Notes on: Nietzsche, F.  (1887- 8).  The Will to Power.  Unknown Trans.  Online:

Dave Harris

[Same old rants, but this time in note form.  See my notes on Genealogy for a more extensive precis.  I have picked out only what seems to be different or new. I think the crux of it for Deleuze anyway is found right at the end (glorious to get there)]:

And do you know what "the world" is to me? Shall I show it to you in my
mirror? This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end;
a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller,
that does not expend itself but only transforms itself; as a whole, of
unalterable size, a household without expenses or losses, but likewise
without increase or income; enclosed by "nothingness" as by a boundary;
not something blurry or wasted, not something endlessly extended, but
set in a definite space as a definite force, and not a sphere that might
be "empty" here or there, but rather as force throughout, as a play of
forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, increasing
here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea of forces flowing and
rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back [NB] , with
tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood [NB again]  of its forms;
out of the simplest forms striving toward the most complex, out of the
stillest, most rigid, coldest forms toward the hottest, most turbulent,
most self-contradictory, and then again returning home to the simple [third NB --
nothing very unusual about the eternal return then --it even looks a bit cyclical or
dialectical?] out
of this abundance, out of the play of contradictions back to the joy of
concord, still affirming itself in this uniformity of its courses and
its years, blessing itself as that which must return eternally, as a
becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness: this, my
Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self destroying [dialectic again?],
this mystery world of the twofold voluptuous delight, my
"beyond good and evil," without goal, unless the joy of the circle [NB x4]  is
itself a goal; without will, unless a ring [fifth NB] feels good will toward
itself--do you want a name for this world? A solution for all its
riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most
intrepid, most midnightly men?-- This world is the will to power--and
nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power--and
nothing besides!]


Old Gypsy Nietzsche predicts catastrophe in the future and proclaims himself as the first perfect nihilist.

Book one.  European Nihilism

Nihilism has not been produced by catastrophe or social change, but as a consequence of Christian morality and reason [I should say immediately that I think Weber has done much better here on charting how rational theology, attempts to pin down the truth of the Bible, led to an inevitable secularisation as more and more doubts about the authenticity of the Bible became apparent].  When Christians finally renounce their faith, they're only left with deep cynicism about everything, or a Buddhist indifference to the world [and again I think Lyotard or Sloterdijk are better on skepticism and cynicism]..  Christianity has collapsed despite the efforts of philosophers such as Hegel to prop it up with promises of something eternal or spiritual.  The signs of the crisis include an entirely amoral science and moral and social relativism, and even art has declined into romanticism or sentimentality. 

However, a proper critique of Christianity is required to overcome any residual elements  [philosophers are still needed even if they are fighting only old battles that no one cares about anymore].  Christianity once had a positive side, in providing people with meaning and some moral dignity, but its rational search for truthfulness ended by undermining its own central values.  In particular, the social origins of Christian belief have become so obvious that they have lost all credibility, and this includes belief in an after life, which clearly only meets the psychological needs of believers.  It has failed to overcome pessimism which has led to nihilism.  This has gone through certain stages of development: first, the promise that man was the centre of the universe has been demolished; second that life gets its meaning by being part of some sacred whole, is obviously just a comfort, linked to some need for domination, or subjected to some external standard of utility.  The result is a pessimistic disbelief in anything that might give life meaning or purpose, nothing to aim at, no higher goals. 

The whole story shows that Christian categories, and Christian notions of truth and reason are completely inadequate and have to be replaced.  Nihilism gets generalised to include every claim that there is something outside of immediate life, including things in themselves.  Christianity itself provides an impulse towards it in the idea that god's purpose is unknowable, and this is the only way in which idealism of any kind can be preserved [Weber had another possibility, that belief could survive as a private and personal matter, a part of your identity].  Philosophers have been only too ready to acknowledge the sort of argument in the form of monism for example, or in postulating some ideal world against which the real world could be judged, and have never squarely faced the difficulties [NB one of the philosophers who can be criticised like this is Spinoza].  Attempts to found some moralism without Christianity are equally flawed: the error lies in thinking that there is some external authority.  Disappointment with this authority will inevitably lead to nihilism.  Rational alternatives include utilitarianism, the happiness of the greatest number, which means sticking with the herd.

The human will alone seems incapable of imposing any goal or purpose.  In some ways, active nihilism can be a positive force, leading to the destruction of the old idols.  It can also be a passive force, allowing weakness and indifference to triumph, and leading to relativism, or to seeking various kinds of intoxicating comforts.  Active nihilism must resist logic in its destructive impulses, releasing the strong to do what must be done, beyond any moral judgment.  Nietzsche himself has had to struggle to become an active nihilist.

We need more of these active nihilists in the form of great leaders like Napoleon: romantic heroes will not do.  [Napoleon is admired lower down as an enemy of civilisation and as offering the only cure for modernity - militarism --'
Napoleon, by awakening again the man, the soldier, and the great fight for power-conceiving Europe as a political unit']. Catering to the demands of the herd will only lead to complete vulgarization of culture with an intolerance towards any exception.  Socialism preaches a false equality of everyone.  John Stuart Mill is 'a flathead' [misprint for fathead?], and so are other reformers for thinking they can engineer the end of all evil.  The exceptional are discouraged.  Weak forms of orientation like pity spread instead of rigorous analysis and decisive action.

It is no good trying to compromise with nihilism, by seeking diversions in intoxication, debauchery, or petty fanaticism.  Nostalgia for the old days, desperate attempts to seek some divine plan in the past or hope for the future are all distractions.  We have to restore the value of nature.  We have to revalue our values.  We have to winkle out Christianity from all our institutions.  We have to reject attempts by the press and others to convince us that current times still display our spirit: the 'gruesome ugliness' of English Christianity is more representative.  We are not thoughtful enough to develop some new orientation to life like Buddhism.

As we have developed our knowledge of the world, so the less worth it seems to have for us [classic disenchantment].  This is a healthy impulse, but it should lead to new values, as long as we undo the slander against higher more noble men.  That slander has led to our present decline, so that natural instincts for courage and decisiveness have been rejected.  Mediocrity has triumphed, producing even more rejection and disillusion.  A general anesthesia and acceptance is what results.

Everything is evaluated at present in terms of whether it produces suffering or pleasure, with no ultimate meaning.  Healthy men reject such trifles and say yes to life, even if it involves suffering.  One absurd consequence of modern evaluations is  that philosophy would become redundant, since only the feeling of pleasure would be relevant to statement of values [and we certainly cannot have that!]: 'To have any right to be, the character of existence would have to give the philosopher pleasure'[marvelous combination of ludicrous claims for philosophy as the voice of being.  Also the source of Deleuze's anti social lonely mission?]

Scholasticism is also a source of nihilism.  Values are detached from both nature and action, opposites are preferred instead of ranks, and ranking itself is condemned: opposites are easier for plebs to understand.  Nature is repudiated, but a socially constructed alternative is disappointing.  We are only left with the sort of values that can be turned into judgments of what exists.  Eventually, any one disagreeing will perish, and more domination will ensue and begin to impose new values [not the good old natural ones though?].  This is the modern tragic age.

Pessimism is discussed itself as a kind of option to be set against optimism, but it is really a symptom of nihilism, which is itself only 'the expression of physiological decadence'.  Decadence has simply accumulated to dominate every day life. Socialist reformers aiming at removing evil are naive, because modern life itself is riddled with it, and reform would actually mean condemning life itself [in the only form in which it still asserts itself?].  Evil, and vice and disease, are necessary byproducts of any life.  Mere social improvements are not going to work.  Decadence is a natural consequence.  The real point is to defend the few who have resisted it, who have avoided contagion [which clearly links to his educational policy]—this is a 'basic biological question'.  The decadent are the addicts, the sick and the criminal, the libertines but also the 'celibate-sterile', the anarchists, the pessimists, the doubters and the underminers [could be the Nazis again].  Attempted reforms and cures will only add to the problem because they are 'physiologically naught'.  The usual type of good and bad men still remain within decadent culture as false oppositions.

[Getting into his ranting stride now].  All social questions relate to decadence, and can be seen as types of sickness.  Apparently remedial forces such as Christianity or social progress will only accelerate cultural exhaustion.  Emerging personality types include the irritable, the depersonalised and the altruistic.  The real cause of it all is religiosity, although this is sometimes seen as an effect.  It is no surprise that people seek escapes from consciousness and feeling.  It is necessary for the strong not to react immediately, but to detach themselves at first in a spirit of adiophora [which, I gather means seeing things not as immediately moral issues, as in Stoicism].  The weak often react immediately and in a way which weakens them further.  Although it can look contradictory, purposeful inaction is often a better option, and to that extent, hermits and solitaries are on the right lines in avoiding anything that would require immediate reaction.  A strong will imposes a coordination on action rather than impulsiveness.

