Notes on Denzin, N., & Keller, C. (1981). Frame Analysis Reconsidered. Contemporary Sociology, 10(1), 52-60. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2067803 Dave Harris [This is a review essay.] Frame Analysis builds on the earlier works and this review comments on the whole corpus, but primarily from FA. The works have commonly been seen as symbolic interactionist, or within the group James – Cooley – Mead of 'pragmatic social psychology' (52), but rather it should be seen as a structural perspective. They are following 'an interpretive social science perspective' and they cite Schutz as well as some of Goffman's primary sources. Overall Goffman's concepts are not useful in studying social interaction or the interpretation of actors in problematic situations as in Schutz, or even the notion of framing as outlined by Bateson. Goffman's structuralism is that found in people like Lévi-Strauss. Interpretive social science assumes that the basic components of interaction are 'subjective meaning, emotional state, motive, intentionality, and purposes – at – hand' (53). Interactants take the others actions and utterances into account as interaction develops. In concrete situations there are both 'phenomenological and interactional streams of behaviour'. Any adequate sociology will build from seeing social interaction as a process which changes the phenomenological stream of each actor. The unit of analysis is the joint act and the way it is assembled or constructed and developed in sequences. The emphasis is on the '"how" of face-to-face behaviour', the meanings participants bring to and construct in the course of interaction. Each participant has a 'repertoire of behaviours', a system of meanings and a system of knowledge: together this is the stock of knowledge [relevance systems?]. We need language meaning and symbols as in Schutz to understand interaction, the 'rules, syntax or grammar and language' do not determine the shape of interaction — there is no deep structure of meaning nor any rules that structure interaction which might be generated. 'Self reflexive, feeling, interacting individuals lie at the core'. Meaning is found in interaction not structures or rules. Communication, talk, conversation, and gestures organise meanings and provide for ongoing activity. Talk indicates 'shifting definitions of the situation… the project at hand… the meaning the situation has for them'. Structuralism is not easy to define, but seems to have a set of propositions and assumptions. First social activity is regular and this regularity is determined by 'an abstract set of rules embedded at a deep level'. Second, every day behaviour offers the surface of the operation of these deep rules. Third behaviour is to be seen as a totality made up of relationships and networks of them, hence the interest in 'strips of behaviour, kinship systems, and myths'. Fourth the underlying totality or structure is based on a system of binary opposites. Fifthly these opposites are both logical and based on a particular '"psychology of the perception of differences"' (54), embodied in the codes of specific groups defining categories and events. The issues that the categories must be perceived as different, as in the difference between a fight and a play. Sixth structural configurations change and are transformed into other structures following laws or rules. Seventh meaning, purpose intentionality and motive are processes 'embodied in structures, not persons'. We understand human behaviour as a matter of syntax, grammar, rules and ritual. Eighth structural presentations are 'typically hierarchical and can be presented in the form of a tree'. FA can be understood in this way, illustrating the eight basic points. Goffman wants to address the structure of experience and to isolate basic frameworks used in defining the social situation. [Summarised in the diagram] There seem to be two basic kinds of framework, social and natural, and these are transformed from primary frameworks into various replicating processes which produce copies, both 'keyings and fabrications' (55). Fabrications are deliberate attempts to induce a false belief about what's going on [as opposed to copies]. The basic keys are things like 'make-believe, contests, ceremonials, technical re-doings, and re-groundings'. These can be subdivided, for example  make-believe has three frames 'playfulness, fantasies or daydreaming', as well as 'dramatic scriptings'. The analysis of make-believe shows the structural underpinnings:  it is a transformed activity with its own logic, motives and meanings 'all of which are quite independent of persons'. The reason for the activity 'is in the frame (nothing practical will come of it)', and so are the expectations of the participants, '(free from pressing needs)'. The 'engrossment activities' of the participants are also in the frames. Keying a frame 'induces others to follow along'. Overall, this frame is above the constructing activities of individuals, something real, available once a keying transformations taking place. All the frames are like this. People can [only] rekey frames, laminate them or re-contain them, until they are far from their original notion of reality. Reality for James and Schutz was multiple, [one  was paramount, however] with movement between multiple realities seen as involving a shock of recognition. James in particular assumed that most people would take as absolutely real anything that was not contradicted. Goffman is more ambiguous — reality involves the activities of a primary framework. Keying can provide something that's not literal or real. However staged actions