What are The Consequences of Increasingly Using the Territorial Army, US Army Reserve and National Guard to Support British and American Operations? Can Any Comparisons be Drawn?

Andy Harris


                Since the end of the Cold War, reserves have been increasingly used to support the regular British and American armed forces in times of overstretch or national crisis. Today they provide support for the full range of military operations, serving alongside their regular counterparts on war fighting and peacekeeping missions, rather than being limited to their Cold War role of providing a general reserve for a general war in Europe.  

            The recent rise in overseas commitments, most notably those in Iraq, has only served to highlight an expanded role for reservists[1]. Increased operational tempo has significantly increased the potential for overstretch, thereby posing a substantial impediment to operational effectiveness. As a result, the numbers of British and American reservists deployed on operations has risen exponentially since the occupation of Iraq in 2003.

            No where are these observations more apparent than in the cases of the British and United States Army, both of which contain a notably larger reserve component than their respective sister services. The Territorial Army (TA) currently comprises twenty five per cent of the entire British Army[2], with over nine thousand of its personnel being compulsory mobilised for operations in 2003 and 2004[3].  

            The US Army has an even higher dependency on reserves, with over fifty per cent of its overall compliment consisting of United States Army Reserve (USAR), and National Guard (NG) soldiers. In 2004 over forty per cent of US Army troops in Iraq were reservists[4], a number which has reportedly risen in 2005.

            With both armies having such a sizable reliance on reserves, they provide an interesting focal point for a discussion on the ensuing consequences. Additionally, because they are two of the most heavily engaged armed forces in the world, they prove particularly useful in debating specific contemporary issues, such as the relationship between increased operational tempo, reserve use, and operational effectiveness. Furthermore, due to the fact that joint British and American Army operations are commonplace, a unique opportunity is provided to make a comparison between the consequences resulting from the increasing use of reserves, in two similarly orientated armies. It is for these reasons that the British and US Army have been chosen as the subjects for this dissertation.     

               It is clear that such an increased use of reservists to support British and American operations has resulted in a number of consequences, but what exactly are these consequences, and what are their effects? In order to address these questions a thorough academic analysis is required, a task that has had surprisingly little attention devoted to it, considering its relevance and importance. A number of studies and reports deal with specific aspects of these questions, but an analysis dealing with the issues in their entirety appears to be left wanting. Accordingly, the aim of this dissertation is to offer such an analysis, by discussing and expanding upon the existing debates. In doing so it also aims to present a fresh perspective, through a more subjective vantage point from within the military establishment. Such an approach is arguably crucial to fully appreciating the entire range of consequences, and yet is absent from the majority of existing literature. Overall it is hoped that the findings presented in the analysis will stand as a basis for further inquiry.      


            In light of the methodological implications arising from the methods used to research this dissertation, it was felt a section should be devoted to addressing them. As a result this section aims to evaluate the methods by discussing their strengths and weaknesses with respect to their intended purposes, along with the difficulties faced in applying them.

            The main method adopted was an analysis of the existing publications on the use of reserves in the British and US Army, in order to give the dissertation a firm grounding. These included a number of government reports, academic pieces, and media articles, coming from a range of British and American sources.

            The government reports came from Ministry of Defence publications, and a study from the US Government Accounting Office. The academic pieces were largely American in origin, and included articles from publications such as “Armed Forces and Society”, and a number of MA theses presented by serving US Army officers, submitted as part of their staff officer training. The media articles were more evenly spread, comprising of British newspaper articles, such as those from the “Daily Telegraph”, and American articles, such as those from the “Washington Post”.

            The government reports and academic pieces formed the focal point of the analysis, with the media articles predominately being used for illustrative purposes, as they provided a number of good examples on specific issues. These reports were used to introduce some of the key debates, and provide an “official” account of the consequences affecting British and US Army operational effectiveness from increasingly using reserves. They also provided a means to measure these consequences, as they discussed the desirable capabilities of reserves, against which assessments of the actual capabilities, taken from other sources, could be compared.

            Due to the nature of this dissertation as an academic inquiry, previous academic discourse on the subject was a vital component of the methodology. It was used to expand upon specific aspects of the key debates raised in the government reports, and counter some of the shortfalls in these reports, by providing a theoretical setting.

            A number of journals, and the MA theses, were deliberately chosen for their unique perspectives, as they combined academic methods with a military insight. Both attributes were lacking from the majority of the government reports, which often appeared rather uncritical in reaching their conclusions. They also often appeared to lack a substantive military input, resulting in the issues largely being interpreted from a civilian perspective.

            There were, however, two key weaknesses inherent in these academic pieces. The first was that almost all of them concentrated entirely on the case of US Army reserves, with very little specific inquiry into the TA, an apparent result of a substantial gap in military academia as a whole. As a result, the problem of over representing the USAR and NG in the findings became an issue.  

            The second weakness was that a number of the pieces needed updating, with specific reference to three pieces. The first was an article by W. Walker, published in 1992, and the second was an article published in 1998 by D. Segal, B. Reed and D. Rohall. The third was one of the MA theses written by J. S. Pritchett, also published in 1998.

            Due to the considerable changes in the way reserves have been used in the British and US Army since the publication of these pieces, the accuracy and validity of their findings was called into question. Arguably therefore, their use in analysing the scale and nature of the current consequences faced by increasingly using reservist, would be inappropriate.

             Despite these weaknesses, it was felt that they could be limited to an acceptable and workable level for the following reasons. With regards to the first weakness, of potentially over representing US Army reserves, it seemed reasonable to conclude that some of the findings from the American sources could also be applied to the case of the TA, if corroborated by findings from British sources. Evidently not all of the findings could be applied to the TA, but it appeared that a large proportion could, due to the number of similarities between the British and US Army.

            With regards to the second problem, that of a number of the pieces needing updating, it appeared unwise to dismiss their findings purely on the basis of the date of their publication. Admittedly they could not provide as contemporary an analysis as more recent publications, but they were nevertheless still relevant to a debate on the consequences of using reservists in the post Cold War era. Indeed not only were they relevant, but upon conducting further research it became evident that their findings were in fact fundamental to understanding some of the key issues, with many of their central tenets being supported by later publications. As a result it seemed reasonable to assume that a number of inferences could be made from these pieces, upon which further, and more recent, research could be used to form a more contemporary analysis.

             In addition to the research gained from existing publications, the decision was taken to include some primary research, using the social science methods of surveying and ethnography, to conduct an analysis of the TA. An elaboration of the specific way in which these methods were used, along with a discussion of their merits and difficulties, is included at a later stage.   

