Notes on: Paterson. S. ( 1963) Dark
Strangers. A Sociological Study of the
Absorption of a Recent West Indian Migrant Group
in Brixton, South London. London:
Tavistock publications.
Dave Harris
[Bit of a fillet]
She saw the study originally in terms of
white-coloured [I'll use her dated terms
throughout] relationships,but it developed into a
study of immigrant-host relationships, with colour
as one of only a number of major factors involved
(xiii)
She initially experienced a '"colour shock"
walking through Brixton ( 3) -- a sense of
strangeness, felt by immigrants on arrival too,
She had experience of a racial situation in S
Africa (RSA). West Indian (WI) -- immigrants
to the UK still saw it as such but it was
inadequate as a model for her. Am immigrant-host
model referred to processes on both sides,
'adaptation and acceptance'-- 'colour was one of
the manifold factors...[but Brixton was ]... 'not
yet a colour or race situation( 6). It was
complicated by skin colour, but as a matter of
degree rather than kind. The hosts community still
had a norm of 'cultural xenophobia or antipathy to
outsiders' but applied it to all outsiders, white
immigrants, even locals.
There are differences between host and immigrant
groups, often obscured by common citizenship,
language and religious beliefs. WIs have a 'far
stronger colour consciousness' (7). Social and
cultural patterns can produce cultural conflict,
which they see in terms of colour. Brixton
is not like RSA or southern USA, though, but
more dynamic,more like earlier the situation with
earlier generations of immigrants, Jews or Irish,
not a unique white/black problem. That overlooks
socio-economic differences in other cultural
conflicts, 'perhaps because the subconscious
feelings of responsibility and guilt that lurk in
the minds of most white students… And because of
increasing public preoccupation with racial
problems and conflicts in general' (8).
This may be justified in 'long established and
institutionalised situations' where there are two
groups both defined and defining themselves in
terms of racial criteria, in ways that affect many
of their relationships, as in South Africa or
southern USA. The American literature has tended
to be influential here, but there is 'no valid
reason, however for retaining the smoked glasses'
when looking at new situations in the northern US
cities, in metropolitan France or in Britain.
There, class affiliations, cultural contacts and
conflicts, rural and urban differences, matters of
adaptations and acceptance, relations between
migrants and the minority group or the receiving
society are more important.
So an immigrant/host framework is more fruitful.
She suggests that homogeneous and peaceable
societies have harmonious and voluntarily ordered
social relations [compared to 'a conquest
society']. Migrant groups expect and are expected
to develop favourable relationships, expressed in
terms of adjustment and accommodation. There may
be short-term disintegration and conflict, but any
group that refuses to accommodate presents 'an
almost insoluble problem'.
There is two-way interaction, understood as
'"adaptation and acceptance"' (10). Adaptation
means 're-socialisation and acculturation' on the
part of immigrants, but acceptance is left to the
receiving society. The processes are largely
unconscious, involving enlargement or modification
of frameworks and cultural power, developing
steadily and perceptively, but possibly less
evident if societies are homogeneous and old
established. Greater initial divergences means
problems with adaptation and acceptance, and they
do not always coincide — she cites American Jews
who have adapted but are still only partly
acceptable, and Dutch and British immigrants to
America who are the converse.
Assimilation is the complete phase of absorption,
complete adaptation, complete acceptance on the
part of the hosts, sometimes the physical
amalgamation of the minority group, as happened
with the Huguenots or the Scandinavians in the US.
It also happened with 'over 10,000 former Negro
slaves in the population of London during the 19th
century' (11). It really occurs in the first
generation.
Integration refers to groups only, possibly as a
matter of 'cultural pluralism' and adaptation to
permanent membership of the receiving society,
largely in economic and civic life, which leaves
certain differences like religion cultural or
family patterns, sometimes even in mother tongue.
Canada is an example where integration like this
is positively encouraged between the original
ethnic groups, and the ethnic group is still the
keystone of government policy. The idea is that
these groups are 'separable but similar in outer
form making up a harmonious whole'. There may be
no single majority society, or the majority
society might willingly accept the minority groups
in various spheres. Integration can be unequal as
in former slave societies, imposed on members of
the slave group, forced assimilation, containing
'elements of grave instability and conflict' (12).
Satisfactory integration requires strength and
adaptability leading to successful negotiation and
especially 'a consciousness of their formal duties
as members of the overall society'. (12). Instead,
'ideologically motivated immigrant groups'
religious or political are more common in the
first period of immigration, although they can
become more integrative. Economic migrants are
less organised generally, because they may be
impermanent or because they have migrated in small
unorganised groups or from peasant or urban
proletariats, with geographical isolation. Local
groups help fill the initial social void.
Intermarriage might help assimilation.
Assimilation might be resisted. There might be a
more 'integrated pluralist' approach as in
Switzerland, Belgium or Canada [which she likes].
Going back to accommodation, as a form of
preliminary adaptation, this can also be equal or
unequal, although inequality is less likely to
produce satisfactory assimilation. At least it can
achieve the most initial progress, following a
certain degree of self sustenance economically and
residentially, perhaps extending to the more
universal and institutionalised areas, but still
lagging in the more intimate areas of association
including residential proximity and intermarriage.
