Notes on: Barad, K. (1996). Meeting with the
Universe Halfway: Realism and Social Constructivism
Without Contradiction. In L. Nelson and J. Nelson
(Eds). Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of
Science, 161 – 194. Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
Dave Harris
[Clear continuities with the huge book of 2007
-- slightly better exposition of Bohr?]
She gave a lecture on the socially constructed
nature of scientific knowledge and then looked down
a scanning tunnelling microscope until she could see
individual carbon atoms, an unusual experience for a
theorist. She could see how delicately the probe was
positioned. She mused that seeing atoms would become
routine for students in the future but was grateful
to have been brought up with science before this
expectation.
How did this square with the socially
constructed nature of science? Empirical adequacy is
not sufficient to silence constructivist arguments,
of course and social construction does not imply
that science doesn't work or that when it does work,
that we have discovered facts that are human
independent. Of course they then have to go on to
explain how it is that constructions do work, and
especially how it interfaces with 'axes of power"
(162).
It's important to remember there are both cultural
and natural 'causes for knowledge claims', and
Constructivism has tended to overemphasise cultural
factors, mostly because they want to challenge the
view that sees science simply as 'the Mirror of
nature'. They have often been forced into an equally
extreme position 'that science mirrors culture',
even though few constructivists take such an extreme
position. Nevertheless epistemological issues have
overshadowed ontological ones.
In traditional science, 'nature is taken to be
transparently given' although Cartwright and others
have denied that this means that 'scientific
entities are unmarked by the discoverers': she has
subsequently split scientific realism into two
independent positions 'realism about theories and
realism about entities' (163). Hacking
advocates realism tours entities through the
examination of experimental practice and the ability
of the experiment to manipulate entities in the
laboratory. Galison emphasises the idea of
stability, in variances of results even though
experimental conditions have changed, and also
'directness (i.e. epistemologically, but not
necessarily logically, non-inferential)'. Other
constructivist approaches include Latour (1993) who
also prioritises stability as 'one variable of a
two-dimensional geometry whose other axis connects
the poles of nature and society. Essence then
becomes the trajectory of stabilisation within this
geometry that is meant to characterise the variable
ontologies of quasi-objects' [the reference is to We
Have Never Been Modern]. Haraway emphasises
instability of the boundaries that define objects
and also that separate epistemology from ontology —
the objects of knowledge are also 'agents in the
production of knowledge', and this leads her to
ideas like cyborgs and 'material – semiotic actors'
which 'strike up dissonant and harmonic resonances
with Latour's hybrids and quasi-objects'.
Derrida seems like a linguistic narcissist
disconnecting sign from signified. Hayles, for
example, objects that language is never groundless
playing and that language is in touch with the
reality: she rethinks reference reality, depending
on consistency, a version of congruence, and 'the
semiotic notion of negativity to acknowledge the
importance of constraints offered by a reality that
cannot be seen in its positivity: as she puts it,
"although there may be no outside that we can know,
there is a boundary"'.
However these ventures into ontology are exceptional
with constructivists. There is a need to understand
more about 'the technologies by which nature and
culture interact'. Is there a natural template that
gets filled in by culture, 'in ways that are
compatible local discourses?'. Do specific
discourses provide 'lenses through which we view the
layering of culture upon nature' and does this
obliterate parts of nature in the process. It is
reality just an amorphous blob before being
structured by discourse and interactions, or does it
have some complicated shape sampled by different
frameworks that fit local regions. Or is there are a
fractal geometry? This must all sound like
metaphysics, although it is crucial as Haraway says,
to define what counts as an object.
She wants to articulate a 'new ontological and
epistemological framework' (164), with a 'realist
tenor'. She rejects the view that scientific realism
is naïve and reflexive or apolitical. Theories may
be constructed but they can still be 'true
representations of independent reality'. There is a
problem in that different theories can account for
the same empirical evidence, or that the whole
debate limits discussion, but she does not wish to
'deny my own realist tendencies' despite
acknowledging that sometimes realism supports
oppressive politics as well as liberatory ones.
She intends to begin with Cushing: that's scientific
realism believes that theories are capable of
'"providing reliable and understandable access to
the ontology of the world"' (165). There are other
aspects she wants to take on as well. Science
studies has long attempted to accommodate moderate
social Constructivism while rejecting absolute
relativism. Feminist science studies in particular
have vigourously rejected epistemological
relativism, and linking it with its binary
objectivism, and have argued instead for 'situated
knowledges' or 'contextual empiricism'. She uses the
term '"agential realism"' to reject extreme
oppositions, address specific forms of realism and
the larger framework covering epistemology and
ontology.
