Deleuze for the Desperate #4 The body-without-organs (BwO)

Dave Harris

This is the fourth one in the series so far. Like the others, this one recommends we use a technique designed to get some sort of initial understanding from the difficult texts written by Deleuze and Guattari. It is an approach for those who might not have time to read the whole texts in a suitable leisurely way, stopping to look things up, going off to think of implications and so on. Instead, we focus on sections in the text, which we find using the index, which discuss the particular key concept we are interested in. We read around the entries a bit, then bring in some additional issues. This time it is the body-without-organs or BwO.

All references and a transcript are available – see the link at the end.

As before, the main focus is going to be on the discussion in A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004) The BwO warrants a whole plateau to itself here, fortunately a fairly brief one. There is also an extended discussion in Anti-Oedipus, and more discussion in Deleuze's books Logic of Sense, (Deleuze 1990) and Proust and Signs (Deleuze 2000) (references in the transcript, cited at the end). As before, a second voice introduces some additional issues from this wider discussion – the voice of Maggie Harris.

M. Harris

My first section introduces a brief account of some main themes in the work of Carlos Castenada, who appears a few times in A Thousand Plateaus. He was a cult writer in the 1960s and 1970s, but is perhaps less well-known these days. The second section introduces some issues from Anti-Oedipus, where the Body-without-Organs is also discussed.

End MH

The body without organs (BwO) is another popular concept which attracts some attention, and some people have insisted that it has application for the education system, people like St Pierre or Guttorm et al. I suppose it came to the attention of social scientists as well, given their interest in bodies as well as minds. A lot of the work in this 'turn to the body' in Sociology refers to the way in which bodies are marked by social forces of various kinds, and how people read off the social forces by the ways in which people hold and display their bodies. Bourdieu (1984), for example, refers to characteristics of working class bodies or middle class bodies, and notes that bodies are conventionally gendered as well. He goes on to say that one major way to teach people about the power of social forces is to constrain and discipline their bodies, to make female children adopt particular deferential stances in the presence of men, for example. Foucault's (1977) work on prison regimes is also about disciplining bodies with the intention to discipline minds, as in a behaviour-shaping regime. Schools do that too, of course.

As the first clue to what the plateau on the body without organs is all about, we can think about ways to escape these disciplines exerted on our bodies, to achieve some state where the body is not heavily socialized or controlled. The body's full potential will then be released – the potential to express desires of all kinds in a creative way, to be affected, in deleuzian terms. This will liberate us from major forces of social discipline and help us think and act in alternative ways. It is simply assumed that we would want to do this in the very title of the plateau: how do you make yourself a body without organs?

The body without organs is one of these things that exist in reality, but in virtual reality (discussed in the video on the rhizome) At least we give the virtual body a separate name, not just call it the body, so this is a welcome break from previous practice with concepts like the rhizome or the haecceity that refer to both actual and virtual states. However, we are told quite early on that the BwO is not exactly a concept in the strict sense, unlike the rhizome and the haecceity, but rather a limit state, something that we can perceive when we push to the limits of conventional bodies to see what might remain or lie beyond them. We get to it by stripping away the effects of various practices, not just by thinking, the practices which constrain conventional bodies. We have to be very careful, though, to ensure that we do not get just an empty body, or one that can easily be re- occupied by harmful forms.

Let's proceed straight away to the examples we have in ATP, Plateau 6.

On p 167 (of my edition) we have a list of ways to escape from the demands of conventional bodies:

In a number of cases, the body shows that it has 'had enough of organs [and the conventional pains and pleasures they bring] ' the hypochondriac body' is one example [citing a French psychiatrist who had a patient who literally thought that they no longer possessed any organs]. The 'paranoid body' is another example, where the organs are continually under attack but constantly renewed [the reference is to the case of a famous paranoid, Judge Schreber, much discussed in Anti-Oedipus]. There is the 'schizo body' struggling with the organs and risking catatonia. [more on this case later] The 'drugged body' is a kind of experimental schizo state [with a reference to W. Burroughs]. There is also the 'masochistic body' which is not just about the enjoyment of pain, but an attempt to stop the organs from working in conventional ways and develop alternatives. All these examples should also remind us of the need for caution. We should also avoid attempts just to empty bodies, rather than releasing them to pursue 'gaiety, ecstasy and dance' (167). That promise leads us to keep experimenting, until we have 'sufficiently [my emphasis] dismantled our self', our conventional self, that is.