            It was decided during the initial stages of researching this dissertation, that a component of the research was needed to focus specifically on the case of the British Army. This decision was taken in light of the lack of contemporary British specific analysis in the existing publications, and therefore with the aim of further limiting the weaknesses inherent in these pieces. With regards to the weakness of a potential overrepresentation of US reservists in the findings, a series of British specific examples would provide a means to cross reference the findings from American sources. Likewise, the inclusion of some contemporary research would further negate the weakness posed by the outdated sources, by providing some updated findings to either support, or disprove their original findings.   

            Predominately though, this specific type of qualitative research was chosen for its ability to provide a unique insight into the questions being addressed, as it allowed for a subjective viewpoint through the eyes of serving reservists. Such an insight seemed particularly important as a number of the surrounding issues dealt specifically with subjective matters, such as the reasons for a reservist being less likely to volunteer for another operational tour. In much of the existing material, particularly from government sources, these matters had been addressed with little or no in depth consultation of serving reservists, favoring quantitative data as a means of compiling findings. Whilst quantitative data certainly had its place in an analysis of reserve use, the shortage of qualitative data stood in need of correcting.

             It should be mentioned that this dissertation does not claim to be a purely sociological piece, having simply borrowed the methods of surveying and ethnography from the social sciences, in order to supplement the existing research. Admittedly therefore, a sociologist may well find the use of these methods in such a way problematic, and the following discussion on the difficulties in using them brief. In response it seems reasonable to suggest that as long as the inherent methodological implications of using these methods are highlighted, their inclusion remains justifiable. Consequently the following discussion aims to highlight the main merits and difficulties associated with the chosen methods, with reference to qualitative research as a whole, and more specifically the research for this dissertation.

             The survey took the form of sending a qualitative based questionnaire, via circular email, to the personnel of a TA infantry battalion and military police company. These units were specifically chosen because they had a high proportion of reservists who had seen operational service, and because they were easily accessible contacts.

            The questionnaire was eleven questions long, and asked for reservists who had been operational to reflect on their experiences during mobilisation, whilst in theatre and upon being demobilised. Subjects covered included their impressions of the training they received, and whether they experienced any employer and family tensions. The questions were deliberately kept open ended in order to give respondents the opportunity to express their own views, in their own words, and therefore maximise the validity of the data. In all, eleven questionnaires were returned.  

            The issue of validity relates to a significant merit of this method[5], reflected in the answers given to the questionnaires, which provided a detailed and extremely useful subjective insight into the experiences of “going on tour”. Another merit was the ability to readily access a large population, with relative ease and minimal inconvenience to the respondents, through the use of email. In addition it allowed for a reachable comparison between the experiences of reservists from two different units, with very different roles.

            However despite these merits, a number of difficulties also emerged. The first relates to a common criticism of open ended surveys, that of the lack of standardised answers making any kind of statistical analysis difficult[6]. Nevertheless, due to the requirement for qualitative, rather than quantitative, data, this criticism did not appear to be a significant concern.

            The second relates to the fact that only eleven questionnaires were returned, even though the number of recipients potentially numbered at company strength (ninety soldiers). Although the exact number of recipients is unknown, due to the nature of a circular email, it was anticipated that there would be a larger number of respondents. As a result, the problem of not having enough answers to provide a typical analysis became an issue.

            Nevertheless, it was felt that this issue could be overcome by using the eleven completed questionnaires as a sample to infer additional findings. Although relatively small in number, the completed questionnaires fortunately came from a variety of reservists, from different civilian backgrounds, different ranks, and who undertook a range of roles. This advantage, combined with the fact that they all provided extremely thorough answers, suggested they could still provide a reasonable sample to highlight some emerging general trends.

            The small number of completed questionnaires also signified another difficulty, that of an unwillingness by some reservists to be overtly questioned about their experiences. Indeed a small proportion appeared openly hostile to being sent a questionnaire and academia in general, with one particular reservist stating that he found it offensive and intrusive. Although such cases were very much in the minority, and every step was taken to ensure the questionnaire remained respectful of delicate issues, it still evidently caused a problem for some. 

             The effectiveness of the questionnaire was also compromised by a number of military restrictions, in particular a concern originating from senior ranks in the military police unit, that restricted information might inadvertently be exposed. Even with the reassurance of being a serving member of the unit myself, and therefore being subject to the constraints of the Official Secrets Act, these concerns appeared to remain a source of contention, and undoubtedly reduced the units’ willingness to embrace the research.

             It quickly became evident that the difficulties inherent in using a survey would need to be complimented by the merits of an additional method. An ethnographic study of the personnel in the military police unit was subsequently chosen as the most viable alternative, using the method of participant observation. The study was conducted over a six month period, and involved the observation, and informal interviewing, of those individuals in the unit who had been deployed on operations. A field diary was kept to record the results.

            The merits of conducting such a study were evident. It allowed me to penetrate the close knit military sub-culture prevalent in the unit, and gain a first hand subjective insight into the reservists’ experiences, thereby filling in the gaps left by the survey to produce a richer understanding of the prevalent issues. Gaining such an understanding proved particularly valuable to the research, as although I personally had military experience, and could gain an insight into the personal issues surrounding a mobilisation, I could not fully appreciate them, as I have yet to be deployed.

             Although the majority of those individuals spoken to knew that I was a student, and knew the title of my dissertation, they nevertheless appeared far more willing to discuss their experiences in an informal and more personal setting. Indeed even the reservist who had stated his disdain at being sent a questionnaire, remarked that he did not object to being approached face to face. Using participant observation also afforded far more flexibility than a questionnaire, as it allowed me to tailor questions and immediately follow up any leads[7].

 There were, however, a number of inherent difficulties in using this approach. Aside from the ethical implications, which it was felt were addressed by ensuring anonymity was preserved, the most significant difficulty arose from a potential for me to loose an objective standpoint, and become an “insider”[8]. The mere fact that I was a serving soldier in the unit made this problem a particularly pressing issue, and called into question my ability to be able to compile an unbiased, and therefore valid, analysis.

            In response, I would suggest that a suitable objective standpoint was achieved through the application of stringent academic standards, in order to distance myself slightly from the group, and maintain a disciplined approach. The fact that I was new to the unit, having just transferred from another TA unit, aided this process. Consequently, although there remains the potential for the analysis to be biased, I would argue that it has been limited to an acceptable level.  

            Another significant difficulty was that although the use of participant observation yielded a higher number, and arguable more valid set, of responses than the questionnaires, it still sampled a reasonably small and specialist group of reservists. As a result it could be questioned whether the responses gained from these reservists can be used as part of a general analysis of the TA. Military policeman/policewomen belong to a small corps, and by the nature of their role often act independently whilst maintaining a distance from other units. The experiences of the soldiers in the military police unit are therefore likely to reflect these particular conditions.

