.

The empirical research drove the enquiries.  Linguistics was already heading towards micro level interactive analyses of conversations.  Dell Hymes and John Gumperz were exceptions in maintaining a social dimension, extending beyond the construction of order by members themselves.  Ethnomethodology was then in its 'messianic stage'(147).  Competence came to the fore in a number of social sciences.  This was not seen as limited to particular cultures, and competence somehow escaped power relations.  It was 'intrinsically creative, informally, tacitly acquired, in non formal interactions'.  There is a certain antagonism to formal and explicit language, seen in the derogatory terms 'lame' in Labov, 'ear'ole'in Willis.  This opposed the notion of deficits and replaced it with difference.  Everyday language was celebrated, official socialization was seen as suspicious and as supporting hierarchy.  There was a resonance with liberal and radical ideologies of the 1960s.

The idealism of the analysis removes it from discussions of power and control which select more specialist modes.  Except that 'some differences are legitimised as superior by dominant groups'(148), and any inadequacies in every day competence shows the effects of these contexts.  Code theory was a 'selectively recontextualized ', and it became important ideologically to critique Bernstein.  However, little of theoretical significance was added, despite a new energy for some interdisciplinary work.

Later sociolinguistics supported Bernstein's view, although the potential for sociology was limited by the narrow focus on what counted as the social.  Complex questions remain including how linguistic theories limit social possibilities, and vice versa.  Problems of arriving at suitable descriptions and translations indicates the difficulty.  Ideally, theory should operate both horizontally and vertically, describing context specific encounters, but 'in a language which can transpose the intra contextual into the inter contextual' (149).  The focus on meaning is crucial to do this, since meanings vary according to particular contexts, and indicate relations of power and control.  Sociolinguistics can provide an notion of the potential semantic capabilities of particular subsystems, which will then reveal modalities of control, which can in turn be seen as 'signifiers of different forms of symbolic control' (150).


Labov's famous paper on the logic of non standard English became famous in the competence approach if.  Allegedly, black working class argument is succinct and logical, whereas middle class black English is verbose and redundant, but 'this is an unwarranted conclusion.  Both arguments are logical, as judged by rules of inference, but the modalities of the argument are different', and so they can not be simply judged.  It might even be the case that the middle class black speaker has access to two forms of argument, while the working class one accesses only one. Labov evaluates the content, but he should be interested in the form of the argument.  It is also the case, that the interviewers offer more probes to the working class speaker to help him structure his argument.  Some other questions to the middle class speaker are obscure and unclear, but no probes are followed up.  Ironically, the liberal ideology insists that differences are deficits here.

The work about the importance of context clearly shows the effect of context and the management of interaction, but Labov does not describe why the contexts were so different, and how they differed.  Again, we could see the fluent speech in the informal context as showing the restriction to context again.  The point however is to demonstrate underlying competence.  The role played by the controls of socio linguistic rules in different contexts is not analysed.  Again, probes vary.  Labov comes to conclusions about competence without examining the context which includes in this case the role of skilled interviewers.  Even in the informal situation, Bernstein finds the replies pretty minimal, and again ascribes importance to the social constraints exercised by white respondents -but it could be down to the form of the discourse itself.

Finally, the examples result from an unusual 'interrogative instructional discourse', itself rather specialised.  Children are still positioned.  Isolating them like this in the specific discourses removes them from the social base and its competences.  However, in informal situations, children are restored to their social base and can draw upon its competences.  However, there is still asymmetry when the boys talk to the interviewers, compared to when they talk to each other - in the latter case, 'they had both draw on common rules and shared knowledge' (153).  Even so, Labov describes these interactions, which are mostly matters of affirmation or negation, as fluent speech.  This again imposes criteria are not relevant to the context and is also 'in an important respect…  Patronising'. However, Labov's analysis is 'virtually sacrosanct'.

For Bernstein, what we have here are examples of language embedded in different social bases, and displaying different rules and competences.  'It has little to do with asymmetry', more to do with asking questions from the outside of the context, compared to utterances generated within it.  What we need is more analysis of the social bases of these modalities, an analysis of the distribution of power and control.  We would get further by using the code thesis.

Chapter 9.  Vertical and Horizontal Discourse: An Essay

Earlier the work looked at pedagogic transmission in the form of code modalities, but the curriculum was only discussed in terms of classification and framing.  What was being transmitted became the focus of analysis in the form of the pedagogic device, although this still assumed particular forms of the discourse.  When we look at these forms, we can see that one is essentially written and the other essentially oral, or in the terms of Bourdieu, aimed at symbolic and practical mastery.  For Habermas, the split lies between life world and system.  Giddens sees the difference between expert systems, which disembed individuals from their local experience.  All sorts of other terms are found, usually operating with different contrasts and at different levels of experience [the list on page 156 includes distinctions between subjective and objective epistemology, and spontaneous vs. contrived evaluations].  Bernstein says these actually go together in whole sets.  They underpin the difference between school knowledge and every day common sense knowledge, or official and local knowledge.  They attract ideological evaluations, and expert knowledge is sometimes seen as a form of domination, leaving local knowledge as a 'voice of unrecognised potential' (156).  However, differences between them are often exaggerated and one tends to be romanticised - what we need is another language of description which will also connect them to social bases, and we can judge its success by looking to 'whether it leads to new research possibilities'.

We begin by distinguishing vertical and horizontal discourses as forms of knowledge.  Common sense belongs to horizontal discourse, and it is oral, local and context dependent, sometimes internally contradictory,especially between segments.  It is segmentally organized, but not all segments are equally important.  Vertical discourses are 'coherent, explicit and systematically principled' (157) with specialised languages and investigative procedures.  They are often marked by strong distributive rules regulating access and transmission.  They develop by being recontextualised and evaluated, within those distributive rules.