The most familiar example, perhaps involves experimenting with drugs. We can withdraw into our body. The practice is sometimes called 'escapism', escape from the body and its responsibilities and demands, but there is a positive side, new pleasures to discover and experience. William Burroughs is discussed briefly. The reference to Castenada later on, about p.180) also involves experimenting with drugs, this time, mind-expanding ones found in peyote buttons. Artaud experimented with peyote too.


Carlos Castenada, is the author of best-selling 60s/70s hippy texts allegedly about the life and times of a (probably mythical) [yah-key] Yaqui sorcerer, “Don Juan”. Castenada claimed to be an anthropology student. “Don Juan” sets out to rock the foundations of Castenada’s world with a series of disorientation techniques, including long walks, starvation, odd and frightening behaviour, isolation in the desert and (eventually) taking peyote. The first volume was aimed at making us all realize our ‘scientific’ conventions were arbitrary and close to magic themselves, and that people we thought of as 'noble savages' had a lot of wisdom too. After that, the books got stranger still, more and more obsessional/paranoid. There were more characters, more improbable alleged concepts central to Don Juan’s belief system. There was a fair bit of repetition, and a general 'eco' philosophy supposedly emerging from a series of ‘critical incidents’ (as we would call them now). It all sounded so hippy that a few people began to say that the whole thing was made up. Deleuze and Guattari say it doesn't matter if it was.

D&G discuss the issues raised in Book 4 of Castenada's epic, where sorcerers apparently construct two views of the world, one based on appearances and empirical relations, a bit like science as D&G see it, while the other operates with flows and fluxes underneath the surface, dissolving all that seems to be actual. This is pretty much like deleuzian philosophy. The two worldviews are discussed with quite a notable seriousness.

Castenada crops up quite a bit in A Thousand Plateaus in fact, not least in Plateau 10 on becoming, where Deleuze and Guattari refer to themselves as 'sorcerers', and, at one stage, refer to human bodies being connected to everything else through a series of 'fibres'. This is a reference to one of those critical incidents described by Castenada, when Don Juan shows him how his friend, another sorcerer, is able to make a hazardous crossing of a waterfall by extending, and making visible, white fibres which snake from his abdomen and connect him securely to neighbouring rocks and trees.

End of MH

We can liberate ourselves from normality, perceive the world in a new way, and deepen our understandings with drugs or traditional techniques of sensory deprivation. Of course this has been claimed by generations of artists and cultural rebels as well. Even ecstasy, once highly popular among clubbers was said to liberate users from normal bodily desires, subduing impulses to predatory sex or violence in favour of developing friendship and sociability.

The other examples might require a bit of context. Take masochism first. We are given graphic details of a masochistic practice, or maybe a fantasy, from the casebook of a French psychiatrist about a man who requires that his conventional sex organs are heavily restrained, to put it mildly. This looks like excessive discipline of the body, but we are told that the idea is to 'destroy the instinctive forces in order to replace them with transmitted forces' (172), and then that there is the intention of experiencing [a kind of culturally induced] fear and suspense, instead of being dominated by lust, e.g. at the sight of women's legs. Legs have ceased to be conventional organs [body parts really] and have been replaced by signs such as boots, and as a result they are now a zone of intensity or a zone on the BWO...that is they produce or channel desire, but not with the same conventional socially accepted results and effects.

Once the conventional pleasures have been denied, the masochist is free to experience unconventional even unformed pleasures, including 'becoming horse'. There is more than a hint that these are somehow 'higher' pleasures detached from the 'normal' body, which reminded me of Bourdieu's (1984) work on elite tastes.

This is far from the usual conception of masochism as involving simply the pleasures of pain, the inverse of sadism. Deleuze argues this much more extensively in a book on masochism, at least on the work of Sacher-Masoch. I have the 1991 version of Deleuze's book which also includes a famous novel by Sacher-Masoch – Venus in Furs. Deleuze pursues some very interesting criticisms of Freud on masochism and on the centrality of the father. Instead, Deleuze says, Sacher-Masoch was offering a very cultured view of sexual activity, wanting to revive mythical versions of women in ritual performances, a kind of sexual theatre. It was important to exclude what passed for sexual reality, and this involved contracting a female partner to learn to play a consistent and plausible part, sexual role-play in modern terms: she was to be the cold but caring woman.