To counter this problem, the technique of “triangulation”[9] was adopted, whereby the results gained from the participant observation study were checked against the results from the questionnaires and existing publications, in order to see if any correlations were evident. In completing the task of triangulation, it emerged that a number of similarities were prevalent amongst all the sources.

 Findings and Analysis

            This section will present and analyse the findings gained from the research, in order to highlight the most pressing consequences from increasingly using reserves to support British and US Army operations. Along the way it will perform a comparison between the way in which these consequences affect the TA, USAR and NG, drawing upon any similarities and differences.

 In doing so it will concentrate on the consequences affecting operational effectiveness, in light of the controversial debate currently raging over whether a reliance on reservists, to counter the negative effects resulting from increasing operational tempo, actually aids, or instead merely impedes, the abilities of the two armies.

It will also explore the social consequences, which although perhaps appear less immediate than the operational consequences, nevertheless still deserve attention. Indeed a consideration of these social consequences proves important, as they can underlie, and act in conjunction with, a number of the operational consequences. Their evident impact upon certain important social institutions and functions also highlights their significance.

Before beginning the analysis, it should be reiterated that these findings focus exclusively on the consequences of increasingly using reservists to support operations, rather than discussing the general pros and cons of the TA, USAR and NG. Some of the more general debates concerning the use of reserves are therefore deliberately omitted, or merely touched upon, in order to narrow the specifics of the analysis and keep it as contemporary as possible. For instance, the debate surrounding the relationships between reserve and regular soldiers is not discussed in depth, because the exact effects of increasingly integrating reserve soldiers are unclear at this stage. To do the topic justice, a separate detailed enquiry would have to be conducted, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 

            From the outset, it is clear that the increased use of reservists results in both positive and negative operational consequences for the British and US Army. In order to analyse these consequences in greater detail, their affects should be assessed in relation to the tasks expected of the TA, USAR and NG. With regards to the TA these task are as follows. Firstly, to provide support to the regular army in order to fulfill operational demands; to act as insurance in case of a reemerging threat against NATO; to provide a homeland contingency measure, in case of a natural or terrorist incident and finally, to provide a link between the army and civilian population[10].

The expectations of the USAR and NG follow suit, but with an extra emphasise on the need to provide a homeland contingency measure, in response to the US’ greater susceptibility to natural disasters, and heightened requirement to support her domestic authorities in the face of terrorist action.

 The Negative Operational Consequences

With these tasks in mind, let us first address the negative operational consequences. These relate to the heightened exposure of prevalent shortfalls in the TA, USAR and NG, which although have always existed, become more of a problem in light of the increasing demands placed upon reserve soldiers. The result is a significant barrier to the readiness of reserves, and therefore their ability to adequately support the full range of operations 

            The most immediate of these shortfalls regards the training standards of British and American reserve soldiers, an issue which has consistently plagued the TA, USAR and NG. However, previously, in their largely inactive role, reservists had advanced warning of an impending mobilisation, and time to bring their training up to speed before deploying. Today deployments are quick, which significantly reduces preparation time. 

             By their part time nature, reserve soldiers receive considerably less training than their regular counterparts, and the quality of the training that they do receive often appears of a questionable standard. The normal annual training commitments of a TA soldier are one drill night a week, one to two weekends a month and a two week camp or course. Similar commitment levels are expected of USAR and NG soldiers serving in the higher readiness “Selected Reserve”, standing at an annual requirement of forty eight drill periods and a two week camp[11]. However, those serving in the “Individual Ready Reserve” (IRR) have no such training obligations[12].

            Unsurprisingly therefore, there exists a substantial gap between the military skills of reserve and regular soldiers in both armies, compounded by the fact that reserve training packages often fall significantly short of regular standards, by having to be condensed in line with civilian schedules. For example, the recruit training for a TA Infantry soldier culminates in a two week TA Combat Infantryman’s Course (CIC), whereas the regular course lasts twenty five weeks.      

            Numerous examples of this skills gap can be found throughout the TA, USAR and NG, despite the existence of pre-deployment training packages and efforts to bring reserve training in line with regular programs. Although these efforts have gone a long way to decrease the gap, the fact that they are often implemented in an ad hoc fashion, means the quality of a reservist is very much hit and miss, and down the individual.

            The findings of the Hansard Debates highlight this gap, with the assessment that only fifty per cent of the TA is readily deployable at any one time[13], pointing to training discrepancies as the key contributing factor. A 2004 Government Accounting Office report highlights a similar gap in the ability of the NG to readily deploy, and also points to training shortfalls as a central cause. It uses a recent deployment to Iraq to illustrate the problem, stating that only sixty eight per cent of personnel from the six brigades activated during 2004 were qualified in their specialist role. The remaining personnel were employed in new roles and without the proper training to conduct them effectively[14].

Findings from the primary research further reflect this skills gap, highlighting a number of prevalent concerns amongst TA soldiers over training standards. In particular, a consistent theme emerging from the questionnaires is the inadequate nature of pre-deployment training received by soldiers before deploying to Iraq. Although the severity of the criticisms varied, all the questionnaires discussed a number of common shortfalls.

            Two of the soldiers questioned were deployed on Operation Telic One, the initial war fighting phase of operations in Iraq. One was an Infantry Corporal whilst the other was a Military Policeman, and both expected to be deployed in their respective roles. However, they were subsequently re-rolled upon arriving in theatre, to perform totally different tasks in a logistical brigade. These tasks required specific training, but both soldiers state that their pre-deployment package covered none of the necessary skills. In addition the soldiers state that it neglected to adequately bring their other skills up to speed, most notably Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) procedures, which was of particular concern in light of the expected high risk from such weapons.

            The rest of the survey group, serving on peacekeeping duties during Operation Telic Three and Four, also stated that they received very little specific training for their role. They were deployed in a “Force Protection” role, a major feature of which was convoy escorting. Despite this, the soldiers state that they received very little vehicle training, such as anti ambush drills, with just one day devoted to the specifics of convoy escorts. As a result they had to learn these skills “on the job” in theatre.

            Another common criticism was a focus on physical training while other, arguably more important, skills were overlooked. Whilst they all accepted the need for physical training, they were quick to point out that it was the wrong kind, with long forced marches proving of little benefit in preparing for the urban environment of Basra. More importantly the soldiers state that practical weapons training was subsequently overlooked, which they feel would have prepared them far more for the rigors of an operational deployment. By practical weapons training the soldiers were referring to learning how to use their weapons in real life situations, rather than merely going through the drills in a classroom.