It would be possible to compare all the values of organized religions and philosophies against the central characteristics of sickliness - lack of strength, resignation.  Actually, health and sickness are not opposed states, and sickness is really the lack of harmony and exaggeration of particular traits.  However, sickliness and weakness can be hereditary.  Weakness becomes a self fulfilling project, welcoming meekness and submission, the rejection of life and of nature.  We must interpret it first.  It is a mistake to equate the calmness of the strong with weakness from exhaustion, although some religious procedures, in particular the ascetic ones, confuse the two.  The exhausted cause further damage, and are 'parasites of life'.  They can sometimes engage in frenetic or fanatical activity, and their admirers fail to see the weakness beneath.  Nevertheless, they are often rated as particularly wise or insightful, and can even be deified. (49)

[OK much of this returns -- eternally it seems to me -- spelled out in terms of critiques of science and even sociology as scholastic, using the categories of the decadent society, failing to realize the need for a healthy physiology etc. I have picked out in particular the bits that seem to contradict Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche as a harmless abstract philosopher -- but that still leaves lots of stuff!]

Some oddities include: 'What a blessing a Jew is among Germans!' [because Germans are lazy alcoholic and dull.  The French, meanwhile, are played with the erotic vices].  These vices are the threats to social order, so there are no real societies or communities. And 'All of education to date, helpless, untenable, without center of gravity, stained by the contradiction of values'( Section 52).  And here is another dangerous proto NAZI bit: 'There is no solidarity in a society in which there are sterile, unproductive, and destructive elements--which, incidentally? will have descendants even more degenerate than they are themselves.' 'Our entire sociology simply does not know any other instinct than that of the herd' (S53) . 'Life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war'.'To cross as a matter of principle selection in the species and its purification of refuse--that has so far been called virtue par excellence. One should respect fatality--that fatality that says to the weak: perish!'

'Let us think this thought in its most terrible form [as plebs do] : existence as it is,without meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness: "the eternal recurrence." This is the most extreme form of nihilism: the nothing (the "meaningless"), eternally!' But  '"everything perfect, divine, eternal" also compels a faith in the"eternal recurrence."'[the context here is to reject the nihilistic view that there are no meanings or goals in human existence, expressed rather oddly in the context of rejecting pantheism.  It is a way of rejecting Christian goals, while maintaining faith in the process of spiritual renewal?].  We can agree with Spinoza that everything that exists must be there for some reason, that everything  has its own logic, but we have to turn this into a morality not just a logical affirmation.

'Morality consequently taught men to hate and despise most profoundly what is the basic character trait of those who rule: their will to power'.  However it is possible to argue that 'even in this will to morality this very "will to power" were hidden, and even this hatred and contempt were still a will to power.', But that would then imply some equality between rulers and ruled, and would deprive the oppressed of the comforts they can find in religion and other egalitarian trends. [On the most abstract level, it might be true that] 'There is nothing to life that has value, except the degree of power-assuming that life itself is the will to power', but we should also see  'Nihilism as a symptom that the underprivileged have no comfort left'.  Spiritual comforts are required even in the most advanced civilizations, actually rather more than in conditions of deep poverty and powerlessness.  Some sort of advanced thinking or theoretical input is also required for the doctrine of eternal return to emerge, as with Buddhism: 'The doctrine of the eternal recurrence would have scholarly presuppositions (as did the Buddha's doctrine; e. g., the concept of causality, etc.)', but for the underprivileged, the eternal return is a form of curse. 

Underprivilege is really a kind of adverse physiology, sickness.  Youth can suffer from this kind of physiological decadence, or from excessive experimentation [almost certainly another biographical bit?]

[The immanent ]social crisis can be useful in forming alliances between people and in particular in letting natural leaders emerge, and these will not be moderates but 'human beings who are sure of their power and represent the attained strength of humanity with conscious pride.' The social crisis includes a certain nomadism and collapse of internal boundaries [almost an anomie theory here, including the emphasis on moral complexity], and 'large-scale associations found in all herd animals --"community spirit," "Fatherland," everything in which the individual does not count)'.  Other factors include 'The fact of credit, of worldwide trade, of the means of transportation--here a tremendous mild trust in man finds expression',and 'the emancipation of science from moral and religious purposes: a very good sign that, however, is usually misunderstood'. As with 'Indian Buddhism', we find 'The reduction of problems to questions of pleasure and displeasure [but happily also] The war glory that provokes a counterstroke'.

'The tensing of a will over long temporal distances, the selection of the states and valuations that allow one to dispose of future centuries --precisely this is antimodern in the highest degree: the breaking up of landed property...newspapers (in place of daily prayers), railway, telegraph.'(S69) 'a. In the natural sciences ("meaninglessness"); causalism, mechanism. "Lawfulness" an entr'acte, a residue. 2b. Ditto in politics: one lacks the faith in one's right, innocence; mendaciousness rules and serving the moment.c. Ditto in economics: the abolition of slavery [sic!!]  The lack of a redeeming class, one that justifies-advent of anarchism. "Education"? d. Ditto in history: fatalism, Darwinism; the final attempts to read reason and divinity into it fail. Sentimentality in face of the past; one could not endure a biography!-- (Here, too, phenomenalism: character as a mask; there are no facts.) e. Ditto in art: romanticism and its counterstroke (aversion against romantic ideals and lies). The latter, moral as a sense of greater truthfulness, but pessimistic. Pure "artists" (indifferent toward content). (Father-confessor psychology and puritan psychology, two forms of psychological romanticism: but even its counterproposal, the attempt to adopt a purely artistic attitude toward man--even there the opposite valuation is not yet ventured!)'

However, there are no sociological facts based on social context because inner force and 'instinct' is everything. '"Modernity" [can then be grasped ]in the perspective of the metaphor of nourishment and digestion'.

(S74) 'Overwork, curiosity and sympathy--our modern vices.'

(S75) 'But nothing looks more wretched than when a shoemaker or schoolmaster gives us to understand with a suffering mien that he was really born for something better.'

(S77) 'Nothing to date has nauseated me more than the parasites of the spirit [in the context of despising all intermediaries and interpreters] the main voraclous, dirty, dirtying, creeping in, nestling, thievish, scurvy--and as innocent as all little sinners and 2microbes. They live off the fact that other people have spirit and squander it' . He despises novelists and romantics like Walter Scott, and 'Being "scientific." Virtuosos (Jews)'.

(S79) 'The showy words are: tolerance (for "the incapacity for Yes and No"); la largeur de sympathie ( = one-third indifference, one-third curiosity, one-third pathological irritability); "objectivity" (lack of personality, lack of will, incapacity for "love"); "freedom" versus rules (romanticism); "truth" versus forgery and lies (naturalism); being "scientific" (the "document hurnain": in other words, the novel of colportage and addition in place of composition); "passion" meaning disorder and immoderation; "depth" meaning confusion, the profuse chaos of symbols'.

(S81) 'One knows the kind of human being who has fallen in love with the motto, tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner. It is the weak, it is above all the disappointed: if there is something to be forgiven in all, perhaps 2there is also something to be despised in all. It is the philosophy of disappointment that wraps itself so humanely in pity and looks sweet'

(S85) 'The unworthy attempt has been made to see Wagner and Schopenhauer as types of mental illness: one would gain an incomparably more essential insight by making more precise scientifically [sic] the type of decadence both represent'.

(S86) [Ibsen]  'speaks of "equal rights"--that is, as long as one has not yet gained superiority one wants to prevent one's competitors from growing in power.'

(S88) Protestantism, that spiritually unclean and boring form of decadence in which Christianity has been able so far to preserve itself in the mediocre north

(S89) Can one even imagine a spiritually staler, lazier, more comfortably relaxed form of the Christian faith than that of the average Protestant in Germany?

(S90) Man represents no progress over the animal: the civilized tenderfoot is an abortion compared to the Arab and Corsican; the Chinese is a more successful type, namely more durable, than the European.