Original social and cultural patterns are also
retained. It can lead almost imperceptibly into
further phases if migrants become permanent, and
here associations might begin to act as
intermediaries rather than separatist bodies.
These various phases should not be separated too
much because they overlap. Individuals in
particular might be assimilated and yet continue
to play an active part in a separatist group
organisation, again especially in the first
generation. The stages might not proceed in steady
progression, and there might even be 'an
apparently partial return to the old values and
loyalty', maybe with the third generation.
There can be conscious guidance by the post
society, or it might be left to 'the natural
interplay of social and economic forces'. However
accommodation is the only stage that can be
definitely predicted, and in the present study it
was the only one that was effective in analysing
the developing relations. Most newcomers were
still dreaming of a speedy and rich return to
their homelands and were not interested in
assimilating. Most of the host community still
regarded them as strangers and outsiders. She does
predict further processes of accommodation, maybe
assimilation, maybe group integration [she is
worried about this later because it will still be
produce class divisions].
She has found minimal adaptation and acceptance so
far, found in economic life and housing, and she
started to explore social life generally including
religious associations. She is focused on the
migrant group itself, its goals and values and how
it has reacted to the host community. She says she
has given 'a general, rather impressionistic
picture of a very fluid situation' and indicated
'certain trends' (16) [a note does explained that
coloured immigrants might be confused because they
expect complete acceptance but only receive much
more limited acceptance].
She also thinks it would be 'unreasonable to
expect more of an unlimited will to adapt among
the West Indians, or a limited will to accept
among the local population' (17), nor would there
be much actual social mobility. She might expect
to find more settled jobs, however and more
regular patterns of employment including joining
the unions. In housing, signs might be West
Indians being accepted by white landlords and West
Indian landlords 'enforcing certain standards of
domestic hygiene and behaviour among their
tenants, maintaining or improving their houses,
and achieving a reasonable modus vivendi with
their white tenants'. She will also hope to find
West Indians 'observing such peculiar native
habits' as queueing, 'ceasing to regard ignorant
but well-meaning remarks about colour or way of
life as deliberate insults', becoming regulars in
local pubs, voting or attending a local church,
maybe marrying sooner and 'taking a more permanent
interest in the children's security and
education'.
We might also find local people getting used to
the presence of coloured people, not to stare at
them or shrink away from, to offer the usual
welcome cup of tea, to worship side-by-side, to
judge individuals on their merits, and not rely on
'old preconceptions or generalisations based on
superficial evidence'. 'One might also expect the
local press to stop lurid headlining of migrant
misdemeanours, crimes or antisocial behaviour'
(18).
There are many factors that either assist or
impede adaptation, including attitudes and
expectations of both migrant groups and the
receiving society. There are differences of social
class, religious and cultural background and
'organisational methods', there are personal
idiosyncrasies, differences of skill and urban or
rural living, motivations and intentions,
political ideologies, there may be an important
role played by 'highly prejudiced individuals or
cliques in key positions' or the presence or
absence of local sponsors for the group. How the
group is organised might also be important and
whether there are migrant leaders prepared to act
as intermediaries. Historical events and
traditional relationships might be important. As a
result, 'a large number of different local
situations' (18) can be produced — hostility in
one area because the local population
discriminates, good relationships in another area
because the sponsors intervened, in a third area
xenophobia after an economic recession, in yet
another a firm stand by unions and employees
against discrimination, and so on.
'The basic motivation of a migrant group may be
classified as economic or ideological' (19).
Ideological people either return to their own
country or try to preserve the ideals which
compelled them to migrate, with low expectations
from the receiving society: they may not expect
acceptance. Economically motivated groups are more
easily tolerated, especially if they have the sort
of cultural and religious organisation that helps
them 'conform outwardly in certain respects' like
the Chinese and Hindu communities. West Indians
lack these, and have high expectations of
acceptance.
Attitudes and behaviour of the host community 'are
often favourable and helpful', although the
unfavourable instances attract the most attention,
including by sociologists. These are described as
prejudice or discrimination. She understands
prejudice to mean 'emotional, irrational and
rigid' dispositions, either favourable or hostile,
not amenable to reason. She thinks that 'the great
majority of people in British society cannot be
called prejudiced in this sense', but they do have
a number of 'unfavourable predispositions and
attitudes towards certain groups of outsiders',
derived from second-hand information or first hand
experience, both superficial or profound,
misleading or relevant. At least these are
'potentially susceptible to rational modification.
These milder views are usually called
'"antipathies"' and they have a wide range, from
avoidance to 'vehement hostility' [all gathered
together by CRT of course]. She thinks that the
manifestations of different antipathies should be
distinguished from prejudices, and context taken
into account [the racial prejudice of a man whose
family starved to death in a Japanese internment
camp, and those whom just has an irrational
hostile dislike for yellow people].