She draws inspiration from reading Bohr and his
'philosophy – physics' [hyphenated because he saw
these interests as not distinctive]. It involves a
crucial examination of observation and measurement,
in contrast to the neglect of the observer in
Newtonian physics. Quantum physics needs 'a new
logical framework that takes the observation process
into account. Measurement is a potent moment in the
construction of scientific knowledge — it is an
instance where matter and meaning meet in a very
literal sense' (166). For example in experimental
high energy physics detectors are 'sites for making
meaning'. They also lead to an understanding of 'the
embodiment of culture within theory'.
Traditional views see the practice of measurement to
be outside of theory, a way of adjudicating among
theories, but Bohr sees practice as within theory,
meaning that theory must be embodied in practice and
'cannot abstract itself'. This is congruent with
post-modernism to the extent that it is the same as
asserting that 'all knowledge is a local
knowledges'. It is to be understood as 'the literal
embodiment of objectivity in the sense of Haraway's
theory of situated knowledges'.
The ubiquitous appropriation of quantum theory is
dangerous, and might form an explosive mixture with
the addition of feminist theory. We need to 'rescue'
quantum theory first. It is not the scientific path
leading to metaphysics or Eastern mysticism, nor is
it 'inherently less and Eurocentric, more feminine,
and generally less regressive than… Newtonian
physics'. It did after or under pin the workings of
atomic weapons, and particle physics is 'the
ultimate manifestation of the tendency towards
scientific reductionism', while it is still the
preserve of a small group of Western males. Science
should not be held up to some fixed notion of
gender, however.
Nor are philosophical concerns irrelevant to
physics, as Bohr himself showed. His Copenhagen
interpretation persists, even though it has now been
understood as providing a set of tools the
calculation rather than a philosophy. Bohr himself
refers to epistemological lessons and saw a more
general relevance beyond physics. There is still
'much disagreement' (167) about how to interpret
him, however, partly because he's not specific about
his philosophical commitments — she proposes 'the
ontology that I believe to be consistent with Bohr's
views, although I make no claim that this is what he
necessary had in mind'. There remain 'vast
differences in opinion'. She wants to take his
writings as a context rather than 'as Scripture', as
'inspiration for her own framework. She differs from
Bohr in strategy, especially in addressing concerns
that social constructivist approaches to science
make apparent, 'but not in spirit' (168) — he also
tried to guess 'what the relevant complementary
variables would be in each arena'. Sometimes these
variables 'turned out not to be complementary [NB
complementary spelt with a capital in each case],
'and because the implications are drawn on this
basis watered down the complexity and richness of
the "epistemological lessons"'. She is not going to
use the notion of complementarity but rather
'directly interrogate particular philosophical
background assumptions that underlie specific
concerns.
She is not going to argue that quantum theory
provides analogies to situations [religious,
spiritual, or psychological] in the macro world, but
focus on 'widely applicable epistemological and
ontological issues that can be usefully investigated
by a rigourous examination of measurement processes
as explicated by Bohr's understanding of physics'.
It is not an analogical process and so the usual
questions of whether it applies are not relevant —
'the epistemological and ontological issues are not
circumscribed by the size of Planck's constant'. He
is not interested in the analogies, but the 'rather
widely applicable philosophical issues such as the
conditions for objectivity, the appropriate referent
for empirical attributes, the role of natural as
well as cultural factors in scientific knowledge
production'.
Bohr argued that must clarify even the basic
epistemological and ontological assumptions, like
those that underlie Newtonian physics — and
autonomously existing world describable
independently of power empirical investigations of
it, with transparent measurement external to the
discourse of science, with 'objects and observers
occupy physically and conceptually separable
positions… Objects… [With]… Well-defined intrinsic
attributes' which scientists have to discover and
separate from context independent variables,
'through some benignly invasive measurement
procedure', often controlled experimentation (168 –
nine). Bohr particularly challenged that (a)
measurement involved 'continuous, determinable
interactions, that is an unambiguous inherent
Cartesian – like cut between knower and known
delineates objects from observational apparatus; (b)
applying conceptual schema is independent of
measurement, because 'concepts are abstract able,
universal, definite, and context independent'.
