Notes on: Hall, S. (1980) Race, articulation
and societiess structured in dominance . In Sociological
Theories: Race and Colonialism
edited by UNESCO: 305 – 45
Dave Harris
[Typical Hall bits eg] Need to be crude and
simple, two main tendencies, mirror images of each
other, might have to restructure the theoretical
field. In simplified terms we might identify the
economic and the sociological approaches.
Economic includes a great range and variety of
studies which we are bundling together 'for
convenience' (306). Some focus on internal
economic structures like the economic and racial
structures of South Africa, others look at
relations between internal and external economic
factors as in arguments about development,
colonisation. Different ways of thinking of the
economic are involved. We can group them as framed
by neoclassical development economics, those which
are based on a modernisation or industrialisation
model as in Roskow, those which take a dependency
approach or those who have employed a Marxist
orientation. They all take economic relations and
structures as overwhelmingly determining, and
racial or ethnic divisions can be explained
principally with reference to these economic
structures.
The sociological includes a variety of approaches
but they focus on social relations between racial
or ethnic strata, or cultural differences,
ethnicity 'of which race is only one, extreme
case', some are more rigorously plural, some look
at political domination on racial grounds. Race is
a social category rather than biological although
not completely. All contributors agree on the
'autonomy… of race and ethnicity' as social
features with 'their own forms of structuration… their
own specific effects': they are not surface
appearances of economic relations.
The first one gives a materialist basis, and the
second one is a sort of reply to this emphasis
introducing complexity, and correcting
monocausality. These reflect the larger debates in
social science and the breaks between various
paradigms. They have real effects for political
strategies. For example development theories
commit nations to national economic development
even though this undermined their position and
those in the region, while dependency theories
have led to anti-imperialist national capitalist
developments. The whole field 'provides an
excellent case study of the necessary
interconnections between theory politics and
ideology in social science' (308).
Each one has a rational core. Race does have an
economic context, not a trans-historical character
unless we are willing to suggest some general
theory of prejudice. Clearly conquest,
colonisation and domination have had effects. The
issue is whether economic factors are adequate as
explanations of racial features. Economic
reductionism is surely inadequate, but how do
extra economic factors appear — how can they be
theorised?
We can take South Africa as an interesting limit
case. It has undeniable racial structures linked
with political and economic domination and a
dominant capitalist mode of production. It is
tempting to see class relations as characteristic
as the labour force is structured and fractured by
race as a major mechanism (Wolpe 1976). Rex
himself is South African and Rex 1973 criticises
both functionalist and Marxist perspectives, as
well as pluralism [which apparently argued that
different ethnic segments were held together
because one segment monopolised political power].
Rex says that people of different ethnic
backgrounds are involved in the same social
institutions — as in the slave plantation and this
provides the whole dynamic of the society [very
close to Bonilla Silva
here]]. There is an important historical context
in that capitalism was imposed through conquest
and incorporation of black people which began as
unfree labour, which makes it much more like what
Marx said about colonial societies. South Africa
has remained distinctive as being based on migrant
labour rather than classical free labour. As a
result there are more specific economic mechanisms
incorporating the African working class — rural
reserves, labour compounds, special native
locations. These are additional to economic
relations per se and are preserved by political
and legal factors as a kind of '"workable
compromise"' (311) between the capitalist class
and the white working class both of whom gain
advantages by confining native labour.
Rex adds to Marx an 'adequate historically
specific abstraction', something which Marx
himself recommended. Instead of pluralism, there
is class relations and class struggle, which
provides the overall shape of political conflict,
but this does not take the universal form of
capitalist class relations. It is a specific kind
of class struggle bearing the traces of earlier
periods, '"conquest and unfreedom '"this also
provides different relationships to the means of
production, '"a whole range of class situations'".
Rex begins with the economic level then adds
differentiations to separate it from the classical
type. He adds other distinctions of culture and
values, found in the system of Bantu education or
forms of political power which have constructed an
African middle-class, Cape Coloureds or Indian
traders.