show that staging is real. As a result, perhaps the best way forward for him is to consider an activity as real and literal or actual if it is only transformed in usual or typical ways 'for such doings'. Denzin and Keller find this unclear and failing to explain why transformations occur. Transformation is crucial, but this implies that materials are already 'interpreted within a meaningful "schema of interpretation"'. But what makes it real, how does it operate, how is it organised? These processes get blurred with the notion of frame. Thus in make-believe people have knowledge ,reason, expectations and others which tell them that make-believe is going on, but what signals the transformation? Goffman implies that the form of the frame itself does this. This is really an Aristotelian concept, beginning with objects, then producing classes, concerning itself not with objects but with processes. In Goffman's case this is about the classification of frames as objects, and only then can we get to the experiences of individuals. Goffman classifies frozen behaviour strips to illustrate the classification of frames. In one example, a challenge to a framework is the result of 'a fortuitous event' which makes the classification of frames seem arbitrary. There are no rules to govern what is in a frame. Goffman claims to have got the notion of frame from Bateson and says that it can be developed into a matter of definitions of the situation linked together according to principles of organisation. These principles govern social events and our subjective involvement in them. A frame is a basic element to explain these processes. For Denzin and Keller, this argument lacks a proper notion of the bracketing of the natural attitude which it just assumes: for Schutz bracketing is something that enquiring individuals do. There is also another implication of Bateson's use of frame. He argued that verbal communication operates at many levels of abstraction, such as denotation, connotation and meta-communication. These can be contradictory and when they are, metacommunication is required, outside the frame. So the frame is first of all a set of messages or meaningful actions is, something psychological with a real existence in that it is recognised by others, as with the frame around a picture. But it is human beings who add these frames, who choose to establish or transform frames, and who have to continually adjust them in the face of paradox. This is not the same as abstract principles of organisation of experience. There is no central place in Goffman for paradox and contradiction, unlike Bateson [logical contradiction is a major motive for metacommunication, it seems]  This is a crucial step away from an 'obdurate, immutable real world'(57 into the 'un-real world of the theatre where transformations can build on transformations' [NB paradox and contradiction by no means easy. Logical contradictions v abstr. Actual events may or may not be contradictory ( pop aesthetic). Ways to resolve contradns as well -- not just cognv transforms but techs of neutralisn or RKM's/Hopper's solns to socl strain. These are aslo shared and learned responses -- may be additional frames?  How do G&UW resolve their contradictions?] Structuralism as a method does involve careful inspection of routine behaviours, clever attempts to underline fundamental features and an emphasis on paired social units. D and K seem to admire here the 'attempt to transcend empirical observation and move to a deeper, explanatory level' (57). But this leads to the idea that organisations are fixed beyond the capacity of individuals to create [Lévi-Strauss is referenced, but a commentary is quoted]. Goffman also assumes that 'definitions are pre-given' and found in cultural materials as varied as folktales and the Bible. Goffman analyses such texts 'not to find meaning' but 'to find its system' [Barthes is quoted here] this is a '"decentred" theory of meaning and structure'. However, 'selves, meaning, motive, and intentionality cannot be confined to depictions of the human found in [various texts] and in frames'. If we reintroduce the notion of self, we can already suspect theories based on binary opposites, since individuals are 'differentially aware', capable of defining themselves and their situations 'in multiple  ways' which are 'often partial, only tentative, and inconclusive'. They may be certain on some occasions, but once they 'bracket and leave the world of the natural attitude', they can display other ways of transforming a situation, 'including being emotional, sincere, incredulous, childish, autistic, senile, primitive, egocentric, lyrical, metanomic, dialectical, and problematic'. Situations are sometimes only half transformed. When people ask themselves what is going on, they may display 'many rational, cognitive, and emotional styles', and this is what is required in any attempt to classify responses. FA is 'structural at root', not compatible with James, Mead, Schutz or Bateson or the interpretive tradition — 'if anything it is antithetical to that body of work' As an illustration, we can look at TV comedy and deploy an interpretive perspective to show the complexities even in a staged or contrived interaction [and analysis follows of a 28 second episode of the Mary Tyler Moore Show. Basically, a female participant falls in love with a male one and  is spotted coming out of his room. A new participant observing this assumes someone else is in the room and when reassured she is not, embarrasses himself by confessing to a skive. He then encounters the boss on leaving the office and realises she has overheard]. D and