Horizontal discourses are aimed at 'maximising encounters with persons and habitats', in a local and segmented context.  Individuals possess a number of strategies to do this, their repertoire, while the whole community possesses a reservoir of complete sets of strategies.  Each one possesses 'analogic potential'.  Individual repertoires have a common nucleus but also specific differences, according to the status of the member and the context.  Horizontal discourses aims to extend the reservoir, however, and this will depend on the isolation of the individuals who can exchange their repertoires [in the example, two smallholders exchange information about how to grow more crops].  Exchanges are obviously limited if there are restrictions such as privatized knowledge embedded in distributive rules.  There is a clear connection between the relations in the discourse and social relations, and horizontal discourse reflects this in the way in which it structures consciousness and produces social solidarity.  It is acquired through a pedagogy, aimed at acquiring different knowledges, but these knowledges are related through 'functional relations of segments'(159): there is no internal principle to integrate different knowledges.  Thus the pedagogy is also segmental, and might indeed vary with the particular segment in question, which might introduce differences between social groups or classes.  Another difference will arise in terms of the access of these groups to vertical discourse.

Segmental pedagogy is usually face to face and has 'a strong affective loading'.  It is sometimes 'tacitly transmitted by modeling'.  It might be limited to the context or segment.  It aims at developing 'a common competence rather than a graded performance', although members can still compete with each other 'on the basis of these common competencies'.  There is a clear relevance to the every day life of the learner and specific immediate goals.  Context itself is not taken as problematic.  However, even 'local literacies' can be flexible [and specialist a note argues] , since an actual repertoire of strategies can be extensive and variable, requiring choice even within the context.

Vertical discourse is coherent and principled and hierarchical, with specialised languages and criteria for the production of texts, as in the natural sciences humanities or social sciences.  There is no segmental organisation.  There is integration at the level of meanings, displayed in 'specialised symbolic structures of explicit knowledge' (160).  There is an institution or official pedagogy which is not limited to context but which is 'an ongoing process in extended time'.  Social units of acquisition are still as 'arbitrary'as those in horizontal discourse [that is controlled by various evaluating constructing and distributing groups and individuals], and both 'have an arbitrary pedagogic base' constructed by distributive rules.

We can explore this further by thinking of hierarchical knowledge structures and horizontal knowledge structures ['hierarchies' and 'horizontals'].  [This moves us away from the difference between official knowledge and common sense, and on to divisions within official knowledge itself] Hierarchies are shaped like a triangle, and include very general propositions and theories at abstract levels which integrate knowledge or lower levels.  We can understand this as possessing 'an integrating code' (161).  Horizontals on the other hand have a series of specialised languages with their own investigative procedures - like the specialised languages of criticism in English, the various theoretical options in philosophy or sociology.  Each of the specialised languages also have ideolects or theories associated with particularly favoured speakers.  There are joined together by collection or serial codes, not integration but accumulation.

In hierarchies, development takes place by generating more or more integrating general theories, but in horizontals, the languages do not translate into each other and indeed are often opposed in terms of what they regard as legitimate.  [So what does unite them?  Official and institutional support for regional groupings? The scholastic field?] This provides a specific form of capital for the speakers of each language, and this provides particular characteristics of the horizontal knowledge field [presumably, competitive as in Bourdieu].  Development occurs through the introduction of a new language offering a fresh perspective and a new set of questions and speakers, often of the new generation.

The opposing theories in hierarchies can be seen as analogous to those oppositions between languages in horizontals, but differences remain.  Opposition between theories can involve attempts to refute or to incorporate rivals, and there is a rational choice available 'provided the issue can be settled by empirical procedures'[not actually falsification]. [This is the real difference betweeen the two and is reasserted below].  Opposition between languages involves defensive mechanisms, arguing that each approach is unique and non translatable, showing 'essential narcissism', and the challenges to capture new markets or to become hegemonic.  [Owes a lot toPopper on the distinction between science and other approaches.  Again compare Kuhn, Latour or just about anybody recent on this view of the rationality and testability of science].

If we turn to acquisition, one problem with horizontals is acquiring a range of languages.  Some will have 'an explicit conceptual syntax capable of relatively precise empirical descriptions' (163) or the capacity to model empirical relations - 'strong grammars'.  The distinction between strong and weak is only relative with horizontals, however.  Those with strong grammars include economics, linguistics and parts of psychology.  Mathematics and logic have strong grammars, but horizontal knowledge structures [this looks arbitrary to put it mildly], and do not have empirical referents [so what does the strong grammar do here?  Define mathematical objects?  Or is this a case where modeling outweighs empirical description?].  Sociology, social anthropology and cultural studies have weak grammars [all of them?  Mathematical sociology or structural social anthropology?  Cultural studies seems the only one that really fits, as with the very weak grammar of concepts like hegemony]. Grammars addressed to empirical phenomena can be applied rigorously, but at the cost of exclusion of meaning [which seems to be one reason why he likes Halliday as opposed to more formal grammars]

With hierarchicals like physics, there are strong boundaries around the subject, leading to no problems for the acquirer in defining an adequate text [kids still need to be able to recognise the power relation in the context though?] .  The shift from one theory to another 'does not signal a break in the language'[never any ambiguity?].  In social sciences, however these problems arise producing anxiety about whether the acquirer 'is really speaking or writing sociology'(164).  'Canonical names' come to the rescue, and they are later associated with languages: the process of managing names and languages become central.  However, the selection of a language and what it privileges becomes important, and this is recontextualised as a matter of asking whose perspective we are examining and how it is generated or legitimated.  'Choice here is not rational', not based on truth, because truth itself is language specific [challenges to truth are implicit in critique?].  The power relations among advocates might be important, or pressures emanating from market or state.  Behind each perspective 'is a position in a relevant intellectual field/arena'.

Acquirers often cannot see the principles of recontextualization, the 'invisible perspective'.  They need to acquire a 'gaze', a particular way of recognizing and realizing what is authentic.  This gaze is transmitted tactically, perhaps through oral transmission or social interaction.  The gaze is less important with hierarchicals, since the principles of investigation can be mastered independently, and the imaginative potential of the language can be deferred until later, although some grasp of the potential is acquired at an early stage.

