Notes on: Bourdieu, P. (1985) The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups. Theory and Society 14 (6): 723 – 44

Dave Harris

A theory of social space breaks with Marxist theory. It stresses relationships rather than substances, that is notions of real groups which are claimed to be defined in terms of number or limits or members. It breaks with 'the intellectualist illusion' that the theoretical class is a real class, 'an effectively mobilised group'. There's also a break with economism, and finally with objectivism that goes with intellectualism and that ignores the symbolic struggles going on in the different fields, over the very representation of the social world and hierarchies within each fields and among them. (723). It is possible to revamp Marx to make it more compatible, by referring to position as a matter of relations of production, but it is necessary to go the opposite way.

Sociology should be seen as a social topology, the social world as a space with several dimensions as principles of differentiation or distribution, with properties that can confer strength or power on those that hold them. Agents are defined by their relative positions within that space. Each of them has a position or a class of neighbouring positions, that is a region. No one can occupy two opposite regions of the space. Since these are active properties we can also talk of 'a field of forces… a set of objective power relations that impose themselves on all who enter the field and that are irreducible to the intentions of the individual agents or even to the direct interactions among the agents' (724).

We are talking about various kinds of power or capital, which may exist in objectified forms as material properties, or be embodied and legally guaranteed in the case of cultural capital. It can represent accumulated products of past labour in the form of mechanisms. Like aces in the game of cards, capital can define the chances of profit in a given field. The same goes with cultural capital, which provides a chance of profit in all the games in which it is effective [I think this is actually an extract from Distinction]. We have economic cultural and social capital as well as symbolic capital in the form of 'prestige, reputation, renown et cetera'. It is possible to see that each agent has a position in all possible spaces of competition. Each field has its own logic and its own hierarchy, but there is also a 'hierarchy among the different kinds of capital' and a 'statistical link between different types of assets'.

So we get a position defined in terms of a system of coordinates, values of different variables. Agents are located in the space according to the overall volume they possess, and secondarily according to the composition of their capital — the 'relative weight of the different kinds of assets within their total assets' [then another extract follows]. These different distributions of different kinds of capital embodied or materialised become instruments to appropriate social labour, define power relations, institutionalise social statuses, achieve social recognition or legal guarantee and thus determine actual or potential powers and the chances of access to profit. Agents acquire information and knowledge of these conditions and their relations especially those who occupy intermediate or middle positions, situated between the two poles of the field.

It is possible to separate out classes in a logical sense — 'sets of agents who occupy similar positions and who, being placed in similar conditions and subject to similar conditionings, have every likelihood of having similar dispositions and interests and therefore of producing similar practices and adopting similar stances' (725). This is a class on paper, something like theoretical existence, like botanical classification, not an actual class, not 'a group mobilised for struggle' at best a 'probable class' easier to mobilise than other sets. We have an objective space which determines compatibilities and proximities, but these are not real groups. We are talking about a space of relationships, 'as real as a geographical space', and similarly requiring work and effort to move up and travel within it. There can be organised movements of mobilisation. Agents closer in social space are probably more easier to assemble, but alliances are never necessary or inevitable, and 'alliance between those most distant from each other is never impossible' (726) thus mobilisation among workers rather than with bosses is easier, but in an international crisis, national identity can provide a grouping [what about race?].

The social world can be 'uttered and constructed in different ways' according to different principles of vision and division 'for example ethnic divisions'. Again those grounded in the structure of space based on capital distribution 'are more likely to be stable and durable' while other forms of grouping are 'always threatened by the splits and oppositions linked to distances in social space' There is always a possibility of organising according to other principles of division 'ethnic or national ones, for example' although these are generally linked to the fundamental principles — 'ethnic groups themselves being at least roughly hierarchised in the social space, in the USA for example (through seniority in immigration)'.

Marx does talk about the difference between class in itself in class for itself, but describes the movement as either totally determinist or totally voluntarist. In practice, is always necessary to 'integrate the agents' representations of the social world' (727), their social representations and identity. These are objectively socially structured [patterned in various probable combinations of taste, for example] and also subjective, based on previous symbolic struggles themselves the result of symbolic power relations. There is always some indeterminacy, however because we are talking about statistical connections and connections that vary over time. That's why we get a plurality of worldviews and of points of view, and continuing symbolic struggles over legitimacy, as well as various 'cognitive "filling in" strategies' (728) that involve going beyond directly visible attributes to refer to the future or the past. Much of this goes on below the level of explicit representation and verbal expression, in the form of a 'practical mastery of the social structure', resulting in what Goffman calls the sense of one's place, and internalisation of objective structures, a sense of taking them for granted, accepting limits, especially characteristic of those who are dominated and to have to accept their position as realistic.