K apply Goffman to suggest that the character has moved out of a social framework via a transformation in order to produce a hoax [his covering of his skive]. However, the hoax was unnecessary, he thought, which is 'an error in framing'. The discovery that he had been overheard after all reveals his own error, causing embarrassment. For D&K there is more than just a hoax involved here, but we will  only understand this if we look at 'interpersonal history and interpretive analysis'(58), turning on the character's history of faux pas with his boss. His limited stock of knowledge concerning who is normally in the room  meant that he adopted 'a natural attitude of "everything is normal"', so he could confess to his skive. The boss's presence is a shock '(he brackets the meaning of her presence)' and he is doubly exposed as in error: his boss is not supposed to see his 'private, backroom side' and when she does, he finds himself with a paradox 'of the Batesonian variety' [so does he solve this by cognitive innovation?] His sudden exit is 'a metalinguistic communication announcing that the paradox is real' but 'its resolution lies in flight'. Overall, we can see that there are multiple interpretations pursued by the character — everyone is in their normal place; it is possible to impress one of the characters by talking about his hoax; a rueful admission that this effort has been wasted; 'the exposed act'. These interpretation move as the interaction flows. Interpretations are derived from stocks of knowledge about people and social situations. History is important as a part of the 'behaviour repertoire''(59): the audience knows this history and thus knows that the character's action is to be expected. FA operates at the surface here and permits an initial classification as the framing error associated with hoaxes, but it misses out all the history, prior social relationships and 'routinised selves' and nor can it deal with multiple interpretations — 'transformations into unit three, consensually defined frames are infrequent'. Goffman shows 'bias' in assuming that only one thing is going on. There are many different things and it is this that constitutes interaction. We should not freeze that into a single frame or single answer to describe what is going on. 'Self reflexive and self-aware individuals... experience more than one thing at a time'. So FA is predominantly structuralist and thus unable to contribute much to interpretive social science. The frames are 'frozen forms'. He is 'illusive and blurred' about reality. Mostly his analysis looks at events on the periphery of everyday life [yes — the marginal strategy], whereas hoaxes, rehearsals plays and so on are usually 'at the edge of most persons daily lives'. Much everyday behaviour is omitted such as 'greetings, goodbyes, relational affirmations, going to sleep repertoires, getting up behaviours, storytelling frames, winding down behaviours at the end of the day, trip taking behaviours, doing chitchat and making conversations'. These everyday behaviours do become habitualized, as Berger and Luckmann argue, but still act outside the scope of Frame Analysis. [None of this appears in Gale and Wyatt either, and they are silent about the ways in which their academic interaction has been habitualized]. So Goffman's actors 'are monads, with single frames looking out at the world' there is no interaction. Selves appear on the sidelines and are not necessary. Structuralism might be useful in performing 'dramatistic – structural analysis of certain kinds of performances that occur within the theatrical world' but not for 'cons, hoaxes, frauds, and deceptions that occur in welfare systems', nursing homes, corporations and generally in everyday life. [Well what a weird thing to say about Goffman who discusses everyday cons and hoaxes] Notes on: Goffman, E.  A Reply to Denzin and Keller. (1981). Contemporary Sociology, 10(1), 60-68. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2067804 Dave Harris D and K argue that my work is structuralist not symbolic interactionist, and thus 'trivial, peripheral, and merely classificatory' (60). Sources are wrongly cited or understood, and analysis superficial even of merely fictive domains: this is illustrated by their pursuing a penetrating analysis of a TV episode. 'One is left to be in awe of what their perspective would allow them to contribute to the understanding of a vital topic that really interested them, for example, actual social interaction'. The tone is denunciation. The argument is to proclaim membership while disqualifying the person being reviewed — 'a case of guilt by pigeonholing'. Diverse works are treated as unitary. A vested interest lies behind this — 'at any current moment in his working life, the true nature and purposes of his doings can be unmasked, reconstituting how they are to be correctly understood'. This 'ideological format' is popular with some sociology students who find it necessary to show that they possess some idea of sociology as a field and that they identify with particular schools of thought — but why build a publication of these necessities? This response offers an item by item dispute with D and K 'offering an opposing set of opinions that are as pat and denunciatory as theirs, and in addition, self defensive'. This pronouncing and counter pronouncing is likely to be tedious and not really relevant to the study of society. As the combatants address amalgams of what the other one wrote, the original texts might end up being further obscured. They claim that subjective meaning, emotions, motives and so on are basic to understanding social interaction, and base this claim on James, Schutz, Mead. Cooley and Weber [I don't remember him]. These classics have to be kept pure, even though Mead apparently did lead to structural analysis of strategic interaction, while James and Schutz are taken as content just to point to sub- universes of meaning instead of trying to see how people identify, organise and structure them. It seems that 'any structuring of interaction that doesn't catch at what the actor feels is significant for him or her must be treated as a misguided concern'. There can be no equivalents of 'anaphora, deixis or [in]coherence' to specify objectively how norms work as individuals take each other's state of knowledge into consideration. There is no focus on conversational turn taking which must be meaningless. Bodily orientations must also be obviously trivial. 