Halliday, J.(2000)'Critical thinking and the academic vocational
divide', in The
Curriculum Journal, 11(2): 159 -
175
Critical thinking has been defined
as a core skill, and there is much support for it as a skill that will
bridge
the academic and vocational divide. However, both of these views are
mistaken
and misleading, and may well lead to a reinforcement of that divide.
The vocational turn has been
gathering momentum in the UK at least since the Ruskin speech. Some
commentators have seen this as the reproduction of capitalism, while
others
point out that there is an absence of discussion of ultimate ends.
There are
also problems in trying to predict the exact skill requirements of the
future
work force. These problems have been glossed by an apparently
consistent
support for core skills, although the term covers'personal
dispositions, mental strategies,
accomplished practical routines or a combination of all three' (160).
It is not
always necessary in an occupation to develop critical thinking anyway
-- for a
joiner, the point is to work within a series of'[technical]... aesthetic and moral considerations'
rather than'mounting a political
challenge to the status
quo' which is what a local community activist might require(163).
Various lists have been drawn of
core skills, including'numeracy,
communications, problem-solving, information technology and
manipulative
dexterity', attributable to the YTS programme. Later ones added included'self-development, learning and studying,
self management and organisation, working with others, communicating,
information seeking and analysis, using information technology,
identifying and
tacking into disciplinary problems, numeracy, practical skills, skills
associated with science and technology and design skills' (161, citing
Tribe
1996).
Some people have advocated a
particular emphasis on critical thinking in teaching students. Kuhn(1991) focuses on argument and the control of
attitudes. She specified is that students should learn to differentiate
opinions/theory some evidence, support opinions with evidence, propose
alternative opinions and be able to see how evidence would support
them,
and'to take an epistemological stance
which involves the weighing the pros and cons of what is known' (quoted
on page
165). Kuhn suggests that early vocational education limits these
abilities, and
an ESRC study was based on it(see
below).
Meanwhile, the key interest in
academic journals focused on critical thinking. Politicians began to
see this
as one way to bridge the academic and vocational and develop a unified
system.
However, where academics stressed the development of personal autonomy,
the
vocational implications were different, and aimed at'flexible technicians are capable of solving
technical problems across a range of occupational domains' (161). The
CBI seems
to want people'to think critically
about the means to achieve an end prescribed by employers', while
philosophers
such as Spring talked about the development of'autonomous, rational, educated persons' (161).
There have been attempts to define
critical thinking, and these also represent two main options -- skills
that can
be learnt in the abstract, or much more implicit and contextual forms
of
practice. Teaching is a good example. For the former, Ennis lists
various
proficiencies, including detecting ambiguity and contradiction in
statements,
judging the validity of conclusions, spotting assumptions, and
challenging
matters such as'a statement made by an
alleged authority' (162). The problem is that dispositions are ignored,
so what
we have is'actually a highly complex
list of proficiencies coupled with the simple admonition to exercise
these
proficiencies' (163, quoting Siegel 1988). For the latter, everything
depends
on context, on critical thinking about something. The problem is that
the
word'critical' can often mean
simply'good'.
The real issue with the academic and
vocational divide is that one form of practice is more socially valued
than the
other. Academic thinking is supposed to be more valuable because it is
more
abstract and detached, and therefore more generalisable. This can
produce a
view that vocational thinking is cognitively deficient and in need of a
supplement. However, academic forms of thinking are as much determined
by
practice and context as any other.
The ESRC study cited above looked at
Scottish Vocational Education in care programmes, and noted that none
of Kuhn's
deficiencies seemed to be deliberately taught. Detailed analysis of
actual
lessons, involving'coding video
recordings of the Peer critiquing,... assessment... and the
administration of a
standard critical reasoning test' showed that lessons based on Kuhn
could be
successful in developing'depth of
reasoning, clarity of argument, sensitivity to ungrounded assumptions
and so
on' (166). However, examination of the experiences of students in a
follow-up
study showed that reasoning about real work situations did not reveal
this kind
of critical thinking(in the ESRC study,
it was simulated work).
The real work situations revealed
the importance of moral and ethical questions, and justification of
action.