The theory itself is what counts with hierarchicals, and this produces both the empirical power and the 'imaginative conceptual projection' (165).  It is still possible to encounter rival pathways to truth, and to have to choose, as in biology.  The social base might be important here, and it will always intrude into recontextualization for transmission, where interests can be influential, including economic ones.  However, legitimate texts can be produced in a less tacit way.

There is a resemblance between horizontal discourses and horizontal knowledge [that is between common sense knowledge and some aspects of theoretical knowledge like that of the social sciences].  Thus resemblance include sources of volatility, which may be related to different referents in the one, and the need to acquire different languages in the other.  At a  deeper level, horizontal discourse involves an acquisition of a particular view of cultural reality, not so much a realisation of reality, and this is like the gaze.

Hierarchicals and horizontals are engaged in a fight for linguistic hegemony.  There is a competition between different gazes in horizontals, and between different integrating principles in verticals.  Strategies might be similar, although the issues are different.  The influence of the field might be different in each case.

Differences might arise in horizontals according to whether the grammar is strong or weak - strong grammar might limit the number of possible languages.  Is this an internal matter alone?  All the academic horizontals study human behaviour in one form or another, and they 'share a similar linguistic organisation' to the humanities.  Why have they not developed hierarchical knowledge?  They can even have similar methods to the natural sciences, as Popper insisted, and they do have a certain common method, which extends to the humanities.

Developments in social sciences might be related to external factors, for example changes in societal development, and we might correlate the expansion of sociology with those periods - noticing for example the increase in practitioners with the onset of rapid economic cultural and technological change in the last 40 years. [So an increase in moral density?]   Generational struggle has become an important element as well.  However, we cannot agree with Bourdieu that this is just a matter of new class habituses entering the field - this is necessary but not sufficient.  It is possible that the languages in sociology 'have an inbuilt redundancy', relating to the past, so that social change weakens their hegemony.

Again it is a feature of horizontal discourse to refer to the past, and this contaminates horizontal knowledge structures.  It arises because the context informs sensibility and embeds it in local contexts of time and space.  Horizontal language limits possibilities 'because of its limited set [limited in practice?] of [the potential of] combinatory rules'(167).  Speakers use such language mostly to reflect on current experiences and practices.  The same affects the social sciences which also refer largely to the time period of their applications.  This produces redundancy, against 'an expectation of change'.  Weak grammar also permits the intrusion of  'idiosyncratic terms' at the level of description, and these help create relevant descriptions.  Weak grammar also highlights issues of language, and generates speakers obsessed with them, leading to constant construction and deconstruction.

This produces the need for an 'obsessive initiation' into using specialised languages, especially where weak grammar fails to deliver 'specific unambiguous empirical descriptions' which can challenge them and lead to rejection or development.  This trend is demonstrated in sociology textbooks which emphasize specialised languages, epistemologies and methodologies rather than methods to undertake empirical research.  [A rather mystifying diagram appears on page 168 to summarise the discussion.  It adds that  weak grammars often require explicit pedagogies, while the sciences often demonstrate through showing or modeling. This also provides a special case for crafts, which have vertical discourses, but horizontal knowledge structures - all very puzzling]. [I think all knowledges have vertical and horizontal dimensions -- eg the philosophical extensions and roots of the different sociological persepctives add verticality, and some are colonising -- eg ethnomethodology claimed to incorporate and replace sociology, as did marxism or Wittgensteinian linguistics]

This is a major difference with hierarchicals.  There might well be struggles over particular theories, but there is a general need to deliver empirical expectations [modelling seems to have been dropped] .  Specific theories fade if they fail to meet these expectations or if they get absorbed into a more general theory, despite particular strategies in the field to preserve them.  In some cases, experimental procedures are inadequate, and here, plausibility depends on relations with more established theories.

As a results, segments of horizontal discourses are recontextualised and turned into school subjects, but even here effective acquisition is in doubt.  Nevertheless, those used to a horizontal discourse might still find it difficult if the recontextualization turns a segment into a vertical discourse [as it must do if it is going to develop assessment?].  Sometimes, segments of horizontal discourse can become 'resources to facilitate access to vertical discourse', if distributive rules of the school allow it.  The intention can often be to improve the student's ability to deal with issues arising in their life worlds.  Similarly, the vertical discourses can provide a set of strategies for improving the effectiveness of repertoires in horizontal discourse. [So more arguments for hybridity].  Horizontal discourse can also increase 'pedagogic populism in the name of empowering or unsilencing voices' (170), and spontaneous text on the part of students can be officially welcomed.  The same trend is found in HE, with the 'confessional narratives of a variety of feminist and black studies' and in the new ethnography with its use of extensive quotations seen as evidence.

For all these reasons segments of horizontal discourse are now appearing in vertical discourses, although they are still distributed according to rules, for example which make them marginal knowledges, or valued only for particular social groups.  This is Maton [rendered here as Marton] on the shift from knowledge to knower.  It is also a shift from equality of opportunity to recognition of diversity or voice.  The trend is towards colonising of vertical discourses, but 'there may be more at stake'for equality than is revealed by simple attacks on elitism.

We have spelled out some implications for the division between specialist and everyday knowledge, by looking at the social basis.  We've developed a new language of description, to generate new research issues.  We have demonstrated an 'interdependence between properties internal to the discourse and the social context, field/arena in which they are enacted and constituted'[not a simple dualism between epistemic and social relations, then, as in Maton].  'Briefly, "relations within" and "relations to" should be integrated in the analysis'.  Other implications include the role of the gaze in horizontals.  It is also possible that the different languages found in horizontals like sociology really reflect the world views of different individuals and groups, 'the various ways the social is imaged by the complex, projections arising out of the relationships between individuals and groups'[surely a misplaced comma after complex?].  Fractured realities might produce the 'invisible energy' of acquiring new languages.  Ultimately, there is a need to shift to empirical descriptions, however, from language to a problem.  Latour agrees, apparently, in his distinction between canons and their establishment, and the dynamic interactions of research.  Sociology should similarly challenge its languages by research, not replacing them but repositioning them.

