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Introduction The problem of ‘values’ pursued in classical sociology has always stressed the connections between ‘values’ in the sense of belief ystems, and actual ways of life of the believers. Ways of life affect beliefs (and can contradict them) in a number of ways, as well as the converse. What follows is a very condensed (and inevitably rather dogmatic) exploration of these points. Social pressures towards moral relativism To summarise a great deal of work very quickly, the ‘founding fathers’ of Sociology identified a number of aspects of ‘industrial society’ (or capitalism’, or what is now fashionably called ‘modernity’) which threatened the value-base of earlier forms of social life. They include: 1. A well-developed social
differentiation
(or division of labour) in work and in social life -- e.g.
the appearance of experts, specialist and
2. The generation of substantial social inequalities of wealth, income and power, and the possible fracturing of societies into conflicting groups 3. Increasing social
contacts between
different societies and ways of life
4. The dominance of economic, political and administrative regulation (‘system’ requirements) over the social and personal lives of citizens (‘lifeworld’) Postmodernism ‘Postmodernism’ refers to a
recent
Parisian social poetics (Baudrillard (1983) and Lyotard (1986) are the
classic choice as spokespersons) which predicts an extreme and
unfortunate
(and rather selective) combination of these trends. An explosion of
cultural
difference, driven increasingly by the mass media destroys the old
bases
of community and community values (and also makes redundant the old
social
sciences). Lacking any sort of restraint in community life, culture is
left free to develop its own momentum, to endlessly develop and stock a
‘cultural supermarket’ of values and beliefs (in this case)
--
those seeking guidance can access equally easily information about Feng
Shui, Buddhism, Californian mysticism, the Toronto Blessing, the Dead
Sea
Scrolls, Cornish satanism, or hypnotism, and will probably pursue these
paths sequentially.
Critical Theory This tradition is rooted in
the classical
work of Weber and Marx and offers a stern germanic counter to the
stylistic
fireworks of postmodernism. Instead of an unlikely moral relativism,
the
work predicts a kind of secularisation. The analysis starts with the
growth
of a particular type of ‘purposive rationality’ in modern societies,
one
which stresses the effective calculation of means and ends instead of
the
considered application and development of ‘values’ (some vision of the
‘good life’). This sort of hard-nosed rationality is rooted in
the
economic system, and it spreads also into the classic bureaucracies of
modernity -- the Civil Service. System growth takes on a
life
of its own, unconstrained by any values other than the effective
pursuit
of measurable goals (often things like growth for its own sake). As
system
dominates lifeworld, a public sphere for the debate and discussion of
values
diminishes -- political debates focus exclusively on the
efficient
running of the economy, or on the best means to achieve cuts in public
expenditure Other types of rationality (or Reason), based on the
pursuit
of the ‘good life’ for human beings (such as a fair and just society,
one
which minimises exploitation and so on) do not entirely disappear, but
they are pushed back further and further into a purely ‘private’ or
personal
realm as system requirements dominate more and more of public or
community
life. This privatisation of values can lead to a dangerous
outcome
-- a deep irrationality, with values informed by emotional
commitments
strengthened by occasional mass outbursts of emotional solidarity. This
kind of outburst and its exploitation was a major factor in the success
of fascism, where public policy was pursued to provide emotional
gratification,
and where mass myths developed at the heart of politics (such as the
Nazi
celebration of the mysteries of ‘blood, race and soil’ as the basis for
German nationhood). The aggressive side of these emotional commitments
became rapidly apparent to outsiders, of course.
Critical theory thus aimed to preserve Reason against both the slow colonisation of systems thinking and the deep irrationality of mass affect. In its most recent form, this appears as Habermas’s (1987) counterfactual assertion’ of the potential of unrestrained speech, devoted to the pursuit of the better argument, and always able to raise doubts about the validity claimed by the statements of others. Habermas (1976) contrasts this kind of ‘ideal speech act’ with the ‘distorted’ or ‘strategic’ communication so commonly found in public life, which represents specific interests as universal ones, and often allows no challenge to its validity claims. Case-studies 1: Mourning Diana What best characterises the
public
reaction to the death of the Princess of Wales? For some commentators,
the extraordinary scenes signified a new spirituality, with a
delightfully
playful (postmodernist?) combination of Christian ritual and Elton
John.
(This seems to be part of an interesting argument developed by Dr G
Davie
at a presentation at Exeter University, 4th December 1997, for example)
Strange combinations occurred of British national ritual and most
un-British
public applause during and after the ceremony itself. For others, a new
sense of community emerged as everyone joined together in mourning,
forgetting
their differences – even Diana was ‘one of us’. Specialist commentators
on cultural politics, like the eternally optimistic Martin Jacques
(1997)
, combined both themes, seeing the mourning public on the march as a
New
Social Movement based on feminine virtues like compassion and the open
recognition of emotion, and a generational rejection of royal tradition
and elitism. Moral relativism, and the heartlessness of Thatcherism
were
both decisively rejected in what Jacques referred to (with a playful
intertextual
reference back to the 1960s) as the ‘floral revolution’. Things, he
assured
us, would never be the same.