This account helps explain the sudden leap in ATP from masochism to 'courtly love', the heavily ritualised activity of courtship that also involved very little actual sexual contact as we would understand it, but which culturally sexualised normal behaviour instead – a meaningful glance, gentlemanly behaviour. A caress is 'as strong as an orgasm: orgasm is a mere fact, a rather deplorable one' (173). Incidentally Proust's novel (I have a summary on my website Harris, nd.) gives some good examples of highly stylised bourgeois love and courtship in Paris.

The same apparently goes for Daoist love [can't help you here]. We can examine D&G's description, and note how they return us to philosophical concepts:

Again, men should not ejaculate, both parties should not see desire as a lack or simply a delaying of pleasure to gain some 'externalizable surplus value' (174), but constituting an intensive BwO, again with nothing external or transcendent. This energy can be directed towards procreation, but this is only 'one side of the assemblage of desire, the side facing the strata, organisms, State, family'.

The 'strata' here can be thought of as solidified forms of energy or creativity that have been compacted and then made rigid, just like geological strata, an argument pursued in Plateau 3. We are told there are three main forms of them: ‘ the ones that most directly bind us: the organism, signifiance and will articulate [discipline] your body –otherwise you’re just depraved. You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and interpreted – otherwise you’re just a deviant. You will be a subject, nailed down as one, a subject of the enunciation recoiled into a subject of the statement –otherwise you’re just a tramp’ (176-7).

Each of these constraining strata need a bit more explanation:

Organisms, 'the organization of the organs'….Conventional organisms are subject to the judgement of God. We will see the origin of this phrase in a minute. It refers to Christian doctrines about bodily functions, riddled with undertones of guilt, hatred of the body, bodily pleasure as sin and so on. Christianity, God, wants to constrain or destroy the creative liberated body, the BwO, and so do scientists and doctors -- both reduce us to animal-like organisms. The animal parts of us are seen as defining us. The organism is therefore a stratum on the BwO, something that has accumulated, coagulated and sedimented 'in order to extract useful labour' by imposing particular forms and functions and organizations on the BwO. So, taking the obvious example, manual labour especially reduces us to 'organic muscle power', as if we were horses or oxen.

We counter it by 'articulating' our organs differently, rearranging the priorities and connections, as in some of the experimental practices above. That is to refuse dominant notions of the human organism, refusing to be judged by our 'natural' bodies, as brutes or beasts of burden, as mere 'specimens' by doctors, or as fleshy robots by scientists.

Signifiance (NB not significance) refers to the operation of conventional language systems, the translator's note tells us. Roughly, it is the capacity to signify or make sense using conventional language and its approved techniques. Mostly, this is heavily conventional and we are forced to use language 'properly', in a form of deep socialisation which 'clings to the soul'. Plateau 5 discusses this best, when you are ready – for example we are told that language contains implicit 'order words' which imply social hierarchies. Experimenting with signifying is the only way out – hence the general admiration for experimental language and art.

And the individual subject. We become subjects only by accepting discipline – elsewhere, Deleuze and Guattari expresses some admiration for Althusser's marxist account of this process. Again Plateau 5 awaits. We are offered an apparently individual identity in social life and we learn to accept it, and our place. Incidentally, Althusser (1977) saw the school as a major mechanism here. This discipline is heavily reinforced every day and is very difficult to resist. We counter it with experiment again, with nomadism, nomadic subjectivity, insisting we are several selves.

The mental disorders, especially paranoia and schizophrenia had already been discussed in some depth in Anti-Oedipus and again the BwO emerges as a key term. Annoyingly, the copy I have does not offer a full index of concepts. So we can't really use the study strategy that we have been advocating with this particular volume, which is to use the index to collect examples of the term in use. As before, as I read through my copy of Anti-Oedipus, I noted down a few page numbers where the body without organs is discussed. My notes on Anti-Oedipus are not as full as I would've liked, because it was the first book by Deleuze and Guattari that I read, more than 20 years ago, and I wasn't quite into them by then. Nevertheless, we can summarize a few themes and try to see how the body without organs fits.


Anti-Oedipus is openly political in its condemnation of capitalism and the way in which it controls people. A dominant feature is the critique of approaches to mental illness and mental health which end up by constraining the creativity of human beings and making them much more malleable. Indeed, at its worst, analyses of matters such as desire can imply that a healthy orientation will actually require levels of political oppression or social repression. Some do not undergo the stages of being disciplined successfully and they end up with neuroses, things like obsessional disorders or hysteria, or even psychoses. The psychoses are serious mental illnesses that dominate the life of the sufferer, such as paranoia or schizophrenia.

