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Reading
Guide to:
Schutz A
(1972) The
Phenomenology of the
Social World,
Heinemann Educational
Books: London
NB I
have reproduced male pronouns and possessives throughout, as in the
original. Apologies for any offence
Chapter
3
Intersubjective
Understanding
No two
individuals can have
the same stocks
of knowledge,
and thus I
can never comprehend
the intended meanings
of the other
[conceived of as a full 'Thou'] in the
same way as
he does.
However, I
can assign meanings
to his acts.
This is done
in a different way
to normal perceptions
of other phenomena,
since some transcending
is involved
(this involves
recognising the other
as another consciousness).
For example,
the bodily movements
of the other
are interpreted as
having reference to
his consciousness.
This involves a
certain intentional
act, ascribing
simultaneity
(we can
observe our own acts
only as an
afterthought, on
the basis of
reflection, but
it is possible
to directly observe
the acts of
others, and
merge them into
streams of consciousness
for a passage
of time).
Comprehending the
acts of the
other means linking
the outward indications
into a context
of meaning,
valid in so
far as it
corresponds to a
context of meaning
within which the
other is constructing
his present lived
experience -- this
is Weber's
'direct observational
understanding'.
Actually, I arrange
both my and
your acts in
my meaning contexts,
attending to experience
according to my
relevancies -- that
is your structure
of consciousness is
given to me
only in segments
and in 'interpreted
perspectives'.
It remains impossible
ever to get
at intended meanings:
I can make
‘mistakes’, for
example, in assuming
that your acts
are thematic,
whereas this may
not be so
for you.
Understanding correlates
with meaning --
that is understanding
involves search for
meaning, and
we have only
understood things when
we've made them
meaningful. In
the 'natural
attitude',
we gain understanding
of the world
by interpreting our lived
experiences of it.
We attempt to understand
the other
[that is
the conscious other,
the 'Thou']
in several ways:
-
We look
at external observables,
such as objects
being manipulated by
the other,
we record sequences,
and we identify
acts. This
presupposes some knowledge,
some interpretative
scheme
-
We look
at the actor's
body and its
changes, and
therefore infer that
action is taking
place, again
according to some
interpretative scheme.
-
We look
at the lived
experiences of the
actor, trying
to link actions
with projects and
motives. We
fill in a meaning
context. We
pay attention to
observables as indicators
of lived experiences.
This can only
give us a
general understanding.
-
Where there
is communication between
us, we
can treat utterances
as words with
definite meanings,
although we are
still making assumptions
when we refer
these to the
experiences of the
speaker.
-
We
regard words
as indicators of
the speaker's
subjective experiences,
taking them meaning
to us what
the speaker has
meant. Again
we can only
gain a general
understanding.
-
We can
try to take
the other's
goal, after
interpreting our perceptions
of it,
then we can
formulate and carry
out imagined projects,
through recalling how
we carried out
identical projects.
Here, we
add reflection to
a simultaneous analysis.
The original derivation
of a goal
is easier if
we have knowledge
of past and
likely overall plans.
-
We can
try concentrating on
deliberately expressive
acts, designed
to project the
contents of consciousness
-- such as
diaries, or
expressive movements
and gestures -- enabling
the observer to
derive the inner
consciousness of the
actor, even
where this may
not be deliberate.
Of course,
the observer still
has the problem
of deciding which
acts are expressive
like this,
and this is
resolvable only by
referring them to
the intentions again
double - for
example, we
may be able
to guess from
context whether the
actor is imitating
or caricaturing such
expressive acts.
Signs and
sign systems
An indicator
is linked to
that which is
indicated by a
complex of meaning.
The connection is
solely in the
mind of the
interpreter or --
that is there
is no necessary
logical connection.
The process involves
relations of representation.
Interpretation of a
sign may arise
through systems adequate
to it whenever
it represents,
or as an
object itself,
and we can
switch between these
two approaches according
to some metascheme
itself a result of
previous experiences
(119). Signs also stand
for the subjective
experiences of the
user, that
is they have
expressive functions.
A full understanding
therefore involves interpreting
a sign according
to the subject's
experiences, or
referring to what
it is representing, or
locating it in a
sign system.
One indication of
understanding may be
our ability to
use the expressive
function of the
sign in a
new context.
Meaning is
attached to signs
if their significance
is understood by
both actors in
a conversation.
Locating signs in
sign systems can
be done objectively.
This involves co-ordinating
to what the
sign represents independently
of whoever is
using it
(for example
mathematical symbols always
mean definite operations).
This involves the
idealisation of repeatability.
