Brief and selective notes on: J Lacan
(edited by J-A Miller) (1993) The
Psychoses. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book III
1955-56. Trans with notes Russell Grigg.
London: Routledge
Dave Harris
[ I
read Deleuze and Guattari before I read any
Lacan, and so this highly selective set of notes
relates to issues with Lacan as identified by
D&G. I am only a casual reader of Lacan and
my intention was solely to find out exactly what
the problems were with two basic arguments that
offend D&G:
- that the unconscious is
'structured like a language', in particular
that the 'subject is a signifier for other
signifiers';
- that language use
necessarily exposes us to a patriarchal and
hierarchical social order.
I have read Schreber's memoirs,
his account of a very well-developed paranoid
delusion,variously described as schizophrenia or
dementia praecox. I have not taken notes, of
course. I have also read Zizek's
defence of Lacan against D&G,which,
apart from anything else, indicates, as usual,
that citing a few extracts can never be decisive
in any dispute about what the hell Lacan means --
or D&G for that matter].
IX On nonsense and the structure of God
Schreber reports his symptoms with expressions
that will also tell us something about the way
his language has developed. The externality of
language is recognised in phrases such as ‘the
word escapes me’ (113), or by the frequent
occurrence of phrases or sayings that seem
natural and obvious to us but which have
actually been invented. Of course all this
language play ‘presupposes first of all that the
word exists’.
Schreber was eventually able ‘to put his
delusion into words’, but this is not to imply
that there is something more primitive some
prior lived experience which is incommunicable
in the early stages. This is sometimes taken to
be totally impenetrable. We find the same
assumptions when people talk about
intellectualisation. However, delusions are
clearly ‘dependent upon the unconscious’ (114)
and ‘the unconscious is fundamentally
structured, woven, chained, meshed by language.
And not only does the signifier players bigger
role there is the signifying does, but it plays
the fundamental role. In fact what characterises
language is the system of signifiers as such…
[But]… The relationship between signifier and
signified is far from being… One-to-one’. In
particular, ‘the signified is not the things in
their raw state, already there, given in an
order open to meaning. Meaning is human
discourse insofar as it always refers to another
meaning’.
Saussure argued that there was never a simple
relation between signifiers and signified, nor
can the relation simply be reduced to words,
which are arbitrary to some extent ‘not so
unitary’ (115). The system of human meanings
involves over time and the signifiers ‘adopt
different usages’. ‘A system of signifiers, and
language, has certain characteristics that
specify the syllables, the usage of words, the
locutions into which they are grouped, and this
condition is what happens in the unconscious,
down to its most original fabric… a pun can in
itself be the linchpin that supports a symptom,
a pun that doesn’t exist in [another] language.
Symptoms might not always be based on puns, but
they are ‘always based on the existence of
signifiers’.
This is how overdetermination works in Freud.
There is a duality of signifier and signified
which allows ‘psychoanalytic determinism’. ‘The
material linked to the old conflict is preserved
in the unconscious as a potential signifier, as
a virtual signifier, and then captured in the
signified of the current conflict and used by as
language, that is as a symptom’. Schreber’s
language simply has to be understood ‘in the
register of psychoanalysis’ rather than as a
verbal elaboration of some primary state. It is
a linguistic connection, ‘a continuous and
profound solidarity between the signifying
elements from the beginning to the end of the
delusion’.
We can understand from psychosis how the subject
generally ‘is situated in relation to the whole
symbolic, original order’ in a distinctive way,
‘distinct from the real environment and from the
imaginary dimension’ (116).
‘Like all discourse delusion is to be judged
first of all as a field of meaning that has
organised a certain signifier’. Good practice
involves letting the psychotics speak ‘for as
long as possible’, without imposing any
theoretical categories or hierarchies. For
example, Schreber himself operates with several
agents of discourse related to the divine
essence, but he does not say that the divine
essence organises the others. Schreber’s inner
voices are ‘related to what presupposes the
continuous discourse which memorises each
subject’s conduct for him’. This is actually a
common experience in the nonpsychotic as well,
often in the form of a verbalisation or a
‘latent discourse… which intervenes at a level
of its own’.