Rex proposes a similar way of analysing Latin
America and the Caribbean (Rex 1978) following the
same strategy, starting with the basic forms of
economic exploitation in colonialism, including
unfree or partly free labour, the plantation
system and dependent peasants, and adding in
various social strata like the sectors middlemen,
missionaries, and administrators. Some of these
groups will be opposed to each other as classes,
some will form relatively close groups culturally
and the overall effect will be 'too much overlap
and interpenetration to justify us in calling it a
caste system, but too much closure of avenues of
mobility for us to call it a system of social
stratification' (312).
Hall sees this as 'essentially Weberian terrain'
[conflict theory?]. Classical Marxism is modified
first, although of course much depends on how this
is defined and there are differences. The problems
identified with this classical Marxism are then
recuperated within '"classical weberianism"'
(313), the work on economic relations including
economic class conflict, a distinctive and often
forgotten stress which enables Rex to see Marxist
analysis as only one limited case, within a range
of ideal types, a range of possible market
situations which do not overlap into a general
form. This also lies behind the notion of housing
classes, where groups dominant in each market
situation do not cohere into single classes. There
is still exploitation, but this needs to be
specified. This is a kind of 'distinctive "left
weberianism"' (314) and weberian appropriations
have also been noted by some commentators for
Marxist theorists [strangely, Turner is not
mentioned, although McLennan is!]
Both Marx and Weber seem to agree that free labour
is the only form compatible with the logic of
rational capitalism, but this is contested by Rex.
In the first place, historical deviations can be
found in social formations which are specifically
colonial, which feature apparently irrational
forms of descriptive relations combined with
effective capitalist modes of production.
Eurocentric theories are blamed here for not
noticing this [Rex appears to be defending the use
of terms like caste and estate? — Hall describes
this as 'a "Marx plus Fanon " sort of argument'
(315). The argument seems to be that as well as
the means of production, certain closed groups
managed to monopolise other social functions and
positions according to their own interests and
using their own power positions]
Wolpe is critical and says that the distinction
between free and forced labour is not adequate,
since Marx argued that free labour is only free in
a very limited sense, and the distinction is not
theoretically powerful enough to distinguish black
labour as a separate category. It is the
exploitation of labour that matters, how surplus
labour is appropriated, and how the production
system works, not just the labour market. This
leaves Rex with too loose a definition of class
which makes it easy to associate with racial
groupings, but racial groups are not homogenous in
their class composition, nor indeed are the white
working class [in South Africa?]. Wolpe talks of
class fractions or class strata which can act not
in correspondence to their interests even though
the overall class position sets the horizon — the
example is the labour aristocracy. The general
argument is that we start with the relations of
production rather than political and ideological
criteria, and treat these as a form of relative
autonomy arising from the mode of production.
Rex has made theoretical gains away from simple
Marxism, but Wolpe is a significant modification
of Marxism [surely Althusser, although we can't
mention him -- yet?] Rex has certainly shown that
it is naïve to call for black and white labour to
sink their differences and join a general class
struggle because there are structurally different
relations between them. It is also argued that the
South African system shows no inevitable
tendencies to turn into the rational forms of free
labour which Marx saw as essential to capitalism,
hence the need for a new definition of the
capitalist mode, which questions the whole
evolutionary form which Marx's work can take.
However current Marxist theorising has also
pursued a critique to rectify some of these and
internally debated. They are rich, complex,
rudimentary
Frank has opposed dependency theorists based
around the United Nations Economic (ECLA)
Commission for Latin America. This took a
fundamentally Marxist view about capitalist
development seeing it as imperialist but were not
Marxist in any other way, and suggested dependent
capitalist development as a result of capitalist
expansion resulting in a kind of dualism. Frank
agrees that the world capitalist system is the way
to start but denies any genuine indigenous
programme of development because Latin America had
been thoroughly incorporated by the European
powers, inserted early on into world capitalism so
that no structural differences remained. Latin
America was in fact a satellite, an imperialist
chain, linking metropolis to regional centres.
Laclau 1977 denied that Latin America had been
capitalist because this assumed a single identical
process. The problem lay with the definition of
capitalism as a production for the market driven
by profit which ignored the mode of production.
