Notes on: Reay, D. Race and Elite Universities in the UK. In H Mercer and J Arday (Ed's) (2018) Dismantling Race in Higher Education, chapter 3. London: Palgrave Macmillan Dave Harris It is necessary to look at the whole meritocratic ideal embraced by Oxbridge and other elite universities and how this leads to a reproduction of the existing order, via the work of Bourdieu. Meritocracy was a term introduced satirically by Michael Young referring to the idea that the best person will win the best jobs and this has been a cornerstone of liberal and social democratic policy toward schools, despite its dangers. Equal opportunities to compete justifies any resulting inequalities. In reality, it can become 'a powerful mechanism of legitimation of social exclusion and exclusion' (48) because the benefits of a privileged class background are misrecognised and taken for the results of individual effort and ability. This way elitism is reproduced. In Bourdieu's terms [eg Bourdieu and Passeron] , academic cultural and social capital is reproduced and expanded in elite universities. Bourdieu explains all this in meticulous detail [my favourite piece is Bourdieu et al] The majority of students are first excluded from the most elite universities and the 'experiences, dispositions and talents of the elite classes' are indirectly rewarded (48). Elite post secondary institutions begin this process of the accumulation of 'several forms of symbolic capital' (49), after selection based on initial cultural and social capital. There is also a role for '"potential symbolic capital (exceptional jobs, famous works, et cetera)'" available to elite classmates [citing Bourdieu 1996). Oxbridge conveys further presumed qualities of membership of high status groups, 'range of positive designations — similar to the bestowal of titles of nobility… and links to the symbolic resource of other  classmates'. They share in the presumed qualities of the most prestigious members of Oxbridge. The whole thing is highly selective and focused on acquiring academic capital and the result is '"forced in somewhat immature minds that… Understand everything luminously and yet understand absolutely nothing"' [citing Bourdieu 1996] Oxbridge and other elite London universities show these 'powerful reproductive effects' (50 — their students reveal 'highbrow cultural capital, strong social capital' reflecting 'very high levels of household income, savings and house prices'). Oxbridge prefers '"legacy" applicants, or students with a parent or close family member who graduated from the university', meaning that these students are 'predominantly white and affluent, but… [Often with)… Lower levels of preuniversity achievement relative to other students with middle-class parents' (51) [although this is based on US studies]. Legacy students are common in Oxbridge according to an earlier study, evoking 'images of elite conveyor belts, rather than considered rational choice… Seamless reproduction at play but the players are all white and upper-class'. Despite this meritocratic police are still,, even dominant, and 'nearly all' Oxford students felt they were there because of their effort and ability, in a recent survey (52). The percentage of disadvantaged students has actually fallen over the last five years, despite pressure to widen their access. The implications are normally discussed in terms of social class, but there are implications for race as well. Admission rates of BME students through UK HEI's have increased, but unevenly. 25% go to 30 post-1992 universities, particularly London Metropolitan University and there is a 'stark ethnic deficit in access to Oxbridge' (52). Data from 2009 so that there is a success rate of 2.9% for admission in contrast to 27.6% for white applicants. In 2013, the white success rate for Oxford applications was 25.4%, Bangladeshi students 6.7, Pakistani students 6.5, Black Caribbean 14.3, Black African 13% (53), with Cambridge 'doing only slightly better'. This discrepancy remains 'even after entry qualifications have been taken into account, and the 2014 data shows variable success rates — some BME groups have improved, others have worsened. In absolute terms, only to Black Caribbean students started a degree at Cambridge, while all black undergraduates amounted to 35, only 26 a year at Oxford [interestingly, there seems to be no particular gender differential for Black Caribbean, although there might be for other groups — see the table on page 54]. 2017 data show 'even more shocking racial disparities in Oxbridge admissions:only '1.5% of all offers from the two universities to UK A-level students went to Black British candidates. Nearly one in three Oxford colleges failed to admit a single black British A-level student in 2015' (55). Even when they do get admitted, BME students face further problems. One student cited by Reay experienced considerable culture shock on his visit, and turned down an offer from Cambridge. A black working class student experience considerable anxiety over the choice, wanting to go to a 'good university' but not wanting to 'stick out like a sore thumb' (56). Both class and ethnic factors are involved here, as with school choice. Some universities apparently had particular racist reputations among black candidates. However, as is common with Whiteness, this has been rarely problematised and not openly discussed. Whiteness as invisible means that white people can ['innocently'] collude in discrimination [and continue to believe in meritocracy]. One of Reay's later studies conducted at Cambridge found nine working class students describing the University as a '"White middle-class bubble"' and 'many of the same feelings and attitudes' behind decisions among BME working class students not to choose Oxbridge (57). NUS research shows that racism is still commonly experienced by ethnic minority students. There are additional challenges for Black students and some have been chronicled on special websites [see page 57]. There are reports of racial abuse, being mistaken for tourists, having hair touched and being complimented on their English [a classic microaggression for Sue et al.]. There is also evidence for a negative impact in terms of final results, and a correlation with results and fears about not fitting in, and also not having enough money — so of those who received no money from their parents 45% tended to get firsts or upper seconds, compared to 75% of those who did receive money. The same results are found with those undertaking paid vacation work. The overall result is to polarise the university system which further distorts University choice [it is not clear how ethnic background intersects with poverty exactly here — Reay says that 'we see class compounding race' (59), but there may be exceptions — see  Vincent et al. on the strategies used by Black middle class parents in school choice. See also a limited study on successful Black students by Wright et al.]. It seems that BME background students are disproportionately from the poorest backgrounds, and are likely to be further disadvantaged by axing student personal maintenance grants. Reay cites Dumangane 2015 [I also have notes on his thesis] studying 17 black male students attending Russell group universities, including four at Oxbridge. The Oxbridge students in particular were surprised and puzzled about 'their White peers' attitudes and perceptions' including [classic microaggressions] querying where a Black driver got the car from, or assuming that black males could only take dates to KFC, or, being expected to be likely to stab people. Ignorance rather than racism was seen as the cause of these perceptions. In the case of tutors, relationships were more distant and cautious. Together, these matters 'contribute to a sense of being an outsider despite their efforts to fit in' (60). As Reay has argued before, widening access, and increasing diversity has only produced '"a segregated and increasingly polarised system"' (Reay 2017). We need to re-examine what 'the best' now means in the HE context. We need to problematise whiteness and see elite HE 'as a space of white hegemony' (61). Beneath meritocratic appearances, the white English upper classes benefit most, and Oxbridge in particular accentuates elitism and a sense of superiority, while marginalising Black students. US universities have managed to do something different. The University of California, for example has 'one of the most racially, ethnically and socio-economically diverse student populations' as a matter of deliberate policy, and the UK should do the same. Berkeley's 'low income and BME students do just as well, if not better, than their wealthy white counterparts'. [Reay is suggesting that if Oxbridge were to become more representative, it would be less alienating and BME students will feel less like outsiders — that still leaves the curriculum, however]. Another suggestion is to base admissions on random selection from a pool of well-qualified students, which is apparently 'similar to the one used in Dutch medical schools' (62). The 'more radical approach' involves a notion of a 'comprehensive or common University', based on the same sort of arguments in favour of comprehensive schools, involving redistributing funds to ensure equality, and 'abolishing selection criteria' [the UK Open University has always claimed to be able to teach students without conventional admissions criteria, but only with a particularly rationalised teaching system — see Harris 1987]. What is not in doubt is that meritocracy does not work because choice still reflects resources, social power and networks of parents. Meritocracy remains as an ideology justifying elitism. What is required is 'just and impartial solutions rather than yet more bland rhetoric about meritocracy' (63).