A note points out that the activity of critique in social sciences is also aimed at different languages and their omissions rather than anything empirical [depends].  Expansion and diversity of HE is given as a further pressure towards an extension of horizontals.  Gaze is attributed to Foucault, and Dowling apparently combines it with Bernstein on recontextualization - Bernstein says it depends on recontextualizing, a matter of de and relocation, which is a move away from concrete practice to a more imaginary or virtual perspective.  This ties in the concept of gaze to the acquirer not to the discourse.  Another note on Latour recognises the truth emerges from the relative weight of networks, so that nature cannot be separated out from society any more.  However, scientific processes can emerge to a state where there is no longer any social mediation, and it must also 'work discursively' (173).  Note 10 denies any simple determinism in the section about social change affecting discourses, and notes that particular social changes have to be interpreted as a challenge first, in other words a theory of social change is required, from within specialised languages.  On pedagogic populism, Bernstein agrees that it is crucial for students to know that their experiences are recognized and valued, but more is required in pedagogy itself, especially the way in which it classifies and frames.  This in turn will lead to a possible challenge of the status quo and its institutional structural and interactional features.  Finally, the BJSE is seen as a site for the new populist ethnography in particular.

[With these last two chapters, we come across Bernstein at his most defensive, and also at his most elusive.  He is keen to defend himself against critics, especially those who want to evoke Bourdieu, but his defence is not at all like the one that Maton proposes on his behalf.  Briefly, Maton suggests that Bourdieu overdoes the political and social dimensions of educational knowledge, that there is something that transcends those dimensions, and Maton uses terms like 'the sacred', or 'the real'to allude to those dimensions.  Bernstein himself seems to take a different stance, which consists of saying that he emphasises the political and social every bit as much as Bourdieu does, and almost apologises for the 'structural' bits that are obviously derived from the split between the sacred and profane - also known as the unthinkable and the thinkable, or the context free and the context bound.  Bernstein admits that those elements are there, but wants to downplay them.

In the process, it all gets rather confused.  Bernstein is able to cite examples from the huge range of his work which apparently qualify the positions that these critics accuse him of.  At the same time, he seems to endlessly refine the terminology, distinguishing between codes and rules, for example, or saying that classification and framing now imply strategies. We also have ambiguous terms like 'translation' between levels. Bizarre examples do not help.  The very existence of these constant reformulations and specific defences is actually rather suspicious, and suggests that there is considerable ambiguity or incoherence at the heart of it all after all.]

Chapter 10 Codes and Their Positioning: a case study in misrecognition

[This is a rather cross reply to Harker and May who have compared Bernstein unfavourably with Bourdieu. If Taylor and Francis weren't so mean in providing access to their old journal articles, I would read H and M for myself.

Bourdieu is quoted to accuse Bernstein of fetishizing legitimate language by failing to trace it back to the class elements of its production and reproduction, or even to the education system.  Bernstein denies this using quotes from his earlier work on the evident basis for the principles in social relationships connected to institutions and the wider situation.  The social relations select meanings to be verbalised; they also provide a material base for forms like restricted coding, with the more complex forms of division of labour increasing the possibility of elaborated coding.  However, codes do not originate in the productive system, 'but in kinship systems and religious systems, that is, in the field of symbolic control' (176).  They are however located in distribution networks [by accident?] arising from 'modes of social solidarity, oppositionally positioned in the process of production, and differentially acquired in the process of formal education'

Legitimate language should not be confused with the concept of code, even if it refers to elaborated codes, which Bourdieu probably meant.  We cannot understand social positioning by looking at legitimate language and its operation, and that would be anyway 'difficult to achieve'.  What code theory does instead is to understand that dominant and dominated principles regulate communication between social groups, and this is dependent upon the distribution of power and principles of control [so almost no independence for codes outside power struggles?].  This fights off charges of fetishism [but only by making the whole thing even more social deterministic].

What his critics suffer from is '"reading omnipotence"' (177), where anything which questioned your own interpretation is left unread.  More quotes follow to show that Bernstein has discussed the institutionalisation of elaborated codes.  This indicates class assumptions which are found at their clearest in the '"classification and framing of educational knowledge and in the ideology they express"'[quoting earlier work].  Bourdieu must have known this because he was responsible for translating Bernstein on classification and framing in an edited collection.

The origin of the codes does not lie with Piaget and genetic structuralism, but with Vygotsky and Luria, on speech as a the regulating system.  Vygotsky opposes Piaget precisely on the role of the social in apparently abstract generative structuralism.

Further misunderstandings arise when discussing how codes limit ambiguity and normalise practices.  'Code modalities as practices' (178) might indeed control ambiguity as in positional modalities in the early work.  However the opposite personal kind of modality provokes ambiguity, offering a range of possibilities.  Specifically, each modality has a 'major latent function'to remove or create ambiguity.  There is a further difference between elaborated codes that relate to objects and those that relate to persons - ambiguity is reduced when it comes to objects but created when it comes to persons.  Bernstein insists that all this is included in the more recent concepts of classification and framing.  In general, he argues that 'code meanings are translations of social relations, within and between social groups.  They are translations of the specific form taken by these relations.  These meanings have arisen out of specialised forms of social interaction and control', as explicated in the discussion of positional, personal, object and person codes.  He also says  that the new middle class are in contradiction because they want to provoke ambiguity by stressing the personal against the positional while maintaining rigidities in the division of labour.  Apparently, he predicted that this would affect the socialisation of the young, but the point is not to defend this view empirically, rather to show how codes do not simply limit ambiguity nor produce simple determined effects.