Discrimination means differential treatment of
people in different categories, and again can be
favourable or unfavourable — she prefers
differentiation to describe the favourable cases.
'There are no discriminatory predispositions, but
only discriminatory actions' and 'prejudiced
people do not always all necessary behave in a
discriminatory way… Discrimination is not always
or necessarily the outcome of prejudice' (21),
although studies of race have long entertained
'the erroneous hypothesis that behaviour is simply
an outward expression of attitudes, and hence is
to be studied and understood in terms of
attitudes… Discriminatory behaviour seems arising
out of prejudiced attitudes'. This is found in
most research, on Negro-white relations in the
USA, where it is easier to understand, but in
Britain 'its inadequacy becomes evident'.
She did observe 'a considerable amount of
discriminatory behaviour' but, this was 'primarily
determined not by individual attitudes but by the
nature and requirement of the particular
situation, and by generally shared social
orientations, values and norms' (22). The
widespread mild antipathy to outsiders can be
displayed, for example in a refusal to allow your
daughter to marry a coloured suitor and this would
not attract social condemnation, but it would if
it meant barring coloured workers who joining a
trade union [!].
Defenders of the '"prejudice – discrimination
axis"' to explain racial situations in Britain
want to explain away the 'increasingly evident
disparity' between favourable attitudes towards
coloured people and the existence of a good deal
of discrimination. It might be that it is naïve to
accept explanations for acts of discrimination
where people disclaim any prejudice and offer
instead economic fears, cultural differences or
social status as rationalisations. She does not
deny that some of them are, but 'came to the
conclusion that the majority of south London
informants were giving the true reasons for their
behaviour' — e.g. refusing to take on a coloured
tenant because the other tenants would not like
it, or a coloured employee because the other
workers would object, or objecting to a mixed race
marriage because the children would be socially
handicapped. This was not a cloak for racism but
'a reflection of the highly conformist social
climate' (23). Prejudiced behaviour might be found
among a few individuals, but for most it is the
'social determinants of interracial behaviour and
relationships… Group orientations, values and
norms' that she is interested in.
There are two major hypotheses to explain the
prevalence of discriminatory behaviour: 'the
"colour – class: hypothesis… (Little)… And the
"stranger" hypothesis … (Banton)' (23). The first
identifies coloured people with the lowest social
class according to the colonial past, the second
sees them as archetypal strangers. Little studied
the Cardiff dock area, while Banton looked at
inland areas, and compared four with coloured
newcomers with two with none. Both types were
found in Brixton. West Indians were strangers par
excellence because 'many of them do in fact react
and behave very differently from the majority of
local people' and they also 'relegated to the
lowest social class', not only as a result of the
colonial era. They also seem to 'conform to an
outmoded 19th century model of lower working class
behaviour'. Observations therefore condition the
behaviour of Brixtonians although orientations are
not rigid as yet and can be modified — strangeness
would disappear, but colour-class would remain and
even be strengthened.
There were coloured migrant groups before West
Indians, especially slaves in the 17th-century,
sometimes from Africa but also via returning
'nabobs from the West Indies'. They were freed
legally in 1772, and many became indigent. Some
were shipped to Sierra Leone together with '60
white prostitutes' (36) and some went to the West
Indies as free labourers. Black beggars were
prominent in London as late as 1814 and Lascar
seamen were found in dock and port areas. There
was intermarriage. The second phase began with
seamen arriving in the dock areas, and, in World
War I labourers brought over to work and serve in
the Merchant Navy. Until the Second World War few
(inland, non-service) inhabitants of the British
Isles had ever met a coloured person except for
entertainers musicians and sporting personalities.
There have been coloured students for the last 250
years, originally to cement trading imperial
contacts. India sent the largest contingent. This
number rose after World War II, mostly Asians or
Africans [then].
The third phase of West Indian migration involve
thousands of West Indians either as volunteers in
the armed services or technicians in the war
industry. 7000 Jamaicans and others served
overseas, often in the RAF. Many of them were
middle-class and ambitious, and many met a
welcome. On return, the economic situation at home
meant they soon returned to Britain. Others came
to work specifically in the Forestry Commission or
in munitions, only about 1/3 of which were
skilled, the other semiskilled. The scheme was
wound up in 1946, 2/3 of them moved out —
but they had discovered the UK. In 1952 W. Indian
emigration to the USA was virtually halted, so the
UK became the only remaining open territory.
Economic conditions in the West Indies especially
Jamaica deteriorated and therefore West Indians
came to Britain, originally as stowaways. The Windrush
brought the first large group and 'within
three weeks they were all in work' (40). Numbers
increased between 1953 in 1955. There was outward
movement generally to other countries in the
Caribbean from Jamaica and Barbados especially,
some of its state aided. After 1955 many became
employed in public transport or hotel businesses
meaning more 'frequent casual contact… They have
on the whole made a very favourable impression'.