The structuring principles of a worldview 'are rooted in the objective structures of the social world: power relations are also present in people's minds in the form of the categories of perception of those relations' (729) however there is always indeterminacy and fuzziness and a certain 'practical, pre-reflexive and implicit nature of the schemes of perception and appreciation' and it's this that offers a space for political action and political struggle. Entities can be made to exist explicitly, rendered visible, including people's disquiet or their expectations, the commonsense of groups can be made explicit, in struggles over the meaning of the social world and social identity. This goes on in all sorts of forms including 'eulogy, praise, congratulations, compliments, or insults, reproaches, criticisms' and so on. An early form of political power involves the ability to name, to make exist by naming as in Kabylia, and later this becomes a concern for professional specialists.

The legitimacy of a mode of perception is an important prize in social struggles. It does not happen automatically as the implicit becomes explicit and it can be expressed in very different ways, through 'more immediately visible differences (e.g. those between ethnic groups)' [colour prejudice?] (730). However socially known and recognised differences require subjects capable of perceiving differences and seeing them as significant, someone who can make distinctions that are regarded as significant. This is achieved through a symbolic system. This is organised itself 'according to the logic of difference, a form of 'significant distinction' what emerges is 'a space of lifestyles… groups characterised by different lifestyles'

[Another chunk of Distinction] We are not talking about deliberate conspicuous consumption, since all consumption and practice can be visible and distinctive and if it is recognised it becomes a sign of distinction. These can be intentionally underscored by the 'stylisation of life'. The point is to produce separations as legitimate differences, even natural differences]

[Lots of references here to the Weberian category of Stand rather than class — 'the class constructed by an adequate division of social space, when perceived through categories derived from the structure of that space' (731)]. Symbolic capital, itself 'another name for distinction' [status] is a form of capital itself which is perceived by someone internalising a particular structure of its distribution which makes it self-evident, it is a symbolic transfiguration of 'de facto differences' and as a result we get ranks orders and grades, 'symbolic hierarchies' the result of schemes of construction, for example arising from pairs of adjectives found in most social judgements. These in turn result from internalising structures and when they are granted legitimacy, the everyday world appears as self-evident, resulting from the 'quasi-perfect coincidence of objective structures and  [in a human sense] embodied structures'.

Like all capital, symbolic capital is connected by constraints that dominate other fields like the social field, 'so that objective power relations tend to reproduce themselves in symbolic power relations, in views of the social world that help to ensure the permanence of these power relations'. Agents gain the power to impose a legitimate view of the social world proportionate to their symbolic capital, a quality of being known and being recognised, which Bourdieu says is the 'etymology of nobilis', a matter of visibility. Ironically, these are the people best placed to change the vision although 'those least inclined to do so'.

There is a symbolic struggle over the production of common sense over legitimate naming and agents use the symbolic capital they've acquired in previous struggles, or the power they possess over various 'instituted taxonomies… Such as qualifications' (732). We can arrange symbolic strategies used to impose visions of the social world and the position of agents within it between two extremes: at one end is 'the insult', an attempt to impose a point of view which involves the risk of reciprocity; at the other end 'official nomination' with all the strength of the collective, a delegated agent from the state monopoly of symbolic violence, an authority from a personal capacity in a role, an authorised spokesman, someone entitled and qualified, with an official identity produced and supported by the state.

Symbolic property rights appear in France in the form of titles of nobility educational qualifications or professional titles. Nobility requires that someone is not just known but recognised by an official tribunal, valued universally, sometimes underpinned with legal backing. There is symbolic scarcity of titles. The rewards are not the same as the rewards of labour and there are differences in remuneration. The title is more durable. And can be used separately to defend the value of work. Classifications involving titles are crucial in struggles over power and knowledge and the role of official naming, correct classification. They act as trump cards.

Again the field is indeterminate to some extent, and open to question in terms of its principles of legitimacy, but the strength of the participants still depends on the position, and the structure of the field is still relevant. It is therefore necessary to establish knowledge of the space of objective relations between different positions and the effects on the habitus of the occupants and their various stances towards the space itself and its regions. This helps understand how agents can conserve or modify the space in which they work, especially how they can form groups to defend their members' interests, by struggling over classifications [dreadful jargon and deployment of classical terms here].