Other Freudians have developed these arguments about psychosis in particular, and the work of Klein is discussed in Anti-Oedipus as well. To be very brief, the argument is that all infants have a traumatic experience when they first encounter the outside world, and discover objects, including people, other than themselves. Indeed, some of these other objects are positively threatening, claiming the attention of parents, and increasingly intruding into the safe and secure world of the infant. There seem to be two responses to this trauma in Klein. First, children can get very depressed at realizing that they are no longer the centre of the world, and this depression can develop into psychosis. It takes the form of a paranoid suspicion and hatred that the outside world is determined to crush or extinguish them altogether. Second, they can try to protect some inner self, by splitting up their identity, and insulating the inner one from outside reality altogether, for example. This split self can turn into schizophrenia.

If we can summarize the main critical thrust of Anti-Oedipus in a few words it would be to suggest that this whole schema is far too rigid and driven by an interest in control. Infants are far more creative than Freud and Klein believe. We saw this in the session on the rhizome with the case of Little Hans, who stars in Anti-Oedipus too. Hans was trying to make sense of his world and to join together all the elements that interested him in the world outside his parental home, especially those he could observe from his window, which was situated opposite a loading bay. His early attempts to make sense of these events in his own way were interpreted by Freud in the classic terms of Oedipal anxiety. The lad's agoraphobia could be explained ultimately by his anxiety that his mother would have another child – the box-wagons stood for wombs. The structure of the 'normal' family as Freud saw it was imposed, as a mechanism to control 'natural' but anti-social sexual forces. No violence was required, although his mother did make the routine threat that she would castrate him if she caught him masturbating.

That was an historical case producing a lot of speculative analysis, but Guattari himself worked with adult psychotics in his experimental clinic. Many had already had the usual treatments for their disorder, often confinement in an institution with compulsory treatments like electro-shock therapy. Guattari treated them instead with group therapy with every effort made to reconnect people, 'transversally' or rhizomatically, with the real world, not the paranoid or schizophrenic one. The regime tried to open out experience and build on creativity, to break the barriers between staff and inmates. Patients were encouraged to participate in new forms of work, or new contacts with the arts.

End MH

Both Guattari and Deleuze had a particular interest in a famous figure in the bohemian artistic life of Paris -- Antonin Artaud. Artaud was seen as a wildly creative figure, experimenting with drugs, writing experimental texts and inventing a new kind of theatre -- the theatre of cruelty (cruel or uncompromising toward the audience, that is). Artaud had been confined in an asylum for a decade, away from Paris, diagnosed as a schizophrenic, and had suffered a great deal. He was treated with a behaviour-shaping regime including ECT, severe diets, and deprivation of social contacts. He was finally rescued after a campaign by Parisian intellectuals and others, but had clearly suffered: he was in ill health, a drug addict, and had lost all his teeth. He was regarded as a bit of a martyr, and there are two long documentaries available on YouTube telling his story. (refs at the end

He wrote a play outlining his personal philosophy and defending himself against charges that he was mad. The title of the play was To Have Done With the Judgement of God the origin of the terminology in Deleuze and Guattari. It included scurrilous mockery of the catholic church, made all sorts of allegations about Americans, and advocated drug taking. It was due to be broadcast on French radio on November 28, 1947, says Brian Holmes (2009) but was banned: alert readers will see that that date appears under the main title of Plateau 6 on BwO.

The play was not broadcast, but it probably circulated among the intellectual underground. It finally surfaced in the form of a heroic reading of the transcript in English on YouTube (Vaughan-Johnstone, nd) , and finally, the whole thing became available on the web [see Surrealism-Plays, nd). It is a very strange piece, and you can read it yourselves. The bit about body without organs occurs right at the end:

Man is sick because he is badly constructed. We must make up our minds to strip him bare in order to scrape off that animalcule that itches him mortally, god, and with god his organs.

For you can tie me up if you wish, but there is nothing more useless than an organ.

When you will have made him a body without organs, then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions and restored him to his true freedom.

They you will teach him again to dance wrong side out as in the frenzy of dance halls and this wrong side out will be his real place.

