Notes on selected chapters of
Lukacs, G. (2023) [1919--23] History
& Class Consciousness. Translator:
Rodney Livingstone https://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/index.htm
Dave Harris
[The context was the struggles to develop Marxism
in the 20s, combined with the more theoretical
work including the one on reification. Luxemburg
and Lenin are assessed as contributing to
methodology and theory in a practical sense. The
approach is also orthodox in the sense of trying
to interpret Marx to gain knowledge of the
present, through dialectical method, but not as in
what came to be called 'Orthodox Marxism' of the
period. We should also credit Hegel, as Marx does,
and in terms of categories. Marx's method is far
more systematic than Hegel, however, and we must
abandon Hegel's system and its mystical form, and
its traces in contemporary bourgeois thought]
Transcendence is important in drawing attention to
the function of abstract concepts as 'intellectual
forms of historical realities' [no page numbers],
parts of the true unity, but taking on a different
meaning within the unity [leading to clever
remarks about the false as an aspect of the true].
What is orthodox Marxism
The point is to change the world, but there has
been increasing scholasticism inside Marxism.
Orthodox Marxism however does not involve belief
in particular theses or sacred books, but refers
instead to method, dialectical materialism as a
'revolutionary dialectic'. Theory must be
converted into practice, into revolution, by
extracting its practical essence, enabling the
masses to become conscious. Thought should try to
realise itself, but '"reality must also strive
towards thought"' [citing Marx], realising a
dream, realising consciousness in practice when a
class understands itself as the subject and object
of knowledge. The proletariat is the 'anyone' that
can do this.
Engels has discussed dialectics as a process of
transition from one definition to the other,
interaction rather than causality, but he ignores
the more important 'dialectical relation between
subject and object in the historical process'
which is what causes revolutionary developments,
and changes reality, despite all the attempts to
make concepts themselves fluid. Without changing
reality, we are left merely with 'scientific'
speculation. Theories can be accepted or rejected
according to what counts as science, which implies
that reality itself is impenetrable and immutable.
These 'intellectual reflexes' express the
'antagonisms of capitalist society and the
intractability of its problems'.
We should abandon academic criticism which
separates method and reality in the name of
improvement or scientific rigour. The categories
[of economics] after all are just '"forms of
being, conditions of existence"' [Marx].
Scholasticism is an ornament, diverting from the
study of facts. Bernstein said this best, although
this has led to an objection to dialectic
altogether and a more opportunist method of
evolution.
Which facts or data are most relevant? Not all
facts are equal. All imply interpretation. Science
does not deliver pure facts via its idealised
method, although capitalism encourages these
abstract views by proposing a real world operating
without outside interference, with a purely
quantitative essence, operating abstractly. Marx
analyses this primarily in the case of labour,
where general abstractions spread as a peculiarity
of capitalism. It develops as reification.
By contrast, dialectics examines the 'concrete
unity of the whole'and the illusory nature of
appearances 'necessarily engendered by
capitalism'. This seems unscientific, but it is
scientific method that fails to grasp actual
developments [which are only seen as unforeseen,
crises and so on]. Usually, science just accepts
that its data and laws are grounded in capitalist
society [and thus assume some natural universal
quality].
We have to revive the notion of appearance and
essence, form and 'inner core' the 'dialectical
nexus' but this is difficult for
'superficial readers imprisoned in the modes of
thought created by capitalism'. Marx's own
strategy is to describe capitalism in its pure
state and then show that it is based on illusion,
an aspect of the totality.
En route '"the concrete is concrete… Because it is
a synthesis of many particular determinants, i.e.
unity of diverse elements"' [Marx]. It is not the
outcome that is produced by synthesis but its
starting point. Pseudoscientists explain synthesis
as combinations of isolated facts, via '"arbitrary
unmediated connections between things"' but do not
analyse the determinants: had they done so they
would have discovered that these things '"belong
together in an organic union"' [labour is the best
example — Taylorism splits it into separate
subtasks which are then recombined under a
rational process]. The determinants seem to be
timeless and eternal, fetishised, combined by
eternal laws. Historical understanding is clearly
lost. [There seem to be to be a similarity with
the ambiguities about when racism emerged]
We need to restore the idea of contradiction and
antagonism, not just between particular theories
accompanied by the claim that we have not yet
approached perfection. Contradictions 'belong to
the nature of reality itself and to the nature of
capitalism'. When we grasp the totality they are
seen as necessary and can be explained as real
tendencies, with the possibility of real
resolution.
So the development of scientific knowledge,
criticism, or vulgar materialism furthers
alternatives to Marxism and is thus 'an
ideological weapon of the bourgeoisie', a part of
its constant struggle to grasp itself as a matter
of 'eternally valid categories', graspable by
eternal laws and inexplicable contradictions.
Classical economics arose in this ideological
need, from the structure of capitalist reality
itself.
Crises were a constant problem, and some
economists, even Ricardo, thought the answer was
to moderate economic growth. Some Marxist
revisionists thought they should downplay the role
of crisis in Marxism. Others thought they should
rewrite dialectics as a necessary conflict between
individuals and social forms, thereby seeing
bourgeois society and its characteristic
ideological struggles as some universal form.
[Symbolic racism is now seen some universal form
although it is characteristic of late capitalism]
The idea of totality does not imply some
undifferentiated uniformity. There is independence
and autonomy in capitalism but this is an illusion
a product of a dialectical relationship, the
dynamism of the whole [Marx specifically refers to
production and distribution exchange and
consumption as members of one totality, with a
mode of production determining forms of the others
and relations between them [a contribution to the
critique]. However interaction doesn't mean
reciprocal causality as vulgar materialists think
because interaction changes objective forms.
The example of slavery! Marx says: '"a Negro is a
Negro. He becomes a slave in certain
circumstances. The cotton spinning Jenny is a
machine for spinning cotton. Only in certain
circumstances does it become capital…' [The
reference is Wage Labour and Capital].
Functions in totalities provide intelligibility,
reality is a social process. Fetishism involves [a
stasis]. These ideas are 'necessarily held by the
agents of the capitalist system of production…
Objects of knowledge… The ideology of its ruling
class'. In this way, supra historical essences
appear.
So do limits 'classical economics was unable to go
beyond the distinction between fixed and
circulating capital. This was not accidental'
[because both are only historical manifestations
of funds which labour is required to maintain
themselves and their family, appearing as
commodities in one direction and money in the
other. I prefer the distinction between divisions
of surplus value in the form of revenue, profit
and so on]. The environment and the categories of
economics appear 'immediately and necessarily in
forms of objectivity' with the relations between
men concealed and only when dialectic is applied
do we see the fiction destroyed; relations between
thingss are seen as relations between persons and
classes.
This is not just a methodological gain. The real
relations between human beings are revealed and
brought to consciousness. We can understand any
epoch of history as a matter of social relations
never as a matter of pure economics or of some
transcendental forces. There are affinities with
Hegel and the development of self-knowledge,
although Marx saw this as being realised in
philosophy for Hegel, executed by the Spirit.