Most were greeted with a utilitarian approach by
employers but there was 'traditional hostility of
the local labour force, organised and other' (169)
but this has been modified by nondiscrimination
action by management and by unions. There has also
been general 'evidence of adaptability' including
joining unions. Actual discrimination by unions
has actually been rare despite voiced hostility —
there has been 'a certain degree of accommodation
on both sides' although little extension to the
neighbourhood or to informal social life, and not
affecting the usual status considerations of skill
level. Some have been socially mobile and this
might increase. They might be less of a stranger,
but will still meet class notions that suggest
that coloured workers are only suitable for
unskilled and semiskilled work.
West Indians have had to develop their own
solutions to housing, mostly by buying up
deteriorating property, increasingly ignored by
local investors. This is then filled with 15 to 25
people. Overall the housing shortage in Lambeth
has not been aggravated as much as might be
expected, or believed, but this is still only a
temporary makeshift and might cause future
problems, much depends on how migrants see this.
They will also be entitled to apply for council
housing if they stay much longer. The ones that
are occupied by West Indians are currently
'degenerating into actual slums'. The British
public often assume that West Indian migrants are
used to this and congregate in numbers by choice
and 'this assumption may be reasonably accurate',
although climatic conditions make overcrowding
quite different in the West Indies, and for most
migrants 'the private enterprise housing solution
means dirt, discomfort, and often ill health… [it]
holds back schoolchildren and those who would like
to study' (212) and restricts mobility. It acts as
a '"colour tax"' and encourages single women on a
low wage to live with men 'for the sake of a
lodging'. Rent is a higher proportion of the
income, and adds to other financial burdens
including remitting money home, and requiring warm
clothing and fuel — this alone makes accumulating
sufficient capital to return home less likely.
There is some house purchase, improvement, and
room letting, which follows the patterns of
earlier immigrants like Poles and Cypriots, which
will produce settlers and absorbed citizens,
although this is rare so far. Patterson thinks the
attitude will not change.
There is a common view that West Indians are
happier living together and in their own way, in a
kind of 'incipient "ghetto"' in Brixton, and this
does ease processes of adjustment and adaptation.
Patterns and distinctions developed within, so
that certain streets are occupied by the restless
or the unsuccessful antisocial, and that includes
some 'white misfits'. Other districts 'acquire a
better name' (214) and there may be labour
associations. There is a danger of ghettoisation
in retarding ultimate integration and self
perpetuation, especially if it is based on skin
colour. Very much depends on how many stay and how
many are willing to accommodate themselves.
Further large-scale migration is another factor.
There may be some amelioration following wider
housing acquisition policy.
At the time, there were more men than women
although women are steadily increasing the
proportion as are the number of young locally born
children. The availability of accommodation work
is a factor, and at the time re-migration back
home was rising. There was a nucleus, but it was
not very well organised, seen as only offering a
temporary home. Nearly all were Jamaican, some
West African students, who saw themselves as
different on class grounds, as did the Indians
Pakistanis and Anglo-Indian. In other areas, like
Camberwell, some of these latter groups were
landlords. Most in Brixton are recent arrivals,
unlike other areas, and in those, there has often
been intermarriage. As it is, there is a fairly
large number of young couples and unattached
women, and only a 'small number of white wives and
consorts' (294). There are few from the
intelligentsia and middle classes, nor, until
recently, many from the 'lively and antisocial
café society elements' — most were urban or rural
working class with some skilled artisans and
lower-middle-class, and of those, many worked in a
lower grade than they did at home. Some higher
income groups did not want to live in Brixton
particularly.
Brixton had three zones: unofficial reception
areas, depressed central streets, accommodating
the newcomers the impoverished the unsuccessful
and some criminals. Those who become settled in
more secure leave these overcrowded areas moved to
streets with a better social standing 'and a lower
concentration of coloured residents'. Some buy
their own houses which they can rent. Third is the
group of professionals white collar workers
old-timers and Artisans living in suburban houses
or private or council flats 'in predominantly
white areas'. Some status conscious migrants were
already dissociating themselves from '"Brixton"'
which came to mean the central reception area and
the market.
At the time, most West Indians 'are still
migratory in intention' (295) intending to return
home rather than to adapt, classic behaviour of
economic migrants, found in large numbers of West
Indian migrants to America. Many are unfamiliar
with life and work in a large city and the much
more narrow life situations in the home
environment, and that alone led some to seek
sanctuary in coloured quarters. Some are limited
by the climate, a source of principal complaint
with a considerable effect on family
relationships. These people are also highly mobile
economically and residentially, rather than
'highly integrated [with] formal communal and
associational life'. One described the lifestyle
in the West Indies — 'low level, with rough food
and no comforts… Go to a cinema or have a drink up
once a week… Otherwise they lie on their beds...
get home from work or maybe talk on street corners
if the weather permits' (297).