'D and K are all for meaning, but one must seek for it in their way'. Take handshaking: an expression of pleasure for the participants, but also showing that there are some elements of significance in the fact that only males do not follow this with a social kiss [in the US of the time], that handshakes also indicate departure, and that they are found in a number of other routines such as congratulatory practices, dispute settlements or contract finalisations. This seems to be some need for a 'concept such as "access ritual"' (62), and even some notion of an independent behaviour despite the different contexts, a 'ritual idiom' that helps to bracket out episodes of social relations. Instead of generalised slogans, we need more actual work in face-to-face interaction, instead of forbidding some approaches from the start, a 'scholastic view'. Their review of structuralism turns on 'the current literary version associated primarily with French writers'. These are mystifying, and extending notions such as the fundamentals of binary oppositions away from phonology into social interaction 'conjures up Hegelianism dialectic and other verbal sleights of hand, all alien to the crude empiricism I was raised with'. Structure for him is based on analyses of kinship systems. Barthes is interesting but studying fictive materials is really based on Berelson's content analysis, and commentators on popular culture such as Orwell. The notion of transformation actually arises from D'arcy Thompson [pass] who is not French. The approach to studying something is to begin by trying to see the matter as a system in its own right and its own level: this is not only found in literary structuralism but in 'the functionalism of Durkheim and Radcliffe Brown'. That bias is what led to the view that face-to-face interaction is a domain in its own right, and that interaction is more than what social psychologists think of it. Denzin himself has sometimes implied some of this when he uses the term encounter [referring to The Research Act]. If this is really decentring the self, this is fine as long as it does not mean a lack of interest in the self but 'an effort to approach its figuring from additional directions' [and he cites his own The Insanity of Place as an example — he wonders if the D&K would call that treatment structuralist, symbolic interactionist or some sort of mixture of the two, and whether they would agree that it is superficial]. Levels of analysis have to be combined, but there are analytical issues which need to be addressed — in FA this is dealt with in the chapter on 'anchoring' activity. Overall, it is not just persons with unique biographies who interact: we need to 'move on from this warming fact to try to uncover the principled ways in which such personal histories are given place, and the framework of normative understandings this implies; which of course bring us back to patterns and structure.' On FA specifically, D and K may have misunderstood what was meant — for example primary activity is subject to transformation but not always or even usually actually transformed. The idea of two basic transformations is not a product of some allegiance to binary contrasts, simply 'keying and fabrication are the two fundamental ways in which any activity can serve as a model for a version that will be geared into the world in a radically different way from the original' (63). There are not three make-believe frames, which would not exactly been binary. These are three examples of make-believe frames. Frames do contain their own logic, motives  meanings and activities. They are institutionalised in various ways and subject to change historically. Sometimes 'one individual has some effect on a particular frame. The individuals I know don't invent the world of chess… or the stock market… or the pedestrian traffic system'. They may have idiosyncratic motives and interpretations, but they must still 'gear their participation into what is available by way of standard doings and standard reasons for doing these doings'. D&K say that James, Schutz and Bateson have been misread. Schutz does indeed refer to multiple realities and this is 'very helpful… Part of a starting point'. However, it can be dispensed with when we consider 'moment to moment… Social activities'. These need to be explored, not by 'simply by expounding James and Schutz'. As for James's definition of the real as something which is uncontradicted, it is a precise statement but of limited use, and anyway, James has additional and different ones, according to his interest in different issues. One definition of reality refers to 'an individual sense of what is ultimately real (which for most is the world of sense perception)' and it is this sense that is disturbed by contradiction and requires entry into