Nevertheless, Schreber’s account clearly
describes what he himself calls nonsense. The
characteristic that interests Lacan is that ‘the
[inner] voices never complete their sentences’
(118). Again this is similar to more normal
relations between subject speaking concretely
and the unconscious subject who is alluded to.
We see that any premature attempt to label
Schreber’s discourse as psychiatric as premature
and will lead to further incomprehension. Normal
subjects classically have an internal discourse
but they do not take it seriously — ‘the
principal difference between you and the insane
is perhaps nothing other than this’. The insane
serve as a warning to what would happen if we
started to take inner voices seriously.
Schreber shows that there is an integrated
interlocutor within an apparently unitary
subject. His delusion shows us ‘a mode of
relationship between the subject and language as
a whole’ (119). Schreber shows there is both a
plurality of agents and modes but also a unity
within him which can maintain continuous
discourse. He feels alienated by this discourse.
Schreber calls this unity God, but this is a
term of ‘universal importance’, and alienating
unity is even taken as a proof of his existence.
Ordinary subjects find it difficult to spell out
the nature of this unity, so it’s not surprising
that a delusional might do so as well.
Schreber’s own background in a nonreligious
family leads him to argue similarly that the
experience of God must be real not delusional, a
matter of direct proof [I must say this
argument, which crops up rather a lot in
Schreber’s account, reminds me of the role of
surprise in ethnography as guaranteeing the
validity of the results]. Schreber also claims
that he is otherwise fully capable of perceiving
things like sounds to an even more sophisticated
extent than most people.
We see that God is a presence, revealed in ‘the
speaking mode’ (120). It is also common to argue
that some evidence for his presence is that our
own aims are not always achieved. However, this
is not Schreber’s argument. Instead, his ‘divine
erotomania is [possibly] to be immediately
inscribed in the register of the superego’
(121). Instead, God is always talking but never
saying anything. Schreber describes relations
with his early therapists in the same way. This
can explain the different stages of the
delusion, where Schreber fears rape at first and
then complains about gods excessive
voluptuousness: the link is that Schreber faces
‘the greatest of atrocities, that he is going to
be forsaken’. This explains the ambivalence that
Schreber has with his various interlocutors: he
must maintain a relationship with them even if
it is painful or troublesome, and a break in
relations produces ‘variously intolerable
internal phenomena of tearing apart’.
Schreber’s God knows nothing about the specifics
of being human, including Schreber’s reactions
to God’s withdrawal. ‘He hypothesises and argues
in ways that wouldn’t be out of place in a
properly theological discussion’ (122). [God
learns about human beings only in a very
indirect way, usually after they have died. His
more direct intervention in Schreber is the
cause of mistakes and excesses]. What we can see
here is ‘an extraordinarily innocent
development… Whose motor is the subjects
disturbed relationship to something that affects
the total functioning of language, the symbolic
order, and discourse’. The question of whether
God is omniscient, for example, is discussed in
terms of whether he can predict the results of a
lottery. The only difference between the tokens
in a lottery is a symbolic one — at the level of
reality they are identical — so God must enter
the discourse. Schreber is reproducing the
distinction between the symbolic the imaginary
and the real.
However there must be some disturbance at work
because God allows unintended consequences to
happen, applies half measures, engages in
tormenting Schreber.
Chapter X On the signifier in the real
and the bellowing-miracle
For Schreber, God is discourse. His actions are
mysterious at the junction between the symbolic
and the real, in particular how symbolic
oppositions are introduced into the real. This
can be found in other dilemmas for normal
subjects where there is a difference ‘between
language as symbolic and his own permanent
internal dialogue… The subject experiences as
foreign and as revealing a presence to him [a
case when language] itself asks the questions
and itself gives the answers’ (125). Schreber
was unprepared for his subsequent belief in God
and this made him question reality.