Principles of association and dissociation are
found within the migrant community and affect
attitudes towards evolution, as do attitudes and
behaviour of the receiving society. The current
focus on economic activities and mobility, an
intention to return home, have impeded the growth
of any stable social organisation. There are also
divisions based on national ethnic and
geographical origin, sociocultural background and
class affiliation here and at home, and length of
settlement. In Brixton, there is national and
ethnic marginality, comparatively, with a split
with West Africans, based on the students and
middle class as well as incompatibility of culture
and language [same with Indians Anglo Indians and
Cape coloured, who are far more interested in
integration]. There are stereotypes on both sides
— West Africans see West Indians as servile, the
descendants of slaves, 'racially bastardised,
uncouth in behaviour, devoid of a sense of
responsibility towards their own children or kin,
and in general lacking a culture or traditions of
their own' (375), and they were proud of their own
movements towards independence. There were enough
West Indians to prevent any kind of forced
association with other black people. West
Indians describe West Africans as 'primitive,
pagan, and uncivilised in comparison with the
Europeanised Christian English-speaking people of
the Caribbean'. Contact to either group can be
damaging. West Indians think that the British
associate a black skin with Africa and therefore
with 'the jungle, primitive savagery, pidgin
English and cultural backwardness' leading to
insults about monkeys and micro-aggressions about
how well they speak English. West Africans, by
contrast see the association of dark skin and lows
status arising from slavery and the stereotype of
the Negro slaves. The stereotypes are found in
informal social life and employment, and there
were several examples of deliberate
discrimination.
There was also a 'common Negro biological
heritage, African antecedents, and former colonial
status' and this is being stimulated 'somewhat
self-consciously and artificially' by some African
nationalists and West Indian protest leaders who
want to stress solidarity against white
imperialism and neocolonialism, but at the moment,
these are seen as potential principles of
association only. This could change radically
'with the homogenising educational process in the
second generation, particularly if a large and
depressed coloured proletariat were to emerge'
(376). At the moment there is no 'strong and
active consciousness of a shared national
identity' and little contact between the people
living on the different islands. There were
internal stereotypes too — 'Trinidadians are
considered to be gay, Jamaicans touchy and
flamboyant, Barbadians '"(Bajans)"' dull and
hard-working'. There are splits with Big Island
people from Jamaica and Trinidad. There are
differences of language, so that people from St
Lucia and Dominica speak French Creole rather than
English. The differences persist even in housing.
There is occasional unity, for example with the
visits of West Indian cricket teams.
Even the bonds between people from the same
islands are 'weak and loose' and are affected by
'colour – class divisions and to a lesser extent
by ethnic affiliations'. These are still the
determinants that affect local socio-economic
hierarchies, rather than local ones. The majority
of the migrants are 'drawn from the dark brown and
black lower classes and socio-economic class
affiliation is therefore the whole principle of
association'. There is no 'lighter coloured middle
and professional class' which leaves room at the
top for any moderately mobile local migrants even
if they are dark — one reason for preferring to
stay in Britain. Many still have 'habitual if
unconscious "white bias" [which] still causes them
to associate improved status with lighter colour'
(378) which leads to preferences for lighter
women, or hair straightening and skin lightening,
praise for kids who have clear colour or good
hair, references to skin pigment is common in
classifications. Skin colour is still 'the
principle of association', even among more elite
bourgeois coloured people.
Education is 'a particularly important principle
of dissoociation'. Few migrants had HE. A minority
had technical secondary education, 'the majority
are barely more than literate'. There is 'great
cleavage between the respectable and socially
ambitious lower middle or upper lower classes and
the great mass of the rural urban proletariat'
which persists in Brixton too (378). The
respectable minority do not see themselves as
leaders, but want to dissociate themselves from
the bulk of migrants.
Economic opportunities provide differentiation
'though not yet… Dissociation' (379).
Opportunities are more easily exploited by
migrants who are already privileged to some
extent, and are able to become landlords, for
example, but there are opportunities for those
with 'individual initiative and energy' who found
no outlet at home. There is a 'loose economic
hierarchy' based on achievements — professional
multiple landlords, licensed nightclub owners and
gamblers, businessmen and successful commission
agents at the top. Then technical students and
nurses, skilled workers, transport and post office
employees and single house landlords. Then
semiskilled and unskilled workers, then the
habitually unemployed and the unemployable. To one
side are 'the small minority of settled old-timers
and of successful professional men and
entertainers'. Ranking by occupation is not as
important as ranking by wealth, however, displayed
in various ways, like the possession of American
cars or expensive clothes, giving lavish parties,
purchasing better class property. Overall the
hierarchy is fluid, nouveau riche, not yet stable
in its internal stratification, still with
elements imported from home. Changed behaviour
seems as important than material display
[including 'formalising the conjugal link']. It
does not lead to contact between the racial
groups, with the exception of landlordism.
However, landlords have 'a vested interest in
continued residential discrimination against
coloured migrants, which enables them to maintain
the "colour tax" in rents' (380). There are often
resented and not closely associated within the
group, and they resent the tenants in exchange.
However, private landlords are likely to persist.
Length of residence is another factor affecting
group cohesion. Brixton has 'probably no more than
a score or so of old-timers' not numerous
enough to influence newcomers, often partially
assimilated. There are a few coloured
professionals as well who also play no real
integrative part. There is a potential community,
but the population is too mobile. There are
special community facilities emerging including a
barber's shop and cafés with special dishes,
together with less socially approved services like
'Ganja- peddling and poncing' (382). Brixton has a
definite pull for migrants, although at the time
of writing there were few voluntary association
and few intragroup contacts, only 'vague feelings
of potential community'. Even the majority
population were indifferent, too unfocused to
produce 'a closer defensive association', although
Patterson thinks this might happen if there is
'greatly intensified friction'.