This is not the same as capital accumulation,
which can take place with different modes of
production. Merchant capital in particular is
older than capitalism. There have been
historically specific forms in Latin America and
it is wrong to declare them all capitalist.
Plantation slavery in the New World might also be
an exception. Slavery might have had a distinct
set of exploitative relations, so Genovese argued
— '"neither feudal… nor capitalist"' (319)
"seigneurial"' . Hindess and Hirst also saw
plantation slavery as a distinctive mode, and
others saw it as capitalist agriculture. There is
debate about whether Marx saw plantations as
substantively or only formally capitalist, on the
grounds that slaves were not free and waged, but
those who dealt with them were capitalist. However
mercantile capital seem to be funding the whole
thing in a specialised agricultural region, '"a
kind of internal colony within the expanded world
market"' (Beechy)
So maybe Marx was saying that there were two modes
of production, a formal one and a true capitalist
one, combined through an articulating principle,
resulting in an articulated structure, 'itself
"structured in dominance' (320 [no references for
this -- is Hall claiming to have invented it -- he
owns up later ?] So slave plantations have their
own form of mode of production which is not itself
capitalist, but which exists within an overall
capitalist system. This will modify Marx and move
away from Frank's insistence that Latin America
has always been capitalist. We now have an
interesting 'emergent theoretical problem of an
articulation', a social formation which may be
composed of several modes of production
'"structured in dominance [and here Hall only asks
us to compare with Althusser and Balibar, Hindess
and Hirst, and Poulantzas (321)]. This has led to
lots of work on precapitalist modes of production
[by whom?]. There are implications for all the
other aspects of social formations including class
political and ideological structures and these
have not been spelled-out by Laclau. A particular
implication is the way in which ethnic groups are
drawn into economic relations and articulated into
the unity, possibly in quite different ways. This
is 'perhaps the most generative new theoretical
development'.
It follows from a newly sophisticated reading of Capital.
Laclau refers specifically to Latin America and
its role in expanding the capitalist system,
referring back to a passage in Marx himself (Marx
1956) which refers to modes of production lying
outside the particular stage of development of
capitalism. Bettelheim says that although the
dominant tendency is towards a capitalist mode,
there can be secondary tendencies where
non-capitalist modes are restructured, only partly
dissolved and partly conserved by being
subordinated to capitalism. Wolpe refers back to
South Africa and corrects Rex here by suggesting
that the capitalist sector relies on the
noncapitalist sector for cheap labour supply and a
form of subsistence reproduction which enables
labour power to be acquired below the cost of its
reproduction. He talks about both articulation and
conservation variants, where capital
accumulation's tendency to dissolve other modes is
blocked by attempts to conserve noncapitalist
economies which are maintained as subordinate,
through political domination and ideology in a
colonial form: these preserve African traditional
societies. Thus economic relations and the mode of
production are not abandoned but made more
complex.
Even so, such complexity 'may not supply
sufficient conditions in itself for an explanation
of the emergence and operation of racism' (322),
but it is a better point of departure than
abandoning the economic level altogether, and it
does retain materialist premises and historical
premises, 'that the specific form of these
relations cannot be deduced a priority… But must
be made historically specific'. As in Capital.
This is how Marx avoids economic reductionism and
historical relativism.
The articulation thesis has done good work on
precapitalist modes as in Hindess and Hirst, in
colonial modes by Banerjee and Alavi and in recent
material on the transitions from feudalism to
capitalism [all cited on 323], and French work on
agricultural social formations and how they have
encountered external capitalist markets — the
point again is to revive a dual sector analysis
which gives the dual sector an ideological
function concealing exploitation of rural
communities which appear to be simply another
component of capitalist production. There is some
work applying this to Africa, considering the
development of the slave trade first, where
relations of exchange developed on the '"internal
contradictions of the lineage social formations"';
a transitional phase '"colonialism in the full
sense where capitalism gradually subordinates the
precapitalist mode; a new type of social formation
'"with the capitalist mode of production
internally dominant… dependent on the Metropolitan
capitalism (neocolonialism)' (324) [citing Rey].
