NOTES on:
Adlam, D. (1979) 'The Case Against
Capitalist Patriarchy', m/f 3
Dave Harris
The term appears in two recent books: Eisenstein
(Ed) Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for
Socialist Feminism, and Kuhn, A. and A-M.
Wolpe (Eds) (1978). Feminism and Materialism.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. The argument in
both is that we require a definite analysis of
capitalist patriarchy, but this is both difficult
and unwarranted.
Engels and the marxian tradition are appropriated
differently in these two books, with Eisenstein
focusing on the early Marx, while Kuhn and Wolpe
are Althusserians. Yet the forms of argument
are very similar and the theoretical differences
are really only 'rhetorical'. The
inadequacies of Marxism are seen in both in terms
of not explaining the history or specifics of
patriarchy. Engels' Origins of the
Family sees the sexual division of labour
only in terms of a class division of labour, and
makes monogamy dependent on private
property. Patriarchy and capitalism are
separated, for the critics, requiring a new
theory. Other feminist theories need
criticizing too—for example radical feminism is
biologistic and transhistorical, Mitchell's work
overdoes the psychological and ideological
dimensions and is also transhistorical. What
we need is a theory of 'the unconscious in
history', the way in which the subject gets
constructed as both inside a class and as
sexed. The recognized danger is this will
result in 'eclectic' and 'confused' analysis
(86). Specifically, we need to reread Engels
to show that patriarchy is historically specific,
and we need to reread theories of patriarchy to
show that women's oppression is 'not simply
contingent'. For the critics,
synthesis should be possible leading to a proper
theory of patriarchy.
However there can be no synthesis of patriarchy
and capitalism, and no understanding of
particularly capitalist forms of patriarchy.
The concept of patriarchy involves an essence
being realized in different forms according to
relations of production. This essence of
patriarchy lies in a primeval domination of women
by men, through the biology and institution of
childbirth. K and W follow Engels in saying
there is first a need for surplus, but this still
assumes that men's desire to oppress women is
latent, or even 'natural' . McDonagh returns to
economism, arguing that middle class women
reproduce the bourgeoisie, while working class
women reproduce labour power, and this essentially
economic function becomes gendered, which makes
reproduction function in the interest of male
capitalists (87). This is really a
functionalist analysis throughout, where the needs
of the capitalist economy condition forms of
appearance of patriarchy.
There is always a danger of the reduction of the
specifics of sex to the economy, corresponding
after all to the 'economism of the male left' (88)
[so are the effects of sexual division of labour
to be seen as an overdetermination?]. There
is another view that says that the sexual division
of labour is a matter of a precapitalist mode of
production, but then there would be no logical
need for patriarchy in capitalism after all.
The idea that we need a combination of Engels' Origins
and Marx's Capital would be
incoherent and produce only a danger of
oscillation between economic reductionism and
sexual essentialism [Adlam reveals her allegiance
is to Hindess and Hirst
here?]. The same goes if the combination is
reversed, and capitalism becomes essential—but
then why does it always benefit men? The
analysis seems to require a dualist model, with
two essences. In practice, we find a certain
sleight of hand in these discussions, where
concepts are seen as problematic, say in
introductions, and then just straightforwardly
used in subsequent analyses. There is a
strong suspicion that concepts of patriarchy and
of capitalism are actually incompatible, and this
appears in the contribution by Cousins [in K and
W, I think]. In practice, most writers have
to opt for one or the other as the most important
in the end.
Kuhn's article specifically talks of 'jamming
together' semiotics, psychoanalysis, Marxism and
sociology, to produce the notion of patriarchy as
a structure which unites property relations and
psychic relations. She refers to Lacan on
the role of the family, where the family is itself
conditioned by forms of economic
organization. The unconscious is seen as
either eternal or at least relatively autonomous,
yet it takes specific forms. Classic
psychoanalysis can only theorize within
patriarchy, and this is supported by Mitchell who
argues that Freudian accounts of sexual difference
means in practice the theory of sexual
division. However, sexual differences do
remain, and must, even if we have non
authoritarian fathers.
The cultural significance of sexual differences is
explicable using Lacanian psychology, but
irrelevant, logically unnecessary for
Marxism. The two analyses can't just be
added together. The notion of the Symbolic
in Lacan and the account of ideology in Marx
relies on different discourses and are really
'incommensurable': Marxism operates with
categories like illusion/reality, psychoanalysis
with sexual differences and role. They are
not both aspects of the same object 'society':
they are different conceptions of the social.