Lukacs argues that Marx took Hegel back to his
more progressive stages and emphasised the
history, the real substratum that was embryonic in
the young Hegel. Maybe the real forces driving
history were still not fully visible to Hegel [or
to Kant, is a possible reading].[NB Yancey is
criticising philosophers who were working before
Marx and were even working in the early days of
capitalism in the case of Kant? He like all modern
thinkers is much more aware of the dynamics of
oppression and exploitation than they were because
he's read Marx?].
If existence determines consciousness, there are
implications for praxis. Existence is a social
process and can be transformed. There are no fixed
and immutable entities. Human beings are both the
subject and object of the social and historical
process. Capitalism did so much to destroy the
constraints of feudalism although it is far more
soulless and impenetrable. Now the proletariat can
gain a new advantage point and grasp reality as a
whole, and must, to resist the crushing material
and spiritual impoverishment of capitalism.
Marxism can only be based on the point of view of
a class.
The proletariat must have undergone a necessary
historical process to make it aware of its own
position, to become a class for itself. Lukacs
envisages an everyday total struggle, not a
utopian one, an exploration of the facts
[micro-politics?], concrete meanings. This can
only happen through constant struggle against
insidious bourgeois ideology, eternal vigilance.
Snippet from The Marxism of Rosa
Luxemberg
The party is the effect of the movement of the
proletariat, the 'bearer of the class
consciousness of the proletariat and the
conscience of its historical vocation'. It does
have more specific tasks than the organisation,
however, but its main job is to mobilise every
available power of the proletariat, in excess of
what is immediately required by economic
necessity. The party must make demands to change
reality.
Thus 'class consciousness is the "ethics" of the
proletariat'. In consciousness theory becomes
unified with practice and the economic necessity
of struggle 'changes dialectically into freedom'.
This ethics determines the politics of the party
which 'may not always accord with the empirical
reality of the moment', but 'the ineluctable
course of history will give it its due'. It will
also gain moral strength, it's 'true strength 'as
it comes to realise that it is the incarnation of
the class consciousness of the proletariat.
This is in contrast to various Social Democrat
alternatives, the 'opportunists' who take
advantage of immediate problems and crises. They
see Bolshevism and revolutionary Marxism in terms
of of religious faith. This is 'cloaking their
negativity in the splendid mantle of the cool and
objective "scientific method" '. Proper method
must be tested by action by revolution not 'the
objectivity of the academic study '. They do not
recognise that temporary defeat can be a
'necessary prelude to victory ': Luxembourg at
least 'argued that the necessarily "premature"
seizure of power by the proletariat was inevitable
'and defeat should not be seen as terminal. For
Lukacs, 'her death at the hands of her bitterest
enemies… Is, logically, the crowning pinnacle of
her thought and life '.
Class consciousness
Marx never defined social class so it had to be
reconstructed, especially the meaning of class
consciousness and how it should be understood both
in theory and practice, whether class
consciousness was special in the case of the
proletariat, or a more general sociological issue,
whether it was homogenous or divided.
Engels argued that individual motives are only of
secondary importance compared to historical causes
which transform themselves into motives, motor
forces which were 'independent of man's
(psychological) consciousness of them '. This
appeared first as a belief in eternal laws of
nature, appearing even in classical German
philosophy and early political economy. It was to
be combated by historical criticism to dissolve
the apparently natural and unhistorical
'appearance of social institutions '. History is
not just about contents but about principles and
how institutions work to control relations between
human beings.
Bourgeois history has always been 'an apologia for
the existing order of things or at least the proof
of their immutability '. This implies that there
is no longer any history in capitalism, in effect
an 'intractable problem '— present institutions
must somehow represent eternal laws of nature
although these somehow could not establish
themselves fully in the past [Lukacs says this
haunts bourgeois sociology -- but there was
social evolution and functional adjustment to take
care of it?]. There were individual epochs [sounds
like bourgeois history to me], perfect in their
own way, a formalism, which makes the relations
between men invisible and absent. It took Marx to
point out that social relations are produced as
much as commodities. Without that understanding,
history could only be the irrational progress of
blind forces, maybe embodied in spirit, or the
unfolding of eternal ethical principles [as in
Kant].
For Marxist is an illusion, disguised in
formalism. We see this disguised best in the
'purely natural and rational laws of classical
economic ', to be countered by an historical
critique focused on the 'totality of the reified
objectivites of social and economic life into
relations between men ', especially capital and
every form in which it is objectified. Once we
understand objectivity we can proceed to move
beyond the will and thoughts of individuals,
recognising that 'this objectivity is the self
objectification of human society ', limited by the
historical context which produced it.
Consciousness still has a role and 'conscious
reflexes 'can still access historical facts of
great importance 'including dialectical
materialism '. However, 'as Engels emphasises in a
letter to Mehring [found it at last — settles the
dispute I had with Steve Crook more than 40 years
ago] this consciousness is false '. This is not a
persistent inflexible confrontation of true and
false however — false consciousness needs to be
investigated concretely as a part of historical
totality and a stage in historical processes.
This looks like what bourgeois historians do, but
they go wrong in trying to locate concrete
analysis in empirical individuals, whether men or
classes or peoples, and by taking immediately
'empirically 'given consciousness. This misses the
mark and erected something abstract for the
concrete. As Mark says the relations involved are
not between individuals but between [roles or
functions] — '"worker and capitalist, tenant and
landlord, et cetera"' — and these constitute
society.
We have to examine society as a whole and the
relations that constitute it and only then is the
consciousness that men have of them relevant. This
consciousness can confirm something is
subjectively justified in the circumstances,
something 'right', but it 'still appears as a
"false consciousness" 'from an objective point of
view. This explains why such subjective
consciousnesses do not reach their own goals but
often further the 'objective aims of society of
which [they] is ignorant and which [they] did not
choose [I've put a note here that says this could
well explain perceptions of racism as central to
capitalism]. We have a twofold analysis, not just
a simple empirical description of what men thought
they wanted: that might be important but we need
to transcend pure description to get to 'objective
possibility '
We need to get to a position where 'it becomes
possible to infer the thoughts and feelings which
men would have in a particular situation if they
were able to assess both it and the interests
arising from it in their impact on immediate
action and on the whole structure of society… The
thoughts and feelings appropriate to their
objective situation '. We need to do this by
relating their subjective consciousness to the
whole of society. The number of available types of
position are restricted by the process of
production. This brings with it 'appropriate and
rational reactions "imputed" to a particular
typical position in the process of production '.
This is not the sum nor the average of what is
felt by the actual individuals. It is historically
significant because actions are 'determined in the
last resort by this consciousness and not by the
thought of the individual 'and we can only
understand actions 'by reference to this
consciousness'[note 11 says these remarks can be
extended by looking at the category of the
'economic persona 'in Marx and 'comparable trends
in bourgeois thought (such as Max Weber's ideal
types)'.