Different class alliances correspond to each
stage. The relations of exchange do the
articulating, while social formations tend to be
implanted.
So articulation is a complex matter variously
deployed. It is significant. It is principally
associated with Althusser and structuralist
Marxism [hooray] it is found in the For Marx essays
and in Reading Capital although it
is not defined in the glossary. It might be a
metaphor indicating linkages between different
level. The unity formed is not an identity,
however, not even a contradiction, but rather a
complex structure where things are related 'as
much through their differences as through their
similarities (325).
So we are not talking about an expressive unity
with a dialectic between the terms, which makes
marks an advance on Hegel, nor is it a matter
where the social formation is an expression of the
economic base, the critique against economic
reductionism. It is a complex unity, a matter of
articulation. In any historical conjuncture such
as Russia in 1917, a condensation of
contradictions, each with its own specificity
produce the rupture. We are talking about
overdetermination
For Althusser and Balibar, a social formation is
composed of a number of instances each with a
degree of relative autonomy articulated into a
contradictory unity. The economic instance itself
is such a combination. Social formations may be
such a combination of different modes. Knowledge
and the production of knowledge are not an
empiricist reflection of the real in thought but
again have a specificity and autonomy of their own
although they are articulated to the real world.
Scientific analysis depends on grasping the
principle of its articulation, how the different
instances fit together and the different times and
histories, both in any one moment and between
different moments. There is no necessary sequence
of stages. Any scientific understanding will show
the variation of the articulation of the instances
including the relations between the levels and
forms of appearances. The determination in
the last instance by the economic is a problem of
articulation. The mode of combination and the
placing of each instance in relation to the others
is what is determined, 'the matrix role of the
mode of production'[citing Balibar] (326).
A&B's notion of structural causality has been
criticised in turn by H&H as turning into an
'"expressive totality" after all, 'a Spinozian
eternity' (327). For example looking at feudal
ground rent and the feudal relation of lordship, B
talks of two different instances, one economic and
one political which are articulated together, and
similarly the mode of production is itself a
combination of elements, the object of labour and
the means of labour. However the elements do not
change but are invariant. It is the way they are
combined that changes, the way they are
articulated [so what exactly is wrong?]. It
follows that articulation is widely applicable to
structuralist Marxism.
There are other 'provenances'. Structural
linguistics provided the 'master model', via
Saussure, arguing that meaning is produced through
the articulation of linguistic systems based on
real relations, not the result of correlation
between signifier and signified, but rather an
articulation [quoting Barthes, but not very
clear]. Althusser has also referred to Marx's
introduction to the Grundrisse, the 1857
introduction for a notion of the social
formation as an articulated hierarchy
[Gliederung], translated by Althusser as '"an
organic hierarchicized whole"'. Marx argued that a
determinate production and its relation ordered
every other production and their relations in
terms of rank and influence, that there was no
simple identity between production and circulation
exchange and consumption, but a complex
determination, articulated in a capitalist mode
with different circuits. The 1857 introduction
attacks the idea of capitalism as a regular
syllogism or an immediate identity, a single
subject, an identity between production and
distribution exchanging consumption, "'a totality
of distinctions within a unity"' (328). There is
no evolution, but a complex historical
development, a definite 'structural premise' which
has been particularly developed by Althusser to
develop articulation.
This is still an approach rather than a resolution
and has been itself critiqued. It means both
joining up and giving expression to. The first
sense is the main one for Althusser, because the
second one implies some sort of epiphenomenal
relation or reductionist formation, and expressive
totality. This still remains, although some
perfect and necessary correspondence is denied by
insisting on relative autonomy. Instead Althusser
uses terms such as '"displacement" "dislocation",
"condensation", [Freudian terms?], And above all
'over determination"'. However, articulation can
imply some external or arbitrary connection,
'"mere juxtaposition"', and this is where over
determination and the notion of articulation, as
hierarchical as well as lateral, tries to solve
the problem by identifying dominant or subordinate
relations. However, this invites the criticism of
excessive formalism — seen best in the notion that
the economic determines in the last instance, as a
matter of principle, 'in a formal way' (329), even
though Althusser has retreated from some of these
formalist interpretations. Nevertheless, it is
obviously in danger of developing an idea of
structure as something self functioning, an
expressive totality after all, and operating with
the notion of change limited to the variations
within different articulations which weakens the
notion of historical change and can lead to
formalism — 'a sort of formalist hunt for one,
separate "mode of production" after another'
(329). Nevertheless Hall likes it for avoiding
both vulgar materialism and sociological
pluralism.