another world. There is also a definition relating to 'any province of meaning in which we can get caught up, such that events within such a world become vivid and lively for us'. Contradiction here involves an event being out of place. In particular, there may be incompatibility between the vividly alive world and the authorised sense perception world, which still has an authority. James does not explore this much in terms of 'the "paramount" reality' but is better on the fictive domains. He does propose types of sub- universes each with its special and separate style of existence and consistent system, making each one real in its own way. This is what Goffman gets from James and which appears in FA. Is not supported by the details describing how sub- universes are put together, but it identifies the issue as critical, and it has implications for our perceptions and involvement. This may or may not be a structuralist concern, but it is a derivation from James, and D and K's derivation is not the only one. The same goes for Bateson and frame. He seems to be arguing that a message announcing that something is play implies '"a spatial and temporal bounding"'. The implication is that a set of acts which normally denote one thing will come to denote something else similar but not identical [the example is the difference between a real fight and a play fight]. Play is not the only design — there are 'threat, histrionics, ritual, dreams, fantasies, and therapeutic transference' as well. We do tend to externalize our frames into spatial domains, and arrange spaces according to the frame ['itself part of the frame which employs it']. The distinction between map and territory 'is always liable to break down' so that ritual blows may be mistaken for a real ones. Framing can itself be framed 'as in hazing, taunting, and trompe l'oeil', a frame designed to ensure that a certain amount of uncertainty persists. Bateson says this and Goffman wants to employ the same sense. Again, D and K might be taking something different from Bateson, but why should their view be privileged? Bateson tends to see framing as a psychological process, while Goffman sees it as 'inhering in the organisation of events and cognition'. Bateson traces paradox to reveal various unresolvable queues and psychological tensions involved in uncertainty about definition, but Goffman sees that play and other keyings can be sustained with 'mutually understood understandings'. Not all frames involve keying. Bateson does not explore the link between modelled activities in play, authenticity and something that is already meaningful: this would imply a frame of reference linking things that are not just replications. There is also a difference between simulation and efforts to hoodwink people — they ' differently gear into the world'. Goffman thinks there is need for a special term to refer to 'externalized spatial and temporal boundaries' to a frame as distinct from the frame itself, and this is what he means by bracket. This term is used by phenomenology in a different way. They do display some paradoxes — they are part of the frame but are not to be read. This concept seems reasonable whatever we call it, and D and K are wrong to suggest that both the links with Bateson,and the notion that bracketing may be involved in frame analysis is false — that's his concept and his analysis, so this comment must simply mean that Goffman's is different from theirs. It is not clear why paradox and contradiction confirms an immutable real-world, whereas framing based on objective social organisation of activity heads towards unreality: if anything it heads into positivism. D&K suggest that Goffman says that people do not define their situations but that these definitions are pre-given, but insist that there are other notions of self, meaning, motive and intention found outside the depictions of humans in various texts. Goffman wants to see what can be said about selves and meaning and so on given that different fictive domains employ their own versions of these terms. [Weaker than his original claim that fiction illustrates these concepts?] He also argued that models need to be 'closely enmeshed in the ongoing world', but that cultural standards persist as do social roles. The moral traditions of the community as in various texts [assumed functionalism] are the bases for these. As a result everyday life seems real and obvious, but is actually a 'laminated adumbration of a pattern or model that is itself a typification of quite uncertain realm status'. This is not the same as saying that selves or meaning or motive are simply found in fictive domains. D&K are happy to use uncriticised Schutz's term 'natural attitude', which implies something unitary. Of course emotions and notions of sincerity and so on transform the situation, and any system of classification should take the different cognitive and emotional styles into account — Goffman addresses this in the notion of 'footing', a chapter in FA and a separate paper. Again we need ethology rather than the interpretive tradition to study this, especially in examining things like the 'gross key setting signals' such as '"this is play"'. This is not been described in detail in FA, but the way forward is to look at the work of phoneticians and how 'slight shifts in speech properties'do this signalling, or at sociolinguistics looking at code switching [good old Bernstein might help here?]