It's clear that we are not just analysing what is
empirically given nor what can be described as
'psychologically describable and explicable ideas
'. The question is whether the classes differ so
much in relation to society as to produce
qualitative distinctions and what the practical
significance might be — 'the practical historical
function of class consciousness '. This in turn
will lead to examining objective possibilities.
How far can we describe a whole economy from
inside it? We have to go beyond the limits of
particular individuals but also remain within the
actual economic system. In effect this amounts to
'a class conditioned unconsciousness of one's own
socio-historical and economic condition '. This is
itself a structural relation, 'a definite formal
nexus ', not arbitrary but produced by the
objective economic structure itself. For example
the value or price of labour power appears as the
price or value of labour itself, because labour in
total appears to be paid [and there is an
interesting aside that under slavery, portions of
labour are paid but appear to be unpaid]
[references here are to Capital I,
presumably chapter 1, and Wages, Prices and
Profit]. Without proper historical analysis,
and the notion of objective possibility, these
illusions are impossible to penetrate and classes
can only play subordinate role [more implications
for racism]. Any class that is 'ripe for hegemony'
must be able to organise the whole of society so
the crucial question is 'which class possesses
this capacity in this consciousness at the
decisive moment? '
[Lukacs does not rule out the use of force, which
may be unavoidable, but argues that force is never
the decisive factor]
Class consciousness does not always have the same
structure. Classes can perform the necessary
actions 'history has imposed on it 'consciously or
unconsciously, with a true or a false
consciousness, and these are crucial practical
matters. The thoughts of individuals and the state
of scientific knowledge are not decisive here,
although they may be important. For example the
limitations of slavery overthrew it, without any
class being aware of it, and the rise of the
modern bourgeoisie never perfected its own science
of classes or a solution to the problem of crises.
Its own class standpoint was too limited and
incapable of observing society from outside: its
consciousness was converted into false
consciousness by an 'objective 'barrier, 'the
class situation itself '. It cannot solve problems
where solutions lie beyond the limits of
capitalism. Its success in solving problems of
organisation within its jurisdiction, compared
with feudalism, are still based on a residual
'"unconsciousness of those who are involved in
them" — the laws of economics are seen as natural
laws. This is 'the objective result of the
economic set up and is neither arbitrary,
subjective, nor psychological '.
[These
limitations of history: (a) social conditions
have to bring together a mass of proletarians
and reduce the petty bourgoisise etc? (b) the
bourgeois theorists are too devoted to the
immediately practical to see the future? (c)
they imagine limitations like natural laws or
peacable evolutions ungraspable because they
are reified ? (d) conflicting and confusing
interretations and historical residues (e)
threir moral mission-- see below]
[So white privilege is also seen as natural
or eternal? Alternatives are unthinkable?
Emiseration has not brought Black people together.
Colonial independence weakens natural laws?
Practical problems are still at the stage of
crisis resolution -- urban riots, immigration,
crime waves?]
It is probable that there are degrees of class
consciousness, types of which emerge at particular
stages in the processes of production, but that
would be a long-term study. It might be in the
interests of classes to go beyond immediacy and
transcend immediate interest, and suddenly see
these as factors in the totality, and to conceive
of a new totality, which may approach to a greater
extent the true totality. Sometimes class
consciousness will remain stationary, or fixated
on aspects of the economy, like consumption or
circulation, and this could be crucial for the
activity of classes in society.
Complete clarity, sufficient to actually influence
the course of history is unavailable. Class
interests in precapitalist formations are never
fully articulated but are always mixed with
political and religious factors. The bourgeoisie
needs first to eliminate estates and other
vestiges.
Precapitalist societies are less cohesive than
capitalist ones anyway with parts that are more
self-sufficient, less united by commerce or
production or the state. Communities are more
self-sufficient and can reproduce themselves in
the same form, hence the apparent immutability of
'Asiatic Societies 'as opposed to Asiatic states.
The state also acts as 'unmediated dominance
itself ', acting to appropriate land or slaves,
combining rent and taxes. Even commerce has a
superficial impact, unable to buy free labour, for
example. There are class struggles but of a
different form — in Greece and Rome there is a
conflict between '"debtors and creditors" '[Marx].
Here, the money relationship is still crucial and
reflects a deeper lying antagonism in the economic
conditions of existence, but it was not possible
[why not exactly?] for the classes concerned to
become conscious of this economic basis: instead
they assumed natural or religious forms, or
political and legal ones.
The same goes with the divisions into estates or
castes as seemingly natural forms without an
economic basis — there is one, but it is difficult
to raise it to consciousness. Legal and political
institutions do not just stabilise economic forces
as in capitalism, but can actually intervene
'substantively in the interplay of economic forces
' [so there is a role for ideology] , since purely
economic categories have not yet appeared or have
been given legal form. There are still interwoven
with legal categories, as in labour rent or
slavery. In these circumstances, the economic
basis of social relations 'could [not] be made
conscious '.
There were objective economic foundations
nevertheless, seeing when apparently stable feudal
estates began to disintegrate as a result of
economic development. The juridical form still
retained importance, however, by focusing
consciousness on privileges or on 'the particular
element of society from which the privileges
emanated (as in the case of the Guilds) '. Estates
can retain an ideological incoherence even when
they have actually been absorbed into different
classes [Lukacs uses the phrase 'status {same as}
consciousness 'which masks class consciousness or
'prevents it from emerging at all ']. There can be
privilege groups lacking any immediate economic
base, although some can capitalise themselves,
turning their privilege into 'economic and
capitalist forms of control 'as with landowners.
It took historical materialism and its methods to
trace this connection in precapitalist society, a
proper knowledge of history that emerged only
[backwards-- the Owl of Minerva] with capitalism
where economic class emerges as 'the motor of
history'. No one could be conscious of that in
precapitalist societies, not even as an imputed
consciousness. The true forces were hidden behind
motives, they were blind. Ideological factors did
not just mask economic interest but were the
components of real [!] struggles. Only when
'sociological meaning of these struggles 'is
pursued via historical materialism do we see the
decisive factor of economic interest.
In capitalism economic factors are present in
consciousness itself even if unconscious or
repressed. They can become conscious. There is an
ideological struggle to make them conscious or to
veil them. This already shows the possibilities of
the 'internal dissolution of pure class society'
[Hegel's owl of Minerva specifically cited].
The only pure classes are bourgeois and
proletariat. They're the only ones produced by the
modern evolution of production. They are the only
ones capable of a plan for the total organisation
of society. Other fractions, petty bourgeois, or
peasants, will always be 'ambiguous or sterile',
linked not to capitalist systems but to the
vestiges of feudal society. They can only aim to
reverse capitalism or moderate it. They focus on
symptoms of development and particular elements of
society.