(S94) The French Revolution as the continuation of Christianity. Rousseau is the seducer: he again unfetters woman who is henceforth represented in an ever more interesting manner--as suffering. Then the slaves and Mrs. Beecher- Stowe. Then the poor and the workers. Then the vice addicts and the sick--all this is moved into the foreground...Next come the curse on voluptuousness (Baudelaire and Schopenhauer); the most decided conviction that the lust to rule is the greatest vice; the perfect certainty that morality and disinterestedness are identical concepts and that the "happiness of all" is a goal worth striving for (i. e., the kingdom of heaven of Christ). [Lots more on Rousseau in S100]

(S95) The eighteenth century is dominated by woman, given to enthusiasm, full of esprit, shallow, but with a spirit in the service of what is desirable, of the heart, libertine in the enjoyment of what is most spiritual, and undermines all authorities; intoxicated, cheerful, clear, humane, false before itself, much canaille au fond, sociable.

 (S108--9) [On German politics] That this "German as he is not yet" deserves something better than today's German "Bildung"; that all who are "in the process of becoming" must be furious when they perceive some satisfaction in this area, an impertinent "retiring on one's laurels" or "selfcongratulation": that is my second proposition on which I also have not yet changed my mind...Principle: There is an element of decay in everything that characterizes modern man: but close beside this sickness stand signs of an untested force and powerfulness of the soul. The same reasons that produce the increasing smallness of man drive the stronger and rarer individuals up to greatness.'

(S111) The problem of the nineteenth century. Whether its strong and weak sides belong together? Whether it is all of one piece? Whether the diverseness of its ideals and their mutual inconsistency are due to a higher aim: as something higher.---For it could be the precondition of greatness to grow to such an extent in violent tension. Dissatisfaction, nihilism could be a good sign.

(S116) On the other hand, the chandala [literally 'stones', maybe idols?] of former times is at the top: foremost, those who blaspheme God, the immoralists, the nomads of every type, the artists, Jews, musicians--at bottom, all disreputable classes of men'

(S119) We desire strong sensations as all coarser ages and social strata do.-- This should be distinguished from the needs of those with weak nerves and the decadents: they have a need for pepper, even for cruelty- 2All of us seek states in which bourgeois morality no longer has any say, and priestly morality even less

(S120) More natural is our position in politicis: we see problems of power, of one quantum of power against another. We do not believe in any right that is not supported by the power of enforcement: we feel all rights to be conquests.

(S124) Progress toward "naturalness": in all political questions, also in the relations of parties, even of commercial, workers', and employers' parties, questions of power are at stake--"what one can do," and only after that what one ought to do.

(S125) Therefore socialism is on the whole a hopeless and sour affair; and nothing offers a more amusing spectacle than the contrast between the poisonous and desperate faces cut by today's socialists--and to what wretched and pinched feelings their style bears witness!--and the harmless lambs' happiness of their hopes and desiderata....To have and to want to have more--growth, in one word--that is life itself. In the doctrine of socialism there is hidden, rather
badly, a "will to negate life"; the human beings or races that think up such a doctrine must be bungled.

(S126) The most favorable inhibitions and remedies of modernity:
1. universal military service with real wars in which the time for joking is past;
2. national bigotry (simplifies, concentrates);
3. improved nutrition (meat);
4. increasing cleanliness and healthfulness of domiciles;
5. hegemony of physiology over theology, moralism, economics, and politics;
6. military severity in the demand for and handling of one's"obligations" (one does not praise any more-).

(S127) I am glad about the military development of Europe; also of the internal states of anarchy: the time of repose and Chinese ossification, which Galiani predicted for this century, is over. Personal manly virtu of the body, is regaining value, estimation becomes more physical, nutrition meatier. Beautiful men are again becoming possible. Pallid hypocrisy (with mandarins at the top, as Comte dreamed) is over. The barbarian in each of us is affirmed; also the wild beast. Precisely for that reason philosophers have a future.--Kant is a scarecrow, some day! [and militarization is possible because the herd instinct makes modern recruits highly trainable]

(S129) Spiritual enlightenment is an infallible means for making men unsure,weaker in will, so they are more in need of company and support--in short, for developing the herd animal in man.

(S132) Position toward peoples. Our preferences; we pay attention to the results of interbreeding...We feel contemptuous of every kind of culture that is compatible with reading, not to speak of writing for, newspapers...Preparation for becoming the legislators of the future, the masters of the earth, at least our children. Basic concern with marriages.

(S134) Moral valuations as a history of lies and the art of slander in the service of a will to power (the herd will that rebels against the human beings who are stronger).

Book two Critique of Highest Values Hitherto

142. We find a species of man, the priestly, which feels itself to be the norm, the high point and the supreme expression of the type man: this species derives the concept "improvement" from itself. It believes in its own superiority, it wills itself to be superior in fact: the origin of the holy lie is the will to power--'. '"He who wills the end must will the means"' [so cold calculation is also required to develop power]...We possess the classic model in specifically Aryan forms: we may therefore hold the best-endowed and most reflective species of man responsible for the most fundamental lie that has ever been told-- That lie has been copied almost everywhere: Aryan influence has corrupted all the world--'

143.'what is called Semitic is merely priestly--and in the racially purest Aryan law-book, in Manu [early Brahmin holy book] , this kind of "Semitism," i. e., the spirit of the priest, is worse than anywhere else'..Mohammedanism in turn learned from Christianity: the employment of the "beyond" as an instrument of punishment..

145 What an affirmative Semitic religion, the product of the ruling class, looks like: the law-book of Mohammed, the older parts of the Old Testament. (Mohammedanism, as a religion for men, is deeply contemptuous of the sentimentality and mendaciousness of Christianity--which it feels to be a woman's religion.)...What a negative Semitic religion, the product of an oppressed class, looks like: the New Testament

151.  Religions are destroyed by belief in morality. The Christian moral God is not tenable: hence "atheism"

190. After the church had let itself be deprived of the entire Christian way of life and had quite specifically sanctioned life under the state, that form of life that Jesus had combatted and condemned, it had to find the meaning of Christianity in something else: in faith in unbelievable things, in the ceremonial of prayers, worship, feasts, etc. The concept "sin," "forgiveness," "reward"--all quite unimportant and virtually excluded from primitive Christianity--now comes into the foreground.

339. For every soul there was only one perfecting; only one ideal; only one way to redemption-- Extremest form of equality of rights, tied to an optical magnification of one's own importance to the point of insanity-- Nothing but insanely important souls, revolving about themselves with a frightful fear--...fundamentally, one upholds the perspective of personalization as well as equality of rights before the ideal

352. The concept of power, whether of a god or of a man, always includes both the ability to help and the ability to harm. Thus it is with the Arabs; thus with the Hebrews. Thus with all strong races. It is a fateful step when one separates the power for the one from the power for the other into a dualism-- In this way, morality becomes the poisoner of life--...

377. Every instinct that struggles for mastery but finds itself under a yoke requires for itself, as strengthening and as support for its selfesteem, all the beautiful names and recognized values: so, as a rule, it ventures forth under the name of the "master" it is combatting...the falsity does not become conscious.[but some priests are openly manipulative and hypocritical about this, even more than are women]

380. Systematic falsification of history; so that it may provide the proof of moral valuation:...Systematic falsification of great human beings, the great creators, the great desires that faith should be the distinguishing mark of the great: but slackness, skepticism, "immorality," the right to throw off a faith, belong to greatness (Caesar, also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe). One always suppresses the main thing, their "freedom of will"

382 [contradicting Schopenhauer] The moral man is a lower species than the immoral, a weaker species; indeed--he is a type in regard to morality, but not a type in himself; a copy, a good copy at best--the measure of his value lies outside him. I assess a man by the quantum of power and abundance of his will....Shopkeeper's philosophy of Mr. Spencer; complete absence of an ideal, except that of the mediocre man....Fundamental instinctive principle of all philosophers and historians and psychologists: everything of value in man, art, history, science, religion, technology must be proved to be of moral value.

383. [early attempts to deny sexuality includes] "if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out.: In the particular case in which that dangerous "innocent from the country," the founder of Christianity, recommended this practice to his disciples, the case of sexual excitation, the consequence is, unfortunately, not only the loss of an organ but the emasculation of a man's character--

386 [Instead of valuing the moral man] From a superior viewpoint one desires the contrary: the ever-increasing dominion of evil, the growing emancipation of man from the narrow and fear-ridden bonds of morality, the increase of force, in order to press the mightiest natural powers--the affects--into service.

387. The whole conception of an order of rank among the passions[is inverted] : as if the right and normal thing were for one to be guided by reason--with the passions as abnormal, dangerous, semi-animal, and, moreover, so far as their aim is concerned, nothing other than desires for pleasure-- [leads to misjudging the foundational role of passion,especially  in asceticism] is strong and godlike selfhood from which these affects grow, just as surely as did the desire to become master, encroachment, the inner certainty of having a right to everything.