K and W tried to work through Althusser's
discussion of Lacan in order to get to the general
theory of ideology as Imaginary. Kuhn uses
the Imaginary as the foundation in Lacan of the
Symbolic, and brings in Althusser on the mode of
production, seeing both as aspects of
'culture'. The Symbolic is a mere content
for the more general form of ideology, in this
case, content referring to sex. But in
Lacan, the Symbolic is a precultural level, the
condition of language and difference, the origin
of the ability to represent (92). Althusser
is wrong in his reading. The Symbolic is not
just a matter of details or contents.
Similarly, psychoanalysis is about differences
rather than divisions, about male and female
positions, not about the concrete subjects 'men'
and 'women'. It is not just a theory of
socialization, a matter of filling empty vessels
with stereotypes, as in conventional social
psychology. Yet this approach can be
detected even in Kuhn, despite her denials, as,
for example, in the debates on domestic labour in
Smith's chapter, the results of which are then
assumed and used for support in Kuhn's chapter!
We find eclecticism in both of these texts, rather
than an argument for necessary connections between
psychoanalysis, patriarchy or Marxism. We
often find 'sophisticated economic functionalism'
being added to some concept of ideology which can
'take care of the residue'. This is, for
example why we find monogamy in working class
families, even though it is 'logically
redundant'. There are a number of lapses
into a sociological analysis of
variables—patriarchy and capitalism become
clusters of vectors which together explain
particular variants, say in the particular
oppression suffered by different groups of
women. This is not Marxism, but multivariate
empirical analysis of relations, not a dialectical
synthesis of any kind as claimed. There is
often a conventional deployment of this analysis,
ending in having to opt for different
possibilities, maintaining a position of 'balance'
or arguing for double determination. Their
particular analyses are better, however.
So do we need a general theory, a master theory
which helps us to read all the specific
affects? The problem is that the specificity
of sexual difference is not the same as the
effects of property relations. Sexual
divisions are political as well as theoretical in
importance. Theory has been produced by the
new [political] feminism on the left. Is
common to assume that theory and politics are
different fields, but the politics of calculating
effects is theory, and we must introduce
such calculations to avoid reductionism and
foundationalism [classic Hindess and Hirst] and
the question is why feminists are so prone to see
an apparent need to combine theory and politics in
classic Marxist ways?
The search for combination has had specific
effects, on neglecting the specificity of
sex. For example the different forms of
oppression and emerging class formations are not
reducible to the economy or indeed anything else
except at the risk of essentialism. The
notion that there is some internal unity is
circular—the clear signs of patriarchy are only
signs because we already know what to look
for. The empirical generality of sexual
divisions cannot be taken as evidence for the
generality of patriarchy, since they show sexual
differences not some ultimate underlying
antagonism featuring male dominance. Adding
in a mode of production as a way of structuring
these differences still leads to problems—'duality
can't be stretched into diversity' (99). The
categories of men and women function differently
at different points in society and are not
unitary, not always in opposition, and not lined
up in some fundamental single opposition.
The specificities cannot be grasped if we are
asking about why women are oppressed in general.
They can't be grasped using the usual approaches
from the traditional social sciences either, which
and lurk in the analysis despite claims of having
made a radical break into feminism. These
writings are still traditional in their desire to
elaborate a set of concepts to capture the whole
problem, leaving only irrelevant loose ends.
There is a danger of an ontology that sees reality
as something logical or rational. Concrete
specific analysis of women could be used to
disrupt that ontology instead. This would be
the challenge offered by feminism, not its
interdisciplinary claims, which can only add
dimensions, rounding out social science rather
than radicalizing it. Here they are, looking
for unity and parsimonious concepts! They
are prepared to split theory and politics and see
theory as a mediator of politics, despite their
earlier rhetorical installation of politics as the
base for their efforts! (100).
A grasp of real complexities, specifics,
calculations and alliances is what is needed,
rather than some unified theory separated from
politics as in 'socialist feminism'. The
real role for these hybrids is to offer comfort
and unity when faced with failure. Would
accepting diversity subvert the supposed unity of
the feminist movement? The risk is
essentialism. Feminists can often see flaws
in the supposed unity of the working class, but
not in the unity of women. Specifically, working
class conservatives are now accepted as an
adequate category, why not conservative
women? Why are these only 'honorary men'?
Unity is a political matter, an ideological
matter. We do not need a unified theory.
more social theory
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