There is a bitter reaction to the new Commonwealth
immigrations Act, although some have welcomed it
in reducing overcrowding and competition for work,
and overall it will be an active force in
accommodation rather than 'to huddle together as a
resentful outgroup community' (383). [There is a
note about the Notting Hill disturbances and a
potential to mobilise and organise to go over and
help black people, but this soon 'died back to the
earlier apathy', and it was hard to get people
even to vote for a black candidate in subsequent
elections].
Overall, seeing large numbers of coloured people
in Britain no longer produces such a sense of
strangeness, partly because migrants themselves
have dispelled their strangeness by adopting local
clothing and speech. This study focuses on jobs
housing and social activities, with Brixton as an
ideal case study, an area with no previous
experience of coloured settlement. There are
clearly universal factors like employment
opportunities, housing and the values of the
receiving community which seem universal, but the
Brixton population also seemed to be emerging
developing definite trends. The original intention
was to trace relationships between migrants and
the local population, in areas where they were in
competition as well as association. She was
interested in adaptation and acceptance, and how
this was complicated by colour consciousness by
migrants and by preconceptions and antipathy to
outsiders of the natives.
The fieldwork soon revealed important differences.
The early models of assimilation more integration
were inadequate, and she preferred accommodation,
'an early phase of adaptation and acceptance', an
attempt to find a modus vivendi, finding work and
housing, but making no real attempts to go further
to integrate. This developed on both sides. West
Indians did find jobs although not the ones they
hoped for, and not with the wages of the others
either. Some had managed to progress and win
individual acceptance, while some have had to rely
on National Assistance. There is no 'real evidence
to support the frequently made charge that this
was a major attraction' (389). On the management
side there was resistance but that was weakened by
chronic post-war shortages of labour and by the
sponsoring activities of employment exchanges,
producing a general quota of between three and 10%
of the labour force. Economic expediency triumphed
over conservatism and antipathy towards outsiders.
The old hatreds and fears of outsiders based on
bitter memories of unemployment and undercutting,
intensified by suggested links with a coloured
skin 'is often mitigated by "live and let live"
attitudes, by a sense of common British
nationality, and by high-level union support for
international working class solidarity'
Nevertheless most migrant workers have not won
full acceptance before 1956, certainly not
compared to migrant southern Irish 'who are their
frequent rivals for unskilled manual work British
industry, but who have been an accepted part of
the British labour force for many decades'. West
Indian workers were often laid off early in
recessions, although often re-employed. The latest
arrivals in the 50s were particularly likely to be
unemployed [with waits of from 2 to 6 weeks!].
Long queues of coloured people outside employment
exchanges 'provoked considerable local
resentment'. Unemployment became 'the major
potential area of friction' during the 1956 – 58
recession. However, West Indians in work 'ceased
to regard their jobs as expendable' and became
more disciplined and even more desirable as
employees. They began to join unions. They were
still relatively unpromoted. Relations at work
were often separated from relations at home, but
this is typical with compartmented living in urban
contexts.
In housing, 'neighbours are rarely
friends'[generally in urban settings] but people
like to feel what they are surrounded by people
like them. However the tremendous housing shortage
since the Second World War is a major factor and
recent immigrants suffered even more than local
people because they found it difficult to rent
rooms, raise money to buy, or qualify for council
housing, and where they did, it caused 'a
disproportionate amount of unfavourable comment
from the local population' (391). Temporary
solutions involved buying up large short lease
properties that were of no value and letting them
out as furnished rooms to fellow migrants.
Perceived social and cultural differences are also
important factors here. The migrants into Brixton
'are predominantly lower class group moving into a
highly status conscious lower-middle-class or
upper working class area' (392), facing
preconceptions linking colour with low status 'as
well as with an alien, primitive,and uncultured
way of life' .These preconceptions were based on
'first -hand , though often
superficial,observation of the newcomers'
behaviour'. Overcrowding and shared housing
of racially different landlords did not
help.There was a fear that property prices would
be lowered and a dislike of 'coloured
basement clubs'. There has been a coulor tax --the
forcingup of rents and prices' arising from
limited choice -- limiting the desire to
make money to return home.
There were improvements after the recession in
1959. Fewer people were coming, and those that
were were families and friends and women.
Overcrowding was diminishing. More migrants bought
their own houses and there were general
improvements in standards of living if not rents.
Paterson anticpates further problems,
though. There may be more qualifying for local
housing and they may become more vociferous, while
existing housing might deteriorate still further.
There might also be further establishment of 'a
coloured ghetto'. While this has advantages in the
early years, it may 'perpetuate social distance
long after the inhabitants have ceased to wish for
it' and this has apparently happened in Bute Town,
Cardiff. There are fewer natural geographical
barriers in Brixton, however and West Indians are
moving out all the time.