398.that there is no worse confusion than the confusion of breeding with taming: which is what has been done-- Breeding, as I understand it, is a means of storing up the tremendous forces of mankind so that the generations can build upon the work of their forefathers--not only outwardly, but inwardly, organically growing out of them and becoming something stronger--...the goal of breeding, even in the case of a single individual, can only be the stronger man (--the man without breeding is weak, extravagant, unstable.

410. I noticed rather that no epistemological skepticism or dogmatism had ever arisen free from ulterior motives--that it acquires a value of the second rank as soon as one has considered what it was that compelled the adoption of this point of view.

413. Ulterior moral motives have hitherto most obstructed the course of philosophy.

423.Theory and practice.-- Fateful distinction, as if there were an actual drive for knowledge that, without regard to questions of usefulness and harm, went blindly for the truth; and then, separate from this, the whole world of practical interests-- I tried to show, on the other hand, what instincts have been active behind all these pure theoreticians--how they have all, under the spell of their instincts, gone fatalistically for something that was "truth" for them...The so-called drive for knowledge can be traced back to a drive to appropriate and conquer....the appearance of moral scruples (in other words: the becoming-conscious of the values by which one acts) betrays a certain sickliness...The deeply instinctive are shy of logicizing duties:...that which really drives the moralist is not the moral instincts but the instincts of decadence translated into the formulas of morality.

428 [Most philosophers have avoided the main issue], for to take pleasure in power was considered immoral...In the entire evolution of morality, truth never appears: all the conceptual elements employed are fictions; all the psychologica accepted are falsifications; all the forms of logic dragged into this realm of lies are sophistries.

430. The great rationality of all education in morality has always been that one tried to attain to the certainty of an instinct: so that neither good intentions nor good means had to enter consciousness as such [and Socrates becomes a leading light in the foolish attempt to rationalise here] The great concepts "good" and "just" are severed from the presuppositions to which they belong and, as liberated "ideas," become objects of dialectic.

440. When morality--that is to say subtlety, caution, bravery, equity--has been as it were stored up through the practice of a whole succession of generations, then the total force of this accumulated virtue radiates even into that sphere where integrity is most seldom found, into the spiritual sphere. In all becoming-conscious there is expressed a discomfiture of the organism; it has to try something new, nothing is sufficiently adapted for it, there is toil, tension, strain--all this constitutes becoming-conscious.Genius resides in instinct; goodness likewise. One acts perfectly only when one acts instinctively.

462 [His goals are]. Fundamental innovations: In place of "moral values," purely naturalistic values. Naturalization of morality. In place of "sociology," a theory of the forms of domination. In place of "society," the culture complex, as my chief interest (as a whole or in its parts). In place of "epistemology," a perspective theory of affects (to which belongs a hierarchy of the affects; the affects transfigured; their superior order, their "spirituality"). In place of "metaphysics," and religion, the theory of eternal recurrence (this as a means of breeding and selection) [so this is a notion of eternal return as dynamic  social reproduction of privilege -- through 'breeding'] .

Book Three Principles of a New Evaluation [the main source for a lot of Deleuzian insight]

466. It is not the victory of science that distinguishes our nineteenth century, but the victory of scientific method over science. [N approves of this as dispelling religion, and likes:]

469. above all, the disposition that takes problems seriously, regardless of the personal consequences-- [and]

470. Profound aversion to reposing once and for all in any one total view of the world. Fascination of the opposing point of view: refusal to be deprived of the stimulus of the enigmatic [which involves denouncing notions of divine necessary reason etc]

475. Critique of modern philosophy: erroneous starting point, as if there existed "facts of consciousness"--and no phenomenalism in introspection.

477. I maintain the phenomenality of the inner world, too: everything of which we become conscious is arranged, simplified, schematized, interpreted through and through--the actual process of inner "perception," the causal connection between thoughts, feelings, desires, between subject and object, are absolutely hidden from us--and are perhaps purely imaginary. The "apparent inner world" is governed by just the same forms and procedures as the "outer" world. We never encounter "facts": pleasure and displeasure are subsequent and derivative intellectual phenomena-- "Causality" eludes us; to suppose a direct causal link beween thoughts, as logic does--that is the consequence of the crudest and clumsiest observation. Between two thoughts all kinds of affects play their game: but their motions are too fast, therefore we fail to recognize them, we deny them-- "Thinking," as epistemologists conceive it, simply does not occur: it is a quite arbitrary fiction, arrived at by selecting one element from the process and eliminating all the rest, an artificial arrangement for the purpose of intelligibility--

478. Upon reflection, however, we should concede that everything would have taken the same course, according to exactly the same sequence of causes and effects, if these states of "pleasure and displeasure" had been absent, and that one is simply deceiving oneself if one thinks they cause anything at all: they are epiphenomena with a quite different object than to evoke reactions; they are themselves effects within the instituted process of reaction.

479. The fragment of outer world of which we are conscious is born after an effect from outside has impressed itself upon us, and is subsequently projected as its "cause"...The whole of "inner experience" rests upon the fact that a cause for an excitement of the nerve centers is sought and imagined --and that only a cause thus discovered enters consciousness: this cause in no way corresponds to the real cause--it is a groping on the basis of previous "inner experiences," i. e., of memory. But memory also maintains the habit of the old interpretations

480 [then even more clear biologism or naturalism] There is no question of "subject and object," but of a particular species of animal that can prosper only through a certain relative rightness; above all, regularity of its perceptions (so that it can accumulate experience)-- Knowledge works as a tool of power. Hence it is plain that it increases with every increase of power...The utility of preservation --not some abstract-theoretical need not to be deceived--stands as the motive behind the development of the organs of knowledge--they develop in such a way that their observations suffice for our preservation. In other words: the measure of the desire for knowledge depends upon the measure to which the will to power grows in a species: a species grasps a certain amount of reality in order to become master of it, in order to press it into service.[could be Bentham really -- implies some inner thermometer to measure survivability]

481. Against positivism, which halts at phenomena--"There are only facts"--I would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations..."Everything is subjective," you say; but even this is interpretation. The "subject" is not something given, it is something added and invented and projected behind what there is. [The world] has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings.--"Perspectivism." [of different races or classes no doubt ,to be solved by competition to impose their will to power?

484. "There is thinking: therefore there is something that thinks": this is the upshot of all Descartes' argumentation. But that means positing as "true à priori" our belief in the concept of substance-- that when there is thought there has to be something "that thinks" is simply a formulation of our grammatical custom that adds a doer to every deed.

485. Critique of "reality": where does the "more or less real," the gradation of being in which we believe, lead to?-- The degree to which we feel life and power (logic and coherence of experience) gives us our measure of "being", "reality", not appearance..."The subject" is the fiction that many similar states in us are the effect of one substratum: but it is we who first created the "similarity" of these states; our adjusting them and making them similar is the fact, not their similarity.

488. Psychological derivation of our belief in reason.--The concept "reality", "being", is taken from our feeling of the "subject"....our habit of regarding all our deeds as consequences of our will.

489. Everything that enters consciousness as "unity" is already tremendously complex: we always have only a semblance of Unity. [Deleuze must like this stuff -- multiplicity].

490. [weird multiple self stuff] The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general? A kind of aristocracy of "cells" in which dominion resides? To be sure, an aristocracy of equals, used to ruling jointly and understanding how to command?...My hypotheses: The subject as multiplicity. [So this only applies to the subject? As does this] The only force that exists is of the same kind as that of the will: a commanding of other subjects, which thereupon change.

492. The body and physiology [NB -- a simple biological body]  the starting point: why?--We gain the correct idea of the nature of our subject-unity, namely as regents at the head of a communality (not as "souls" or "life forces"), also of the dependence of these regents upon the ruled and of an order of rank and division of labor as the conditions that make possible the whole and its parts. [So the body is seen as something political, with various bits obeying and escaping dominion and] we try, if you like, to see whether the inferior parts themselves cannot enter into communication with us.[whether our physiology affects our thinking? As in 'Biology of the Drive to Knowledge' and]

495. It is improbable that our "knowledge" should extend further than is strictly necessary for the preservation of life. Morphology shows us how the senses and the nerves, as well as the brain, develop in proportion to the difficulty of finding nourishment....the "sense for truth" will have to legitimize itself before another tribunal:-- as a means of the preservation of man, as will to power. Likewise our love of the beautiful: it also is our shaping will. The two senses stand side-by-side; the sense for the real is the means of acquiring the power to shape things according to our wish. The joy in shaping and reshaping--a primeval joy! We can comprehend only a world that we ourselves have made.