OK we have done the main thrust of the argument I think, except for Spinoza. He crops up elsewhere as we have said, and here is he being rendered as offering 'the great book of the BwO'.

Spinoza drew attention to bodies long before Bourdieu or Foucault. He argued that an action in the mind is necessarily an action in the body, or a passion in the body is necessarily a passion in the mind...that consciousness is actually an illusion, which merely registers effects. We have hinted at this in the earleri videos when discussing affects.

In general, Spinoza, according to Deleuze (1988) is famous for the idea that there is a single substance with an infinite number of attributes, uniting God and nature. This denies the transcendental God, and implies a number of ‘practical theses that made Spinozism an object of scandal’ (17).

Roughly, existing things are just modes of the attributes of universal substance. Modes represent degrees of power to affect and to be affected, which they get from their origins in 'universal substance', so to speak.

I don't know if this is helpful or not. I think it means that the BwO is something like the universal substance, and specific organisms, or organisations of its organs, are modes. In other words, we have two levels of reality again, an actual and a virtual. This is seen perhaps in philosophical asides throughout ATP Plateau 6:

[The BwO is] a distribution of intensities in a spatium [something which is intensive itself], and not space. ..non-formed, non-extensive matter, 'intense matter', something where 'intensity = 0" , and zero is not to be taken as negative, simply as a sign that there is no energy at work except that which matter itself possesses. (169) ...the full egg before the extension of the organism and the organization of the organs', before the formation of the strata' (170 )

This notion of the egg, full of potential and as yet not fully formed into separate organs and conventional bodies also appears in AO, linked to the specific paranoid and highly detailed fantasies of Schreber:

The body without organs is like the cosmic egg, the giant molecule swarming with worms, bacilli, Lilliputian figures, animalcules, and homunculi, with their organization and their machines, minute strings, ropes, teeth, fingernails, levers and pulleys, catapults: thus in Schreber the millions of spermatazoids in the sunbeams, or the souls that lead a brief existence as little men on his body....The socius [existing social system] is not a projection of the body without organs; rather, the body without organs is the limit of the socius, its tangent of deterritorialization, the ultimate residue of a deterritorialized socius. The socius—the earth, the body of the despot, capital-money—are clothed full bodies, just as the body without organs is a naked full body; but the latter exists at the limit, at the end, not at the origin. (281)

That is, existing societies are not the natural production of the creative potential of human bodies, but stratified, 'filled' and 'clothed' versions of it. If we can work back from these added forms of organization we can get to the BwO, as we will see in a minute.

There are several more asides but I will leave you to find them. Two final implications remain, divided rather artificially into political and philosophical – as you will see, both are connected:

1. Political. We are in a social formation and need to see how it is stratified. Then we can trace the strata back to the deeper assemblage. Then 'tip the assemblage' towards the plane of consistency [that is treat it as a plateau, to see how it connects at the virtual level]. This reveals the BwO as a connection of desires, flows and continuum of intensities. This will provide each of us with 'your own little machine, ready when needed to be plugged into other collective machines' (179). BwO is therefore a place and the plane of consistency, a collectivity - 'my' body is a location on it, 'what remains of me, unalterable and changing in form, crossing thresholds'.

However, we have to be very careful before abandoning conventional bodies altogether in radical experiments, and D&G get rather conventional here: We have to keep enough of our organism to carry on with every day life and enough signifiance and subjectification if only to be able to criticize them as systems, 'to respond to the dominant reality'(178). We can 'mimic the strata'. We should beware excessive destratifying which will lead to 'empty and dreary bodies' [the catatonic drug addict, the seriously ill schizophrenic, or, in terms of the body politic, the absence of democratic bodies in fascist dictatorships]. Patience is required, a temporary dismantling of the organs. It is easy to 'botch' it, failing to produce it, or producing it as something empty. Heading towards the plane of consistency and experimentation will end in death, a black hole or catastrophe unless you take precautions. Better to stay stratified rather than provoke an even heavier stratification. Hence 'lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow, conjunctions here and there... [but] have a small plot of new land at all times'. We need a 'meticulous relation with the strata'. [In short we need philosophy to 'connect, conjugate, continue: [produce] a whole"diagram"as opposed to still signifying and subjective programmes'. Philosophy is the safest way to experiment.