. D and K need to 'move from admonishment to study', and this will involve them in 'microanalysis of patterns and structures' (66): they will need to depart from classic social psychology to examine a number of other disciplines. The analysis of the TV sitcom is intended to show that FA is vacuous compared to their own proper understanding. Goffman finds 'their analysis painful to read' and confesses that so are his own passages in FA. You can see the whole of sitcom as about the ritual display of framing processes. We have to remember that these are fictive not real circumstances, with special conventions and staging of action. They classically feature undertaking of vulnerable course of action, and then circumstances leading to exposure ['the generation of discrediting evidence in the presence of the most relevant others']. The character then has to deal with an almost impossible situation. There are typically several courses of action each with a subset of characters, each supplying different kinds of information about particular events. The audience also has its own changing state of information, 'sometimes being more inclusive than any of them', although this does not affect the characters. This is been better analysed by dramatic critics. Events build up to a climax in order to permit the anti hero to get into the predictable fix — these are 'written backwards... Thoroughly dictated by the use to which they will eventually be put'. Any sort of prior events will serve, meaning there is no particular need for a coherent personal history of the characters. Sitcom shows what can happen in awful situations, and maybe congratulates the audience for avoiding them. This can happen regardless of our own past, revealing 'the contingencies it forces us to face during any occasion of interaction'. There are important carryovers from one episode to another, but no knowledge of prior episodes is actually necessary: loyal viewers are rewarded by being able to better expect behaviour. Again there may be a link with the pleasures that arise in real life from 'cast – typing'. Goffman would not refer to these deceptions in sitcoms as hoaxes — that should be restricted to more specific attempts to 'contain' members of the public (67). He has done more extended narrative analysis, with more attention to the background of the character, the shift in circumstances and multiple interpretations but confesses the work is 'just as banal and threadbare as D and K's story'. Their analysis misses some possible aspects. The device of unseen hearing, or seeing, is actually quite widespread in fictive materials, and the information provided often leads to some dramatic confrontation. What is unseen by the characters is shared with the audience and this helps trap them 'into a sense of the realness of the played events'. We find this in fictive plots generally not just comic ones. We find 'unwitting disclosures' in real life to, for example in some medical encounters with vital information is shared by people other than the patient. These might be episodes in real life that we wish to avoid, while they figure prominently in fiction — this might tell us something about fiction and reality and the difference between them. We get there by linking [abstract] different features in play and real-life even if this offends interpretivists. He has reported on matters such as greetings, goodbyes and affirmations, and even introduced them into contemporary sociology. He offers a generalised analysis of these activities, and of cons hoaxes and so on throughout his writing [e.g. in Strategic Interaction]. FA has its faults — too much about fictive domains and summary news reports, and need to consider how different frames can be simultaneously sustained, probably not requiring a shift to interpretive understanding, though. Details are missing about primary frameworks and how frames shift. Terminology is sometimes ambiguous — a frame that incorporates a key sometimes called a transformation. There are alternative conceptions of frame that should have been considered in other disciplines. But there is no substance in the challenge that these are Aristotelian static classifications. There are indeed 'clumsy typologies… Held together by string' in the first chapters, but the rest of it deals with 'distinctive analytical issues' and offers 'a range of data'(68). It is necessary to take a snapshot view if you are interested in general cognitive issues, how individuals attempt to identify what is going on, what sort of activities in progress, whether deception is involved, or simulation, and how these fabrications or keyings link to the ongoing world in order to make them appear to be not just solo concerns. It was necessary to focus on episodes to show how cognitive issues are most likely to arise, display bracketing conventions, 'laminative depth', tolerance for different sorts of activity, potentials to miss framing, 'vulnerability to disorganisation'. Face-to-face activity is worth studying: it both confirms and undermines 'widely institutionalised enterprises'. There are fleeting contingencies in face-to-face which do not affect social structures most of the time but which do require management there. Snapshots represent to some extent how 'we are lodged in life', how we face possible challenges to our definitions moment to moment. Individuals certainly do bring something of 'what they are and now', but 'there are rules of etiquette and reference for guiding this importation' and interaction is required to manage any breaches. Typically knowledge is 'gradually and fitfully acquired' but this also opens the possibility to management of information. D and K 'have paradigms to grind… A broad perspective to defend and promote'. This gives them an equally 'stilted sense of social reality'. back to social theory page