The social formation itself can be seen as '"an
articulated hierarchy"', where a social formation
is articulated around more than one mode of
production, with characteristic political and
ideological features arising from a combination,
which might still be an articulated hierarchy.
There is no necessary correspondence, but we have
to think out the relations between different
levels as an ensemble nevertheless. Marx referred
to this when discussing uneven development. We
have to ground discussion at the level of economic
structures but we can't deduce all the relations
of political and ideological structures especially
'where such features as racism make a decisive
reappearance', so 'the economic level is the
necessary but not sufficient condition for
explaining the operations at other levels of
society' which avoids reductionism. There is no
necessary correspondence between them, but an
historical specificity [heavy weather to get to
here!]. Relations possess validity at a particular
conjuncture, but it remains to demonstrate exactly
what the correspondence is and here we can
introduce some more sociological explanations.
However there is a debate about whether specific
features can be identified tightly from the
economic level — no problem with the general level
which requires some extra economic frameworks. The
issue is whether these levels are fully autonomous
not relatively autonomous. What combinations might
be preferred, 'invented and solidified by real
historical development', without any necessary
correspondence — Hall thinks this might apply to
some cases in Latin America. Engels acknowledged
that capitalism can develop very different legal
systems, for example, even though it has often
been accompanied by bourgeois parliamentary
democratic regimes,, perhaps as the best possible
political shell [citing Lenin].
However there can be counteracting
tendencies, combinations with various kinds of
unfree or forced labour, for example in
postcolonial societies [rehearsing the South
Africa argument]. Let's take free labour — most
capitalist formations seem to require it, as
something more than a formal condition of
existence, but there can be counteracting
tendencies, combinations with forms of unfree
labour, as in some postcolonial societies [we've
already covered this with the case of South Africa
and the bantustans] this needs additional
concepts, 'to supply further determinations' (331)
and the economic level itself cannot determine
these levels. We need to supplement the
Althusserians.
Enter Gramsci [!]. The work is fragmentary, far
less theorised, formative for Althusser, although
he remained as an historicist, but their
relationship is 'a complex one'. Hall says he
provides a 'limit case" of historicity'. We cannot
elaborate in any depth of course. The central
concept is hegemony, '"total social authority"'
achieved at certain specific conjunctions by a
specific class alliance following a combination of
coercion and consent, not only at the economic
level but with political and ideological
leadership, 'in civil, intellectual and moral life
as well… Over the terrain of civil society' (332).
This is not given, but a moment of 'unusual social
authority', still subject to the class struggle,
unstable equilibria, a state of play needing to be
continually worked on, a contradictory
conjuncture. [so you can have it both ways of
course, predict both settlement and crisis] It
obliterates domination through coercion, and the
corresponding class struggle is not a frontal
assault on the state, but a more tactical one, a
war of position working on different
contradictions. The ruling class alliance tries to
'undertake the edge off the different formative
tasks of raising the whole social formation' to
expand the regime of capital instead of imposing
its narrow interests, acting in the name of a
universal level — this is the '"educative,
formative role of the state… Creating new and
higher types of civilisation"'. There is a notion
of an historical bloc, a 'unity of opposites and
distincts' uniting super structural levels.
There is no correspondence between economic
structure and superstructures but historically
specific mechanisms and historical moments where
relationships can be forged. We have to analyse
these specificities and resolve them. This is
non-reductionist and we have to develop 'a
philosophy of praxis' (333). We have to deny
economism especially in politics and struggle by
developing the concept of hegemony. This is only
just begun. We have to use him to analyse the
social formations of developed capitalism in
Western Europe. So far he has hardly been applied
to non-European formations, although he might be
particularly useful there in combating economies,
and an overemphasis of economic aspects of
imperialism; introducing a suitable complexity in
the relations between structure and
superstructure, although we cannot just transfer
concepts but work with historical specificity; use
the notion of hegemony and the struggle for it,
movements in and out of it and how this is been
affected by uneven development, as it was in
Italy.