496. The way of knowing and of knowledge is itself already part of the conditions of existence: so that the conclusion that there could be no other kind of intellect (for us) than that which preserves us is precipitate...Our apparatus for acquiring knowledge is not designed for [intellectual,philosophical]  "knowledge."

497 [Such knowledge is in vain...] The most strongly believed a priori "truths" are for me provisional assumptions; e. g., the law of causality, a very well acquired habit of belief, so much a part of us that not to believe in it would destroy the race. But are they for that reason truths? What a conclusion! As if the preservation of man were a proof of truth!

501. All thought, judgment, perception, considered as comparison, has as its precondition a "positing of equality," and earlier still a "making equal." The process of making equal is the same as the process of incorporation of appropriated material in the amoeba.[This follows an earlier argument that when we think we make new things the same as  old experience] .

502. One must revise one's ideas about memory: here lies the chief temptation to assume a "soul," [or unique personality] which, outside time, reproduces, recognizes, etc.[Instead...]

503. The entire apparatus of knowledge is an apparatus for abstraction and simplification--directed not at knowledge but at taking possession of things: "end" and "means" are as remote from its essential nature as are "concepts." [not music to Deleuze's ears I would have thought] .

505. Consciousness is present only to the extent that consciousness is useful [for survival].

506. The tiny amount of emotion to which the "word" gives rise, as we contemplate similar images for which one word exists--this weak emotion is the common element, the basis of the concept. That weak sensations are regarded as alike, sensed as being the same, is the fundamental fact. Thus confusion of two sensations that are close neighbors, as we take note of these sensations; but who is taking note? [good question -- how come this is only perceptible by Nietzsche?] Believing is the primal beginning even in every sense impression: a kind of affirmation the first intellectual activity!

507. [Thus] "The real and the apparent world"--I have traced this antithesis back to value relations. We have projected the conditions of our preservation as predicates of being in general. Because we have to be stable in our beliefs if we are to prosper, we have made the "real" world a world not of change and becoming, but one of being.[Odd bit this. I am still not sure if N believes in the 'reality' of the biological underpinnings? Or in his account of their reality? Can paradox be avoided? N somehow speaks for biology?]

509. The earthly kingdom of desires out of which logic grew: the herd instinct in the background.

510. On the origin of logic. The fundamental inclination to posit as equal,to see things as equal, is modified, held in check, by consideration of usefulness and harmfulness, by considerations of success: it adapts itself to a milder degree in which it can be satisfied without at the same time denying and endangering life. This whole process corresponds exactly to that external, mechanical process (which is its symbol) by which protoplasm makes what it appropriates equal to itself and fits it into its own forms and files.[So the 'semeiology' of Nietzsche is really biological mechanism?]

512. Logic is bound to the condition: assume there are identical cases. In fact, to make possible logical thinking and inferences, this condition must first be treated fictitiously as fulfilled. That is: the will to logical truth can be carried through only after a fundamental falsification of all events is assumed.

513. It is the powerful who made the names of things into law, and among the powerful it is the greatest artists in abstraction who created the categories.

514.[Gets a bit Berger and Luckmann-ish here]: Exactly the same thing could have happened with the categories of reason: they could have prevailed, after much groping and fumbling, through their relative utility--There came a point when one collected them together, raised them to consciousness as a whole--and when one commanded them, i. e., when they had the effect of a command--From then on, they counted as à priori, as beyond experience, as irrefutable

515. No preexisting "idea" was here at work, but the utilitarian fact that only when we see things coarsely and made equal do they become calculable and usable to us...The categories are "truths"' only in the sense that they are conditions of life for us...The subjective compulsion not to contradict here is a biological compulsion: the instinct for the utility of inferring as we do infer is part of us, we almost are this instinct--But what naivete to extract from this a proof that we are therewith in possession of a "truth in itself"!--Not being able to contradict is proof of an incapacity, not of "truth."

516 [Challenging the law of non-contradiction again] are the axioms of logic adequate to reality or are they a means and measure for us to create reality, the concept "reality," for ourselves.?--To affirm the former one would, as already said, have to have a previous knowledge of being ...The conceptual ban on contradiction proceeds from the belief that we are able to form concepts, that the concept not only designates the essence of a thing but comprehends it--In fact, logic (like geometry and arithmetic) applies only to fictitious entities that we have created.

517. The fictitious world of subject, substance, "reason" etc., is needed--: there is in us a power to order, simplify, falsify, artificially distinguish. "Truth" is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations:--to classify phenomena into definite categories. In this we start from a belief in the "in-itself" of things (we take phenomena as real).[Could be Adorno on the connections between cognitive and real domination -- but no class dimension for Nietzsche, just some natural human tendency to reify?]...Knowledge [of this kind] and becoming exclude one another.

518. If our "ego" is for us the sole being, after the model of which we fashion and understand all being: very well! Then there would be very much room to doubt whether what we have here is not a perspective illusion--an apparent unity that encloses everything like a horizon. The evidence of the body reveals a tremendous multiplicity [So body and multiplicity are put in the context of denying solipsism]

520. Continual transition forbids us to speak of "individuals," etc; the "number" of beings is itself in flux....A world in a state of becoming could not, in a strict sense, be "comprehended" or "known"; only to the extent that the "comprehending" and "knowing" intellect encounters a coarse, already-created world, fabricated out of mere appearances but become firm to the extent that this kind of appearance has preserved life.

521. [On biological classifications] The form counts as something enduring and therefore more valuable; but the form has merely been invented by us; and however often "the same form is attained," it does not mean that it is the same form--what appears is always something new [so this is a plus for Deleuze's view of eternal return?]  and it is only we, who are always comparing, who include the new, to the extent that it is similar to the old, in the unity of the "form."...One should not understand this compulsion to construct concepts, species, forms, purposes, laws ("a world of identical cases") as if they enabled us to fix the real world; but as a compulsion to arrange a world for ourselves in which our existence is made possible:--we thereby create a world which is calculable, simplified, comprehensible, etc., for us....before logic itself entered our consciousness, we did nothing but  introduce its postulates into events: now we discover them in events--we can no longer do otherwise--and imagine that this compulsion guarantees something connected with "truth."

524. Usually, one takes consciousness itself as the general sensorium and supreme court; nonetheless, it is only a means of communication: it is evolved through social intercourse and with a view to the interests of social intercourse--"Intercourse" here understood to include the influences of the outer world and the reactions they compel on our side; also our effect upon the outer world. It is not the directing agent, but an organ of the directing agent.

528. [D would like thyis too] Principal error of psychologists: they regard the indistinct idea as a lower kind of idea than the distinct: but that which removes itself from our consciousness and for that reason becomes obscure can on that account be perfectly clear in itself. Becoming obscure is a matter of perspective of consciousness.

[530 has a detailed critique of Kant]

531. If I say "lightning flashes," I have posited the flash once as an activity and a second time as a subject, and thus added to the event a being that is not one with the event but is rather fixed, "is" and does not "become."--To regard an event as an "effecting," and this as being, that is the double error, or interpretation, of which we are guilty.

532. Essential: to start from the body and employ it as guide. It is the much richer phenomenon, which allows of clearer observation. Belief in the body is better established than belief in the spirit [because] Probably an inner event corresponds to each organic function.

533. Thus it is the highest degrees of performance that awaken belief in the "truth," that is to say reality, of the object. The feeling of strength, of struggle, of resistance convinces us that there is something that is here being resisted. [so]

534. The criterion of truth resides in the enhancement of the feeling of power.

535.[Another bit D would like] "Truth": this, according to my way of thinking, does not necessarily denote the antithesis of error, but in the most fundamental cases only the posture of various errors in relation to one another. Perhaps one is older, more profound than another, even ineradicable, in so far as an organic entity of our species could not live without it; while other errors do not tyrannize over us in this way as conditions of life, but on the contrary when compared with such "tyrants" can be set aside and "refuted."

538 [It follows from the above that] The doctrine of being, of things, of all sorts of fixed unities is a hundred times easier than the doctrine of becoming,

543. Simple, transparent, not in contradiction with himself, durable, remaining always the same, without wrinkle, volt, concealment, form: a man of this kind conceives a world of being as "God" in his own image. For truthfulness to be possible, the whole sphere of man must be very clean, small and, respectable; advantage in every sense must be with the truthful man [and it clearly isn't]

549. "Subject", "object", "attribute"--these distinctions are fabricated and are now imposed as a schematism upon all the apparent facts. The fundamental false observation is that I believe it is I who does something, suffer something, "have" something, "have" a quality.

550. is intention the cause of an event? Or is that also illusion? Is it not the event itself?