Newtonian physics us determinist predictive and
rectory addictive, claiming to specify the full set
of physical states of the system once the initial
conditions are known, including the position and
momentum of an object through time-of-flight
measurements, assuming the process of illuminating
the object offers only minimal disturbance. All
these are false assumptions. Quantum physics is
based on 'empirically verified discrete this all
discontinuity… In measurement interactions' [hence
the notion of a quantum of action, Planck's
constant]. This means that measurement interactions
are not negligible and so they must be subtracted
somehow from the properties of an independent object
— but this is impossible and measurement
interactions cannot be specified without disrupting
the measurement itself. In effect this 'undermines
the separability of the "object" and the "agencies
of observation"' [all nice and easy if we take the
simple case of a light beam used to illustrate
particles, where the photons in the light being
themselves disrupt the path of the particles]
[Scaling up a lot!] 'concepts are defined by the
circumstances required for their measurement' and
this [somehow] underpins [?] the indeterminability
measurement interactions [the actual phrase is that
indeterminability 'is based on his insistence that
concepts et cetera]. Therefore [?] 'Mutually
exclusive experimental arrangements would need to be
employed simultaneously (which is impossible) in
order to determine all the features of the
measurement interaction'.
A helpful example [I hope] (170). We are attempting
a time-of-flight measurement, but the momentum
imparted by light impinging on the object would need
to be subtracted out. However measurements of
momentum require 'an apparatus with movable parts
(i.e. the concept "momentum" is necessarily defined
by reference to an apparatus with movable parts)' [a
homely example asks us to imagine catching a ball,
where the momentum of the ball is measured by the
distance our arm has to move back]. However, the
early measurement of the position of the particle
requires an apparatus with fixed parts, and 'the
concept "position" is necessarily defined by
reference to a fixed apparatus' which means that
observation is only possible if interaction is
'indeterminable (i.e. it cannot be subtracted out)'
[I think this means we cannot subtract out the
impact delivered by the photons). What we have is an
observation which must involve 'an indeterminable
discontinuous interaction, as a matter of principle,
there is no unambiguous way to differentiate between
the "object" and the "agencies of observation"' [or
in easier terms 'observations do not refer to
objects of an independent reality', rendered by
Barad as 'no inherent/naturally
occurring/fixed/universal/Cartesian cut exists'].
Quantum theory via Bohr thus offers profound
challenges to the idea of measurement transparency
which underlies Newton and lots of other
enlightenment notions, leading him to have to
develop a new epistemology.
One step is to move from reference to
'"disturbance". He emphasises '"quantum wholeness",
or the lack of an inherent/Cartesian distinction
between the "object" and the "agencies of
observation"' [as we saw above]. The old separation
implies 'a non-dualistic whole' and it is
'conceptually incoherent to refer to an inherent
distinction' between its two parts. There is
descriptively only a single situation, and we can't
abstract one part, or at least not without running
into problems with other descriptions [and this is
how the complementary situation arises]. There is no
independent object in the usual sense, but there are
'particular instances of wholeness' and these are
called 'phenomena' by Bohr — they arise 'when the
interaction between object and apparatus can be
neglected or, if necessary, compensated for, in
quantum physics this interaction thus forms an
inseparable part of the phenomena', that is it is an
inherent and relevant feature of the experimental
arrangement itself. Essential wholeness is
demonstrated by the failure of any attempt to divide
or subdivide the phenomena while preserving the same
experimental arrangements and the same appearance of
the phenomenon.
What is observation? Bohr says that in any
experiment we can understand an event in an
unambiguous way if we can '"state the conditions
necessary for the reproduction of the phenomena"'
(171) when we state these conditions we are in
effect introducing 'a constructed/agentially
positioned/movable, local/"Bohrian" distinction
between an "object" and the "agencies of
observation"' (171). This is not an inherent
distinction but results from measurement involving a
choice of apparatus which gives definition to
classical variables while excluding others, placing
a 'particular constructing cut delineating the
"object" from the "agencies of observation". This is
a 'particular constructed cut', used for a
particular context, and should really be seen as
'part of a particular instance of wholeness, that is
a particular phenomenon'.
[Another example on 171 where light is scattered
from a particle and then directed towards a
photographic plate fixed in the laboratory recording
the position, or directed towards a piece of
equipment with movable parts used to record its
momentum. The light is part of the measuring
apparatus in the first case, but part of the object
in the second — together, they indicate that the
measurement interaction is indeterminable. It is the
Observer who has constructed a cut defining the
object and the agencies of observation in this
particular context].
Bohr also insisted that quantum mechanical
measurements were '"objective"', bit did not mean
that measurements reveal with the objective
properties of independent objects. Instead he meant
that '"[n]o explicit reference is made to any
individual observer"', so that the objective here
meant reproducible and 'unambiguously communicable',
in the sense that permanent marks are left on
bodies. Objectivity means '"does not admit of
ambiguity"', rather than the Newtonian notion of
'observer independence'
'Agencies of observation'replaces the term observer
for Bohr [in his definition of objectivity as
well?], Involving the 'in separability of the
material and semiotics apparatuses' — [thinking of
just] the physical apparatus 'marks the conceptual
subject – object distinction: [Bohr's conception of]
the material and semiotics apparatuses form a
non-dualistic whole' (172), and this is the 'pivotal
point'. In classical approaches, concepts get their
meaning by referring to a physical apparatus which
'marks the placement of a constructed cut between
the "object" and the "agencies of observation"'. [In
classical approaches too?] Unambiguous communication
results from '"permanent marks — such as a spot on a
photographic plate"' left by an electron, itself
defined by the experimental conditions. Thus the
experimental conditions are involved throughout in
the notion of meaningful observation, from start to
end of observation [I think that is what she means].