The petty bourgeois for example mostly live in
cities and are influenced by capitalism and are
affected by class conflict. But they are a
transitional class [thus?] imagining that they are
above class antagonism. Their interest is in
weakening this antagonism and promoting harmony,
which makes their actions irrelevant and without
proper consciousness. The fraction has
objectives 'exclusively in its own consciousness
', but these must be increasingly weakened and
divorced from social action. They will become
'purely "ideological" forms '. They might coincide
now and then with the real economic interests of
capital, as happened during the French Revolution,
but afterwards, they turn into caricatures.
The peasantry engage in the mode of production
that isolates them from each other and from
general social relations. The common conditions
make them a class but they have no other political
or social unity. They can coalesce in a unified
movement as a result of external upheavals. This
can be progressive or reactionary. The ideological
form it takes changes its content frequently
because it is borrowed. Any party basing itself
wholly on this class will never gain adequate
support since it will find rivals doing so as
well. There is no proper class consciousness, 'for
a full consciousness of their situation would
reveal to them the hopelessness of their
particularised strivings in the face of the
inevitable course of events '.
The bourgeoisie have a dialectical opposition
between their consciousness and their interest
rather than a contradictory one. For other
classes, class consciousness cannot emerge from
their position in the process of production. For
the bourgeoisie their consciousness develops 'an
insoluble contradiction at the very zenith of its
powers '. In defeating feudalism, it also
liberated the proletariat. In developing bourgeois
freedom it had to develop a new repressiveness.
The liberated individual had to be annihilated at
the same time by the economic conditions of
commodity production. There were many other
contradictions.
There is not just an inability to grasp these
contradictions. The saturation of capitalism
should have helped the bourgeoisie gain a
consciousness of the whole system, but even if
they did they would not be able to control it
'even in theory '.[again --why not?]
Ricardo had thought that the centre of capitalism
was production, but Marx emphasised that
distribution is crucial in the realisation of
capital and the interests of capitalists. That is
because they produce not goods but commodities.
[This is the bit I have read somewhere else
-- Poverty...? -- about the price system as the
necesary intermediary of use value. Capitaists
just produce stuff never knowing of its use value
and rely on prices to feed back to them. But this
is not a reliable feedback mechanism and is
affected by all sorts of factors. The mechanism of
price movements is NOT the centre of economics
though]. Capitalists find it impossible to grasp
the problem involved which become invisible. This
is also produced by a split between private
property and the objective economic function of
capital, between the social and the individual
principles, social consequences and individual
interests. Even developments that move on from
pure individual capitalism do not lead to more
insight — the bourgeoisie 'understands the process
(which it is itself instigating) as something
external which is subject to objective laws which
it can only experience passively ', and still
thinks of economic life only from the standpoint
of the individual capitalist. This can produce
confrontation between individuals and apparently
non-individual laws of nature, and between
individual and class interests in the event of
conflict. It also produces a 'logical
impossibility of discovering theoretical and
practical solutions to the problems created by the
capitalist system of production '.
The example is crises in the system of credit,
which lead to a reversion to hard cash, and
ensuing '"theoretical fright on top of practical
panic… Impenetrable mystery"'. This is something
which can either be denied or fully understood
because '"the real barrier of capitalist
production is capital itself"' [that is is dynamic
restless and competitive tendencies]. And to
recognise this 'would entail the self negation of
the capitalist class '. 'In this way the objective
limits of capitalist production become the limits
of the class consciousness of the bourgeoisie'.
The older forms of domination could persist, but
capitalism is a revolutionary form. However 'it
must necessarily remain in ignorance of the
objective economic limitations of its own system
'and this produces 'an internal dialectical
contradiction in its class consciousness '.
[Again a limit then -- bourgeois thought cannot
grasp the implicit revolutionary tendencies -- is
this still so with an understanding of the
machinic phylum? Eg AI?}
The response was to convert false consciousness
'into a mendacious consciousness… The theoretical
problem turned into a moral posture which
decisively influenced every practical class
attitude '. There is now a hegemonic struggle to
embrace the whole of society to organise the whole
of society in the interests of the bourgeoisie, to
develop a whole world view, a coherent theory of
'economics, politics and society 'and to develop a
mission to control and organise society. Class
interests have to be clarified on every issue.
However, the question of the totality remains as a
problem — the bourgeoisie remains as a minority
with minority interests, and they must deceive
[they think they must persuade] the other classes.
However this proceeds with an indispensable veil
over bourgeois society, with the risk that the
internal contradictions will become revealed with
increasing starkness. This will produce the need
for a choice — to ignore insights or suppress
their own moral instincts. Good conscience is
important to the strength of support for the
mission, 'unbroken confidence '. The bourgeoisie
has always displayed by contrast 'desperate
resistance to every insight into the true nature
of the society it had created and thus to a real
understanding of its class situation '—
falsifications of fact, theories about the essence
of history and the state. These were in vain.
Compromises clearly had to be adapted.
Combinations for example rather than
individualism. Stock companies cartels and trusts
showed the social character of capital, but still
in an 'illusory' way. The War brought about the
idea of a planned economy as a practical way at
least in the short term, abandoning the initial
idea that property freedom and lack of
restrictions were sacred ideas. These compromises
for Lukacs showed a deep ideological crisis that
meant that for the bourgeoisie 'its power to
dominate has vanished beyond recall '
Historical materialism still has a crucial role.
Recurrent crises appear to the proletariat as a
gathering of strength, an increase in truth.
Attempts to attack it with bourgeois science are
evermore desperate, but are doomed: it is obvious
that the proletariat will see this as a power
struggle over the correct understanding of the
nature of society. This has been totally ignored
by vulgar Marxists and their demands for 'petty
realpolitik' instead of arguments of principle.
The proletariat is unique in going beyond
contingencies, wanting more than the bourgeoisie,
not fighting on the ground of the bourgeoisie,
especially since, on the grounds of empirical
science 'the bourgeoisie has the intellectual,
organisational and every other advantage'. The
proletariat must take another view, holism and
political action. Vulgar Marxists have fallen for
this reduction of theory to scientific treatment
of social change and pragmatic practice.
It is not easy because the proletariat also has to
confront contradictory consequences thrown up by
capitalism. These will not produce ideological
crises, but contradictions between theory and
practice. At least there is some correspondence
between the false consciousness of the bourgeoisie
and its class situation, enough to energise its
continued struggle, but contradictions appear to
offer a block to the correct proletarian action,
especially if supplemented by vulgar Marxist
theory. This leads to an internal class struggle,
which the proletariat must win and go on to
understand its own historical mission. It will
take the 'conscious will of the proletariat 'to
prevent the final crisis of capitalism produced by
the blind forces unleashed destroying everybody,
but this will depend on the 'ideological maturity
of the proletariat, i.e. on its own class
consciousness '.
It follows that the proletariat 'cannot liberate
itself as a class without simultaneously
abolishing class society as such '. This mature
consciousness must expose the nature of society
and fuse theory and practice. Ideology for the
proletariat is not just a banner nor a
justification for objectives. 'Every
non-principled or unprincipled use of tactics on
the part of the proletariat [reduces?] the basis
[of] historical materialism to the level of mere
ideology ', bourgeois tactics which therefore
permits a role for bourgeois consciousness.