551. Critique of the concept "cause".- We have absolutely no experience of a cause; psychologically considered, we derive the entire concept from the subjective conviction that we are causes, namely, that the arm moves-- But that is an error. We separate ourselves, the doers, from the deed, and we make use of this pattern everywhere--we seek a doer for every event. What is it we have done? We have misunderstood the feeling of strength, tension, resistance, a muscular feeling that is already the beginning of the act, as the cause, or we have taken the will to do this or that for a cause because the action follows upon it--cause...A necessary sequence of states does not imply a causal relationship between them (--that would mean making their effective capacity leap from 1 to 2, to 3, to 4, to 5). There are neither causes nor effects....The calculability of an event does not reside in the fact that a rule is adhered to, or that a necessity is obeyed, or that a law of causality has been projected by us into every event: it resides in the [necessarily subjective] recurrence of "identical cases"....There is no such thing as a sense of causality, as Kant thinks. One is surprised, one is disturbed, one desires something familiar to hold on to--As soon as we are shown something old in the new' we are calmed. The supposed instinct for causality is only fear of the unfamiliar and the attempt to discover something familiar in it--a search, not for causes, but for the familiar [all this presumably before science started to deal with mathematical notions of or evidence for causes between imperceptible events etc].

552. [human examples again] "Mechanical necessity" is not a fact: it is we who first interpreted it into events. We have interpreted the formulatable character of events as the consequence of a necessity that rules over events. But from the fact that I do a certain thing, it by no means follows that I am compelled to do it. Compulsion in things certainly cannot be demonstrated...It is only after the model of the subject that we have invented the
reality of things and projected them into the medley of sensations. If we no longer believe in the effective subject, then belief also disappears in effective things, in reciprocation, cause and effect between those phenomena that we call things...Duration, identity with itself, being are inherent neither in that which is called subject nor in that which is called object: they are complexes of events apparently durable in comparison with other complexes...Will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable, an abolition of the false character of things, a reinterpretation of it into beings. "Truth" is therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered--but something that must be created and that gives a name to a process, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end...As soon as we imagine someone who is responsible for our being thus and thus, etc. (God, nature), and therefore attribute to him the intention that we should exist and be happy or wretched, we corrupt for ourselves the innocence of soon as dominion is established over a lesser power and the latter operates as a function of the greater power, an order of rank, of organization is bound to produce the appearance of an order of means and ends.

555. as soon as dominion is established over a lesser power and the latter operates as a function of the greater power, an order of rank, of organization is bound to produce the appearance of an order of means and ends. ...The question "what is that?" is an imposition of meaning from some other viewpoint.

556. "Essence," the "essential nature," is something perspective and already presupposes a multiplicity.[as in multiple intentions?]  At the bottom of it there always lies "what is that for me?" (for us, for all that lives, etc.)...The question "what is that?" is an imposition of meaning from some other viewpoint. "Essence," the "essential nature," is something perspective and already presupposes a multiplicity. At the bottom of it there always lies "what is that for me?" (for us, for all that lives, etc.)...the interpretation itself is a form of the will to power, it exists (but not as a "being,' but as a process, a becoming) as an affect.{Again, all human examples of becoming etc --not forces in and of themselves or nonhuman processes,  bu the results of human interventions?]...[We should see things,including subjects,as] a simplification with the object of defining the force which posits, invents, thinks, as distinct from all individual positing,
inventing, thinking as such. Thus a capacity as distinct from all that is individual--fundamentally, action collectively considered with respect to all anticipated actions (action and the probability of similar actions).

558. If I remove all the relationships, all the "properties," all the "activities" of a thing, the thing does not remain over.

560. That things possess a constitution in themselves quite apart from interpretation and subjectivity, is a quite idle hypothesis...Conversely, the apparent objective character of things: could it not be merely a difference of degree within the subjective

561. All unity is unity only as organization and co-operation--just as a human community is a unity--as opposed to an atomistic anarchy, as a pattern of domination that signifies a unity but is not a unity

562. "The thing affects a subject"? Root of the idea of substance in language, not in beings outside us! [sounds like Winch now] ...The explanation of an event can be sought firstly: through mental images of the event that precede it (aims); secondly: through mental images that succeed it (the mathematicalphysical explanation).

563. Our "knowing" limits itself to establishing quantities; but we cannot help feeling these differences in quantity as qualities...Our senses have a definite quantum as a mean within which they function; i. e., we sense bigness and smallness in relation to the conditions of our existence.If we sharpened or blunted our senses tenfold, we should perish; i. e., with regard to making possible our existence we sense even relations between magnitudes as qualities.

564. Might all quantities not be signs of qualities?...the desire for an increase in quantum grows from a quale; in a purely quantitative world everything would be dead, stiff, motionless.-- The reduction of all qualities to quantities is nonsense: what appears is that the one accompanies the other, an analogy--

565. we cannot help feeling that mere quantitative differences are something fundamentally distinct from quantity, namely that they are qualities which can no longer be reduced to one another. But everything for which the word "knowledge" makes any sense refers to the domain of reckoning. weighing, measuring, to the domain of quantity;...Qualities are an idiosyncrasy peculiar to man; to demand that our human interpretations and values should be
universal and perhaps constitutive values is one of the hereditary madnesses of human pride.

567. Every center of force adopts a perspective toward the entire remainder, i. e., its own particular valuation, mode of action, and mode of resistance. The "apparent world," therefore, is reduced to a specific mode of action on the world, emanating from a center....But there is no "other," no "true," no essential being--for this would be the expression of a world without action and reaction

568. Appearance is an arranged and simplified world, at which our practical instincts have been at work; it is perfectly true for is essentially a world of relationships; under certain conditions it has a differing aspect from every point; its being is essentially different from every point; it presses upon every point, every point resists it--and the sum of these is in every case quite incongruent. [You can see how Sartre developed out of this]...The measure of power determines what being possesses the other measure of power; in what form, force, constraint it acts or resists

569. the antithesis of this phenomenal world is not "the true world," but the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations--another kind of phenomenal world, a kind "unknowable" for us [so a conclusion which seems to deliver him entirely to phenomenology?] hypothesis that only subjects exist--that "object" is only a kind of effect produced by a subject upon a subject a modus of the subject.

572. Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value and said: The more "Idea", the more being. He reversed the concept "reality" and said: "What you take for real is an error, and the nearer we approach the 'Idea', the nearer we approach 'truth'. "--Is this understood? It was the greatest of rebaptisms; and because it has been adopted by Christianity we do not recognize how astonishing it is.

574. It is in the nature of thinking that it thinks of and invents the unconditioned as an adjunct to the conditioned; just as it thought of and invented the "ego" as an adjunct to the multiplicity of its processes; it measures the world  according to magnitudes posited by itself--such fundamental fictions as "the unconditional","ends and means'',"things","substances", logical laws, numbers and forms.

576. That which has been feared the most, the cause of the most powerful suffering (lust to rule, sex, etc.), has been treated by men with the greatest amount of hostility and eliminated from the "true" world. Thus they have eliminated the affects one by one...In the same way, they have hated the irrational, the arbitrary, the accidental (as the causes of immeasurable physical suffering.

579. Psychology of metaphysics.--This world is apparent: consequently there is a true world;--this world is conditional: consequently there is an unconditioned world;--this world is full of contradiction: consequently there is a world free of contradiction;-- this world is a world of becoming: consequently there is a world of being:--all false conclusions...If, however, the conditioned world is causally conditioned by the unconditioned world, then freedom to err and incur guilt must also be conditioned by it: and again one asks, what for?--The world of appearance, becoming, contradiction, suffering, is therefore willed: what for?...But the origin of these antitheses need not necessarily go back to a supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to oppose to it the real genesis of the concepts. This derives from the practical sphere, the sphere of utility...Brave and creative men never consider pleasure and pain as ultimate values--they are epiphenomena: one must desire both if one is to achieve anything.

580. In a world of becoming, "reality" is always only a simplification for practical ends, or a deception through the coarseness of organs, or a variation in the tempo of becoming.