Schreber identifies two spheres of language use
and these are different. We have to see that
this is common in language where terms are
distinguished only by their oppositions, such as
plus and minus signs, regardless of any real
coordinates — ‘a game of symbolic alternation’
(126). Here we cannot rely on experience or
facts in the real to choose between them. There
seems to be an a priori law.
Psychoanalysis has long recognised that patients
are not cured by appealing to the healthy parts
of their ego. Often this was connected with an
explanation of some imaginary force limiting
reason and strengthening delusions which are
otherwise rational and coherent. Psychoanalysis
is different because it sees delusions as
examples of ‘the discourse of the unconscious’
(127), although this is still almost impossible
to disentangle, affected as it is by matters
like inversion or negation. In this way, ‘the
psychotic is a martyr of the unconscious’ in the
sense of being a witness, but the testimony has
to be deciphered. Psychotics operate with a
closed discourse.
We find such discourses in normal life as well.
For example slavery is deplored but it has not
been abolished, that modern exploitation
resembles a relation of bondage, that a ‘master
slave duality’ is widespread. The situation has
arisen following the spread of a particular
discourse, ‘the message of brotherhood’, serving
as a message of liberation somehow subsisting
with repression. The discourse of freedom by
contrast features a contradiction: it is ‘by
definition not only ineffectual but also
profoundly alienated from its aim and object’.
It persists nevertheless as a deep commitment to
individual autonomy.
This can be compared to a delusional discourse —
‘it’s one itself’. Claims to autonomy are
clearly individualised rather than connected to
those of other people. We encounter problems as
soon as we attempt to apply it to the conduct of
others or their discourse. The result is a
necessary ‘coming to terms with what
everyone effectively contributes
[actually] resigned abandonment to reality’
(128). Schreber has to do the same, despite his
delusion that he is the sole survivor of the
destruction of the world. That there is an
external reality is certain notwithstanding his
own inner convictions, and he must resign
himself to it. Similarly, we have to abandon
what we take to be an essential internal
discourse about autonomy as soon as we consider
the rights of others.
Again this is not reducing thought to some
elementary reality. We constantly think about
these notions of internal freedom and how they
are manifested. Social reality itself ‘is
essentially going round in circles’, so we
always come back to personal actions which are
seen as problematic when applied. This is how we
think of ‘an insoluble contradiction between
discourse that is at a certain level always
necessary and reality to which, both in
principle and in a way proved by experience, we
fail to adjust’. We should see that analysis ‘is
deeply bound up with’ a doubled subject…the ego
of every modern man’ (129).
No one feels at home with current relations
between human beings. Most of us experience a
contradiction between our principles and these
relations. The meaning of these relations must
remain open and this is why we feel unable to
offer specific prescriptions for action or to
give specific answers. Psychoanalysis sees this
as a positive refusal to take sides, to focus
instead on a specialist discourse of specific
kinds of individual suffering. However,
Schreber’s case will get as close to
understanding ‘what the ego really signifies’.
It is necessarily enigmatic, with Schreber’s
discourse clearly linked to the normal
discourses experienced by everyone as soon as we
try to think of ourselves as an autonomous
individual.
Schreber was always hard to label in the classic
terms of psychoanalysis, and he resented being
categorised or having his own words interpreted.
This appeared as the imposition of another
external world which he had already rejected. Is
this an hallucination? The usual view is that
hallucinations are false perceptions somehow
forced on us from the external world, so they
are located in the real. But this implies that
discourse is a mere superstructure simply
referencing reality. The ambiguities of verbal
hallucinations show us something different,
especially the subject’s role. The issue arises
because subjects who speak also hear themselves,
and this needs to be explored. If you overattend
to the discourse of another, you are imposing an
additional form of understanding, sometimes to
the exclusion of understanding them. The crucial
thing is to attend to meaning. When a subject
speaks, he intends a meaning for himself. For
the internal listener, meaning can take shape
over time, but this also involves increasingly
the effects of language itself and how
signifiers convey meaning: ‘to listen to words,
to give them one's hearing, is already more or
less to obey them’ (131). Sense is always
heading towards something, ‘towards the closure
of meaning’, but this may be endlessly deferred.