Similar problems arise with the concept of a rule.  We can describe any pedagogic practice as a set of rules about hierarchy selection pacing and evaluation, but these rules 'do not constitute the code' (179) and only 'direct attention to the controls on the form' of particular features of pedagogies.  They show what is specific about pedagogic practices.  They might express the inner logic of pedagogic practice, but this is not the code.  There is however some similarity with the distinction between language and speech [the rules regulate the transition between the two?].  The code is revealed by how the rules actually work, and this also reveals the different interests at work in trying to make the code serve those interests [both?].  Actual practices are revealed by examining 'the code modality, that is the classification and framing'.  [I find this really confusing.  It seems that codes are actually put into practice by the operation of rules, which result in code modalities, so rules have a major impact on how the code is actually operated.  To insist that the code is not the same as these rules is to argue for some transcendent status for it?  Is there any way we can study the code without looking at the way in which it is put into practice?  It seems to be a priori in some sense, probably a functional necessity of some kind as in the split between the sacred and the profane?  If so, the code is already binary?]. 

Framing refers to the control over pedagogic communication and its context, and the control might lie either with the transmitter or the acquirer, and is apparent in things like the 'selection, organisation, pacing and timing' of the transmission of knowledge.  The term can also explain any social relationship which involves control, like that between doctor and patient.  Understanding this involves a further set of rules related to particular interactional practices. This enables Bernstein to deny that he is doing abstract structuralism like Levi Strauss or Saussure, where linguistic codes are somehow directly manifested in things like kinship structures.  So how are general rules related to particular ones?].

Bernstein has been accused of neglecting the role of strategy, 'the creative, indeterminate feature of practice' (180).  As a result, he is seen as constructing a mechanical world governed only by the rules.  Strategies may also invoke a Hobbesian world, however.  [Then a long and not very helpful example].  We are to imagine a person from a remote culture witnessing breastfeeding in our culture - a man feeding the child from a bottle, for example, which will offer a shocking form of weak classification by gender.  A practice might not even be recognized as feeding by the remote visitor - recognition rules are provided by classification values, although not in a rigid way, because classification values can be changed.  In baby feeding, the locus of control appears to lie with the feeder, and there is very strong framing.  However, both parties can develop strategies to regulate the pacing and timing of feeding, for example.  Sometimes locus of control might lie with the baby altogether, as in demand feeding, and this may produce the '"illusion" that there is no desire except his own' (181).  Again a range of strategies might be required to maximize the possibilities.  However once more, these strategies are 'selectively elicited and facilitated by variations in framing'].

[Another example, referring to classification this time, with the example of what is acceptable when using a toilet].  The activity is strongly classified.  Within the context, framing operates. The rules for use might be selectively realized, and some strategies might develop to uphold them more or less efficiently - leave things as you found them, but also do not clean too enthusiastically which will make the facilities damp and require another strategy.  These strategies can be seen as maximising, or at least preventing the reduction of cultural social and economic capital.  Strategies seem to be necessary, because framing rules do not specify particular practices, but rather focus on criteria: generally, there are no 'criterial rules', and this permits agents to develop their own style, as long as the general rules are observed.  If the action itself can be observed, we might expect to find criterial rules and a more regulative discourse, although observers themselves might adopt different evaluations, depending on 'different code modalities through which the respective habitus is being constructed'(183) [so code modalities now affect habitus - I suppose we could reread some Bourdieu on Kabylian gendered behaviours to indicate various kinds of classification and framing, and this is presumably the basis of fans of Bernstein claiming that his work is more explicit than Bourdieu's].  We can see 'how code modalities construct different structuring structures'[same point about habitus], and this will help us see something more specific about habituses.

[The irritating example continues].  A middle class couple also required users of toilets to decorate the room by adding postcards to displays.  This provided an opportunity to evaluate and regulate any persons using the toilet, via shaming, involving the reduction of cultural capital.  Anyone not recognising the principles of displays revealed 'a deficit habitus'.  The principles were implicit and could only be demonstrated, as 'a style realisation'.  Close acquaintance would have enabled some pedagogic activity to take place, largely implicitly, and this would take the form of a restricted code.  However, the required behaviour to add to the display would be 'part of the discourse of an elaborated code modality'[again I am not sure that we need this to make a simple point that pedagogies can be restricted while aiming at more general collaboration - not without contradiction I would have thought, however.  This must characterise an awful lot of artistic and creative education, where people learn mix in a restricted way in order to release their creativity in a more elaborated display afterwards].

[So we now have a notion of style], and apparently this helps describe the effects of different modes of pedagogising, sometimes local context-dependent and implicit, both for transmitter and acquirer.  This would be 'the perfect form of the restricted code'.  It specializes in 'the acculturation of the body', including movement and posture or style.  It assumes 'enduring intimacy' with constant realisations and corrections, a characteristic 'monitoring procedure'.  In this way, we have connected code modalities with the acquisition of style, in a way that's claimed to be new and specific.  Clearly, we have gone beyond structuralism here.  Classification and framing produce different modalities with different strengths.  Practices may be based on explicit or implicit principles and rules.  Framing may be initially restricted and then elaborated.  Classification and framing also produces specific locations or spatial arrangements.

[A final example]. A particular school might be strongly classified and framed, leaving little possibility for challenge by the students.  The only option for them is to break with isolated, privatized and competitive acquisition to more communal collective and non competitive forms.  [I have done this in reverse confronted with unruly groups of students in seminars, by insisting on individual tutorials instead] If this happens, the group of students gains more power over realisation [so we have the implicit possibilities of struggle and conflict?  An analysis of the necessary changes for conflict to take place?]

Pedagogic discourse is not just the result of code theory realizing itself.  Instead, rules [which are crucial in implementing codes or constructing code modalities] need to be placed in the context of social relations.  Pedagogic practice can be distinguished by its particular combination of rules.  However, rules can be used selectively to construct specific pedagogic practices, and there is always a source of challenge and defence.  The possibility of using rules in power struggles will depend on classification and framing, which are themselves produced by power and control relations [I regard this as another contradiction - if classification and framing are produced by dominant groups, actual conflict and struggle can only be local matters within the overall framework, a kind of hegemony theory.  Unless we are to understand local conflict and struggle as a kind of inevitable deviance, as functionalists do?].  Particular options will produce particular contexts, arenas, and styles.