The obstacles preventing the realisation of
proletarian conscious are still great. There seems
to be a great diversity of independent objects and
forces, a separation of economic and political
struggles, for example, and this heresy has
remained within proletarian politics. For earlier
classes it was easier, since pursuing immediate
interests led to objective developments via the
ruse of reason. The proletariat must transform
society consciously, which means 'a dialectical
contradiction between its immediate interests and
its long-term objectives, and between the discrete
factors and the whole '. The immediate interests
are still within capitalism and it is difficult to
reinterpret them from a total point of view, one
which will point beyond capitalism.
This must occur within the consciousness of the
proletariat and cannot be a purely objective
process. It is not a matter of the realisation of
the interests of the class,, or its coming into
being, but rather its self abolition. Proletarian
politics must go beyond opposition to the
bourgeoisie in the normal empiricist kind of way,
advancing beyond what was given immediately, and
embracing contradiction directly. This will mean
that false consciousness is different for the
proletariat — the bourgeoisie can develop correct
statements about particular situations which are
still false when related to the whole of society,
but 'the proletariat always aspires towards the
truth even in its false consciousness and in its
substantive errors '. This led Engels, for
example, to comment that utopian or revolutionary
versions of existing economic theories could be
'"true in the perspective of world history…
[Concealing]… A very true economic content" 'even
though they were '"formally incorrect
economically" '[a very interesting comment, quite
unlike the usual dismissals of utopian thinking.
The reference is the Preface to the Poverty of
Philosophy!].
This still implies that active intervention by the
proletariat is required, via the development of
'historically significant and socially
revolutionary knowledge… Conscious action and
conscious self-criticism ', the realisation that
there are now tasks which humans can accomplish.
With other classes there is an antagonism between
self interest and these possibilities which 'set
an external limit to consciousness ', but for the
proletariat, this antagonism can be overcome, if
the class becomes conscious of its historical
role. It might require it first to 'slip back into
the most primitive utopianism '[!], Which is a
danger, if it is not a step towards the ultimate
goal, and Marx particularly warned about economic
trade unions. The proletariat needs to remind
itself that they are 'applying palliatives 'in
these 'unavoidable guerilla fights '. We must not
give way to opportunism, but see 'particular
struggles as a means of education for the final
battle'which closes 'the gap between the
psychological consciousness and the imputed one '.
Opportunism can only see present consciousness and
this can produce even more disunity and division.
There is a psychological reality to this limited
consciousness. We can see this from the
'infinitely painful path of the proletarian
revolution 'and it's 'incessant self-criticism'
[apparently described in the 18th Brumnaire]
The major divisions of capitalism are not always
visible. The economic basis of a crisis conceals
underlying unity by appearing as disparate events
in different countries or in different branches of
industry. Bourgeois thought helps by dividing
different parts of society into different
specialisms, but this will limit it ultimately
because it will only tackle symptoms. In the short
term, however it helps to impose its mode of life.
As crises develop, unity in the economic
process become more comprehensible. Capitalist
theory itself is affected. An objectively possible
step now appears to develop consciousness beyond
the immediate. Lukacs thought that this would be
'instinctively felt to be a necessity by larger
and larger sections of the proletariat '[if
only!]. Opportunists will still try to reduce
class consciousness to what is immediately given,
moving beyond simple error to 'conscious deception
(regardless of whether its advocates are
psychologically conscious of this or not)',
becoming an ally of capitalist theory. Only if
proletarian consciousness develops will the crises
and impasses of capitalism be ended. This is the
historical role of the proletariat — to be both
against capital and for itself. There might be
even more suffering before sufficient ideological
maturity is obtained
The current uncertainty and immaturity,
'inhumanity and reification 'arises because the
proletariat has been created by capitalism. Its
very existence implies only criticism and
negation. Until crisis and subsequent maturity
develops, with true class consciousness, the
proletariat can never go beyond criticism
[including criticism of reification] and can only
ever be 'negatively superior to its antagonist'.
It can only negate some aspects of capitalism. We
see this in the 'petty bourgeois attitudes of most
trade unionists ', or the greater interest in the
economic rather than the political among the
proletariat.
Reified consciousness will be trapped in 'the two
extremes of crude empiricism and abstract
utopianism '. Consciousness becomes a passive
observer responding to laws beyond its control, or
a power which masters subjectively the motion of
objects. Opportunists are usually crude
empiricists. Utopianism can also be seen as the
result of divisions of class consciousness.
Utopianism can occur together with empiricism.
The young Marx tried to refute theories of
consciousness like the idealism of Hegel and the
materialism of Feuerbach. Early on he sees
consciousness as immaent in history 'it does not
have to be introduced into the world by
philosophers '. The critique of Hegel is about the
otherworldliness of consciousness, a reactionary
confrontation of spirit to mass. For Feuerbach,
his critique was limited to bourgeois society
instead of a continuous process of changing the
world.
Utopians contain a duality of social process and
consciousness. Consciousness belongs to another
world and intends to lead the real world back from
falsity. They cannot see the proletarian movement
as the true bearer of history even though that
truth '"is happening before their very eyes"'.
Utopianism may remain as a factor in proletarian
struggle, but reification should be understood
first. There are gradations within class
consciousness as we saw, and it is a remaining
error to separate economics and politics — some
sections of the proletariat already can develop
high levels of class consciousness and economics,
but remain with utopian thought with politics.
This is a dialectical link affecting their notion
of the totality as a whole [and the example is
Syndicalism — capitalism is a corruption of some
natural community?]. This will not lead to a war
against the whole economic system. The guild
system also shows that utopian thought is
prevalent even where the crisis shows a more
correct course of action is possible.
The same goes if we consider are purely
ideological questions, 'questions of culture
'[racism especially, seen as operating somewhere
separately from critiques of capitalism, now that
it focuses only on equality and social mobility,
or status mobility?]. These occupy an isolated
position and is almost entirely utopian among the
proletariat [same with Marxist analysis? Not for
him though with this stuff on the novel?] There
are some self-criticisms of capitalism [moral or
religious ones?]. This is another separation, like
that between economics and politics.
Lukacs says that these gradations based on
divisions 'can no longer be referred back to
socio-economic causes '. The stratification and
distribution of these problems is 'almost wholly
unexplored' and needs more research to develop 'a
typology of the various strata 'guided by whether
we could make the objective possibility of class
consciousness into a reality. Extraordinary
individuals can, like Marx, but how to transform
the whole class? We must have no illusions.
Yet there are signs of progress like the
development of 'revolutionary workers councils'
[we are told not to confuse these with
'opportunist caricatures ']. These have taken a
step towards eliminating separations of
'legislature, administration and judiciary', and
strives to bring economics and politics together
as true proletarian praxis. Only class struggle
will close the distance between the most advanced
revolutionary workers and revolutionary
consciousness, and this will involve 'the struggle
of the proletariat against itself', against the
effects of capitalism on its class consciousness.
