Very brief and
unfair notes on: Shotwell, A. (2011) Knowing
otherwise: race, gender and implicit
understanding. The Pennsylvania State
University Press: Pennsylvania
Dave Harris
[Ostensibly about implicit knowledge, which,
through a US feminist lens {sic} becomes a
rambling discussion about affect, embodied
knowledge, and the Unconscious/habitual. This
section {Part One} is pretty well impossible to
read and to summarize. The horrendous style is
largely to blame, with its various 'calls' for
this that and the other, its imaginary dialogues
where X 'speaks to' Y, and its evasive
metaphorical language where arguments are
'torqued', 'imbricated' or 'braided ' together,all
in the name of taking stands against various
injustices -- mostly matters of identity politics.
The basic structure is provided by humanist
marxism -- young Marx, Marcuse, and S Hall/Gramsci
-- with some more recent femininst or black
activist stuff. Even that stuff is not summarized
that well, and we are invited to admire it instead
or feel good about some of the phrases used.
Everyone is introduced in a series of
name-checks, using full names ( sometimes 3
of them) in the American style, or with
student-like sections like 'Geographer Emily
Zimbalist Golightly...' or 'In her wonderful book
Musings
Hermione
Wahabi Lee Rae Ponsonby refers to the
torquing of sensuality and sensuousness...'
Basically, we gather that common-sense is
ideological but also contradictory, and that key
parts of it are held implicitly.
Part 2 is a bit better but long-winded and often
repetitive. A good copy editor would have done
wonders for this 'stream of consciousness' stuff
I hope it is not too rude to pick out a {very} few
quotes]
'For common-sense to be non-consecutively
incoherent is for it to contain, in some sense,
the possibility of contradiction. The
commonsensical can hold both P and not-P and not
to be particularly bothered - perhaps not even
notice. For common-sense to be uncritically
absorbed is for it to enter our consciousness
uninterrogated, at a level beneath notice [see
what I mean about repetition]… The very
nature of common sense resists a critical view
which is at base an articulate, propositional
understanding. For something to be coherent
and voiced is for it to no longer be
commonsensical' (33). The piece goes on to
argue that it is not just a matter of making the
implicit explicit, and that there are certain
elements, the 'somatic and affective' (43) that
resist, and it is these elements that are also
addressed by ideology. 'David Lionel Smith's
discussion of common sense in relation to racial
formation and culture is useful on this
count'(35). The chapter goes on to argue
about different kinds of ignorance.
Chapter three on aesthetics makes the
point that aesthetics is a realm of common
understanding and potential critique, mostly
following Marcuse, lacking Ranciere or Bourdieu.
Chapter four argues that shame is crucial
to understanding the reactions of white people to
displays of racism against black people.
Guilt is also involved, but shame is a more
productive relationship, because it implies some
proper relation to others and some notion that
it's possible to behave in a better way.
This is referred very briefly to Bourdieu, although
I think he puts it much better: it's only possible
to experience shame, the basic emotion, once
you've also experienced and internalised the major
forms of morality and social judgments.
Shotwell does point out the political implications
rather better, though, that shame provides some
potential to discuss racism, by appealing to
people's better natures and contradictory beliefs
about how to behave. There is also this:
'Shame is hard to enunciate because there is some
shame attached to feeling shame, because it
is an affect, and because it is broad, amorphous,
and not clearly defined. There is an
internal obstruction to expressing the feeling of
shame, perhaps even to one's self, because to do
so involves admitting that one has proceeded
through the world in a way that oneself [SIC]
perceives as somehow wrong' (90). There have
been successful attempt to develop identity
politics based on recapturing shameful terms like
queer or crip.
'As a motivator of racialized redefinition, it is
important that shame is also polymorphous.
It attaches itself variously to the self and to
things in the world. One can feel shame for
or towards oneself, on behalf of or toward someone
else, and for something as broad as the actions of
the nation one lives in… Relations of scale
break down: shame for one's nation can collapse
into a seamless application to the self, and shame
about the self can expand into an affect with
effects on one's family network. The shame
one feels individually can have a similarly
unsettled topography and a similarly protean
relation of causes to effects—seemingly small
events can produce pervasive shame. It may
be difficult to delineate the bounds of shame; the
effort to define what makes one feel shame may
cause the feeling to expand and contract in ways
that make it hard to "see" clearly' (93).