When discussing pedagogic discourse specifically, we are interested in general conditions which define pedagogic discourse, and also the specific processes that construct and maintain specific pedagogic discourses.  The general conditions are described in the work on the pedagogic device [above].  Specific pedagogic discourses are analysed through a discussion of recontextualization, and the actions of official and pedagogic fields: the result is code modalities.  The device's rules can be seen as its grammar, its ordering principles to connect the different levels of activity.  In this, it constructs symbolic roles for consciousness.  It is the subject of struggle by various groups wanting to impose their rules by constructing different sorts of code modalities [but what is the origin of this struggle?].  In general, the device translates power relations into discourse and vice versa, but there is a necessary 'potential of its own disturbance'(185), and apparently we can trace this process from the state down to families and local communities [so these are the groups who are struggling?].  We have far more than principles of selection and combination.  Shilling has even described the analysis as poststructuralist.

We need to define code more carefully.  It would be wrong to suggest that it is completely separate from classification and framing, or different kinds of pedagogy.  Instead, it relates to 'the distinction between orientation to meanings and realisation of meanings' [original emphasis] (186).  The orientation might be similar, towards elaboration, for example, but different modalities of realisation can accompany them - at first positional and personal, themselves a vehicle for social class distribution of meanings.  Then a more complex account of origins [presumably the stuff about functional prerequisites in families and religion?].

The code can be formally 'explicated'as 'the regulative principle, tacitly acquired which selects and integrates (a) relevant meanings, (b) forms of their realisation, (c) evoking contexts'(186).  This helps us 'conceptualise specific [pedagogical?] code modalities by a process of translation [but what is covered by this?  Is this operationalism or some kind of recognition of general principles after all?] of the above three elements', so that context becomes interactional practices, meanings become orientation to meanings, realisation becomes textual productions.  Once we have made the shift, we can bring in different sorts of power and control.  So interactional practices are differently classified and framed and this will produce different orientations to meaning and realisations.  Apparently, the formulation also shows the possibility of texts having consequences for meanings and their generation [although this is still unclear and remains a formal possibility only?  Maybe we are back to the mechanism referred to above where restricted pedagogies produce elaborated texts?].  Generally, however the orientation to meaning is 'embedded...  in the conditions of its realisation and their context' (187), and thus to the operations of classification and framing and whether they face internally or externally.

This is not structuralism, and therefore not open to critiques of it, from Bourdieu or anyone else.  It is possible to agree that language and speech are dialectically related, and this comes over in the 'surface/structure distinction in my thesis'[so codes operate at the structural level after all, but surface features show the affects of rules and the struggle to use them as resources?].  There are structuralist features, but they are 'integrated with other features', so tightly that the overall theory can not be easily classified [he has uniquely coherently synthesised structural linguistics and marxism? In the name of adequate empirical description it is implied above? ] .  In particular, rules are not codes, yet they have an important part to play in controlling and constructing specific practices.  The rules themselves need to be subdivided according to 'the classification and framing of practices,  communication and context' (188).  Code modalities [implies a connection with codes after all? Rules only turn codes into modes?]  'translate distributions of power and principles of control into discursive practices' and vice versa.  This produces arenas of struggle around code modalities 'by social groups/social classes'.

A particular claim is that we now understand 'different specializations [specific forms] of the habitus'.  Bernstein was in the game long before Bourdieu, and he has always been interested in relations within the school as well as relations between schools and other social institutions.  Bourdieu has never been interested in these relations within, and this can be seen in the different definitions he gives of the arbitrary, ending with an absolute substantive theory [this is Li Puma] where anything whatsoever could be used in the process of bourgeois distinction.  This distracts from looking at specific signifiers that we find if we look within institutions - [at academic discourses as code modalities].  Bourdieu's interest is always been about power games and struggles inside the fields, even in Homo Academicus, a focus on relations rather than on specifics.

Nevertheless, 'the primary social unit of [Bernstein's] thesis' is a relationship, a pedagogic one.  It is not a general social theory [it looks like he claims this elsewhere] .  It might suggest a general interest in how communication is turned into pedagogy as part of symbolic control, and this has led to some research on different cultural forms.  However, nothing is embedded in concrete, and the systems themselves both reveal and legitimate power relations, exposing 'poles of choice for any set of principles' and opening up the possibility of change.  There is no reification.

Notes explain that the difference between language and speech is used to show how pedagogic realisation emerges from forms of communication.  This specific level of analysis is required to explain the operation of power.  The intention is not to draw up ideal types.  Hierarchical and distributive rules regulate the other rules, [not some structuralist manifestation].  There is a link to Saussure through Durkheim, but the model is not just used.  Framing refers to both the interaction required and an appropriate physical location, and together this provides actors with 'the feel of the situation/game' (190) [a space for strategies].  The macro can be linked to the micro if we take the notion of the relevant meaning in interaction to depend on discursive practices [and vice versa), forms of realisation to link with transmission practices, and evoking contexts to link with organisational practices.  [This is only a definitional link though?].  Realisation rules link up with recognition rules, for example in limiting the exclusion of variation according to classification and framing [another irritating example has a student behaviour, discussing an assignment with friends as being variously described as good or bad, in other words tightly or loosely excluded].

Appendix accuses Harker and May of a motivated misreading.  They are really pursuing a religious or moral form of ritual cleansing to lay bare the conceptual structure and how it pollutes the argument.  Referees' comments call for repeated simplified criticisms 'which take on a facticity' (192). There is also 'epistemological botany' as before, with the intention of labeling theories so they can be easily criticised, 'an important reading economy for both lecturers and students'.  The labeling is often very simple.  Theories that mix discourses are particularly suspect, and discourses ar often extracted for particular attention - any discourse can be chosen leading to multiple rejections.  A particular 'field strategy' is evident as well involving the selection of stages of the development of the thesis.  Together, categorisation and 'time warping'can themselves be seen as examples of classification and framing to produce modalities of critique, as 'a realisation of field constructed motivations'.