583. I observe with astonishment that science has today resigned itself to the apparent world...[but generally in philosophy, the notion of an apparent world also implies a real world -- a fundamental mistake] Prejudice of prejudices! Firstly, it would be possible that the true constitution of things was so hostile to the presuppositions of life, so opposed to them, that we needed appearance in order to be able to live-- After all, this is the case in so many situations; e. g., in marriage....It is of cardinal importance that one should abolish the true world. It is the great inspirer of doubt and devaluator in respect of the world we are: it has been our most dangerous attempt yet to assassinate life. War on all presuppositions on the basis of which one has invented a true world. Among these is the presupposition that moral values are thesupreme values....The "will to truth" would then have to be investigated psychologically:
it is not a moral force, but a form of the will to power. This would have to be proved by showing that it employs every immoral means....The "criterion of truth" was in fact merely the biological utility of such a system of systematic falsification; and since a species of animals knows of nothing more important than its own preservation, one might indeed be permitted to speak here of "truth." The naivete was to take an anthropocentric idiosyncrasy as the measure of things, as the rule for determining "real" and "unreal" believed one possessed a criterion of reality in the forms of reason--while in fact one possessed them in order to become master of reality, in order to misunderstand reality in a shrewd the world became false, and precisely on account of the properties that constitute its reality: change, becoming, multiplicity, opposition, contradiction, war...The expression "that should not be," "that should not have been," is farcical-- If one thinks out the consequences, one would ruin the source of life if one wanted to abolish whatever was in some respect harmful or destructive. Physiology teaches us better!...We see at work before us a dreadful tool of decadence that props itself up by the holiest names and attitudes.

585. Why is it that he [man] derives suffering from change, deception, contradiction? and why not rather his happiness?-- Contempt, hatred for all that perishes, changes, varies-- whence comes this valuation of that which remains constant? Obviously, the will to truth is here merely the desire for a world of the constant....A nihilist is a man who judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist. According
to this view, our existence (action, suffering, willing, feeling) has no meaning.

586 [long recap of the argument so far -- true and other worlds as necessary consequences of the rejection of this world] General insight: it is the instinct of life-weariness, and not that of life, which has created the "other world." Consequence: philosophy, religion, and morality are symptoms of decadence.

588. The question of values is more fundamental than the question of certainty: the latter becomes serious only by presupposing that the value question has already been answered

590. Our values are interpreted into things. Is there then any meaning in the in-itself? ! Is meaning not necessarily relative meaning and perspective? All meaning is will to power (all relative meaning resolves itself into it)

594. Science--this has been hitherto a way of putting an end to the complete confusion in which things exist, by hypotheses that "explain" everything--so it has come from the intellect's dislike of chaos.--This same dislike seizes me when I consider myself: I should like to form an image of the inner world too, by means of some schema, and thus triumph over intellectual confusion. Morality has been a simplification of this kind

595. Our presuppositions: no God: no purpose: finite force. Let us guard against thinking out and prescribing the mode of thought necessary to lesser men!!

596. No "moral education" of the human race: but an enforced schooling in [scientific] errors is needed, because "truth" disgusts and makes one sick of life--unless man is already irrevocably launched upon his path and has taken his honest insight upon himself with a tragic pride.

600. No limit to the ways in which the world can be interpreted; every interpretation a symptom of growth or of decline.

604. "Interpretation," the introduction of meaning not "explanation" (in most cases a new interpretation over an old interpretation that has become incomprehensible, that is now itself only a sign). There are no facts, everything is in flux, incomprehensible, elusive; what is relatively most enduring is--our opinions

605. The ascertaining of "truth" and "untruth," the ascertaining of facts in general, is fundamentally different from creative positing, from forming, shaping, overcoming, willing, such as is of the essence of philosophy.

608. [Shades of Lyotard again] The development of science resolves the "familiar" more and more into the unfamiliar..."Wisdom" as the attempt to get beyond perspective valuations (i. e., beyond the "will to power"): a principle hostile to life and decadent, a symptom as among the Indians, etc., of the weakening of the power of appropriation.

612. To win back for the man of knowledge the right to great affects! after self-effacement and the cult of "objectivity" have created a false order of rank in this sphere, too [as opposed to the 'objectivity' proposed by Schopenhauer].

617. To impose upon becoming the character of being--that is the supreme will to power...That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being:--high point of the meditation....Becoming as invention, willing, self-denial, overcoming of oneself: no subject but an action, a positing, creative, no "causes and effects."...Instead of "cause and effect" the mutual struggle of that which becomes, often with the absorption of one's opponent [looks a bit Hegelian]

[and then a remark that Zarathustra is a parody of conventional values,a point re-emphasised in Kauffman's commentary in Gay Science]

Book Four Discipline and Breeding

858. What determines your rank is the quantum of power you are: the rest is cowardice.[and what determines the quantum of power, matey?]

862. A doctrine is needed powerful enough to work as a breeding agent: strengthening the strong, paralyzing and destructive for the worldweary. The annihilation of the decaying races...Dominion over the earth as a means of producing a higher type.-- The annihilation of the tartuffery called "morality"...The annihilation of suffrage universel; i. e., the system through which the lowest natures prescribe themselves as laws for the higher.-- The annihilation of mediocrity and its strive for fullness of nature through the pairing of opposites: race mixture to this end [? abolishing it?] ...a free subordination to a ruling idea that has its time

871. that which men of power and will are able to demand of themselves also provides a measure of that which they may permit themselves. Such natures are the antithesis of the vicious and unbridled: although they may on occasion do things that would convict a lesser man of vice and immoderation...Here the concept of the "equal value of men before God" is extraordinarily harmful...Confusion went so far that one branded the very virtuosi of life (whose autonomy offered the sharpest antithesis to the vicious and unbridled) with the most opprobrious names. Even now one believes one must disapprove of a Cesare Borgia...Has it been noticed that in heaven all interesting men are missing?-- Just a hint to the girls as to where they can best find their salvation.

893.  Hatred of mediocrity is [seen as] unworthy of a philosopher: it is almost a question mark against his "right to philosophy." Precisely because he is an exception he has to take the rule under his protection, he has to keep the mediocre in good heart

898. Until now, "education" has had in view the needs of society: not the possible needs of the future, but the needs of the society of the day...The increasing dwarfing of man is precisely the driving force that brings to mind the breeding of a stronger race--a race that would be excessive precisely where the dwarfed species was weak and growing weaker (in will, responsibility, self-assurance, ability to posit goals for oneself)...[and later]: one should observe our scholars from close up: they think only reactively; i. e., they have to read before they can think. [As for pedagogy] One would make a fit little boy stare if one asked him: "Would you like to become virtuous?"-- but he will open his eyes wide if asked: "Would you like to become stronger than your friends?"
The homogenizing of European man is the great process that cannot be obstructed: one should even hasten it...As soon as it is established, this homogenizing species requires a justification: it lies in serving a higher sovereign species that stands upon the former and can raise itself to its task only by doing this. Not merely a master race whose sole task is to rule, but a race with its own sphere of life, with an excess of strength for beauty, bravery, culture, manners to the highest peak of the spirit; an affirming race that may grant itself every great luxury--strong enough to have no need of the tyranny of the virtue-imperative, rich enough to have no need of thrift and pedantry, beyond good and evil; a hothouse for strange and choice plants.

899. now there are coming new barbarians cynics {experimenters} conquerors union of spiritual superiority with well-being and an excess of strength

900. another type of barbarian, who comes from the heights: a species of conquering and ruling natures in search of material to mold. Prometheus was this kind of barbarian

910. To those human beings who are of any concern to me I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities--I wish that they should not remain unfamiliar with profound self-contempt, the torture of self-mistrust, the  wretchedness of the vanquished: I have no pity for them, because I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not--that one endures.

916. [Among other decadent institutions enshrining asceticism are] Our absurd pedagogic world, before which the "useful civil servant" hovers as a model, thinks it can get by with "instruction," with brain drill; it has not the slightest idea that something else is needed first--education of will power; one devises tests for everything except for the main thing: whether one can will, whether one may promise; the young man finishes school without a single question, without any curiosity even, concerning this supreme value-problem of his nature. [However, fasting is OK]: occasionally to stop reading, listening to music, being pleasant; one must have fast days for one's virtues, too. [There is also] death-- One must convert the stupid physiological fact into a moral necessity. So to live that one can also will at the right time to die!

941. They [the majority] want to have themselves formed--that is the meaning of their cultural activity! But the strong, the mighty want to form and no longer to have anything foreign about them! [And here is a good one for outdoor adventurers...] Thus men also plunge into wild nature, not to find themselves but to lose and forget themselves in it. "To be outside oneself" as the desire of all the weak and the self-discontented.

942. There is only nobility of birth, only nobility of blood [but this does not refer to existing noble families] ...When one speaks of "aristocrats of the spirit," reasons are usually not lacking for concealing something; as is well known, it is a favorite term among ambitious Jews. For spirit alone does not make noble; rather, there must be something to ennoble the spirit.-- What then is required? Blood.