For Bohr, this means that 'measurement and
description entail one another (though not in the
narrowly operationalist sense but in the sense of
epistemological in distinguishability)'.
Bohr often includes detailed drawings of
experimental apparatuses, mechanical devices use for
observing quantum events, in his discussions of
complementarity [which seems to indicate,
incidentally, the coexistence of apparently
contradictory states like waves and particles?].
This somehow emphasises the connection between
concepts and apparatus. He wanted to show how
'meaning is tied to the experiential world' [or at
least objectivity is?]. He might have been
influenced here by Rutherford who was his doctoral
supervisor.
What is the referent for a given objective property
obtained by a measurement process? There can be no
attribution to the object all the measuring
instrument, either of which are seen as observation
independent. Instead, 'measured properties referred
to phenomena… Particular instances of wholeness'
which, in Bohr, '"must, in principle, includes a
description of all relevant features of the
experimental arrangement"' [but what counts as all
relevant features — this is the problem of endless
openness which Barad discusses].
This is unlike the classic approach which has a
subject object distinction. However since there is
also a 'constructed subject object distinction'
(173) in the concept of a phenomenon, we can still
use classical concepts, indeed, Bohr says it is
necessary in describing phenomena — classical
concepts are 'just the ones that are useful in
describing phenomena' [that is exactly the ones that
are needed required for measurement?].
Alternatively, unambiguous communication refers to
permanent marks left on (macroscopic) bodies, that
in particular circumstances become defined as the
apparatus, and this apparatus specifies how the
classical concepts are to be defined, using everyday
experience, 'and therefore premised on an object
subject distinction'. Therefore, phenomena must use
classical concepts, even though they see involve
seeing the relation between concepts and apparatus
as, the 'particular constructed cut in question'
[not some eternal epistemological relation?. This
leaves '"room… For a wider description… [Since]…
Consequent use of our concepts requires different
placings of such a separation"' [all these are
citing Bohr himself]. Indeed, acknowledging
complementarity means we have to consider 'all
possible ways of drawing the subject object
distinction', so that 'mutually exclusive
experimental circumstances' and 'mutually exclusive
constructed cuts' will only serve to 'de-naturalise
the nature of the observational process' [I think —
artificially restrict it, I think the argument is].
This is radically different from Newtonian physics
and now means that measurement 'must play a
prominent role in scientific theorising', so
practice is situated within theory, and method
description epistemology and ontology are connected.
[Now a 'methodological interlude']. Reading Bohr is
difficult because his style is a typical, reflecting
on his own descriptive process. Barad has also had
to reflect on her process in reading Bohr, and this
means she is not claiming to have discovered what he
was actually thinking or intending. She finds
parallels between his methodology and feminist and
'other are located – knowledges methodologies' as 'a
reflection of a common critical reflexivity' (174).
They get this after more than a decade of study.
There is some agreement with the standard secondary
texts, however but there is still divergence. Many
scholars think of Bohr as an anti-realist, sometimes
a positivist, idealist, relativist or pragmatist.
Only a few see him as a realist. He does focus on
epistemological issues and never really spells out
the ontology — so she has to present an ontology
consistent with these views this is '"agential
realism"', proposed here is a framework for thinking
about critical issues in science studies. It is not
just Bohr
.
The debate about realism often turns on the
correspondence theory of truth. But that is still
rooted in the usual dualism is of subject object,
culture and nature and word world, epistemology and
ontology. Bohr contests these distinctions and wants
to describe 'our participation within nature'. He
seems to recognise that language is crucial both in
determining interpretation and reality [says a
quote, page 175].
Barad turns to a passage by Bohr responding to a
1935 paper of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen on
'physical reality'. This is essential to his work,
criticises their approach, but also offers positive
definitions: EPR contains an ambiguity concerning
what it counts to disturb the system during
measurement. Bohr argues that of course there is an
overall influence on the conditions which define the
possible types of prediction of the system, and
these include a description of '"any phenomenon to
which the term physical reality can be properly
attached". As a result, EPR cannot argue that
quantum mechanical description is incomplete.