Gramsci's work has been taken up in Althusser's essay on ISAs [!], 'In a
structuralist manner' (334). It is different
because it focuses on reproduction, but its
concerns 'are not all that distant from those of
Gramsci'. Economic relations must be reproduced,
above all in ideology, which is like Gramsci
saying that the noneconomic levels have to be
developed through moral, intellectual and
ideological leadership. Althusser 'shares with
Gramsci'an interest in how the hegemony of the
ruling class alliance is secured through educative
class leadership or authority. 'Both of them
argue' that expanded hegemony is specific to the
so-called superstructures. 'Both… Insist' 'that
ideology is contradictory but has a specific
function in securing the reproduction of capital
and is therefore a distinctive level of struggle
although its mechanisms and sites are relatively
autonomous — it is not just false consciousness'.
All societies require specific ideologies to make
sense of the world and relate people in an
imaginary way to the real conditions of their
existence. Althusser sometimes sees ideology as
'too functionally secured to the rule of the
dominant classes', while 'for Gramsci ideology is
thought of in a more contradictory way'. He is
also interested in how ideologies can be worked
upon to transform them into conscious struggle.
'Both insist' that ideologies are material
relations which shape social actions, appearing
concrete institutions and are materialised through
practices. Althusser points out that ideologies
operate by constituting concrete individuals —
'the process of what, following Laclau [!!]
, he calls "interpellating subjects"' (335).
Laclau has taken this forward. Particular elements
of ideologies such as nationalism or racism do not
belong to class and have no connotation. Classes
have no single worldview which are carried around,
unlike Poulantzas, although they do have a unity
of their own, through condensation — one
interpellation can evoke another, operate as a
symbol of the others, producing '"a relatively
unified ideological discourse… Connotative
condensation"' . This unity then is secured
through a specific interpellation. So what is the
relation between classes and ideologies? The class
struggle articulates various ideological
discourses which appear as raw materials. Dominant
ideology articulates different ideologies to its
hegemonic project by eliminating their
antagonistic character. They do not impose a
unitary world vision, but also distinction and the
relative weight of elements of the old ideology,
making important what was only secondary before,
making it the nucleus of a new ensemble [citing
Mouffe here] [the basis of Hall and Jacques on
Thatcherism]. Problems include the notion of class
practices which transform ideologies without
having any ideological elements themselves, but
again it is a triumph for articulation.
So there is a new theoretical paradigms emerging,
based on a problematic Marx, but overcoming
certain strategies. it is an emergent field, the
solutions are not adequately developed yet and we
have not really begun to apply them to 'racially
structured social formations' (336).' There is
no adequate theory of racism which is capable of
dealing with both the economic and the super
structural features'[of racially structured
social formations], one which is concrete
historically and sociologically specific on the
distinctive racial aspects. However, we can
specify some initial protocols.
We should start with historical specificity rather
than seeing racism as a general feature of human
societies. There are 'historically specific
racisms', not a universal structure. There
might common features, but we have to be careful
about abstractions which are theoretical only,
since elements that are not general uncommon might
be the most important. Only historical specificity
can help us understand racism as fully valid for
social relations, and even help us to distinguish
what might appear to be 'variants of the same
thing' like racism of the slave South from racism
of industrial capitalism in the post bellum North,
'or the racism of Caribbean slave societies from
that of the Metropolitan societies like Britain'
(337).
Although there may well have been racism in
precapitalist formations, racism is thoroughly
reorganised and re-articulated in capitalism. And
in other societies, for example slavery in the
ancient world did not 'necessarily entail the use
of specifically racial categories, whilst
plantation slavery almost everywhere did. Thus,
there can be no assumed, necessary coincidence
between racism and slavery as such'. We should
instead examine the specific coincidence and how
it is articulated, instead of assuming that it was
attitudes of racial superiority which introduced
plantation slavery — slavery instead might have
been based on earlier forms of nonblack indigenous
labour and white indentured labour producing
'juridical racism' requiring subsequent 'specific
and elaborate ideological work'.