An important area of association is in social
relationships varying from casual contacts to
sexual relationships and intermarriage, and only
the former shows much improvement, generally there
is a 'voluntary association or avoidance [and]
some competition can arise over women and material
amenities' (394). Many factors separate the
groups. Migrants need to concentrate on getting a
living, there is an unwillingness to admit
strangers to personal relationships, already seen
in housing, and likely to be particularly
important with sex and family life. There are
migrant preoccupations 'with colour and class…
Religious beliefs and practices… Everyday concerns
such as diet and recreation' with no current
concern to adapt to local patterns. Casual
contacts are the only ones that persist although
there is 'a fair degree of accommodation…
Discernible on both sides', a tendency to live and
let live. Coloured crimes are possibly over
reported. There are other signs of acceptance such
as stocking West Indian foods and West Indian
music. Acceptance in pubs is slower and some had
had colour bars. Others have turned into migrant
locals. However there have so far been no mass
disturbances even after the 1958 riots.
Migrants have displayed 'apprehension or apathy'
towards more organised social activities in church
community centres or youth clubs (395), but there
is room to provide more opportunity. Intermarriage
and sexual associations are 'not yet the norm'.
There is some association with 'white "misfits"
and declassed women ' often from other parts of
London. The norm is still 'the all West Indian
ménage'. White Brixtonians still see intermarriage
or a sexual association as 'socially declassing or
at least socially complicated for the female
partner and the children'. There is 'little
evidence of friction between local and migrant
children' however.
Generally, low levels of integration and
'impermanent intentions, residential instability,
and socio-economic divisions' have produced a
'weak and amorphous' internal social organisation
for the migrants. There are a variety of
elementary families, many impermanent although
this is changing with prosperity and adhering to
local mores. There are some 'cellular households,
a few Pentecostal congregations… Cricket clubs,
and a fair number of small informal economic
partnerships' designed to save up capital to put
down a deposit or pay a wife's fare from the West
Indies. There are also 'a number of small protest
organisations' but these did not last because the
local population 'were insufficiently hostile'
(396). The nearest they have to leaders is 'the
small minority of wealthy multiple landlord' and
there is as yet 'little or no feeling of
community' although there is 'a clear geographical
focus' especially in the area around Brixton
market, and this will be enhanced in the second
generation.
There is increasing accommodation in work, less in
housing, some sign of acclimatisation and
acquiescence in social contexts, following 'slow
though not necessarily smoother uninterrupted
progress towards a more complete accommodation on
both sides' especially as people realise that
migrants are there to stay. The controls imposed
in 1962 'seems likely to promote the absorptive
process by easing local tensions over housing and
work and giving the migrants a breathing space in
which to consolidate their economic position'. It
is also likely to do away with the impermanent
intentions and promote a "secular" mentality'
(397) because re-entry is no longer an automatic
right.
Further welfare educational or other kinds of
legislation might change events. Generally greater
accommodation and integration in the labour force
should continue except for recessions. There is
some evidence that news of recession deters some
migrants. If there is a major depression
consequences will be grave 'for all identifiable
newcomers or outsiders'. Housing might be further
source of friction, with long-term dangers in
ghettos, although there are no particular dangers
at the moment, in Brixton or in any other areas
[there is a contrast drawn with American cities
like Chicago].
It is too early to assess the progress of social
relations and cultural adaptation, but strangeness
and uncertainty might diminish: however 'a more
rigid class colour identification' might replace
them (398), placing West Indians within the local
system, but at its foot, and as an easily
identified group. However, this 'does not… seem
very likely', because there is such diversity at
the moment inside the migrant settlement and it is
fairly widely dispersed, not well-organised as a
community, and there is some upward social
mobility. She has hope that 'the shared social and
cultural traits… Against an English background
(and aided by a shared education in the second
generation) [will] outlive the differences so
noticeable today'. West Indians might at least be
able to assimilate if they don't actually
integrate like other minority groups did, and this
is favoured by an official 'unified and democratic
social structure which admits of no
institutionalised differentiation between groups;
the prevalent feeling that racial prejudice and
discrimination are wrong; the low intensity, "live
and let live" attitudes of so many urban British;
and the nation's slowly growing awareness and
acceptance, despite the occasional bouts of
"postcolonial blues", of Britain's change role and
status' (399).
Predictions are always dangerous, but she is
prepared to guess that over the next decades, West
Indians 'will follow in the steps of the Irish',
not without checks and reverses. They will be
accepted as 'a regular and permanent component of
the local labour force' and gradually raise their
living standards and fan out from concentrated
settlements. ' An able minority will push upwards
into the skilled and professional strata' where
there is already a trail blazed by skilled
migrants. This in turn will lead to 'closer social
relationships with the local population, and
probably to increased intermarriage and to an at
least partial biological absorption [sic] of the
West Indians and the local population — as
happened in the case of over 10,000 freed coloured
slaves in 19th-century London, and to many
thousands of white ex-soldiers, indentured
labourers, and set those in the West Indian
islands themselves'.