Chapter 11 Bernstein Interviewed (by Solomon)


All experiences have a pedagogic potential, but they are not all pedagogically generated.  Pedagogy relations shape communications and contexts, and there are explicit, implicit and tacit varieties.  The acquirer might not see the relation as legitimate or acceptable.  With tacit pedagogy, neither of the members might be conscious of what is going on and the meanings are 'non linguistic, condensed and context dependent: a pure restricted code relay' (200), as in modeling, 'perhaps the primary pedagogic mode'.  However, there can be deliberate modeling.

If someone asks for information, it might be supplied without particularly focusing on the person to be informed, and it might be shaped according to the needs of the acquirer: the latter case requires 'recontextualizing which may have a complex backing'.  These occasions offer a horizontal discourse and segmental pedagogic acts.  Evaluation may not take place.

Media presentations and projections contain a range of different discourses, but they are all segmentally organized, and the segments might vary in terms of their realization and motivation.  But they are aimed at 'maintaining, developing or changing an audience niche'(200).  Media productions 'presuppose what I call the pedagogic device', but their output may not be pedagogic communication [because the acquirer resists?].  It is rare to find substantial control over the context relations or motivations of the consumers, so the communications that result are complex and multi layered -media discourses: 'the quasi pedagogic discourse generated by the pedagogic device but having an embedded segmental realization' (201).  The acquirer could see that there may be modeling present, or that what's going on is a pedagogic projection, or even a specific pedagogic act, or all of these.  [Only for media presentations, though?  He assumes commercial media presentations?

So pedagogic communication in particular educational agencies [which include family, school and religion] is not the same as where there's pedagogic regulation with no control over acquisition, in everyday discourse, for example.  We can refer to pedagogic acts in the former case, and pedagogic communication in the second one.  Sometimes pedagogic acts involve vertical discourse being recontextualized [in 'discourse {s} of specialized knowledge' - with the examples being doctor/patient or lawyer/client - not teacher/child?] The media offer only 'potential and actual pedagogic regulation', so the medium intervenes in realization.  That discourse is still segmental, and any particular segment of it might be pedagogical, but overall it is quasi pedagogical.

Any pedagogic modes can be understood as realizations of symbolic control 'and thus of the process of cultural production and reproduction', attempting to shape and distribute 'consciousness, identity and desire'.  There can be official symbolic controls in official pedagogies, but local pedagogic modalities may offer different sorts of practices, which can even conflict or marginalise official ones [not always]. Symbolic control also 'has other cultural relays, and whether the theory is applicable is a matter of investigation'.  His work is focused only on official and local modalities [and deliberate pedagogic acts?] [All this clarification is beginning to throw up all sorts of inconsistencies].

The pedagogic device has three rules as above.  Bourdieu and the concept of field has been 'immensely valuable' (202), but the relation with his work is still problematic, and he prefers the metaphor 'arena' instead of field, to emphasize 'drama and struggle both inside and outside'[he is claiming to be even more of a class theorist than Bourdieu!].  There is no linear translation in the three rules of the pedagogic device, which is instead 'the object of a struggle for domination'[always?  We have moved through assuming a function to everything, through a mixed case, to now assuming that it is always a matter of domination].  Even so, realization offers more possibilities, influenced by the activities within the arena.  Such activities create pedagogic modalities 'that is their generating codes...  regulative principles which selects and integrates relevant meanings (classifications), forms of the realizations (framings) and their evoking contexts.  The values (strong/weak) and functions [internal and external types of classification and framing] carry the code potential'.  [So now these generating codes arise from conflict and struggle.  So generating codes are not like social codes at the most structural level?  Isn't it misleading to call both types codes?].  The potential is actualised in different ways, again as 'a function of the struggle'.  'Conflict is endemic within and between the arenas in the struggle to dominate modalities' and to control the relation between official and local modalities.

Rules are not codes but the resources for codes, and different groups have different resources according to the distribution of power and control.  Codes 'transform distributions of power and principles of control into pedagogic communication'(203).  They try to suppress contradictions and dilemmas in classifications and external orders, and 'set up psychic defences for intra-individual order through the insulation (boundaries) they produce'.  In this way, 'code acquisition necessarily entails both the acquisition of order and the potential of its disturbance'.  [This still is not clear either, since it assumes that one side of the struggle never prevails, leaving the other one still active, but why should this be - because of some democratic pluralism?  Because deviancy can never be prevented, especially in the advanced division of labour,which produces cultural lag?  Because the sacred is always aligned with the profane?  Because there is an active class struggle in capitalism?].


Identity was first seen as a function of the classificatory relation, a 'subjective consequence of pedagogic discursive specialisation'[so you became a biologist or whatever].  However, identities have both sacred and profane features - the sacred ones refer to the relation to a form of knowledge, 'its otherness', and the obligations required.  The profane refers to 'contextual demands and constraints of the economic context'[only the economic?].

Later on, mechanisms of realization and acquisition were expanded, through distinguishing voice and message.  Voice refers to the legitimacy of the identity, its power relations 'through the classificatory relation'.  What was said and in what form is more a matter of realization and that is the message, and that refers to framing, which control the space for what can be said [an implication that had escaped me.  He has to make these two terms work of course].  There can be a tension between voice and message, with messages changing voice - thus framing relations can challenge power relations behind classifications [again I am not sure I have ever seen this spelled out, but it might be done in the 1981 paper he cites.  It could mean cases where kids are able to impose their own discourse in the classroom and this challenges the authority of the teacher?  Again is this to be seen as chronic - patients getting together to challenge the discourse of their doctors, or clients to challenge their lawyers, or is its specific to the one context of mass compulsory schooling with large and uncontrollable classes?].