For other commentators, however, darker notes were detected, best of all, perhaps in Christy (1997). The role of the media were noted in amplifying and shaping the public’s grief. Some psychological commentaries detected guilt and aggression in the public mood, as demands were made, of Royals and ordinary mortals, for ‘proper signs of respect’. It was necessary to cry, for example, or to observe a respectful silence in the neighbourhood during the funeral. The suspicion grew in some quarters that this was one of those dubious public spectacles after all, where unfocussed emotions were released as a kind of irrational substitute for public debate. Spokespersons hastened to
add their
spins – -- Tony Blair extended his role as a politician of the heart,
claims
were made for young princes as successors to the Diana heritage. After
all the mediated mourning, at least commercial life seemed to continue,
unreformed, just as before with a massive exercise to market
souvenirs.
‘Values’ were expressed in a characteristic manner -- in
private,
en masse (the two are complementary), as a temporary holiday from ‘real
life’, and, eventually as a form of consumption.
Case Studies 2: British Higher Education One of the main reasons for turning to specific cases is to show the complexity of actual social life (a theme at the heart of proper sociology, but sadly lacking in either Parisian poetics or critical theory on the grand scale). Nothing could be more contradictory than higher education systems in terms of their values. It is common to think of education as offering a set of values, ones sometimes defined in terms close to those of critical theory, especially Habermas’s ideal speech act, perhaps (the perfect university seminar?) -- yet the practices of educational institutions often contradict these values. Higher education often relativises as well, for example, as young people encounter members of other societies or other subcultures with quite different but seemingly equally adequate ways of life. In close proximity, it becomes impossible to rank order such differences. The very academic subjects studied can encourage a questioning of values which once were held without question, of course, as students learn to philosophise or theorise. In the (urban, cosmopolitan) academy above all, young people can best experience that relentless drive of modernity poetically described by Benjamin (see Clifford 1988) -- propelled into an unknown (social) future, facing backwards, aware of past identities yet unable to conceive of a future based upon them. Parisian postmodernists are
not the
first academic specialists to have been led to relativism by following
theory to its logical (but perhaps not sensible) conclusions, or to
have
found in the position of the university professor the perfect example
of
leisured dilletantism and a sophisticated ennui. The impact of
these
trends and practices on more ordinary people is rarely discussed or
analysed,
however, in favour of little more than a hope that, eventually, some
resolution
will occur.
Concluding Thoughts The relativism celebrated
by postmodernism
is better thought of as a special professorial and poetic case of
the privatisation of values described in critical theory. In that
context,
the apparent re-emergence of emotional commitments and visions of
community
in events like the mourning of Diana is a worrying trend, not one to be
celebrated.
Postscript Looking back now, in January 2000, the impact of the cult of Diana seems all but diminished. There is to be some sort of permanent Diana memorial, it seems, but there has been no floral revolution, no feminisation of British society, and, in a retrospective millenial edition, two Observer journalists re-published accounts that were openly and courageously critical of the event: Ferguson (1999) mentioned a 'public enforced outpouring [of feeling]...[with]...attendant censorship of any views not deemed to be sufficicently black-bordered...lunatic aspects [of crowd behaviour], the visions and the portents...and [a] more subtle worry...the number of sane, intelligent,compassionate people...who are obviously moved absolutely beyond words...I honestly hadn't understood how many people truly treated Diana as an icon. And I don't know how healthy it is for so many to have adored someone they had never met,and, it appears, lived their lives vicariously through her' The Observer also reprinted Pearson's (1999) account of the famous Diana broadcast on public TV (on Panorama, a prestigious BBC current affairs programme, 20th November 1995): 'Most were transfixed by adoration...[but Pearson saw a]...queasy blend of therapeutic self-evacuation and prefab epigrams masquerading as current affairs...Nothing was left to chance.Candour was never more candid...The programme was ...spliced together from different sessions, almost from different takes, you might think...The interview was instantly hailed as a blow against the Establishment. Maybe so; but it was also a cheapening of public discourse that...will hurt everyone in the end. TV like this makes bulimics of us all: we gorge on it, throw it up and end up wanting more' Postscript 2
Returning to higher education, attempts to turn to ‘values’ by organisations already dominated by purposive rationality seem doomed, whether they be companies trying to bolt on some culture or educational institutions trying to put values back on the curriculum (in a nicely modular timetabled slot, of course). At its most pessimistic, critical theory sees a source of resistance to the colonisation of the lifeworld only in the fading memories of those who lived it before the latest incursions. The notion of the university as a place trying to preserve or create the basis for the ‘good life’ could end in irrelevance and nostalgia, or, worse, as a kind of façade, clothing a thoroughgoing educational culture industry: nothing as dramatic as a collapse, more a hollowing out and numbness, perhaps: less abeunt studia in mores than stat magni nominis umbra*. * apologies for any obscurity -- less study reveals itself in a way of life than only the shadow of a great name remains References Baudrillard, J (1983)
Simulations,
New York: Semiotext(e)
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