This is only a problem if we think that
discourse aims to end with pointing at a thing.
The fundamental reference of discourse instead
is ‘being’.
To take a homely example, after a stressful day,
we can experience what might be called ‘the
peace of the evening’. To call it that adds
something to the simple phenomenal experience of
the close of day. It’s quite possible to think
that other languages might have quite different
expressions and different distinctions among the
times of day. If it is an expression that we
have uttered we will get a different experience
than if it comes from someone outside — this
latter can generate surprise, appearing as ‘a
manifestation of discourse in so far as it
barely belongs to us’. Generally speaking, the
less we articulate the expression the more
effective it can be on our mood. The
expression is a signifier, an arbitrary one, and
we can be open to it or closed. The more closed
we are, the more surprising and effective it
becomes. This cannot be predicted in advance,
there is no automatic connection between the
signifier and the real. So what we can find with
Schreber is that he senses things but does not
know them, and is externally affected by
signifiers, although they are not recognised as
signifiers.
These external effects act as a sort of test of
Schreber’s capacities, but they also produce an
experience of a potential rupture with the
outside absolute Other [who seems to be
understood, and not just by Schreber as an
‘interlocutory who has emptied the universe of
any authentic presence’] (133). How does this
account for the accompanying ‘ineffable
voluptuousness’?
The experienced relations to God are painful but
they can be understood as ‘four connotations of
a linguistic order’ (134). These are first the
bellowing, a form of speech ‘which is combined
with an absolutely a-signifying vocal function
and which nevertheless contains all possible
signifiers’ just like ‘what it is that makes a
shiver in a dog’s baying at the moon’. Second is
the call for help from the divine nerves and
souls. Unlike the pure signifier of the
bellowing, the call for help has an elementary
meaning. Thirdly there are external noises which
are seen as the result of miracles and therefore
which have a human meaning. They are real noises
but they are designed for him. There are other
[so this is the fourth?] miracles as well
like the singing birds or the insects. For
Lacan, the links between bellowing and the call
for help can be understood as ‘traces of the
passage of the subject absorbed in an undeniably
eroticised link. The connotations are there –
this is a male–female relationship’ (135).
There is a whole ‘nonsensical field of
eroticised meanings’. For Schreber it’s
necessary to be linked to the activities of God,
however humiliating or absurd, by trying to
understand the fundamental language for example.
Whenever he is able to get outside these
obsessions, something happens in the external
world which appears as an illumination once it
has gone through ‘all the component elements of
language in a dissociated form’. There is vocal
activity producing something like a sense of
shame or disarray. These can also be seen as
calls for help. Schreber always recognises them
as internal speech.
Even the idea of the mysterious penetrating rays
can be seen as taking place ‘in a trans-space
linked to the structure of the signifier and of
meaning’, existing before the familiar
dualisation of language in the subject. This has
implications for Schreber’s notion of reality.
No longer underpinned by internal dialogue
[maybe], reality has to be underpinned by
something else. To the extent that
hallucinations transform reality this is what
they do, ‘if we are to preserve any coherence
for our language’. The normal borders around the
real are not the usual ones, and this can
produce a sense of unreality and of novelty in
the real.
Hallucinations offer different sorts of
reciprocal contrasts and oppositions. The
subject himself is the best one to point these
out. They play the same role in subjective
organisation as with normal subjects. They
develop over time. Schreber’s constant awareness
of surprise but of mystery ‘is located in the
order of his relations with language, of these
language phenomena that the subject remains
attached to by a very special compulsion’.
We learn that ‘there is a subjective typology’[a
special one in psychotics]. This arises from the
presence of an unconscious signifier, appearing
to be external to the subject but in a specially
exterior way. The subject is attached to it
‘through an erotic fixation’. It seems as if
space speaks as such, that reality is also
affected and also signifying. |
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