            It should be mentioned that these soldiers overcame these shortfalls to perform their roles extremely well, but the clear gaps in the training suggest that that was largely down to their unusually high caliber, allowing them to quickly adapt their training in theatre. Thus it remains questionable whether a less able TA unit, of which there are many, would have been able to perform as effectively, highlighted by a number of examples in the UK press of TA soldiers performing badly.

            An article in The Daily Telegraph for instance, pointed to the case of a TA soldier being court marshaled over the shooting of a colleague whilst on a tour in Iraq. During the investigation, it emerged that he was deployed despite demonstrating poor weapons skills, suggesting the training he received was inadequate. Furthermore, the article suggests that this was by no means an isolated case, with an official British Army estimate alleging that approximately two thousand three hundred TA personnel should not have been deployed for the same reason[15].             

A particular problem arising from this skills gap, regards the quality of reserve officers in the TA, USAR and NG. With regards to the TA, officer training is significantly less extensive than in the regular British Army, culminating in a mere two week course at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, compared with the usual eleven months for regular officers. Although superseded by several months of training in the officer’s respective unit, there is a massive discrepancy in the way it is implemented, resulting in a significant number of potential TA officers reaching Sandhurst under trained and under prepared[16].

            Likewise, Walker’s study points to a disparity in the abilities of USAR and NG officers[17], compared with their regular counterparts. He studied a sample group of both reserve and regular officers, and recorded a greater tendency for the reserve officers to appear uncertain and indecisive, and be overly concerned with “local issues”, such as promotion opportunities. He also noted that they were intensely mistrusted by their regular colleagues, indicating a lack of confidence in their abilities. Ultimately, it would seem reasonable to attribute the majority of this disparity to the existence of shortfalls in USAR and NG officer training, similar to those found in TA officer training.

Findings from the primary research also support the existence of a problem with reserve officer training, with a number of soldiers revealing a concern over the abilities of their officers. A commonly cited problem was the inability of TA officers to adequately prepare for training exercises, leaving soldiers unnecessarily under prepared and under equipped. On one specific occasion, whilst conducting public order training, soldiers were left without the necessary protective equipment, resulting in three sustaining serious facial injuries and having to be medically discharged.

The doubts over these officers’ abilities were reinforced upon arriving in theatre, with soldiers describing how an operations cell had to be closed down by regular staff, because it failed to perform effectively. Interestingly, even the officer in the survey group indicated the presence of these problems, stating that if he were to deploy again he would prefer to serve with, and under the command of, regular officers.

            A significant barrier to reserve soldiers achieving the required training standards, relates to an apparent disparity between their average fitness levels, and those of regular soldiers. This disparity appears to be a particular problem amongst US reservists, with the Pentagon confirming that a troubling percentage was medically unfit for deployment to Iraq[18]. Furthermore, a disproportionate percentage of reservists were recorded as sick or injured during their service in Iraq, and although fatalities and wounded in action rates were similar to those of regular soldiers, the instances of reserve “Disease and Non Battle Injuries” (DNBI) were nearly double. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence for Health Affairs, also reported that reservists had a fifty per cent higher incidence of “health concerns”, and a sixty five per cent higher incidence of “medical/dental problems”. They also displayed a thirty three per cent higher incidence of “mental health concerns” than regular soldiers[19].

These divergences are attributed to Reservists’ being on average older than their regular counterparts, which in turn suggests they are less able to cope with the rigors of operational service, particularly those presented by combat roles. Although no figures were available to compare these findings against those from the TA, the fact that the average age of a TA soldier is also higher, suggests a similar problem may be prevalent.    

Training shortfalls in the TA are made worse by the fact that it is often the most experienced NCO’s that are mobilised first. With increasing numbers of deployments, units have been left without their best instructors, resulting in a substantial lull in the training standards of those soldiers left behind[20]. This lull is a particular source of concern with regards to recruit training, which has had to be virtually suspended in some units, due to the high numbers of training staff deployed on operations. For example, the observations of the military police unit indicated significant shortfalls in the training of recruits, and the company as a whole, due to a substantial number of personnel remaining in Iraq. As a result there were neither enough instructors, nor enough numbers of personnel, to make the training as effective as it should have been.

            In comparison, none of the existing material on the USAR and NG discussed the problem of loosing experienced instructors, perhaps due to the fact that US reserves tend to deploy in large formed units more often than the TA, meaning very few soldiers are left behind to experience a training lull. Instead, the material suggests other factors are responsible for the training problems inherent in the USAR and NG, such as those relating to geographical constraints. For instance, due to the highly dispersed nature of the NG, with training locations spread out over vast distances, it proves extremely difficult to conduct centralised training on a regular basis[21].               

Equipment procurement problems also serve to exacerbate the training shortfalls; a common difficulty faced by both British and US reserve units. As the Hansard Debates highlight, the TA is significantly under equipped compared to the regular British Army[22], in terms of weapons, radios, vehicles and other personal items such as clothing. Not only are there insufficient quantities of equipment, but it is also often outdated and therefore different to that issued to regular soldiers.

USAR and NG soldiers face a similar problem, with one US Army estimate stating that reserve equipment is on average ten to fifteen years behind that of their regular counterparts, making it largely ineffective and incompatible[23]. Furthermore, the Government Accounting Office report stated that the NG units deployed to Iraq in 2004 were only allocated sixty five per cent of the equipment they needed, whilst the remaining inactive units faced a thirty three per cent equipment deficit.  

The ensuing effects are a widening skills gap amongst reserve soldiers, and a reduced capacity for integrated training with regulars. Operational effectiveness is further compromised by the fact that reserve units are often forced to deploy with deficient equipment, meaning they are under prepared to serve alongside regular units, especially at short notice.

            From examining the extent of these training shortfalls, and the further problems caused by equipment procurement difficulties, it is clear that the readiness of reserve units to deploy on certain operations is questionable. In particular, their ability to deploy quickly is limited, with reservists unable to immediately step into regular roles, as they require substantial time to prepare for an impending mobilisation.

            The majority of reserve units are therefore largely unsuitable for operations requiring a quick reaction capability, which includes the majority of war fighting missions and “spearhead” deployments. Consequently, it is doubtful whether these units can adequately perform their first task, that of providing support in order to fulfill operational demands, as a large proportion of these operational demands concern war fighting missions. Accordingly, they are also limited in their ability to provide an insurance measure against a potential reemerging threat to NATO, referring to their second task.