For this reason 'the proletariat must not shy away
from self-criticism, for victory can only be
gained by the truth '
Reification and the Consciousness
of the Proletariat
Everything leads back to the nature of commodities
in the commodity structure, as the central problem
of economics but also as the 'central, structural
problem of capitalist society in all its aspects
'. If we grasp its structure we can get a 'model
of all the objective forms of bourgeois society
together with all the subjective forms
corresponding to them '.
In the commodity structure, a relation between
people becomes a character of a thing a '"phantom
objectivity"', with a complete autonomy that
conceals its very nature — 'the relation between
people '. This fetish character of commodities is
both an objective form and subjective stats and we
need to grasp it in order to understand the
ideological problems of capitalism.
Commodity fetishism is specific to capitalism.
There was commodity exchange with various
relations before, but now commodity exchange
influences 'the total outer and inner life of
society '. It is not just a quantitative change —
'all the subjective phenomena in the societies
concerned are objectified in qualitatively
different ways '. Before capitalism, the commodity
form appeared in an episodic way, initially tied
to use value and its production. Commodity
production begins only with barter, and the effect
this has on '"decomposing"' communities.. The
commodity form still remains one among many rather
than the 'universal structuring principle' [note
the emphasis on universal]. Where it is universal
it has completely different consequences [it
emerges as a kind of organising category or
form?].
The exchange of goods precedes this form. They are
exchanged in a '"quite arbitrary"' [all quotes
refer to Marx] at first, but with continued
exchange and proper production for exchange, the
arbitrariness is reduced, especially for the
go-between, the merchant who is able to compare
money prices. Merchant capital is thus an
important original intervening moment.
Economic relations were still understood in
personal terms at first, but this becomes harder
and harder to sustain with the development of 'the
Vale of reification ', 'economic mystification
'for Marx, which began with money and capital and
the generation of interest. The precapitalist
societies, the 'relations of domination and
servitude' which govern production, in slavery or
serfdom, appeared as '" the direct motive power of
the process of production "'. [Maybe this is why
slavery and production of commodities involving it
remained outside Enlightenment thought, for Kant
and others, a mere irrational residue?]. Once the
commodity becomes the 'universal category of
society as a whole' does reification assume
decisive importance in 'the subjugation of men's
consciousness', their attempts to understand the
process and liberate themselves.
Marx actually defines reification himself in
connection with the mysteries of the commodity. An
object appears representing the sum total of
labour derived from social relations, and these
objects have tangible qualities. Thus it is the
social relation that '"assumes, in their eyes, the
fantastic form of a relation between things"' [ref
is to Capital I, of course, but it is
extended apparently in Capital III]. A
person's own labour becomes objective and
independent, able to control the producer,
possessing 'an autonomy alien to man'. The
processes can be understood objectively as
responding to laws of the market, for example, but
these still seem to be invisible forces.
Subjectively, the endpoint is estrangement from
self, '"labour power assumes the form of a
commodity belonging to him"' [a more mature
account than the Young Marx]. As the process of
abstraction develops, more universality becomes
possible. Formal equality has to be recognised if
commodities are to be exchanged, including the
'formal equality of human labour in the abstract
'[for political economists]. This in turn leads to
the 'isolated "free" labourer 'and the division of
labour and its organisation.
We can describe the trend as one towards 'greater
rationalisation, the progressive elimination of
the qualitative, human and individual attributes
of the worker '. The process of labour becomes
increasingly rational and specialised, eventually
mechanical repetition. The period of time
necessary to accomplish work becomes calculable as
a 'work stint' that again appears as a fixed
reality, and with modern psychological analysis
[Taylorism is specifically mentioned] there is an
extension into psychological attributes separated
out from total personalities and integrated into
the production system.
Rationalisation is the chief principal, with
definite effects: (1) the mathematical analysis of
work, breaking with the organic and qualitatively
determined unity of the product. Predictability
with great precision, and inevitable
specialisation. The finished article becomes an
'objective synthesis of rationalised special
systems whose unity is determined by pure
calculation and which must therefore seem to be
arbitrarily connected with each other '. There is
no organic necessity, no necessary link with use
value, certainly not as a unifier — and use value
can become separated [and devoted to different
specialisms?]. (2) the fragmentation of objects
'necessarily entails the fragmentation of its
subject'. Human qualities are seen only as sources
of error, and humans have only mechanical parts in
the system which is pre-existing with laws of its
own. There is an increasing need for
contemplation. Overall, the system 'reduces space
and time to a common denominator and degrades time
to the dimensional space '. [Early pomo!]. In
Marx's phrases '"the pendulum of the clock has
become an accurate measure of the relative
activity of two workers as it is of the speed of
two locomotives [reducing specialism to abstract
labour]. Quality no longer matters. Quantity alone
decides everything: hour for hour, day for day"'.
Time itself becomes quantifiable filled with
quantifiable things, something abstract and
measurable, just like physical space. Labour is
similarly rationalised and fragmented, reduced to
a component of a system. This clearly destroys any
bonds that might have bound individuals to
communities and results in 'isolated abstract
atoms whose work no longer brings them together
directly and organically', which makes them even
more vulnerable to 'the abstract laws of the
mechanism'. This process also produces the '"free"
'worker who can offer abstract labour power as a
commodity which he possesses.
We are describing factories, but factories contain
'in concentrated form the whole structure of
capitalist society '. Of course there was
oppression and exploitation before capitalism,
even mass production with standardised labour, for
example with canal construction in Egypt, although
these were isolated phenomena [Lucaks does say
that these projects were so isolated that slaves
'therefore stood outside of what was thought as
"human" society and even the greatest and noblest
thinkers of the time were unable to consider their
fate as that the human beings'.
Early on, surplus labour was extracted in pretty
brutal ways, but reification replaces these
'"natural" relations ', with social relations that
seemed to be objective. This happens especially if
mechanisation and calculability extends
everywhere, for example into consumer articles
which appear now as isolated objects '"the
possession or non-possession of which depends on
rational calculations"'. This completes the notion
of the free worker [who becomes a sovereign
individual and consumer?].
All this 'isolation and fragmentation is only
apparent', with atomisation of individuals 'only
the reflex in consciousness of the fact that the
"natural laws" of capitalist production have been
extended to cover every manifestation of life in
society '. This is a necessary illusion with
immediate practical consequences, not least of
which include the obedience to natural laws and
processes. These are 'found to exist already in
the finished form, as something... typically
given… Rational and isolated acts of exchange
between isolated commodity owners '.
Rationally objectified things no longer have any
qualitative or material character, including use
values who lose their 'original and authentic
substantiality '[there's a bit of eco-stuff from
Marx about how the land and the earth now means
nothing except a source of ground rent].