This follows from his view that conditions defining
possible types of prediction are 'an inherent
element of the description of any phenomenon'.
Further, 'phenomena are constitutive of reality',
not 'things – in – themselves, or things – behind –
phenomena, but things – in – phenomena' (176). This
squares with von Weizacker's point about quantum
reality, where atoms are not just seen as little
things, not even things behind phenomena, but they
must be phenomena involving things in order to be
objectified enough to develop a science. This also
explains the distinctiveness of quantum reality and
why it breaks down. Honner confirms that this is not
the Kantian distinction between things in themselves
and our perception of them, which would be an
argument that things lie behind phenomena. However,
it is not clear in Bohr.
It is the only interpretation that 'respects the
complex intention of the Bohrian notion of
"phenomena"' for Barad (176). Phenomena are 'a
non-dualistic whole' so there are no independently
existing things, especially not some fixed notion of
being prior to signification. Nor is being
inaccessible to language, but not completely
determined by language either. Instead, humans
participate in agential reality. Bohr confirms that
we are part of nature ourselves, and that science
has taught us this. He also claims in the EPR paper
that complementarity leads to that inevitable
conclusion [actually to the need for new physical
laws, that might involve the participation of
humans? — Barad extends the point to argue that
'since phenomena constitute agential reality and it
is phenomena that scientific theories describe, it
follows that scientific theories describe agential
reality' (177). Otherwise she says, Bohr would be a
'diehard realist advocating a classical
correspondence of truth... a correspondence theory
'. Butt he has already argued that there is no
observer independent reality, which leaves agential
realism as the only compatible position consistent
with his philosophy, that breaks with the old
distinctions.
Bohr was some sort of realist, and continued to
practice science, including contributions to the
different efforts in the 1920s to explain the
wave/particle duality [explained as involving
mutually exclusive conceptions leading to a
'communitywide struggle… To resolve this paradox']
(178). Classical realists tried to find a unifying
explanation that said objects and look like
particles only on certain scales. Others turned to
mathematical formalism rather than attempts to
visualise concepts independently [including
Heisenberg, apparently]. Bohr developed an entirely
new approach, again which shows his rejection of
classical realism. That led to complementarity and
the Copenhagen interpretation.
In 1924 he even suggested that the conservation of
energy would have to be sacrificed at the atomic
level to explain the paradox. This was quickly
retracted, but shows his radicalism. He then tried
to examine the circumstances in which the different
characteristics were manifested, leading to 'the
context dependence descriptive concepts'. He
retained 'certain realist commitments' to reject
instrumentalist stances like Heisenberg's
[alternative description simply arise from different
visualisations?]. Bohr and Heisenberg differed
subsequently, and developed both Complementarity and
the Uncertainty Principle respectively, and Bohr
criticised the Principle because it neglected
duality as central.
Bohr solve the paradox by saying that the terms wave
and particle are classical descriptions, referring
to 'different mutually exclusive phenomena' not to
independent physical objects, it was just that
'mutually exclusive experimental arrangements'
produced the paradox [I think — different
experimental arrangements enabled physicists to
observe both, solving the problem of inconsistency].
There is no final reductionist explanation, but
'contextual understanding', a challenge to some
universal subject object distinction. The ambiguity
is contextually decided and descriptive
characteristics 'do not signify properties of
abstract objects or observation independent beings
but rather describe the "between of our intra
actions"' [no one is actually cited for this quote
within quote, but Barad says she has introduced the
term 'intra-action'] (179). She wants to avoid
're-inscription of the contested dichotomy'. What
this means is that the values of the variables are
'attributable to the phenomenon' as a whole [then an
odd bit 'the fully contextual be in' '— misprint for
being?] where the matter and meaning meet'.
[OK at this level,much is clearer. The
behaviour of electrons shows two Complementary
patterns. This is not the result of some natural
indeterminacy {wherever Heisenberg thought that
came from} but because the two are both components
of the same phenomenon
.
They can be separated only by 'cuts' introduced by
different experimental set ups which include the
observer. Barsad says only a general ontology of
agential realism can generalise this position, so
I was right to say that Barad's whole position
depends on diffraction at the electron level ( as
well as beams) -- it is qaboutthe obnly
evidence for Bohr's whole position? Other quantum
weirdness also suiports itlike entanglement? {I
guess, scinec the Copnhagen School has survived}.
BUT generalising this beyond the quantum world
involves serious problems: is the macro world
similarly divided into only 2 Complementary states
or more? Worse with the social world,and far more
interaction {sic} between observers and objects as
well as any intra-action. EG when Barad diffracts
Hayashi, are the alternative readings
Complementary in Bohrs sense or just different,
with the possibility of lots more different ones,
and is the interaction {sic} between Barad and
Hayashi also interfering with their intra-action?