The same might be said about those who see racism
as a universal function of individual psychology,
a matter of general prejudice. The issue is not
that people make perceptual distinctions between
groups, but rather 'the specific conditions
which make this form of distinction socially
pertinent, historically active… A concrete
material force' (338). Britain's imperial
hegemony [used in a very deterministic way
here] laid the trace of active racism, but
this cannot explain the form and function which
racism assumed at the end of the 19th century, or
different forms of indigenous racism in the
working class in post-war migration — there is
no '"general history"' [citing his own
work].
We need concrete historical work, seeing how
racism is articulated in specific historical
conditions as a set of definite economic political
and ideological practices positioning different
social groups in relation to one another and
legitimating these positions to secure the
hegemony of the dominant group to help them
dominate the whole social formation favourable to
the long-term development of the economic base. It
is not just a matter of economic coercion,
although there may be an economic nucleus. We
still need to see how these mechanisms operate,
and how they require 'further determinations': racism
is not present in all capitalist formations,
'not necessary to the concrete functioning of all
capitalism's'
Racism has been articulated with other structures.
The position of the slave 'was not secured
exclusively through race' but through the
productive relations of slave based agriculture
and property relations, together with legal
political and ideological systems — which went
over into '"informal racism" after emancipation.
Even there, there was new ideological work
required as in Jim Crow, including tensions
introduced by official ideologies of equal
opportunity. At the same time race differentiated
between different fractions of the working
classes, intersecting class relations and dividing
the class struggle as much as expressing it.
Even at the economic level race must be given a
relatively autonomous effectivity. We need to know
how racial and ethnic groups were 'inserted
historically and how their distinctions have been
eroded or preserved not as residues but as 'active
structuring principles of the present organisation
of society. Racial categories alone will not
provide explain these.' How are these forms
combined under capital how have they been
articulated in different modes of production and
how has race functioned in these articulations?
How does race help reproduce labour power below
its value, or cheap labour, or a reserve army of
labour? How does it relate to semi domestic
production as in Caribbean societies, or produce
distinctive patterning's as in black migration in
post-war Britain. How do black people relate to
other sectors in the reserve army.
It is clear that there should be no either/or
categories. The structures through which black
labour is produced are not just functions of race
'they work through race'. Classes are articulated
different levels of the social formation, and
there are different sorts of relative autonomy
between them. The class structured mode of
production appears differently in each level and
acquires different sorts of effectivity. 'Race is
intrinsic to the manner in which black labouring
classes are complexly constituted at each of these
levels' (340) it affects the way in which black
people are distributed as economic agents and how
they appear in class struggles, how they are
constituted in political representations and how
they engage in political struggles and the
consciousness and culture that results. 'Race is…
the modality in which class is "lived", the medium
through which class relations are experienced'
(341) with consequences for the whole class, how
it is divided or fractured and articulated, and
how the white fractions of the class are
ideologically represented and how their
experiences are interpellated, how contradictions
are recognised or misrecognised [general pessimism
about racism in the white working class here as
well]. Capital reproduces this class and its
internal contradictions and structures it by race:
racism is one of its effects, racism helps it
defeat alternative means of representation to
represent the class as a whole. Sectional
struggles are 'the site of capitals continuing
hegemony'. We still need specific forms in which
racism appears, different ways in which racist
ideologies have been constructed and made
operative, how it differs from other hegemonic
ideologies, what makes it particularly powerful,
what makes it appear as natural and universal,
grounded in biology, how it can transform the
whole ideological field and connect other
discourses to itself through mechanisms like
connotative condensation. How racism can
dehistoricise, construct new historical subjects,
construct imaginary representations and otherness.
These interpellations can themselves become
elements for ideological struggle and oppositional
formations, as where white racism is contested by
black power. Racism remains contradictory and a
continuing source of struggle.
Sociological theory still needs to clarify its
procedure, avoiding reductionism and pluralism.
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