In contemporary cultural conditions, there are a number of resources for constructing a sense of belonging to and different from, especially in official pedagogic discourse, where there may be four 'positions' for pedagogic identities - 'retrospective, prospective (centring identities), therapeutic and market (decentring)' (205).  A career develops 'in a society's dominating purposes'.  The same approach can be used to describe local identities when capitalism is reorganizing.  These careers are 'decentred (present oriented), censuring (past - oriented) and recentring (becoming/future oriented)'.  Resources are required to construct these identities and manage the context [seen here in a very micro sense of being with people]. Some identities have had their collective unstable bases weakened and have been disembedded.  Official identities may be related to emergent local ones.

[Apparently, this is related to] 'Foucault's technologies of normalisation, discipline and the construction of the subject, but the theory gives a more dynamic picture of the struggle to appropriate, design and distribute these technologies and the conditions for variation and change'.  It also offers a better language of description.  It shows the relation between symbolic structures '(discourses) and social structures (where the latter are seen as frozen practices)'.  This makes the concept of habitus 'more transparent with respect to the manner of its specialization and thus formation'.  It sees function as interdependent with form, and '" Relation to" and "relations within" are integrated in the analysis'[what a lot of talking up!  Is an improvement on Bourdieu apparently because it offers different typologies, different combinations of the factors that are assumed to be important - but these are described very formally, at least in this account: official vs. local, the four positions and so on]


There is still a concern with autonomy and agency but 'in our lives the space for this potential is so small, its realization entails complex issues, ambiguities and dilemmas' (206), so we're always looking for theories to confirm it.  Classificatory relations are always connected with temporal ones, but the pedagogic relations themselves 'regulate' whether there is a boundary and if so how it appears.  Creativity and autonomy is going to 'vary with pedagogic modalities'[the two types each of classification and frame].  We cannot discuss autonomy without looking at these types of symbolic control.

Durkheim saw the importance of discipline for social life itself, and transgression brought about the emergence of the social.  Foucault on the other hand simply 'homogenizes discipline', with no modalities.  Durkheim points to various 'pathologies' in different disciplinary regulations and says that has a social basis, and Bernstein'follows this approach'[so he is going to identify group minds on the one hand and anomie on the other?].

There are always boundaries [around human subjects?], and they might vary in terms of how explicit, visible or actualized they are.  Different interests are promoted or privileged by boundaries, but the issue is how they are acquired, whether stemming from the past, or offering some sort of tension between past and future.  Social class relations distribute unequally different resources, creating categories of included and excluded, and making boundaries permeable to some but not to others. [So social class is fundamentally a matter of accessing resources, monopolising markets etc?]


Elaborated and restricted codes have now been subsumed under higher order concepts, now seen as code modalities regulated by classifications and framings.  Access to different codes ' were regarded as class regulated' (207), elaborated orientations were constructed in pedagogy relations in families and schools, and realized boarding to how the context was classified and framed.  Combinations of homogenised, local, context dependent and specific work context or social relations produced restricted code modalities.  The early approach ignored the form of the discourse, however.

The next step was to 'see code modalities as realizations of forms of discourse', of which there were two basic kinds, vertical and horizontal.  Vertical discourses are specialized knowledges, which 'have their origin and development in official institutions of the state and economy'[implying nice functional ties again?].  How they are realized depends on who can control classification and framing, 'the code modality'.  [and who is the 'who' here?]. Horizontal discourse originates in the everyday or life worlds, and is segmental, with variable pedagogic relations, although 'code modalities may interpenetrate'(208).  There might well be different types of vertical and horizontal discourses depending on 'their own specialized social base and conditions of existence', and other possible agencies between official and local.  [So here we have some nice abstract formal categories losing their way when it comes to actual examples. Discourse is the fundamental category with its vertical and horizontal types,which are then realized as code modalities? Realization is controlled by classes of some kind, seemingly rooted in state or economy? Realization takes the form of combinations of classification and framing -- and horizontal discourse {but not vertical?} can offer different combinations of these and these can interpenetrate -- without class control?]


There is too large a gap between theory and data, with too much emphasis on 'internal conceptual language' rather than 'externally unambiguous descriptions of the phenomena'.  We need a language of description to accompany a theory.  The steps involved producing a model to generate modalities, then referring the model to something else, using it to 'provide the principles which will identify' something, 'recognition rules'.  Nearly always, this produces more information than the model provides, requiring further 'realization rules' for the excess, and this is necessary if we are to change models [and test them?].  There must be 'a discursive gap' between the rules internal to the model and the actual realization rules, so that description goes beyond the internal rules [depends how hard he worked on the model, surely?].  A full theory should encompass all the steps.

Models are universal, it is just that some are more explicit than others, the same goes for principles of descriptions and criteria for redescriptions.  Sometimes we might quantify, but the problem in the end is 'whose voice is speaking?', and Bernstein's preference is to be explicit as possible so people can 'deconstruct' his voice.[Voice = human subject here?]


There are political implications, but these are 'secondary' (210) to the business of understanding and describing.  Effective choice and challenge requires this understanding.


The whole theory can be seen as an attempt to develop better powers of description, conceptual clarity, increased generality and 'increased delicacy at the level of detail' (211).  It is possible for him to see a linear development, but the presentational style and the empirical work can make this difficult, and each paper can be seen as the new starting point for a future series, and features 'productive imperfection', pointing to a potential for development.  There is a more general theory, one featuring symbolic control and change as a part of a theory of culture, but this is beyond him.  The vulnerabilities have been revealed by empirical research [well -- he is not a systematic theorist as he says]  and have led to subsequent developments.

[Solomon's PS says that this contribution also sets out some future problems, addressing recent changes of technology and culture and the impact on identity, and picking up on pedagogic modalities' found in say health education information, consumer education, and professional training.  Regulation and control may itself be changing given the 'extension and multiplication of agencies'(213), including mass media and electronics. as usual, Bernstein's own attempts on mass media lead to yet another hybrid case. All actual examples will be hybrids? So the great task of  description, recognition and realization really means jamming hybridity into structural variations of the types he theorises -- a combinatory? Has anything ever remained outside of the categories?]

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