How does Barad control her own American cultural
baggage, her politics,or her feminism?]
Haraway identifies the main problem of linking
objects of knowledge to the real world, given that
it may be multiple complex and contradictory. Barad
thinks agential realism will provide a suitable
framework —
it 'grounds and situates knowledge claims on
local experiences: objectivity is literally
embodied'
it privileges neither material nor culture: 'the
apparatus of bodily production is material –
cultural and so is agential reality'
it entails the 'interrogation of boundaries and
critical reflexivity'
it 'underlines the necessity of an ethics of
knowing' (179)
In more detail, despite feminist's criticism about
objectivism, objectivity is literally embodied,
although the old dichotomies in positivism and the
Enlightenment are rejected. Lots of
anti-Enlightenment theory, 'including Derrida,
Foucault and Lyotard' have ignored gender and race
in their critique of universalism, however, and also
'the entire set of Enlightenment goals as well'
including 'the possibility of positive
epistemologies' (180).
Haraway advocates 'situated knowledges' to challenge
both abstract objectivism and its viewpoint, and
relativism. The advocates 'the view from somewhere,
along with the responsibility that that entails — is
the key to feminist objectivity'. Scientific
accounts in particular offer 'highly specific visual
possibilities… A partial way of organising worlds',
and they can be used to 'embody feminist
objectivity'. Agential realism provides the
technology, through the argument that concepts
obtain their meaning by reference to particular
apparatus, and objective descriptions refer to
permanent marks left on bodies defining experimental
conditions. 'Therefore, bodies which define the
experimental conditions serve as both the endpoint
and the starting point for objective accounts of our
intra-actions. In other words, objectivity is
literally embodied'. Knowledge is always a view from
somewhere, 'objective knowledge is situated
knowledge'. [Situated in experiments? Situated in
apparatus?]
Bodily production is both material and cultural 'and
so is agential reality'. Theoretical constructs are
not just transparent representations, nor are they
artefacts, purely discursive. Bohr again, referring
to a conference which discussed the appearance of
phenomena and how it should be described, in terms
of nature or the Observer: it was not reasonable so
'"endow nature with volition in the ordinary
sense"', nor "possible for the Observer to influence
the events which may appear under the conditions he
has arranged"'. We can only choose to deal with
individual phenomena and when we handle measuring
instruments we can only choose between '"different
complementary types of phenomena we want to study"'
(181). Barad concludes that 'nature has agency, but
does not speak itself to the [passive] observer… We
do the representing'. Nature is not a blank slate.
Splitting the material and the discursive forgets
'the inseparability that characterises phenomena'.
Bohr and the others did assume a liberal humanist
observer and ignored the social dimensions of
knowledge production, and we must acknowledge
cultural influences, especially if 'reproducibility
and unambiguous communication are the criteria for
objectivity' which involves the scientific
community. This makes 'the apparatus… A multi
dimensional material – cultural framework'.
If something is socially constructed, that 'doesn't
mean that it isn't real', since 'reality is itself
material – cultural', and constructed Mr is not
denied materiality. The materiality of the body is
not challenged ['dissipated'] by constructed must,
'since reality is constituted by the "between"
[nature culture, world word, physical conceptual,
material discourse]. Phenomena are material and
cultural 'be– in's' [again — lots of repetition and
assertion and tautology here. Haraway describes
objects as '"material- semiotic actors"', with the
object of knowledge as something active and meaning
generating, part of the '"apparatus of bodily
production"'. They are only separated out from
phenomena by mapping and boundaries.
However, wholeness 'according to agential realism,
does not signify the dissolution of boundaries'
(182). Boundaries are necessary to define the limits
of theoretical concepts, their context. There is no
attempt to prioritise the whole over some of the
parts, but rather to indicate the 'inseparability of
the material and the cultural'. Within that whole
all sorts of delineations and differentiations must
be drawn, indeed 'different this is required of
wholeness'. Dissolving boundaries are utopian
illusions 'since by definition there is no agential
reality without constructed boundaries'. Nor can we
deny responsibility these boundaries by claiming
they are natural or that they are arbitrary
divisions outside human space and time. Instead,
boundaries are [always?] 'Interested instances of
power, specific constructions, with real material
consequences'. There are difference stakes and
'there are different ontological implications.'
These boundaries are not fixed but exist intention
because of different possible 'agentially situated
cuts'. There may be 'mutually exclusive
intra-actions… Opposing shifts in the conceptual
terrain', because concepts refer to phenomena not to
some independent reality. Descriptions are linked to
boundaries [very confusing and circular bit on 182].