It is possible to identify a political ambition in terms of producing 'the correct classification' (735), as in Marxism, which is both and is an ought but Bourdieu says that instead he wants to 'objectify the ambition of objectifying, of classifying from outside, objectively, agencies struggle to classify others and to classify themselves'. Sociologists can classify and make divisions, for example 'for the purposes of statistical analysis', but that is so as to 'objectify all forms of objectification'. He also seems to flirt with the claim that you can do this in a spirit of neutrality, but seems to recognise this as something 'positivistic, bureaucratic' at least when it comes to arbitrating in the struggles. It all seems to end in pathos that the whole enterprise is 'a space in a game in which the social scientist too is caught, like all those who argue about the social classes'

Generally, those who are dominated in the social space are also dominated in symbolic production, and it is not at all clear where they could get suitable instruments to express their specific viewpoint, except from a fraction of committed professionals who help them challenge representations — what Marxists call '"consciousness from outside"' (736), a contribution from intellectuals to break with the dominant view. This can only arise, he thinks, from a homology between 'the dominated position of the producers of cultural goods within the field of power... and the position in social space of those agents who are most completely dispossessed of the means of economic and cultural production' [he means alienated and marginalised intellectuals?].  This however has to modify the usual one-dimensional view of the social world in which there is only one opposition between the owners of means of production and the sellers of labour power.

This is a result of Marxist economies, which ignores the social space as multidimensional, 'an open set of fields that are relatively autonomous', and where the occupants of the dominated positions are always engaged in struggles of different forms although not necessarily as antagonistic groups. There can be 'homologies between positions within different fields'(737), experiencing a universal relationship between dominant and dominated and leading to alliances. They include 'homology of position between intellectuals and industrial workers', leading to ambiguous alliances. This is not an identity of condition, as the ultraleft in the 60s thought, however because 'the principle of differentiation is different each time' as are the stakes, and the strength of the domination [so what remains of the apparent 'universal content of the relationship between the dominant and the dominated'?].

We need a better analysis of specific interests, for example those that representatives have in both the political field and in the subfields of their union, for example, especially among those who represent the managerial class of the labour aristocracy and who face contradictory imperatives. They are often forced to resort 'variable geometry concepts such as "the working class," "the people," or "the workers"' (738).

More normally however, they have to adjust to different forms of demand [starts to look like role conflict here, but this is a form of 'quasi-automatic' adjustment]. They have to offer political products which appear to be suitable to those who mandate them but which also have a certain 'structural duplicity' in that they are often 'aimed at competitors within the field' [another kind of role conflict]. There is a whole history behind political stances assumed by spokespersons, including the product of previous struggles as well as the agents who are to be represented and their interests are to be expressed — 'the whole history of the social field is present' including parties, unions and the disposition of various agents, collective identities and other representational bodies, each of which has a social identity, sometimes embodied in institutions, developing after long struggles within and outside of the political field. There has been a process of naturalisation as well as a long historical labour.

There is also the process of institution, the process of delegation where mandated representatives receive power from the group. This has been expressed as 'the mystery of "ministry"' (740), and there is a history of representation here, where a spokesperson gets the full power to speak and act in the name of the group. There is a circular process here where groups can exist only once spokesman act. There is also the risk of political alienation since isolated agents can never constitute a group and must always risk giving way to a group. The spokesman is a metonym.

Politics shows best symbolic efficacy, how signs produce social things and groups. It shows how anything that can be symbolised can be seen as really existing, including things like a working class, or the people, or any other group in question, it operates through 'the magical operation that is inherent in any active naming'(741).[deliberate implied reference to Durkheim on magic or reigion here I think]

So a class exists insofar as mandated representatives are authorised to speak in its name, and so make it exist as a real force in a political field. Things like the working class these days are only 'an existence in thought', 'a working class in representation', existing in the minds of people and groups vitally interested in believing that it exists and identifying with it. It is not a self acting class as in Marx. It has a magical reality, the result of a huge labour of theoretical and practical invention, and a core of mandated representatives, the result of a Marxist theory effect. Paradoxically, though Marxism is incapable of progressing any further because it is least able to grasp the social world [I think] (742)