These reified objects get increasingly integrated
into social activity. So do other forms of
'primitive capitalism 'that were once separate
from production [examples are merchant capital, or
the hoarding of money, which is linked to finance
capital]. Everything is subordinated to the
extraction of surplus value, but these forms can
still remain 'in the minds of people in bourgeois
society 'as the 'pure, authentic, unadulterated
forms of capital' [hence the mysterious quality of
interest as revenue arising from pure, and
guilt-free investment]. All this helps conceal the
relations between men that lay in these relations
in the past and do so in the future, especially
'the relations between men and the objects that
should really gratify their needs' [notion of
false needs here then?].
The 'reified mind'sees commodities as true
representatives of existence, 'the form in which
its own authentic immediacy becomes manifest '.
There is no attempt to transcend it, but rather to
extend it, maybe by scientific development.
Again Lukacs cites a chunk from Marx [Capital
III — but I like the shorter pieces in Theories
of Surplus Value]: '" in interest-bearing
capital [we see an] automatic fetish, self
expanding value, money generating money [which] no
longer bears the birthmarks of its origin… Form
without content… A property of money… A fetish
form of capital… The meaningless form of capital,
the perversion and objectification of production
relations in their highest degree… The capacity of
money, or a commodity, to expand its own value
independently a reproduction [is] a mystification
of capital in its most flagrant form. For vulgar
political economy… This form is naturally a
veritable find, a form in which the source of
profit is no longer discernible and in which the
result of the capitalist process of production…
Acquires an independent existence"'.
Bourgeois attempts to grasp ideology are as stuck
in 'self-created immediacy' as the economics. Some
thinkers are well aware of the existence of
reification and its effects and destructive
consequences, but failed to penetrate to the basic
phenomenon, and links with 'the real capitalist
foundation '. Instead reification is seen as 'the
timeless model of human relations in general',
seen best in Simmel [and Sartre?]. They need a
deeper analysis, one that does not just focus on
the eternal manifestations. Both failed to grasp
that capitalist transformation must penetrate to
every aspect of the life of society if it is to be
self-realised completely. This produces a
distinctive form for the state and the system of
law 'corresponding to its needs and harmonising
with its own structure 'even Max Weber noticed
this similarity between a business concern and the
modern state, and identifies the basis in
calculation, which is applied to the proper
performance of machines and the administration of
the law. The breach with empirical and irrational
methods of administration is crucial and there is
rational systematisation, the development of
'universally applicable', 'purely systematic
categories'. [So it is only irrational residues
while this process is taking place that we find in
Kant or Hagel?].
One implication is that the events of social
existence remain 'permanently established and
exactly defined', but the revolutionary forces of
capitalist economy create constant contradictions
with a rigid legal system, requiring new
codifications. Even so, modern law still seems
fixed compared to the laws of primitive societies
[which are not properly codified, I think the
point is,open to bricolage]. This is the same
antagonism that we find between traditional
craftsmanship and the rationalised factory. The
'ceaselessly revolutionary techniques of modern
production' confront the individual producer as
something 'rigid and immobile'.
There is an effect on human contemplation.
Rational calculation is limited to finding laws to
predict sequences and probabilities, quite unlike
the legends of creative bourgeois entrepreneurs.
This is a 'structural analogue to the behaviour of
the worker vis-à-vis the machine he serves '.
Creativity is reduced to the way in which the laws
are applied. Even technologists have an only
quantitative difference from factory workers.
Eventually 'all issues are subjected to an
increasingly formal and standardised treatment and
in which there is an ever-increasing remoteness
from the qualitative and material essence of the
"things" '. There is an 'even more monstrous
intensification of… one-sided specialisation 'at
the expense of 'man's humanity'. We see these
effects especially clearly with advanced
intellectual labour.
However, 'not every mental faculty is suppressed
by mechanisation'. However again there is an
increasing subjection of notions like honour and
responsibility, even ethics to this division of
labour in consciousness. Before capitalism the
fate of the worker appeared to be an individual
matter and the ruling class members 'could be free
to assume quite different forms'. However,
capitalism produces a more unified structure of
consciousness. At first problems arising from wage
labour. In the ruling class 'in a refined and
spiritualised, but, for that very reason, more
intensified form ', producing specialist contemplaters
[I think the argument is that they can comment and
contemplate their own 'objectified and reified
activities']. The most 'grotesque 'example is
journalism where subjectivity, knowledge and
powers of expression are reduced to a functional
mechanism [a formula], with the lack of personal
convictions — 'comprehensible only as that of
capitalist reification'. [Academics would be a
better example these days] In this way the whole
consciousness of human beings become reduced to
commodities, things to own or be bought and sold.
There is no natural form left. Marriage is another
example, and Kant 'described the situation
with the naïvely cynical frankness peculiar to
great thinkers' [he saw sexual community as '"the
reciprocal use made of one person of the sexual
organs and faculties of another"'].
However the very formalism of rational law
produces an incoherence because they cannot grasp
concrete details. We see this with recurrent
crises. As a result, Engels is right to describe
'the "natural laws" of capitalist society as the
laws of chance' [casino capitalism]. It is the
bonds that hold the system together that seem to
be a chance affair, and this exposes the pretence
that there are eternal laws. There are only formal
links between what are in effect 'independent
rationalised and formal partial laws', connected
to concrete realities only fortuitously.
Marx found this even with economics. There might
be the divergences between the conditions of
exploitation of the labourer and those of
realising surplus value, for example, or an
accidental connection only between the amount of
total social labour applied to an article and the
volume which society seeks to gratify its wants
for the article. [The references are to Capital
III]. The problem is that although there might be
a rational form of authority inside the production
process, outside, commodity producers are related
to each other only by competition, '"of the
coercion exerted [by?] pressure of their mutual
interests"'.
Capitalist rationalisation requires this
interaction between strict laws and 'a totality
ruled by chance '. we see this already in the very
nature of 'speculative calculation '. Competition
would not be possible if everything was exactly
regulated according to a systematic mode of
functioning. The commodity owner is not in
possession of laws regulating every detail of
production. The laws of the market are rational in
the sense that they are calculable, but according
to probability rather than strict law. For a law
to emerge, we would have to suggest that it was
the unconscious product of different commodity
owners acting independently of one another [a
hidden hand surely?], and even then it could never
be known fully, certainly not by one operator
alone because that would end competition. The
[hidden hand] is only a postulate or
presupposition.
The division of labour produces [functional
autonomy — nearly explicitly: 'making these
partial functions autonomous and so they tend to
develop through their own momentum']. This
develops with the division of labour and
specialism, as a 'centrifugal movement '. We see
this with the development of professional lawyers,
initially linked to production and trade but then,
driven by the need to be internally coherent,
developing more and more specialisms. [Engels's
examples turned on the gradual functional autonomy
of the civil service and the military apparatus
'or of the academic faculties']
Specialisation itself means the destruction of
images of the whole. Science has itself been
criticised for clearing the real world into
shreds, but again Marx insists that the criticism
is round the wrong way: it is '"as though it were
the textbooks that impress this separation upon
life and not life upon the textbooks"' [the
reference is to A Contribution to the
Critique…]. As science develops toward
understanding itself methodologically, it
'resolutely' ignores ontological problems and
tends more and more to become 'a formally closed
system of partial laws', with the result that the
world beyond its confines, especially 'the
material base which it is its task to understand,
its own concrete underlying reality lies,
methodologically and in principle, beyond its
grasp.'