The description includes the boundary: 'human
conceptual schema are part of the quantum
wholeness'. 'Descriptions of phenomena are
reflexive, and the shifting of boundaries
constitutes a meta critique' [always? Just in
feminism?]. This is common to many feminist
epistemologies [aha], which often call for critical
examination of background assumptions, including
cultural agendas.
'Agential realism includes practice within theory:
theory is epistemologically and ontologically
reflexive of [?] context', unlike positivism which
separates theory and practice Bohr sees the
discourse of science as including the discourse on
science, with phenomena as 'the embodiment of
cultural practices within theory' (183). Then an
odd bit 'I suspect that the reflexive
implications are the root cause of Bohr's
marginalisation within the physics community'.
Reality is not independent of our explorations of it
and we must focus on the ontological as well as the
epistemological if we are to intra-act responsibly,
and draw boundaries to produce phenomena with
material consequences. Agency 'modifies and
specifies the form that realism takes' as a form of
intra-acting, enactment, 'it is not something
someone has'.
Particular social constructions have material
consequences via technologies and these must be
understood including 'the full apparatus of bodily
production' [thinking of feminism again?]. Back to
wave phenomena 'in the context of a particular
apparatus of bodily production: particle phenomena
are tied to a mutually exclusive apparatus' [a state
of the two slit apparatus with detectors?]. We know
that we must include the apparatus [why is it
specified as the apparatus of 'bodily production' —
to smuggle in a generalisation?]. We can understand
dynamic interactions of nature-culture as these
weird 'ontological be in's' again to understand the
material consequences of constructing particular
apparatuses, and if we multiply or destabilise the
existing apparatus we can progress with knowing to
reconfigure boundaries. This will have further
material consequences 'so that agential realism
underlines the requirement for an ethics of knowing'
[weird].
[Section 7 starts with a quote by Honner about Bohr
on complementarity — he is saying that "a
relationship between word and world is accepted is
necessarily denying complete resolution"']
Her interest as in feminist science studies, which
have classically resisted the binaries found in
usual discussions of science — one a radical
critique that ignores the effectiveness of science,
and the other full confidence in science which
implies an unchanged philosophy. The '"discovery
model"' sees nature at the centre stage with passive
observers, but is no longer acceptable. Nor is
extreme social Constructivism that sees science as
'an arbitrary compendium of power laden rhetorical
moves' (184). Agential realism provides a framework
to re-theorise the interaction of nature and
culture, reconciling the view that scientific
knowledge is socially constructed, but that it also
gathers empirically adequate knowledge with
implications about the ontology of the world and
realism.
The enlightenment version of the scientific method
claim to remove all cultural influences and develop
objectivism, involving the gaining of independent
facts, separate from human subjects. Agential
realism wants to challenge this conceptualisation on
epistemological and ontological grounds.
Instead, concepts obtain their meaning by reference
to 'a particular physical apparatus marking the
placement of an agential a constructed cut between
the "object" and the "agencies of observation"'.
Objective descriptions are referred to permanent
marks left on the bodies '"which define the
experimental conditions"' [Bohr — I still don't
fully grasp the implications of the last bit]. Barad
says that because bodies are important, 'agential
realism gives us an embodied account of objectivity'
(185) [I don't get this because Bohr also says that
there must be unambiguous communication of the
results, implying some saw the scientific community,
as others have noted — like the entry in the
Stanford Encyclopaedia. Human activity and agreement
on interpretations is as important as embodying the
results. Indeed, the Encyclopaedia says, agreement
has to be gained not just on the immediate results
of the experiment but on the whole issue of
complementarity and whole phenomena]. Barad renders
this as 'reproducibility is possible because
scientific investigations are embodied, grounded in
experience, in praxis' [that is the not just thought
experiments? Important activities have been though?
Although you could weasel and say that experience is
embodied?]. Phenomena 'other place where matter and
meaning meet'. There is no need for a concept of the
transcendent or some other absolute foundation
[Honner on Bohr]
There is choice in reproducibility, though, choice
of a 'constructed cut for which the ambiguity is
only temporarily, contextually decided in such a way
as to lend meaning to certain concepts at the
exclusion of others'. However this is 'not a filter
for shared biases; the apparatus of bodily
production is culturally situated'. Scientists are
'marked by the cultural specificities of race,
history, gender, language, class, politics, et
cetera' [real confusion and contradiction here], and
somehow this restores agency and accountability, 'in
stark contrast to the classical framework'. Agential
realism is this wonderful movement between meaning
and matter, word and world, 'interrogating and
redefining boundaries, a dance not behind all
beyond, but in "the between", where knowledge and
being meet'.