But we can
also focus on
the links between
the sign and
the experience of
the actor.
Here, an
aura surrounds the
objective meaning,
which can be
specified fully only
when all the
subjective meanings and
occasions for their
use are given
(124).
The full meaning
of a sign,
for example a
word, is
possible only where
we have a
knowledge of the
mental structure of
all the people
using it,
and something like
a 'logic
of everyday life'
to let us predict
when different types
are using different
meanings. Subjective
meanings are always
'occasional'--
that is affected
by context,
just as the
meaning of an
individual word depends
on a whole
prior sequence and
syntax. This
context emerges during
discourse. Discourses
are a project like
any other act,
with the motive
of unifying different
parts. The
project may be
a word,
a book,
or whole series
of volumes,
and the meaning
of the project
is never apparent
until the project
is finished.
Conversations are
conducted with regard
to the other's
subjective, that
is interpretive and
expressive, schemes.
The listener tries
to guess what
the speaker had
in mind,
and the speaker
is trying to
guess the impact
of words and
the likely success
of his project.
There are different
levels of understanding,
as above.
The listener tries
to establish both
objective and subjective
meanings, and
then he may
seek the speaker's
'in -
order - to'
motive, to
get it his
project, and
to fantasise a
full meaning for
it. Projects
can also be motivated
by 'because'
motives, which
need not be
subjectively experienced.
Interpretation relies on
the knowledge of
the other,
which in turn
depends on the
degree of intimacy
established with the
other.
For Schutz,
the objective meaning
of events arise
from an ordering
of the interpreter's
experience, and
thus can never
be free from
interpretive bias. Subjective
meaning arises from
the ordering of
the producer's
experiences. Objective
meaning reflects a
level of abstraction
-- universal meanings
divorced from flows
of experience,
containing idealities.
Both subjective and
objective meanings are
therefore two ends
of a continuum
of meaning.
The distinction between
them is important
in cultural sciences
particularly. In
other subjects,
such as economics,
academics are content
to operate with
an ideal actor
acting in accordance
with laws,
and subjective meanings
arise only when
asking why particular
managers or whatever
did not act
in this way.
The generalised search
for subjective meanings
is not suitable
for a science,
and will result
only in some
argument for God,
or some kind
of animism.
Chapter
4
The social
sciences use different
categories of meaning
than does the
person in the
natural attitude --
here, we
take the world
for granted,
and experience others immediately.
As soon as
one questions the
taken for granted,
social science begins.
Given that social
science can be
understood as a
disruption of the taken
for granted,
it indicates in
the simplest sense
that social science
must be based
on prescientific categories.
The social
world can be
divided according to
the degree of
direct experience of
it: the
most immediate level
concerns our fellow
beings; then the
world of contemporaries
(where we
can make inferences
about subjective experiences,
or actually interact
with others);
then the world
of predecessors
(we cannot
interact with these
people yet we
can get inferences
about them);
then our successors,
who are inferrable
only via idealisations.
Understanding therefore consists
of different types
of processes according
to this degree
of experience.
Social action
involves 'other
orientation',
that is if we
are assuming that
the other is
a Thou -- denying
this means we
can treat the
other as an
object. Action
can be 'other
affecting',
where my antecedent
projects are motivated
(in order
to) bring about
a conscious experience
in the other
through an attention
to his flow
of consciousness.
There are different
kinds of 'affecting'
-- for example
teaching may involve
simply making sure
that my ideas
are present in
the consciousness of
the other,
or my ideas
may be intended
to influence the
other's behaviour more
positively. My project
involves selections from
among the past
actions of the
other. I pursue
a continuum of
actions according to
their results on
the other.
Some actions need
not involve effects
on the other
at all,
however, although
all signs involve
some tacit aim
to affect,
although this may
not be intentional.
The other need
not reciprocate.
My attempts to
affect the other
will vary according
to the degree
of anonymity of
the other.
Any observer
watching us would
seek the outward
indications of a
relationship between the
other and me,
the originator. For
example, there
might be relations
between the actions
of the actors
which will be
interpreted by imaginative
reconstructions of projects
for both of
us. The
observer will validate
his understanding according
to his experience
of the social
world and his
knowledge of the
character of the
observed persons,
both actual or
typical. This
means an other
orientation for the
observer as well.
The observer will
refer to accounts
of correspondence of
indications invoking events
in his past
-- he will
make habitual interpretations
from experience.
However, the
degrees of interpretability
open to him
will depend on
his knowledge of
the people being
observed.