There were conflicting requirements needing balance. Here, distinctions
between
opinions and evidence, for example were far more blurred, and it was
less than
tactful to demand evidence for the claims of people like headteachers.
It
seemed more important simply to work with relevant people. [This seems
pretty
uncritical about work practice to me -- all would be well if senior
practitioners could show that they acted without prejudice or damaging
assumptions].
The author also explain to students
about academic practice --'much
reasoning that takes place in universities does not approximate to the
conception of critical thinking outlined by Kuhn either'(167).
Nevertheless,
there were some relative standards, some idea of better or worse
reasoning, and
a claim that justifications can be more sophisticated than just
appealing to
feelings or authority --'the view that
it is better to be educated than not' (168).[I think the author needs a bit of sociological
critique here applied to
universities, to get away from ludicrous abstractions like this].
Personal feelings and dispositions
are relevant to concrete action, although they are not sufficient.
Moral issues
have'an essential indeterminacy', which
means that students should not just defer on every occasion. Teachers
need to
accept this too, and doing so can give students confidence. There are
no abstract
standards that can be applied uniformly, and students can lose
confidence in
their own moral reasoning if they believe that there are. Similarly, if
critical thinking becomes a skill, students are likely to accord
authority to
experts in it, rather than attempting to participate in self-critical
communities of practice(168)[Wenger is cited here, but Dewey gets more
attention below, so this looks like an American pragmatist approach].
Dewey insists that training can only
be accomplished through actually practising an occupation, and drawing
on 'the
shared practices of a community' (169). He emphasises the'mostly noncognitive background' to cognitive
inquiry. Garrison(1996) suggests that
noncognitive elements'such as need,
affect, intuition and selective attention' actually work to inform
thought
rather than the fashionable notion of meta-cognition, which focuses on
the
cognitive alone. Interest affects meaning, and so do human relations.
All
thought is contextual, including critical inquiry. The infinite regress
that
threatens cannot be dealt with by abstracting critical skills. Instead,
some
sense of appropriateness limits endless reflection --'Justifications come to an end at some point
that is known by those who are engaged in similar activities' (170)[This whole discussion would be much more
informed by Bourdieu and the notion of habitus].
Is good thinking transferable? Some
learning does seem to be capable of being applied to new contexts,
although it
is not always worthwhile to do so[the
example is learned criminal behaviour being applied to new
enterprises].
Politicians would do better to realise that there are inevitable
tensions
between'endless criticality and
acquiescent action' (170). Communities of practice need to be
challenged, and
this is where transfer from one field to another can help.[The example is Heidegger's analogy between
joinery and philosophy -- both need to work with the grain and so on --
171].
Encounters with the unknown also offer a challenge. Practices can
overlap, but
probably not enough to produce'core
skills', and critical thinking as a core skill requires'communities of critical thinkers united in a
conception of what this super practice is for' (171)[Shades of the Kuhn Popper debate, or
Hammersley on the role of educational researchers as arbiters of
policy].
All educational activities have'traditions of inquiry supported by
communities of practitioners', often working with tacit criteria and
notions of
validity(171). These provide the'epistemological ground which gives reason a
purchase on something beyond the personal' (171), and abstracting
critical
thinking from them makes no sense. It replaces the community with'the authoritarianism of a form of discourse
policed by officers of various examining bodies' (171). This encourages
instrumentalism, because there is no independent way to establish what
critical
thinking as a core skill is.
The vocabulary of skill suggests
that vocational practices are cognitively deficient. This ignores that
vocational practices can be rigorous and can also resist attempts by
policy
makers or curriculum theorists to police them[see Ozga on skill as a contested issue]. Critical
thinking as an
abstraction seems likely to mislead people through a'cheap and easy appeal to their materialistic
interests in securing a job' (172). Taught critical thinking may be an
inoculation against proper widespread grounded critical thinking.
Bolting it on
to vocational courses could be elitist, and helped to domesticate the
work
force.
Why aren't other valuable activities
such as those involved in music, drama sport reading media studies,
knowledge
of the legal system or foreign languages deemed to be central?
Finally,'there
are many people who can read
Shakespeare and redecorate their living rooms without recourse to any
core
skill that obviously links the two activities' (173).