Again we see this best with economics which
abandoned the attempt to understand use value
altogether [and eventually value]. The theory of
marginal utility tried to sidestep the issue, as
an attempt to 'start from "subjective" behaviour
on the market', because it still retained the
notion of formal exchange regardless of use value,
preserving concrete equality between obviously
unequal and incomparable objects. That is what
'creates impasse'. [I am vaguely capable of
remembering some of this stuff, and as I recall
marginal utility was mostly used in my day to
explain why a firm expands production until the
revenue it gets from the last product equals its
costs. Maybe marginal utility has a similar idea
that people go on buying things until the utility
of the last item they buy equals the opportunity
cost of the item?]. Marginal utility is just as
abstract as before, and the search is for abstract
laws again that can only take utility and its
pursuit is something immutable and eternal. The
'social character' of the material base and the
'range of possible attitudes towards it 'cannot be
comprehended.
This is another example of interaction between
class and the method it uses to try and understand
the social character of itself. It's already been
argued that the 'ultimate barrier to the economic
thought of the bourgeoisie is the crisis '. Here
is another limit: the very success of
rationalisation and abstraction, the development
of mathematical formal laws creates a
methodological barrier, to understanding crisis
and to the qualitative existence of things more
generally, things in themselves, use values, where
the laws do not function, and patterns give way to
'"chaos" '.
Crises are regarded as accidental, of course,
although some have seen it as a foundational
problem for modern economics [somebody called
Tugan-Baranovsky] because consumption has been
excluded together. The focus on production and the
quantitative relations between matters such as
capital and profit and accumulation just assumes
use values of a definite kind. The same goes with
abstractions such as seeing everything as a
variant of capital — money capital, fixed or
circulating capital. It matters at times that
these elements are actually 'machines, raw
materials, labour power other quite definite
(technically defined) sort'. For Marx, the failure
to comprehend 'use value and real
consumption'leads to 'the methodologically
inevitable failure' of bourgeois economics.
[I've suggested a similar materialist blindness in
CRT, working with its abstract categories in
specialist theoretical questions in discourses,
and not actual practices as in ordinary racism].
So Marx, for example argued that capitalism can
reproduce itself even if commodities have not
actually been fully inserted into systems of
consumption. Indeed, consumption is not part of
the cycle of capital, which ends when the product
has been sold [to wholesalers or merchants?]. The
producers see only that part of the cycle of
capital and value. [There may be 'productive
consumption', which might be demand on the part of
labourers in order to reproduce their own labour
value?]. Yet a whole part of the cycle remains
invisible, since commodities can still be unsold,
still in the hands of dealers.
This sort of partial visibility 'is not the fault
of individuals', but the result of the advance of
science and the 'more consistently of functions
from the point of view of its own premises' [it
ignores problems that are beyond its purview]. [If
I've understood this property, early economics
struggle more with the total economic process, but
this was 'solved' by people like Ricardo who
specialised in production and ignored the total
reproduction of capital as a central issue].
[I think of the
more recent stuff on the contradictions of
Fordism and the difficulties produced by having
to deal with large stocks of both raw materials
and finished products. These are consumer goods,
with use values, outside the control of
production,in these terms. The prices paid for
these can change dramatically during the
production process meaning calculations go badly
wrong. Failures to regulate prices and inflation
mean trouble. Fluctuating exchange rates also
screw things up. For a while,
reformists,including New Times socialists
thought the answer was 'post-fordism' Try my
rather naff student exercise here]
There is a similar problem in jurisprudence, where
there is more 'conscious reification '. Here are
the qualitative content is not provided by some
rival principle as it was with use value in
economics. It is rather an issue of form versus
content, the initial belief that the formal
equality and universality of the law could and
should determine its content, in replacing the
'varied and picturesque medley of privileges
dating back to the Middle Ages ', for example. The
revolutionary bourgeoisie demanded that these laws
be replaced by ones founded in reason.
During the French Revolution, a rival view of
natural law came to oppose this demand for reason.
Here the belief was that 'the content of law is
something purely factual and hence cannot be
comprehended by the formal categories of
jurisprudence', that there was an unbroken
continuity of law that should be retained. Critics
argued that these natural laws were actually
'"always political and economic" 'in effect, and
this actually 'acquired "scientific" status '[in a
functionalist sense, I think not a critical one].
Thus a Kantian philosopher, a certain Hugo, was
able to establish that slavery had a juridical
basis because it '" had been the law of the land
for thousands of years and was acknowledged by
millions of cultivated people"'. This led to more
modern attempts to abandon the project to ground
law in reason, and instead, more narrowly, to
pursue rational implications, to consider legal
consequences of particular actions.
This is also prone to contradiction and crisis. It
makes the law have mysterious origins, which may
themselves be quite iniquitous, even though the
law turns out to be legitimate. To properly
resolve this would require penetrating critical
analysis and inevitably uncover class relations [I
think is the argument here — 'the real, material
substratum of the law would at one stroke become
visible and comprehensible']. However the law must
insist that it is based on eternal values. It can
only operate with a version of natural law, while
generating [tame, academic, ideological]
disciplines like jurisprudence, 'sciences which —
in conformity with the modes of thought current in
bourgeois society — generate the same problems of
transcending their material substratum '.
Philosophy has this absurd quest for overall
knowledge, even though the material sciences have
abandoned that goal. However, philosophy needs to
change its approach quite radically and focus on
'the concrete material totality of what can and
should be known' in order to break through
formalism. That formalism has ended in
fragmentation. Formalism itself needs to be
explained, it's 'causes… genesis and… necessity '.
People have looked for synthesis, but inward
synthesis is needed and bourgeois philosophy
cannot do this. All it can do is 'assemble the
whole of knowledge encyclopedically ', or turn to
'living life '[irrationalist philosophy which
includes Bergson for Lukacs]. Mostly though,
philosophy confines itself to explaining the
achievements of the special sciences and
clarifying the grounds for their validity, as a
form of 'formalist conceptualisation 'of some
'immutability given substratum '. [Qualitative
sociology and its politics!]
Reification is complete, and criticism of this
kind will not penetrate it. It is still the only
possible world, the only one that is conceptually
accessible and comprehensible. We might reject it
and seek irrationality and mysticism instead, but
we cannot modify the situation. Bourgeois thought
has barred its own way to understanding the
problems because it confines itself only to the
'"possible conditions" validity of the forms in
which its underlying existence is manifested'. It
is in a kind of infinite regress, never asking
what science itself stands on, limiting its
critical enquiry.
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