It will
obviously be easier
to identify social
interactions where people
are simply oriented to
their others than
it will be
to estimate effects
on the other
-- the only
way to increased
the probability of
a valid interpretation
is by asking
actors if they
are really affected.
It might also
be possible to
live in a
face-to-face relationship,
one of simultaneity,
and then to
reflect upon
it, examining one's
own past acts
acting as an
observer, and
checking the validity
of those observations
against knowledge of
one's own subjective
intentions.
There may
be a minimal reciprocation,
were the other
is merely paying attention
to me rather
than actively seeking my
meaning. This
may lead to
me aiming to
make the other
equally other- oriented,
leading to an
intersubjective motivational
context. Here,
the in -
order - to
motives in the
speaker become because
motives in the
responder. This
context of motivation
which governs the
reply is often
taken for granted,
as when we
assume that a
question immediately brings
a reply.
This only happens
when the other
is genuinely other
-oriented himself,
however. As
we might expect,
our knowledge of the
respondent's context
of motivations can
be specific or
typical according to
whether he is
a consociate
or a contemporary or whatever.
Various relationships
with the other
are possible.
With a face-to-face
relationship, characterised
by immediacy,
simultaneity of structures
of consciousness and
so on,
any reflection on
experiences means an
end to the
relationship
(because we
can only attend
to experiences once
they have elapsed).
Face-to-face is a
‘content-filled
we-relationship’,
seen as specific,
unique, and
in a concrete
context. It
may be remote
or intimate,
and vary according
to intensity.
I have both
general and specific
knowledge of my
partner in such
a relationship,
and of his
interpretive schemes,
and this increases
with exposure.
Both his acts
and his characteristics
become multiple,
and interaction tends
to yield reciprocity.
The environment can
be guaranteed as
a common one,
shared in experience,
which is useful
in getting the
interpretive schemes of
the others --
we can make
unambiguous references
to objects within
our mutual reach,
and check our
guesses by questions.
The flexibility of
face-to-face enables the
disclosure of the
other’s motivational
contexts -- he
continually adjusts to
me and I
participate to test
his reactions,
to see how
his assumed motives
produce what he
says. I
can continually compare
my expectations of
his behaviour with
his actual behaviour,
and can witness
him actually deciding
things.
Direct social
observation can occur
where the other
is unaware of
me. His
body still gives
off expressive movements,
and I can guess
at his subjective
meanings because he
is acting now
in a structure,
that is I
can see processes
at work.
However, no
testing is possible,
since we can
make no reference
to objects,
and cannot ask
questions to check
observations. Observers
cannot modify the
behaviour of the
other, and
in extremes cannot
even be sure
that the movement
is a planned action
rather than some
simple purposeless behaviour.
However, three
indirect approaches are
available to assist
in interpretation:
-
We can
remember our own
similar actions,
and try to
use them to
draw up the
principles of motivation
contexts, assuming
that these principles
are the same
for the other
as well.
This can be
done directly or
post hoc.
-
We can
use our own
knowledge to build
up a picture
of the 'customary
behaviour'
of the individual,
specifically or typically,
and thus arrive
at typical motives.
-
We can
try to infer
the motive from
the act itself
(asking,
for example,
whether a particular
motive would be
furthered by this
Act).
This involves an
assumption that the
effects we observe
are as intended.
Generally,
the validity of
interpretation depends
on the proximity
to a face-to-face
relationship. This
is the only
way to check
on those assumptions
of customary behaviour
or intention.
Face-to-face interaction
typically does not
reveal these very
clearly either,
but they are
easier to infer
because the data
is more vivid.
The problems are
similarly present for
any observers of
social relationships,
since the observers'
interpretive schemes can
be different from
those of either speaker
-- the attentional
modifications are different
and it becomes
difficult to be
aware of both
equally.
The third
kind of relationship
is one with
contemporaries. The
knowledge of contemporaries
is always direct
and impersonal,
graspable only as
general types of
subjective experience.
Contemporaries are not
given to us without
mediations. We may
regard a contemporary
as a former
Thou, now changed
in certain ways,
or as a
relation to a Thou.
In both cases
he can only
be understood through
a typification which
is held to
be invariant across
the changes.
Cultural objects can
index our contemporaries:
they are related
to the contemporary
via an experienced
relation to a
known person or type
[eg '
my friend behaves like
that'].
All our experiences
of contemporaries are
therefore based on
interpretative judgments.
We extend
our other orientation
into a
‘they orientation’,
in an attempt
to gain experience
of social reality
in general,
of human beings
and their operations
in the abstract.