Most of the immigrants will settle here for good.
There are 300,000 in 1962 and even allowing for
more migration and a higher birthrate, this group
'can hardly be said to constitute a serious
national problem', so the 'usual processes of
adaptation and acceptance' should be left to
proceed, maybe with some voluntary assistance.
However there is now a 'worldwide "colour
problem"', aligning with divides between have-nots
and haves, and anti-colonialists and colonialists.
This has led to more outside scrutiny and comment,
'the effect of which is often rather to exacerbate
than to soothe the tensions and conflicts' (400).
There is now a new moral and practical challenge,
especially as Britain has transformed into a
Commonwealth. It also needs to relate to newly
independent Afro Asian countries. The traditional
laissez faire is probably inadequate 'even
though it seems to have worked so far in Brixton':
further action is required before things become
too fixed and institutionalised.
This has been an academic study, but some types of
action might be of use. The overall goal is to
make racial affiliations irrelevant as a criterion
for the allocation of rights and responsibilities
as in the UN Declaration of human rights. In
Britain, 'the ultimate goal is a society of unity
in diversity… In which a coloured skin… [can]
still no longer be associated with strangeness,
inferiority, or outgroup status by either side'
(402). Action is needed to reduce and eliminate
discriminatory behaviour, racial prejudice, and
finally racial consciousness in both receiving
population and migrants, and especially to assist
adaptation and acceptance through 'various areas
of association. Action should be official and
voluntary.
Legislation should cover rights of acceptance in
'universal spheres', in civic and legal rights,
education, public housing, and entertainment.
These are where most discrimination against
newcomers is found and they are of most concern to
West Indians. However direct legislative action is
less applicable to informal situations of
co-residents, primary groups and social
intercourse, so long-term social action is
involved there, although there could be effective
action about discrimination by landlords. It would
be efficacious in Britain despite the difficulties
of enforcement and would establish a pattern of
behaviour, penalising pathological displays of
prejudice and giving a firm lead to the 'uncertain
but not ill disposed majority' (404). It might
also reassure West Indians and make them less
'prone to a attribute setbacks and shortcomings to
"colour bar" and "colour prejudice"' and make them
more willing to adjust and adapt themselves. It
might lead to frivolous complaint, but those are
expensive.
A long-term educational program aimed at reducing
bias should be carried out by a variety of
agencies. A mild antipathy to strangers 'is a
cultural norm in English society', often arising
from ignorance, myths from simple historical
accounts or superficial contact. There are also
the myths of an outmoded colonial past and
sometimes 'pseudo-scientific racialism'. (405).
Textbooks and syllabuses in schools will need
reform to overcome stereotypes and prevent
their 'insular slant', and older pupils
might be taught human relations or comparative
cultural studies. Training college syllabuses will
also need to provide courses in 'race and
human relations'. There should be international
exchanges and visits because personal contact is
often 'worth a gallon of second-hand knowledge',
although sometimes 'personal contact evoke not
greater understanding but greater hostility'
(406). The mass media and other organisations like
unions and churches should aim to influence homes
through talks and discussions, media should have
'an agreed code of reference' and bias should be
brought to the Press Council: it should lead
public opinion and avoid letter columns which are
'still largely monopolised by the lunatic
racialist fringe' (407).
There should be more integrative social action,
aimed not at 'group integration but assimilation',
already a goal of West Indians 'in character if
not yet in intention'. Actual integration might
only produce 'a highly visible lower class
minority group inferior rights and status'.
Particular areas should be chosen and attention
paid to the need to 'recognise and reconcile the
differing expectations and values of the migrants
and the local population': the British think in
terms of gradual and modified acceptance, but West
Indians expect acceptance to be 'immediate and
complete'; the British are aware of class and
cultural differences, 'whereas many West Indians
are extremely colour conscious and tend to
overlook all the other differences' (408).
Integratory agencies should understand the
difference and explain them to both groups. West
Indians should face the fact of the need to adapt,
and local populations the need to widen their
acceptance. The universal areas of association are
the most promising areas, but there should also be
'personal advice and welfare counselling'. There
might need to be a specific department dealing
with the reception and integration of immigrants —
there was one but it was closed in 1951. West
Indian governments themselves had migrant services
division which did well but were under resourced
and eventually closed. Welfare organisations and
other have a role to play to encourage acceptance
and to coordinate their efforts — places other
than Brixton have done better here. A community
development officer might be appointed. Special
agencies might be set up, concerned with
recreation and social relationships, perhaps, with
a particular emphasis in areas already focused on
adaptations such as work and housing, leading to
support for trade unions or housing associations.
The second generation will be particularly
important, and care should be taken not to
marginalise them or treat them as strangers.
Sponsors might be important here, including the
Anglican Church, even the Rotary.
Development of relationships between migrants and
British is still 'a relatively small sector… Of
everyday social life in this country' (412). There
is a worldwide problem as well. There should be
more levelling up within the Commonwealth as a
whole, for example, and skin colour should cease
to be as relevant in Europe and in the Western
world generally.
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