            Furthermore, the increased demand for reservists to support operations overseas has resulted in the training being focused almost exclusively on operational roles, which detracts away from training for the task of providing a homeland contingency measure.  For instance TA units currently allocate just two weekends a year to training for their Civilian Contingency Reaction Force (CCRF) role, presenting a concern over the ability to effectively co-ordinate with the emergency services should an incident occur[24]. Neglecting this role is a particular source of concern for the US, due to their greater reliance on reservists to support domestic authorities in the face of a natural disaster or terrorist attack.

A shortage of useable manpower in the TA, USAR and NG is the second most obvious shortfall, another prevalent problem which has progressively worsened with the increasing demands placed upon British and American reserve soldiers. According to 2002 figures, the TA had a personnel deficit of one thousand three hundred[25], a figure which is likely to have risen following the recent numbers of deployments[26]. A similarly damaging deficit is facing the USAR and NG, although is far more serious with the US Army’s heavier reliance on reserve support. The NG currently falls some ten thousand personnel short of its required number, and the USAR only has an estimated thirty seven thousand five hundred and fifteen available personnel, from its usual two hundred thousand three hundred and sixty six compliment[27].  

Mounting difficulties with recruitment and retention are the main reasons behind these deficiencies, a direct result of the personal costs faced by reservists from being increasingly deployed. The question of whether the TA, USAR and NG can provide enough numbers to fulfill their heightened operational requirements is subsequently raised, presenting more doubts over their readiness to conduct the tasks expected of them.     

With an increasing disparity between military and civilian attitudes[28] resulting in individuals choosing to pursue alternative paths to a military career, recruitment in the British and US Army has been a problem for some time. But with mounting social unrest over recent operations in Iraq, reserve units have found it progressively more difficult to recruit sufficient numbers. The major factor behind this recruitment problem, is that individuals are dissuaded from joining as they become increasingly aware of the personal costs they could face as a result of being deployed[29], a subject which has received a lot of attention in the British and American media. An underlying social consequence is therefore reflected, one which is further discussed later in the findings.  

            It is the issue of retaining serving reservists that proves the greatest source of concern though, with a reported mass exodus following large deployments of British and US reserve units in 2003 and 2004[30]. Tensions between reservists and employers are seen as the most influential reason behind these retention problems, closely followed by family pressures, as reservists become concerned over the implications further deployments could have on their careers and families.    

            These concerns are reflected in the British Government’s assessment of the retention issue for the TA, referring to employer tensions and pay anomalies as the most common source of unrest amongst deployed personnel[31]. In particular they are seen as being concerned over the security of their jobs upon demobilising, questioning the effectiveness of the provisions in the 1985 Reserve Forces Act, in which employers are legally bound to keep a “similar” position open to returning employees[32]. The potential financial consequences are also highlighted as a key concern, with a large number of complaints emerging over the difficulties faced in gaining compensation for loss of earnings, due to the discrepancy between civilian and military rates of pay[33].

Whilst deployed TA soldiers are paid the same rates of pay as their regular counterparts, and with a compensation ceiling of just twenty thousand pounds, dependent on rank and specialist civilian skills, many soldiers have experienced serious financial loss. Further compensation is available upon proof of hardship, but, according to the government assessment, this process proves unwieldy and increases the likelihood for affected individuals not to volunteer for further deployments, or to leave the TA completely[34].

            A recent survey of TA personnel sent to the Gulf further reflects these concerns. Of the personnel questioned, eighty per cent stated that they did not expect their employer to be supportive of a future deployment, and thirty nine per cent stated that they believed their job security had been directly threatened by being deployed. Because of these factors, sixty three per cent stated that they were considering resigning from the TA, and sixty one per cent indicated they would not recommend joining the TA to work colleagues[35]. 

            Employer related problems appear to particularly affect TA officers, resulting in the issue of officer retention receiving special attention in the assessment. The Hansard debates attributes the rise in the numbers of officers leaving the TA to the fact that they often possess high powered civilian jobs, which are especially threatened by being mobilised. They are therefore forced to make a choice between their civilian and reserve careers, and invariably their civilian career comes first[36].  

            American sources also reflect the view that concerns over employment and pay are the main reasons behind reservists making themselves unavailable for further deployments. But they also introduce the notion of family pressures having an equal impact, a tension which specifically affects reservists due to being, on average, older than their regular counterparts[37].  Kirby’s study for instance, found that family stresses were placed alongside employer tensions as the most common reasons for US reservists terminating their term of service following a deployment[38]. Female reservists were found to be especially influenced by these stresses[39].

In addition, Kirby discusses the impact of other factors on US reserve retention, such as the importance of feeling satisfied with being a member of the USAR and NG. She found that those who were satisfied with their service were twice more likely to extend their contracts than those who were not, which becomes a source of concern in light of rising levels of disillusionment amongst reservists over operations in Iraq. This could present a particularly acute problem for the USAR and NG, with levels of disillusionment amongst US reserve soldiers at their highest since the Vietnam War[40], almost certainly due to the extensive demands placed upon them. Increasing these demands would only heighten the unrest, and make retention even more of a problem than it already is.      

            The primary research further supports the notion of employer tensions and family pressures having a considerable impact on the retention of reserves. Just two of the soldiers from the survey indicated that they would unconditionally volunteer for another deployment, with the rest stating that they would not due to potential career implications, and, or, pressures from their partners. Four of the soldiers indicated that they would leave the TA completely at the end of their service engagement, because they felt they had now “done their bit” and were keen to pursue more personal agendas. 

Out of the soldiers who indicated they would not volunteer again, five described experiencing financial loss as a result of being deployed, supporting the assessment that financial considerations also have a serious impact on retention figures. One soldier stated that there was a twenty thousand pounds difference between his civilian and military salary, which left him struggling to keep up his mortgage repayments. Another soldier stated that due to the short notice of his deployment, he was unable to exit his tenancy agreement, and was consequently liable to pay rent for his central London flat throughout the six month tour.

These findings were also reflected in the study of the military police unit, which, as previously mentioned, is currently suffering from a severe shortage of personnel following deployments to Iraq in 2004. The majority of regular attendees were soldiers who had not yet been deployed, a notable observation in itself, but upon questioning the soldiers who had been deployed as to why they thought the turn out was so low, the most common answer given was that employer tensions and family pressures had caused many  to reconsider their position in the TA. A number of these soldiers also stated that although they had enjoyed their tour, and were happy to remain in the TA, they themselves would think twice about volunteering for another deployment for similar reasons. Those soldiers who were self employed were particularly concerned about the effects another deployment could have on their business.