Chapter five addresses solidarity, again
in the curious world of the American
feminist philosopher, where we have to work with
others in the struggle, which usually means trying
to formulate some thoughts about solidarity.
It is reasonably interesting. It says that
empathy is not adequate, any more than guilt
is. Empathy generates only a sentimental
identification with the others, which actually
still privileges whiteness - in other words it
fails to acknowledge difference. She then
discusses a curious organization called Race
Traitor which says that white people have to
disavow their whiteness and their
privileges. A couple of examples are
offered, for example when white people video the
beating of black people by the police, or a white
athlete stands in respect as his two colleagues on
the podium give a black salute. However,
this group is inadequate as well because she
wonders whether you can just disavow your
whiteness, especially if there are all sorts of
implicit dimensions to it [so that connects with
the general themes].
Her own perspective works towards [SIC] trying to
understand others as different, and yet to think
of a form of solidarity based on difference.
Durkheim springs to mind, but Shotwell doesn't
seem to mention him, and no doubt he would appear
to be conservative to those who want to build a
solidarity working towards a struggle with
injustice [which never seems to be defined].
At times, it almost reads like Bourdieu on understanding - that
we have to realise that people are different and
to try and explain why they might be, but again
this would be too rational, involve too much
propositional knowledge. Somehow, we have to
use our implicit knowledge to realise this.
At times, including this one, a kind of lingering
Christianity seems to inform the whole discussion,
where we recognise that we all have different
identities, some of these involve privilege and
others do not, we should accept this for ourselves
and for others. We have to admit this perspective
into our lives and commit ourselves to living a
better life. [It badly needs a focus on
calculative interests, something that identifies a
real interest in overcoming inequalities, not just
an imaginary moral one. Something like a STAMOCAP
analysis on how we are all victims of monopoly
capitalism, that its stupidity will kill us all,
something like Empire
].
Chapter six returns to the political
importance of sensuousness, discussing mostly
'trans folks', through the usual device of citing
all sorts of people who say things with which she
agrees or does not. This chapter in
particular as a series of name checks. You do
learn something about the bewildering identities
available to the trans. The point seems to
be to struggle to involve increasing your
possibilities for flourishing, and maintaining a
dignity. In practice it looks like pretty
much the old identity politics, not wishing to be
stereotyped and having a lot more choice about how
you live your life: its Californian, strictly for
affluent people.
There is a great deal of talking up involved, and
I focused on the way Bourdieu is developed in this
piece. On page 126 we are urged to 'Recall
Bourdieu is interested in the revolutionary
possibilities of bodily hexis'.
Understandably puzzled by this, I went back to
look at the discussion of Bourdieu in chapter
one. Shotwell runs through the notion of the
habitus as a kind of embodied memory, and suggests
that this indicates 'that the habitus is also
productive and expressive of the knowledge the
body holds'. No doubt, but of course these
are largely conservative lumps of knowledge, moral
values in the Durkheim sense, and Bourdieu is
quoted to remind us that these are arbitrary in
the sense which he means it. Getting on to
bodily hexis, Shotwell reminds us that small
details indicate 'a whole cosmology' for Bourdieu,
instilled through an implicit pedagogy without
ever getting into discourse or
consciousness. The habitus is a key for
memory, and it also reproduces our understandings,
enacting the past. Shotwell wants to say
that this is tacit knowledge, that it is a way of
expressing something which propositions cannot
manage, something forgotten in history.
However, while Bourdieu sees this as something
taken for granted or doxic, Shotwell sees it as
something more radical, something that will escape
explicit culture. It is all based on what
Bourdieu says about language as practical
consciousness, and that there is a boundary around
orthodox discourse: true, this also implies
unorthodox discourse, so that crossing it would
awaken political consciousness. But that is
not to suggest, as Shotwell argues, that we all
possess some 'inarticulate knowledge that may be
moving into explicitness… The fact of
recognizing a lack in the field implies the
possibility of its speaking' (15). It is
only that Shotwell assumes that everything that is
implicit is potentially critical of everything
that is explicit, which simply ignores all the
manifold ideological ways in which the implicit is
dominated and its results explained away or
rationalised. It also seems to imply that
there is some simple path between the implicit and
a radical political consciousness, that all you
have to do is examine your own implicit
knowledge. What we are really being told to
do is to think out what we really want to know and
avoid any choices that stop this from flourishing,
we should feel good in our bodies, feel at home.
It's really a kind of FreudoChristianity.
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