And finally general philosophical implications

How does the BwO (and the haecceity as well) relate to the whole of virtual reality, or rather what we can understand of it, the 'plane of consistency'? We find a bit of indecision here, a problem yet to be solved – eg:

...masochism, Tao and courtly love are [not] interchangeable, but they are locations on a field of immanence or plane of consistency, which we must construct [by philosophizing, of course]. This runs through different social formations and assemblages and shows itself in different types of BwO. 'The plane of consistency would be the totality of all BwOs, or pure multiplicity of immanence, one piece of which may be Chinese, another American, another medieval, another petty perverse, but all in a movement of generalized deterritorialization in which each person [sic] takes or makes what she or he can, according to tastes she or he will have succeeded in abstracting from a Self... According to a politics of strategy successfully abstracted from a given formation' [sounds a bit like Foucault on strategy here]. (174)

But later ...So the plane of consistency is not the sum of BwOs, but rather the sum of elements that have been selected, full and creative BwOs, leaving out cancerous or empty bodies. Is this just a logical construction, or does each BwO actually produce effects which are 'identical or analogous to' those of others? If so, we might be able to get the same effects from drug use or masochism from other BwOs, like 'being soused on pure water' as in an experiment by Henry Miller. Or perhaps there is a real exchange of substances, an intensive continuum of substance. 'Doubtless, anything is possible' (184). [Guattari doesn't really care, if this is indeed him -- it is therapy and politics that attracts him]. In any case, we need 'an abstract machine capable of covering and even creating [the plane of consistency],... assemblages capable of plugging into desire' which will ensure there are connections and pursue 'transversal tie-ins'. If we don't do this, all the BwOs will remain separated from each other marginalised, and cancerous and emptied doubles 'will triumph'.

We still haven't covered all the examples – there are more in the books on Proust, Kafka and in Deleuze's The Logic of Sense. You will have to read this for yourselves – I've given page numbers for relevant sections in the references. The idea is that you can achieve a BwO by developing a particular writing technique -- a machine that does not write about the normal bodily sensations and emotions or from normal subjective positions. Both Kafka and Proust manage to do this, after normal subjective writing.  Bogue's book is really good on this.I also have notes on a useful article by Buchanan on the BwO.

Deleuze had an early interest in cinema as also offering a chance to develop non-human 'machinic 'perspectives through cameras and sound recording equipment, and  the books (especially Cinema 2) show how modern film-makers detach from the normal 'sensori-motor' perspectives of conventional human subjects.

STOP PRESS: I have also discovered a bit on the BwO in the paintings by Bacon: Deleuze, G. ( 2005) Francis Bacon. Trans. Daniel Smith.London: Bloomsbury Press, pp. 34--6.


Althusser, L. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)" in Althusser L (1977) 'Lenin and Philosophy' and Other Essays, London, New Left Books. My notes:

Bourdieu,P. (1984) Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul

Deleuze, G. (2008) [1964] Proust and Signs, trans. by Richard Howard, London: Continuum. See p. 117.  My notes:

Deleuze, G (1990) The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester, edited by Constantin Boundas, New York: Columbia University Press. See pp.87–93. My notes:

Deleuze, G. 'Coldness and Cruelty', (published with Sacher-Masoch, L. 'Venus in Furs'). Both are combined in a volume called Masochism (1991) New York: Zone Books. My notes:

Deleuze G and Guattari F (2004) [1987] A Thousand Plateaus, London: Continuum. My notes to Plateau 6:

Deleuze G and Guattari F (1984) Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia, London: The Athlone Press. See pp: 281, 283, 327–9, 338, 364. My notes:

Foucault M. (1977) Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison, London: Penguin Books Ltd. My notes:

Guttorm, H. et al. (2013)  Encountering Deleuze: Collaborative Writing and the Politics of Stuttering in Emergent Language. International review of Qualitative Research, 5 (4) 377--98.

Harris, D. (nd) The Dave Harris Entry in the Summarize Proust Competition,

Holmes, B. (2009) Guattari's Schizoanalytic Categories.

St Pierre, E. (2004) ‘Deleuzian Concepts for Education: The subject undone’, in Educational Philosophy and Theory, 36(3) :283-96. My notes:

Surrealism-plays (nd) A. Artaud: To Have Done with the Judgement of God.

Vaughan-Johnston, T. (nd) A Artaud: To Have Done with the Judgement of God. http: www.


My Life and Times with Artaud

Artaud the Momo (director Mordillat, Laura Productions, USA, 1995).