            Increasingly using reserves to fulfill operational commitments has thus undoubtedly resulted in mounting recruitment and retention problems, thereby further reducing the readiness of British and US reserve units to fulfill the tasks required of them. Consequently, it is likely to become increasingly difficult to deploy reserves on a mass scale, and on a continuous basis, with a marked depletion in the numbers of willing and able personnel. The TA is currently only effective at providing company level support[41], and even this is likely to become more difficult in the face of continuing recruitment and retention problems. For USAR and NG units, the problems are more acute, with the head of the USAR, Lieutenant General J. R. Helmly, stating that they are in danger of becoming a “broken force”[42].

            The notion of reserves being ineffective at providing support for sustained military operations, such as war fighting missions, is therefore further supported, making the completion of the first two tasks expected of them even more problematic. In addition their ability to provide an effective homeland contingency measure is also reduced, with missions of a higher priority, which are generally overseas, soaking up the available manpower.

The Positive Operational Consequences

   Despite these negative operational consequences, it is important not to be overcritical of reserves, especially when considering the abnormal demands placed upon them. Although variable in quality, some reserve units, certainly the TA units studied in this dissertation, have shown that they can perform extremely well, demonstrating the same standards of professionalism as their regular colleagues. An appraisal of the USAR and NG in one of the MA theses reflects a similar view[43].

Indeed in some instances they even appear to perform to a higher standard than regular soldiers, as highlighted by a number of examples from the primary research. Soldiers from both units stated that regular soldiers often appeared lackadaisical in their approach, with one particularly poignant example being when a TA corporal had to lead a dangerous patrol, because a regular corporal was reluctant to go.

A change in the attitudes of regular soldiers towards their reserve colleagues is another example of some units’ achievements. Whereas reserves were previously viewed with some disdain by regular soldiers, they now appear to be increasingly viewed on equal terms, a trend that is reflected in the primary research. When asked to describe their relationships with regular soldiers, the soldiers from both units commented that generally speaking it was good, although there were some exceptions, particularly with regards to the attitudes of regular officers.

Consequently, whilst increasingly using reservists has resulted in significant problems, it has nevertheless given them the chance to prove themselves and show that effective integration with their regular counterparts is possible. In addition, whilst they are certainly impeded by a significant skills gap, reservists can often make up for it in enthusiasm and the possession of certain civilian skills.  Indeed these skills prove extremely valuable to the British and US Army, because they include much needed specialist expertise.

It is clear that these skills manifest themselves in more general, as well as specialist abilities. For instance, reserve soldiers bring life experience and maturity, due to them being on average older than their regular counterparts. The TA is also renowned for having, on average, better educated soldiers than the regular British Army, with a high percentage having at least a good standard of secondary education, and a considerable number with further and higher education. This is reflected in the primary research, with the vast majority of soldiers from both units possessing GCSE’s and A Levels, and an estimated fifty per cent holding diplomas or degrees. The fact that the TA is a largely urban force could be one reason behind these better standards, making for high caliber recruits.

These observations are not reflected in the USAR and NG though, with their soldiers, on average, possessing similarly low education standards to regular US Army soldiers[44]. Perhaps this reflects the fact that the majority of recruiting is done from lower income families in the more provincial areas of America.

However, the TA, USAR and NG all share the advantage of having reservists with specialist civilian skills amongst their ranks. These skills are often directly transferable to a military context, which enhanced operational effectiveness in a variety of ways. 

Civilian managerial expertise become particularly valuable as both the British and US Army adopt more a more civilian outlook. For instance, logistical operations now resemble those found in industry, with concepts such as “just in time stocks”. It is clear that the military struggles with such concepts, as demonstrated by the equipment shortfalls during Operation Telic One, and require a civilian input to facilitate their smooth implementation. The experience brought by reservists who work for large companies is therefore invaluable.

Human resource management skills are another advantage in an increasingly civilianised military, often providing a fresh and more productive outlook on leadership than traditional military approaches. The primary research highlights this point, with a number of soldiers from both units commenting how they felt their management backgrounds allowed them to lead the soldiers under their command more effectively than regular counterparts. One example was a soldier from the infantry unit, who stated that whereas regular NCO’s tended to shout at their men and enforce discipline, he applied his management experience to discuss the issues with his team, and make sure any grievances were addressed. He continued by stating that in doing so, he believed he achieved better results on the ground.

            The primary research also highlighted a number of occasions where reservists use other transferable skills in their military roles. Most obvious were the civilian policeman in the military police unit, who stated that although policing in Iraq was a unique challenge, they were nevertheless able to step into the role with relative ease. Another soldier in the unit was an immigration officer, and remarked that his skills came in useful on a number of occasions while patrolling Iraq’s waterways.  

Perhaps the biggest asset of increasingly using reservists is that they can be used to sustain a niche in expensive, short supply skills. With the effects of downsizing and cost cutting, the British and US Army find it increasingly difficult to sustain adequate numbers of medical personnel, technical tradesman and soldiers in more specialist areas such as psychological operations and civil affairs. As a result the TA, USAR and NG prove extremely valuable in covering these shortfalls. 

            Although the British Army relies extensively on the TA to provide these capabilities, particularly with regards to medical services[45], the US Army is even more dependent on USAR and NG soldiers to overcome shortages. In 2002 reservists accounted for ninety seven per cent of its civil affairs forces and eighty two per cent of its public affairs forces. The reserves also contained eighty one per cent of its psychological operations forces, eighty five per cent of its medical personnel and sixty six per cent of its military police[46]. Heightened operational demands are likely to have caused these figures to rise over the last three years.  

            These forces prove particularly useful in supporting peace support operations. Thus, whilst reservists remain unable to deploy at short notice, and are therefore largely unsuitable for war fighting missions, it is clear that without their specialist skills, a large number of British and US Army operational commitments could not be fulfilled.

There is also the notion that reserve soldiers are generally more receptive to peacekeeping duties than their regular counterparts, who see war fighting missions as their primary role. Segal et al attributed this receptiveness to the “constabulary attitudes” of reserve soldiers, which tend to be more compatible with peacekeeping operations than the martial attitudes of regular soldiers[47].

As a result, it would appear that increasingly using the TA, USAR and NG could actually enhance operational effectiveness in certain circumstances. If used correctly, reservists can not only provide important skills to the regular British and US Army, but also free up regular soldiers to concentrate on what they do best; fighting wars.

Increasingly deploying reservists also gives them more experience, further enhancing the usability of the TA, USAR and NG, as it allows for the honing of specialist and military skills. In addition, although smaller, due to the ensuing recruitment and retention problems, the remaining pool of reservists unaffected by these issues is nevertheless more committed, demonstrated by their willingness to remain in service and be mobilised again. These reservists are what the British Army calls “serial mobilisers”[48], and are arguably far more useful than having large numbers of personnel who are unwilling to deploy, allowing for a dependable, yet flexible, niche of personnel. There is also evidence to suggest that some reservists are actually attracted by the prospect of using their skills in real life situations[49], suggesting that the numbers of serial mobilisers could rise with increasing opportunities to deploy.