958. I write for a species of man that does not yet exist: for the "masters of the earth...In Plato's Theages it is written: "Each one of us would like to be master over all men, if possible, and best of all God." This attitude must exist again. Englishmen, Americans, and Russians.

966. The highest man would have the greatest multiplicity of drives, in the relatively greatest strength that can be endured. Indeed, where the plant "man" shows himself strongest one finds instincts that conflict powerfully (e. g., in Shakespeare), but are controlled.

981. Not to allow oneself to be misled by blue eyes or heaving bosoms [too late matey] :greatness of soul has nothing romantic about it. And unfortunately nothing at all amiable.

1003. [The hero] divines the remedies for partial injuries; he has illnesses as great stimulants of his life [hmm --anyone in mind here?]

1007. To revalue values--what would that mean? All the spontaneous--new,future, stronger--movements must be there; but they still appear under false names and valuations and have not yet become conscious of themselves. A courageous becoming-conscious and affirmation of what has been achieved--a liberation from the slovenly routine of old valuations that dishonor us in the best and strongest things we have achieved.

1017 . Neither has one dared to grasp that an increase in the terribleness of man is an accompaniment of every increase in culture; in this, one is still subject to the Christian ideal and takes its side against paganism, also against the Renaissance concept of virtù...Napoleon: insight that the higher and the terrible man necessarily belong together. The "man" reinstated; the woman again accorded her due tribute of contempt and fear. "Totality" as health and highest activity; the straight line, the grand style in action rediscovered; the most powerful instinct, that of life itself, the lust to rule, affirmed

1026. Such men as Napoleon must come again and again and confirm the belief in the autocracy of the individual: but he himself was corrupted by the means he had to employ and lost noblesse of character

1038. Is it necessary to elaborate that a god prefers to stay beyond everything bourgeois and rational? and, between ourselves, also beyond good and evil?

1054 [soon after a subheading -- The Eternal Recurrence] The greatest of struggles: for this a new weapon is needed. The hammer: to provoke a fearful decision, to confront Europe with the consequences: whether its will "wills" destruction. Prevention of reduction to mediocrity. Rather destruction!

1055 a mighty pressure and hammer with which he [the philosopher]breaks and removes degenerate and decaying races to make way for a new order of life.

1056. the idea that gives many the right to erase themselves-- the great cultivating idea.

1057. The eternal recurrence. A prophecy [there follows a series of headings for a planned book,apparently, including ]3. Probable consequences of its being believed (it makes everything break open). a) Means of enduring it; b) Means of disposing it. 4. Its place in history as a mid-point. Period of greatest danger. Foundation of an oligarchy above peoples and their interests: education to a universally human politics. Counterpart of Jesuitism.

1058. The two great philosophical points of view (devised by Germans): a) that of becoming, of development. b) that according to the value of existence (but the wretched form of German pessimism must first be overcome!)--both  brought together by me in a decisive way. Everything becomes and recurs eternally--escape is impossible!-- Supposing we could judge value, what follows? The idea of recurrence as a selective principle, in the service of strength (and barbarism!!).

1059. 1. The idea [of the eternal recurrence]: the presuppositions that would have to be true if it were true. Its consequences. 2. As the hardest idea: its probable effect if it were not prevented, i. e., if all values were not revalued. 3. Means of enduring it: the revaluation of all values. No longer joy in certainty but uncertainty; no longer "cause and effect" but the continually creative; no longer will to preservation but to power; no longer the humble expression, "everything is merely subjective," but "it is also our work!-- Let us be proud of it!"

1060. To endure the idea of the recurrence one needs: freedom from morality [so he won't feel guilty next time] ; new means against the fact of pain (pain conceived as a tool, as the father of pleasure; there is no cumulative consciousness of displeasure); the enjoyment of all kinds of uncertainty, experimentalism, as a counterweight to this extreme fatalism; abolition of the concept of necessity; abolition of the [normal conceptions of?]  "will"; abolition of "knowledge-in-itself." Greatest elevation of the consciousness of strength in man, as he creates the overman.

1061. The two most extreme modes of thought--the mechanistic and the Platonic--are reconciled in the eternal recurrence: both as ideals.

1062. [Given the lapse of time, the world would have reached its final state by now if it were not still becoming]  If it were in any way capable of a pausing and becoming fixed, of "being," then all becoming would long since have come to an end, along with all thinking, all "spirit." The fact of "spirit" as a form of becoming proves that the world has no goal, no final state, and is incapable of being [really weak tautological arguments in my view- -and the latter refers to human notions of becoming again.Not Deleuzian at all!]...This notion--that the world intentionally avoids a goal and even knows artifices for keeping itself from entering into a circular course--must occur to all those who would like to force on the world the ability for eternal novelty, i. e., on a finite, definite, unchangeable force of constant size, such as the world is, the miraculous power of infinite novelty in its forms and states....The world, even if it is no longer a god, is still supposed to be capable of the divine power of creation, the power of infinite transformations; it is supposed to consciously prevent itself from returning to any of its old forms. it is supposed to possess not only the intention but the means of every one of its movements at every moment so as to escape goals, final states, repetitions--and whatever else may follow from such an unforgivably insane way of thinking and desiring. It is still the old religious way of thinking and desiring, a kind of longing to believe that in some way the world is after all like the old beloved, infinite, boundlessly creative God--that in some way "the old God still lives"-- that longing of Spinoza which was expressed in the words "deus sive natura" [God or nature.] (he even felt "natura sive deus"). {So THIS notion cannot be the basis for the eternal return?]...the world, as force, may not be thought of as unlimited, for it cannot be so thought of; we forbid ourselves the concept of an infinite force as incompatible with the concept "force." Thus--the world also lacks the capacity for eternal novelty.

1063. [So] The law of the conservation of energy demands eternal recurrence [so it is OK to rely on science here then? Isn't this just a superficial law based on appearances?] [and what do we make of this...]

1064. That a state of equilibrium is never reached proves that it is not possible. But in an indefinite space it would have to have been reached. Likewise in a spherical space. The shape of space must be the cause of eternal movement, and ultimately of all "imperfection". [all tautological and self-referring,claiming to be 'science' still?] ...[Matey sees the problem] the necessity of change has only been posited once more conceptually.[so let us appeal to common sense...]

1065 everything seems far too valuable to be so fleeting: I seek an eternity for everything: ought one to pour the most precious salves and wines into the sea?-- My consolation[sic]  is that everything that has been is eternal: the sea will cast it up again [Reads like Moby Dick here -- and elsewhere!].

1066. The world exists; it is not something that becomes, not something that passes away. Or rather: it becomes, it passes away, but it has never begun to become and never ceased from passing away--it maintains itself in both.-- It lives on itself: its excrements are its food...The last attempt to conceive a world that had a beginning has lately been made several times with the aid of logical procedures--generally, as one may divine, with an ulterior theological motive.{The some waffle to demolish straw men arguments for a finite world,specifically Duhring's] Nothing can prevent me from reckoning backward from this moment and saying "I shall never reach the end"; just as I can reckon forward from the same moment into the infinite. Only if I made the mistake--I shall guard against it--of equating this correct concept of a regressus in infinitum with an utterly unrealizable concept of a finite progressus up to this present, only if I suppose that the direction (forward or backward) is logically a matter of  difference, would I take the head--this moment--for the tail...If the world could in any way become rigid, dry, dead, nothing, or if it could reach a state of equilibrium, or if it had any kind of goal that involved duration, immutability, the once-and-for-all (in short, speaking metaphysically: if becoming could resolve itself into being or into nothingness), then this state must have been reached: from which it follows--...If, e. g.,the mechanistic theory cannot avoid the consequence, drawn for it by William Thomson [{his brackets} First Baron Kelvin (1824-1907), British physicist and mathematician who introduced the Kelvin or Absolute Scale of temperature.], of leading to a final state, then the mechanistic theory stands refuted [pathetic argument from authority,personal and scientific] ...If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of force and as a certain definite number of centers of force--and every other representation remains indefinite and therefore useless--it follows that, in the great dice game of existence, it must pass through a calculable number of combinations. In infinite time, every possible combination would at some time or another be realized; more: it would be realized an infinite number of times. And since between every combination and its next recurrence all other possible combinations would have to take place, and each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: the world as a circular movement that has already repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game in infinitum. This conception is not simply a mechanistic conception; for if it were that, it would not condition an infinite recurrence of identical cases, but a final state. Because the world has not reached this, mechanistic theory must be considered an imperfect and merely provisional hypothesis.[Still not the deleuzian notion --but  statistical repetition, like monkeys pounding keyboards.The last bit is really baffling or tautological]

[Ends with the quote at the start]


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