Contemporaries perform
actions with objective
meanings -- that
is meanings constituted
by me and
my interpretive schemes
into a unity [objectivated].
My interpretation
is a synthesis,
based on my
experiences of many
Thous. It
is a personal ideal
type, constructed
from many cases,
although it need
not correspond with
any of them.
My social relations
with others take
place through these
ideal types based
on assumptions of
generalisability,
or in Schutz's
terms 'again
and again'
[one kind of idealisation].
For example,
one expects policemen
to act in
certain ways,
and thus we
can relate with
them in an
ideal way without
ever knowing them
as individuals.
Similarly, such
people are only
relevant for us
in so far
as they correspond
with our ideal
type.
Ideal types
like this are
also important for
understanding predecessors.
They are even used
to interpret the
Thou in face-to-face relationships,
although they are
more concrete and
more liable to
be modified by
conversation. Ideal
types are therefore vital
to all elements,
all meaning contexts
all products and
all actions.
They are formed
by lifting moments
of experience out
of their settings
and contexts,
via 'syntheses
of recognition',
by 'freezing'
them into an
ideal type.
They may be
a type of
person -- the
personal ideal type
-- or of
an expressive process,
an 'action
- pattern type'.
These are often
related, as
when a person
is defined by
their role.
However, there
are problems:
The first
sort of problem
arises when an
interpreter discovers the
motives for an
actor by interpreting
his act in
an objective context.
The same motive
is applied to
any act that
achieves the same
end via the same
means, no
matter who performs
it. In
this way we
arrive at one
typical motive for
one typical act
per personal ideal
type. The
next step is to
link an agent
with an act,
a person who,
with typical modification
of attention,
typically intends
this typical act.
This can only
be done if
we assume that
ideal typical people
are rational,
that is,
in certain states
they logically construct
actions without hesitation
or doubt,
that their act takes
the form of
a major goal,
and that acts
arise out of
a definite passage
from their experience
(that is
they have because
motives).
This all stems
from an objective
interpretation of the
act: the
observer imposes some
unity on a
person's experience around
that interpretation.
The personal ideal
type is selected
by the observer
on the basis
of an originally
objective definition.
It tries to
explain actions,
yet it is
already determined by
actions. It
is linked with
acts definitionally rather
than empirically as
sociologists believe.
All the ideal
type can offer
is an account
of experience polythetically
constructed [roughly –
constructed over time, by a number of synthetic acts], but
this is not
based on some
real event,
but on an
act already conceived
monothetically [
‘at a glance’, in one defining moment] by social
scientists
[in other
words, it
spells out some
complexity based on
an original assumption].
It is an
illusion to regard
the ideal type
as real --
circularity can ensue,
where the ideal
type seems real, and
testable, seen as based
on real actors,
and then used to
explain real actions
which validate it in the first place.
People
are sometimes seen
as being 'free’
to choose their
actions, and
this is justified
by departures from
their ideal types
-- but all
that is really
involved is a
manipulation of their
typical characteristics
(such as
when we get
to realise more
of their complexity
as they become
more intimate to
us).
Generally, the more
detail that is
required the less
secure the ideal
type and the
less likely that
there will be
a definite type
to be assigned.
Typing is performed
only using certain
criteria, and
characteristics other than
these are seen
as properties attached
to unique individuals.
Since we can
relate to others
in degrees of
concreteness or anonymity,
there is often
an uncertainty over
how actual others
might conform to
ideal types,
and how much
we might need
to modify our ideal
types. We
also have the
possibility of turning
they-relations into
several we-relations,
operationalising general
types into more
specific ones with
greater concreteness.
Finally,
types may be
'characterological',
that is concrete and
based on direct
experience, or
‘habitual’, defined
solely according to
function.
Some habitual types
can be collectivities,
such as the
state. We
can be anthropomorphic
about them but
they're absolutely anonymous
and permit no
inference about subjective
meaning contexts --
the action of
the state must
be reduced to
the action of
its functionaries and
then understood via
networks of personal
ideal types.
Artefacts can be
understood via types
of producers and
users, and
both are perfectly
anonymous.
Relationships between
contemporaries therefore
are always doubtful
-- will the
other correspond to
my type,
and will I to
his?
Contemporaries assume
a shared interpretative
scheme, a
notion extended after
its experience in
the nuances of
face-to-face. Effects
of the relationship
can only be
evaluated after the
interaction, as
there is no
continual feedback.
Much can go
wrong double -
for example if
I make a
mistake, it
alters the other’s
motivations, and
now I can't
correct my expectations.
My knowledge of
the other is
modified |