The Social Consequences

            When turning to deal specifically with the social consequences arising from increasingly using reservists, it becomes clear that they also manifest in positive and negative effects, which have a range of ramifications for British and American society, and a number of further consequences for the British and US Army.

            With regards to the negative effects on society, the most apparent problem emerging from increasingly mobilising reservists is a more frequent removal of key workers from their posts in important social institutions. As discussed in the previous section, many reservists possess valuable specialist skills, which although prove a great asset to the British and US Army, are also in great demand in civilian life. Thus, although the total numbers of mobilised reservists may not appear high enough to make a large impact on social functions, the fact that certain specialist areas are disproportionately affected means that these functions can be significantly compromised. Increasingly relying on reservists to provide skill niches will only compromise these functions further still.

The overrepresentation of public sector workers in the reserves is a particular problem for both British and American society, although is undoubtedly more acute in America due to the US Army’s higher reliance on their skills. For instance, in Britain the National Health Service was severely affected by the extensive deployment of TAMS personnel during recent operations in Iraq. Many health trusts had substantial numbers of crucial workers mobilised, with some senior staff being called up twice in one year, and others having their tours unexpectedly lengthened[50].

Consequently, the efficiency of the service provided by these trusts was reduced, with one consultant orthopedic surgeon referring to waiting list failures as a prime example[51]. A survey of reservists deployed with 202(V) Field Hospital, one of the TAMS units used in Iraq, also found that seventy three per cent believed the NHS had lost vital skills as a result of the deployments[52].

            British and American industry also faces serious problems from loosing skilled personnel, especially when they are deployed at short notice. These problems are made worse by a failure to properly compensate employers for any ensuing financial loss, a particular source of contention between British business and the MOD[53]. Again, although affecting both British and American industry, the impact of loosing workers is felt hardest amongst American business owners. One assessment even goes so far as to suggest that the US economy has suffered from so many reservists being mobilised, attributing it as a factor in causing the total pay roll employment figures to fall by some three hundred and eight thousand in February 2003[54].

             There are, however, some positive effects on society, referring to the transferable skills reservists bring back from an operational tour. As previously mentioned, increasingly deploying reservists allows them to hone their specialist skills, and often allows them to gain additional skills along the way. For example, medical workers get the chance to improve their trauma management skills, and perfect surgical techniques in dealing with serious injuries.

            Reservists also gain more general transferable skills, such as increased confidence, a greater sense of responsibility and improved interpersonal skills. Some employers openly support their employees to be mobilised for this very reason, noting that, in military terms, they go as a private soldier and return a lance corporal as a result of their experiences[55]/span>. British Telecom is one such employer, which has almost ten times as many TA soldiers on its pay roll than any other company[56].  

            The primary research also supports the notion of these benefits, with a number of soldiers commenting on the skills they felt they gained from being deployed. In particular, the civilian policeman in the military police unit described how they felt more confident in their abilities, with most situations encountered in their civilian roles now {palling} into insignificance compared to those they faced in Iraq. Other soldiers commented how they felt more able to complete tasks which were once deemed difficult, or stressful, due to the confidence they had gained from successfully dealing with “life and death” incidents.

             When referring to the problems of recruitment for the TA, USAR and NG, discussed in the section concerning the negative operational consequences, an underlying social consequence emerged. It related to the postmodern notion of an increasing disparity between military and civilian attitudes, as a result of the cultural changes prevalent in wider society, such as the celebration of diversity rather than a belief in “the superiority of one way of life”[57].

            From examining this notion further, it is clear that if it holds true, the resulting social consequence has a number of further consequences for the British and US Army. More specifically, it reduces the ability of the TA, USAR and NG to fulfill the final task expected of them, that of providing a link between the respective armies and civilian populations. This is because the gap between military and civilian attitudes has arguably become so great, that it can no longer be breached by reservists. The problem gets worse as other social organisations, such as Youth Service Programs, gradually fill the void[58]. Increasingly using reservists, especially to support unpopular operations, is likely to only exacerbate the difficulties, as it further polarises public opinion and attitudes.



The findings and analysis found that a number of positive and negative operational and social consequences emerge from increasingly using the TA, USAR and NG to support operations. It is also found that substantial comparisons can indeed be drawn between British and US experiences, although some differences do emerge. The most apparent of these differences is that the effects of the consequences generally prove more acute for the US Army, and American society, due to a higher reliance on US reserve soldiers.

            The amplification of existing prevalent shortfalls in the reserves, most notably a training gap and recruitment and retention issues, encompass the negative operational consequences. As a result, the ability for reservists to deploy quickly is severely limited, making them unsuitable for certain operations, such as war fighting and spearhead missions. The ability to provide an adequate homeland contingency measure is also limited, with training and available manpower concentrating on supporting overseas operations.           

               However, it has been shown that reservists can, in some instances, perform extremely well, and that some positive operational consequences emerge from their increased use. These relate to reservists possessing valuable civilian skills, particularly in specialist areas, which compensate for deficits in the British and US Army. Increasingly using reservists therefore allows for a niche in expensive, short supply skills to be maintained, an advantage which is bolstered by the experience gained from being deployed more extensively. These skills are particularly useful in supporting peace support missions, meaning that although reservists may well prove unsuitable for some war fighting missions, they nevertheless still have a clear role to play.

With regards to the negative social consequences, the most apparent is an increased likelihood of removing key workers from their positions. British and American public sector services have suffered as a result, as has the industry of both countries, with small companies especially affected by the loss of skilled workers at short notice.  

            Despite these negative social consequences, their impact is limited by reservists bringing transferable skills back to civilian life after serving on operations. These skills often prove extremely beneficial to services and employers, suggesting that increasingly deploying reservists could actually produce some benefits to society.

            Another social consequence is a widening disparity between military and civilian attitudes, heightened by mounting social unrest over operations in Iraq. A further negative consequence for the British and US Army subsequently emerges, with the TA, USAR and NG finding it extremely difficult to breach the gap, and therefore fulfill their task of providing a link between the army and civilian population.

                In conclusion the findings and analysis show that the TA, USAR and NG can provide much needed support to British and American operations. But if the demands placed on them increase, it is clear that unless the resulting problems are addressed, they will not be able to perform to the required standards. They will therefore cease to be a sustainable option, and operational effectiveness will suffer accordingly.