Scientific knowledge is not an arbitrary
construction independent of reality, not separate
from us. Some concepts are well-defined and can
achieve reproducible results, but they are always
contextualised. They do not tell us about
independent reality or name discoveries of objective
attributes. They are not innocent or unique but are
constructs, [this time] 'used to describe "the
between" rather than some independent reality' [with
a strange appeal to common sense here 'why would we
be interested in such a thing as an independent
reality anyway? We don't live in such a world.]
Phenomena constitute reality. Reality is material –
cultural. [Lovely circularity here]: 'And according
to agential realism scientific knowledge are
situated knowledges describing ''agential reality"'.
She paraphrases Bohr to say that physics is not an
attempt to find how nature is, but rather what we
can say about interactions within nature, since '"we
are in reality we must be in our theories"'. We
describe 'agential reality… (We don't live in a
transcendent reality)', so we must take material
cultural factors into account 'since they are in
agential reality' that's why they produce
empirically adequate accounts of our intra-actions
within nature. Reliability is nothing to do with the
transcendent or access to an independent reality. We
have mutually exclusive concepts in science which
shows that scientific knowledge is socially
constructed and it is allied 'along particular axes
of power' (186). We are not viewing nature through
the lens of culture, not fitting our theories to
reality, but dealing with phenomena which are not
out there but are 'material cultural be ins'
describable by scientific concepts. This is a form
of realism. Finally, 'agential realism is a form of
social Constructivism that is not relativist, does
not reduce knowledge to power plays or language, and
does not reject objectivity'.
Agential realism is not naïve realism but 'entails a
conscious, critical reflexivity' it does not endow
dualisms binaries or dichotomie or other Cartesian
cuts s with natural status, but sees these as 'power
laden epistemological moves'. This doesn't mean that
science doesn't work, and that we must go straight
to epistemological relativism. Instead we need the
alternative of agential realism which opposes
objectivist accounts and proposes situated
knowledges which can still be scientifically
effective.
It opposes classic science by demanding that science
'incorporate a reflexive critical discourse' (187),
just as Bohr argued that even physics required a new
framework, and was prepared to undermine the
hegemony of Newtonian physics. She is not proposing
holism which reunites subject and object but rather
insisting on 'the importance of constructed
boundaries and also the necessity of interrogating
and re-figuring them'. She sees the relations
between subject and object as interaction not and
natural innocent separation but is not arguing for a
rapid dissolution of boundaries, since 'they are
necessary for making meanings'. However they have
material consequences and we must develop
accountability. Boundaries bring to the surface
questions of power. Agential realism advocates
'mutually exclusive, shifting, multiple
positionings' to grasp the complexity of
interactions, and to combat 'reification and
petrification'. We should aim to develop 'reliable
accountable, located temporary boundaries, which we
should anticipate will quickly close in against us'
[sounds like Latour now] [and get this]: 'agential
realism will inevitably be a casualty of its own
design, but I suggest there is power there presently
for some of our purposes' with its emphasis on local
situated knowledges, rejecting master theories and
transcendental understandings.
Who are the agents? The usual story is individuals
with power, although they deny their own agency. The
idea of discovery and science is that the well
prepared scientist somehow reads the universal
equations of nature, so the objects being studied
are the agents, even though they are passive and
inert. This contrasts with the liberal humanism of
the enlightenment. The argument constructs cuts like
those between nature and culture or object and
subject and these become fixed and inherent.
By contrast agential realism shifts and destabilises
boundaries and emphasises the 'between' not the
binaries. There is no total agency over passive
matter, nor the reverse. Both subjects and objects
have agency. [Again this strange phrase about
'phenomena are material – cultural be ins' 188]. In
our understanding we actively participate. Realism
is not just representing an independent reality but
intra action
with all its consequences interventions
possibilities and responsibilities. Materiality is
still important. There are material reasons for
knowledge claims and real material consequences.
Agential realism 'is an attempt to formulate a
feminist notion of realism… [It]… Goes beyond the
recognition that there are material and cultural
reasons for knowledge claims, beyond the
reconceptualisation description in knowledge
systems, to providing us with a positive sense of
the ontology of our world and some important clues
as to how to interact responsibly and productively
within it' (188 – nine)
[It is extremely confusing what it
actually is still. I think I've interpreted it as
saying that human beings are not the only agents,
that matter to some extent acts, that phenomena
are intra-actions. This might be the standard
process ontology reading. I'm not sure she has got
there quite with this piece. Agential realism here
seems to say there is still a role for human
agency, and for culture, that human beings
construct apparatuses at least and do experiments,
and do so out of their own interests, as a matter
of social practice, as a result they get adequate
science, because those apparatuses are congruent
with reality in phenomena. Who knows
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