            If the British and US government want the reserves to be more than just a quick fix to an overstretched British and US Army, they need to invest in their development, make them more integrated with their regular counterparts and do more to smooth tensions with employers and families. This process is underway, but further legislative improvements must follow, in order to provide a sustainable, well trained and readily deployable TA, USAR and NG, capable of facing the challenges of the twenty first century.  




A. Giddens, Sociology, (Polity Press: 2001).

Journal Articles

S. N. Kirby, “The Impact of Deployment on the Retention of Military Reservists”, in

Armed Forces and Society, Vol.26, 2: 2002.

M. Morgan, “The Reconstruction of Culture, Citizenship, and Military Service”, in Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 29, 3: 2003.

D. Segal, B. Reed, D. Rohall, “Constabulary Attitudes of National Guard and Regular Soldiers in the US Army”, in Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 24, 4: 1998.

W. Walker, “Comparing Army Reserve Forces: A Tale of Multiple Ironies, Conflicting Realities, and More Certain Prospects”, in Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 18, 3: 1992.

Government Publications

General Sir Mike Jackson, Defence Select Committee Debate, 3 November 2004, from

Ministry of Defence website, www.mod.uk, accessed 10/12/04.

House of Commons Hansard Debates, 6 February 2002, from Ministry of Defence website, www.mod.uk, accessed 15/12/04.

J. St. Laurent, “Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges”, (United States General Accounting Office Study: 2004).

Memorandum from the RFCA to the Defence Select Committee, 20 November 2002, from Ministry of Defence Website, www.mod.uk, accessed 15/12/04.

1998 Strategic Defence Review, from Ministry of Defence Website, www.mod.uk, accessed 15/12/04.

Supporting Essay Three, MOD White Paper, December 2003, from Ministry of Defence website, accessed 10/01/05.

MA Theses

M. K. O’Hanion, “National Guard: Force Multiplier or Irrelevant Force?”, (United States Army Command and General Staff College: 2002)

S. M. Herron, “Mortgaging National Security: Will The Increased Use of the Reserve Components Impact The Ability to Mobilize For War In The Near Future?”, (United States Army Command and General Staff College: 2003).

J.S. Pritchett, “Operational Tempo and Army Reserve Unit Personnel Readiness”, (United States Army Command and General Staff College: 2003).

Media Articles

Author Unknown, “Horror Stories”, in Economist, Vol.366, 8315: 03/15/03.

Author Unknown, “Overstretched and Over There”, in Economist, Vol.369, 8344: 10/04/03.

D. Glick, “Changing of the Guard”, in Harper’s Magazine, Vol. 309, 1851:2003.

B. Graham, “General Says Army Reserve Is Becoming a Broken Force”, in the Washington Post, 06/01/05.

A. Russell, “Bonus Boost To Bring In New Guard”, in The Guardian, 18/12/04.

M. Smith, “Army’s Reservists Kept on in Iraq Fear for Their Jobs”, in The Daily Telegraph, 07/05/03

M. Smith, “TA Faces Revamp to Loose Dad’s Army Image”, in The Daily Telegraph, 30/08/04.

P. Stokes, “2, 200 TA Soldiers In Iraq Failed Gun Tests”, in The Daily Telegraph, 22/10/04.


British Army website, www.army.mod.uk

Ministry of Defence website, www.mod.uk

Notes and References

[1] House of Commons Hansard Debates, P2 - 18.
[2] British Army website.
[3] M. Smith, Daily Telegraph, 30/08/04.
[4] D. Glick, Harper’s Magazine.
[5] A. Giddens, P647 - 9.
[6] A. Giddens, P647 - 9.
[7] A. Giddens, P647 - 9.
[8] A. Giddens, P647 - 9.
[9] A. Giddens, P647 - 9
[10] 1998 Strategic Defence Review, P2.
[11] J. S. Pritchett, no page numbers on electronic copy.
[12] B. Graham, Washington Post.
[13] House of Commons Hansard Debates, P2 - 18.
[14] J. St. Laurent, P3 - 22.
[15] P. Stokes, Daily Telegraph.
[16] House of Commons Hansard Debates, P2 – 18.
[17] W. Walker, P3 -7.
[18] D. Glick, Harper’s Magazine.
[19] D. Glick, Harper’s Magazine.
[20] Defence Select Committee Sixth Report, P3 - 6.
[21] M. K. O’Hanion, no page numbers on electronic copy.             
[22] House of Commons Hansard Debates, P2 - 18.
[23] M. K. O’Hanion, no page numbers on electronic copy.

[24] Memorandum from the RFCA to the Defence Select Committee, P1-42.

[25] House of Commons Hansard Debates, P2 - 18.

[26]Memorandum from the RFCA to the Defence Select Committee, P1 - 42.

[27] B. Graham, Washington Post.

[28] M. Morgan, P373 – 391.

[29] J. S. Pritchett, no page numbers on electronic copy.

[30] M. Smith, Daily Telegraph, 29/05/03, and B. Graham, Washington Post.

[31] Memorandum from the RFCA to the Defence Select Committee, P1 - 42.

[32] Supporting Essay Three, MOD White Paper, no page numbers on electronic copy.

[33] Supporting Essay Three, MOD White Paper, no page numbers on electronic copy.

[34] Supporting Essay Three, MOD White Paper, no page numbers on electronic version.

[35] M. Smith, Daily Telegraph, 07/05/03.

[36] House of Commons Hansard Debates, P2 - 18  

[37] J. S. Pritchett, no page numbers on electronic copy.

[38] S. N. Kirby, P3 - 9

[39] Kocher and Thomas in S.N. Kirby, P3.

[40] Author Unknown, Economist, 10/04/03.

[41] House of Commons Hansard Debates, P2 - 18. 

[42] B. Graham, Washington Post.

[43] S. M. Herron, no page numbers on electronic copy.

[44] A. Russell, Guardian.

[45] M. Smith, Daily Telegraph, 07/05/03.

[46] M. K. O’Hanion, no page numbers on electronic copy.

[47] D. Segal et al, no page numbers on electronic copy.

[48] House of Commons Hansard Debates, P2 – 18. 

[49] S. N. Kirby, P 3 - 9.

[50] M. Smith, Daily Telegraph, 07/05/03.

[51] M. Smith, Daily Telegraph, 07/05/03.

[52] M. Smith, Daily Telegraph, 07/05/03.

[53] Supporting Essay Three, MOD White Paper, no page numbers on electronic copy.

[54] Author unknown, Economist, 03/15/03.

[55] General Sir Mike Jackson, Defence Select Committee debate, P3.

[56] Memorandum from the RFCA to the Defence Select Committee, P1 - 42.

[57] M. Morgan, P373 – 391.

[58] M. Morgan, P373 – 391.

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